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SOCIAL PROGRESS

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June, 1928

The Century Social Science Series

SOCIAL PROGRESS

A Theoretical Survey and Analysis

BY

JOYCE O. HERTZLER, PH.D.

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278

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TO MY CHILDREN,
BETTY MAY AND ROBERT LINCOLN
"HOPE—AND A RENOVATION WITHOUT END"

"New times demand new measures and new men;
The world advances, and in time outgrows
The laws that in our father's day were best;
And, doubtless, after us, some purer scheme
Will be shaped out by wiser men than we,
Made wiser by the steady growth of truth.
We cannot hale Utopia on by force;
But better, almost, be at work in sin,
Than in brute inaction browse and sleep.
No man is born into the world whose work
Is not born with him; there is always work,
And tools to work withal, for those who will;
And blessed are the horny hands of toil!

.

Ours is the harder task, yet not the less
Shall we receive the blessing for our toil
From the choice spirits of the aftertime.
My soul is not a palace of the past,
Where outworn creeds, like Rome's gray senate, quake,
Hearing afar the Vandal's trumpet hoarse,
That shakes old systems with a thunder-fit.
The time is ripe, and rotten-ripe, for change;
Then let it come: I have no dread of what
Is called for by the instinct of mankind;
Nor think I that God's world will fall apart
Because we tear a parchment more or less.
Truth is eternal, but her effluence,
With endless change, is fitted to the hour;
Her mirror is turned forward to reflect
The promise of the future, not the past.
He who would win the name of truly great
Must understand his own age and the next,
And make the present ready to fulfill
Its prophecy, and with the future merge
Gently and peacefully, as wave with wave.
The future works out great men's purposes;
The present is enough for common souls,
Who, never looking forward, are indeed
Mere clay, wherein the footprints of their age
Are petrified forever; better those
Who lead the blind old giant by the hand
From out the pathless desert where he gropes,
And set him onward in his darksome way.
I do not fear to follow out the truth,
Albeit along the precipice's edge.

.

My God! when I read o'er the bitter lives
Of men whose eager hearts were much too great
To beat beneath the cramped mode of the day,
And see them mocked at by the world they love,
Haggling with prejudice for pennyworths
Of that reform which their hard toil will make
The common birthright of the age to come,—
When I see this, spite my faith in God,
I marvel how their hearts bear up so long.
Nor could they but for this same prophecy,
This inward feeling of the glorious end."

—Extracts from James Russell Lowell's
"A Glance Behind the Curtain."

PREFACE

The social theorist is a realist in most respects. He is trying to discover the realities underlying various notions and forms; he wants realities wherever there are controversies, confused issues, perplexing situations, maladjustments; on the basis of present occurrences and trends he tries to foresee future realities. This study is such an adventure in realism. As a theoretical survey and analysis of social progress it deals, first, with the great social values and social ends that lie not only behind sociological thinking, but the thinking and activity of all the sciences, physical, biological, and social, and all other human endeavors that are worthwhile; and, secondly, with the various agents, processes, attitudes, techniques, institutions, situations, and other conditioning factors that thwart or advance the realization of these values and ends. Of necessity the scene will be painted in with broad strokes, universals will be dealt with as far as possible, and the reader will be left to fill in the details and make many of the applications. In no sense is this a discussion exclusively of certain pathological phases of social life that are usually treated in so-called "social betterment" literature or in books on social problems, nor is it concerned to any great extent with the subject matter of social reform movements. At best such discussions involve only a small sector of the progress problem. This study is frankly extensive rather than intensive; it tries to view and analyze progress in its full stature as a general, involved, and multifarious social process. The writer fully realizes that in this book lie the potentialities of a dozen volumes.

Believing that lack of thought is one of the most widespread obstacles to progress, the writer seeks to stimulate thought and raise questions concerning present conditions and trends in the different departments of life, suggest reasonable standards whereby these trends may be evaluated, and where possible offer certain sane and feasible ways of handling the present issues. The materials are intended to serve as suggestions, primers, or inciters that will lead to further analysis and constructive discussion along lines that seem to need consideration and treatment. They are presented frequently in a critical way and occasionally with a positive emphasis—even exaggeration—

that is intentional; for the conditions and situations they involve should strike the reader in the face, irritate him, and goad him to thought and action.

The spirit of the new age must not be one of reaction nor, still less, revolution, but one of reform and progress. Therefore it is hoped that this book may serve incidentally as an antidote to some of the pernicious Bourbon tendencies of the times, dispel certain current, deep-seated illusions, be a means of developing a positive scientific attitude toward change, and here and there encourage constructive efforts. An attempt is made to put first things first, and to see them in the light of social ends.

Wherever possible the writer gives credit to the thinkers whose thought he is weaving into his treatment. Occasionally, however, he is reflecting thought that has not been definitely expressed in writing, but is sensing attitudes, beliefs, and ideals as they play here and there among the saner progressives. Inevitably also many of the ideas here given cannot be attributed to their proper originators because, having been acquired through more or less unconscious exposure and absorption, they carry no property label. To such thinkers the writer expresses his deepest obligation though they are unknown to him. For all the other thought, for the special uses here made of all the ideas, for the general organization of materials, the interpretations, the conclusions, and the general spirit of the book the writer is alone responsible.

The inspiration which led to this volume was received more than ten years ago in a graduate seminary on this subject given by Professor Edward Alsworth Ross at the University of Wisconsin. In the preparation, continual encouragement and valuable criticism have also been received from Professor Ross, the editor of this series. For all this the writer acknowledges his deepest obligation and gratitude. He also hereby expresses thanks to those colleagues, students, and friends who have read, criticized, and discussed with him various portions of the manuscript. Greatest of all is his indebtedness to his wife for her constant and sustaining encouragement, her assistance with parts of the manuscript, her advice and criticism, and her freewill sacrifices of various kinds that have given him the time and opportunity and peace of mind that made this book possible.

J. O. HERTZLER.

The University of Nebraska.

CONTENTS

CHAPTER	PAGE
I. SOCIOLOGY AND SOCIAL PROGRESS	3
1. Origin of the Word	
2. Progress a Western Concept	
3. Factors Responsible for the Prevalence of the Progress Idea	
4. The Progress Idea Held by Various Types	
5. Diverse Nature of Progress Ideas	
6. Sociology, the Analytical and Coördinating Social Science	
7. Sociology, the Humanitarian Science	
8. Sociology, the Science of Social Progress	
9. Necessity of a Knowledge of Sociology for an Understanding of Progress	
II. THE HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF THE THEORY OF PROGRESS .	11
1. The Necessity of an Historical Review	
A. Before the Renaissance	
2. The Ideas of the Ancient Orient: Egypt, Persia, India, China	
3. The Idea of the Hebrews: the Prophets, the Apocalyptists, Jesus	
4. The Ideas of the Greeks and Romans: Hesiod, Thales, Anaximander, Anaximenes, Heraclitus, Empedocles, Aeschylus, The Pythagoreans, Plato, The Stoics, Seneca, Marcus Aurelius, the Epicureans, Lucretius	
5. The Progress Ideas of the Church Fathers and Medievalists; Roger Bacon	
B. The Fifteenth, Sixteenth, and Seventeenth Centuries	
6. The Events Inducing the Changes in Thought	
7. The Writers: Ibn Khaldun, Machiavelli, Copernicus, More, Rabelais, Bodin, Bruno, Francis Bacon, Campanella, Descartes, Fontenelle, Saint-Pierre, Vico	
III. THE HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF THE THEORY OF PROGRESS (CONTINUED)	39
C. The Eighteenth Century	
8. The French Thinkers: Montesquieu, Turgot, Voltaire, The Encyclopædists, Chastellux, Rousseau, Condorcet	
9. The English Thinkers: Hume, Smith, Gibbon, Godwin, Bentham, Malthus, Owen	
10. The German Thinkers: Leibnitz, Herder, Kant, Fichte, Hegel, Schnelling	
D. The Nineteenth Century	
Saint-Simon, Fourier, Comte	

CHAPTER	PAGE
11. The Significance of the Evolutionary Doctrine: Darwin, Spencer	
12. Ward and the Telic Idea	
E. Conclusion	
IV. THE PRESENT CONCEPT OF SOCIAL PROGRESS: BASIC PRINCIPLES .	68
1. Need of Defining the Progress Idea	
2. Change Is not Progress	
3. Evolution as such Is not Progress	
4. Evolution May Be Progressive or Regressive	
5. The Present-Day Concept	
6. Progress as Social Telesis	
7. The Vision of a Controlled World	
8. The Dangers of the Idea that Progress Is Automatic and a Matter of Law	
9. The Necessity of the Telic Point of View	
10. The Significance of the Goal in Progress	
11. The Source of Progress Ideals	
12. The Relative Nature of the Progress Goal	
V. THE PRESENT CONCEPT OF SOCIAL PROGRESS: CRITERIA AND OBJECTS	83
1. The Mistaken or Partial Tests	
a. The Materialistic Tests	
b. The Statistical Tests	
c. The Ideological Tests	
d. Happiness Is not the Goal of Progress	
e. The Adaptation Tests	
2. Consciousness of Social Shortcomings as an Evidence of Progress	
3. The Content of the Contemporary Goal: Progress as Self-fulfilment	
4. The Indispensable Supplement to the True Aim: Social Well-Being	
5. The Composite Nature of the Progress Tests in Practice	
6. The Necessity of Having Objective Tests	
7. The Determination of the Tests	
8. Some Suggestive Multiple Tests of Progress	
9. Conclusion	
VI. THE PRESENT CONCEPT OF SOCIAL PROGRESS: ATTITUDES AND PROCESSES	105
1. Progress and Mental Attitudes	
2. The Progressive Attitude and the Other Attitudes toward Change	
3. The Spirit of Progress	
4. The Resistance to Progress	
5. The Rate of Progress	
6. Progress Mainly a Problem of Control, especially Social Control	

CHAPTER		PAGE
7.	The Proportion of a Group Necessary to Inaugurate a Progressive Measure	
8.	The Conditions Favorable to Progress	
	a. A Time of Social Faith and Hopefulness	
	b. A Time of Social Idealism and Invention	
	c. A High Level of Intelligence and Will	
	d. A Plastic Social Structure	
	e. Wealth, Surplus Energy, and Leisure	
	f. A High Level of Ethical Attitudes	
9.	The Stages in a Particular Progressive Movement	
	a. Aggravation	
	b. Initiation	
	c. Discussion	
	d. Outlawry	
	e. Enforcement	
10.	The Course of Progress	
11.	Cautions to be Observed in Progress	
	a. Start with Things as They Are	
	b. The New Is not always Good nor Is the Old always Bad	
	c. Beware of Clamor and Noise	
	d. There Can Be no Progress without Emotion	
	e. The Social Control Exercised Must Not be Excessive or Repressive	
	f. The World of the Future Must Not Be Too highly Standardized or Regimented	
	g. We Must Beware of Pampering the Race	
	h. We Must Not Confuse Quantitative and Utilitarian with Qualitative Change	
	i. The Need of a Unified Attack on the Part of the Reformers	
VII.	PROGRESS IN THE PAST	132
	1. Purpose of the Quest	
	2. The Significance of the Standard	
	3. The Significance of the Time Element	
	4. Civilization and Progress	
	5. The Qualitative Nature of Social Change in Early Groups and Societies	
	6. Has Man Progressed Biologically?	
	7. Intellectual Progress vs. a Richer Social Heritage	
	8. The Case for Material Progress	
	9. The Question of Political Progress	
	10. Moral Progress in the Past	
	11. Conclusion	
VIII.	THE SHAPING OF HUMAN NATURE	157
	1. Human Nature and Progress	
	2. What is Human Nature?	
	3. Why Some Object to its Modification	
	4. The Nature of Instinct	

CHAPTER	PAGE
5. The Shaping of Instinctive Behavior	
6. Self as a Shaped Product	
7. The Group Environment as a Modelling Force	
8. The Plasticity of Human Nature	
9. Progress as a Manipulation of the Shaping Agencies	
IX. THE AGENTS OF PROGRESS: INTELLECT AND KNOWLEDGE . . .	176
1. Intellect as Distinguished from the Other Human Psychological Reactions	
2. The Intellect as a Social Factor	
3. The Theory of the "Idea-Forces"	
4. Social Progress as Intellectual Achievement	
5. The Waste and Neglect of Intelligence	
6. The Need of Exercising Intelligence	
7. The Importance of Having the Best Conditions for Thought	
8. The Nature of Knowledge	
9. The Significance of Knowledge	
10. Knowledge and Progress	
11. History as Knowledge for Progressive Purposes	
12. Social Science as Knowledge for Progressive Purposes	
13. Man's Fear of Knowledge	
14. Diffusion and Wide Use of Knowledge	
X. THE AGENTS OF PROGRESS: SCIENCE AND INVENTION . . .	191
1. What is Science?	
2. Science and Research	
3. Science and Invention	
4. The Relativity of Scientific Truth	
5. The Spirit of Science	
6. The Contributions of Science and Invention to Progress	
7. The Liberalism of the Scientific Point of View	
8. The Stumbling Blocks in the Way of Science	
9. Science as a Progress Agent	
10. Social Science as a Factor in Progress	
11. Science and the Future	
12. The Moral Responsibility for the Uses of Science	
XI. THE AGENTS OF PROGRESS: EXCEPTIONAL INDIVIDUALS . . .	219
1. The Significance of Exceptional Men in History	
2. Who and What are Exceptional Men?	
3. Exceptional Men as Agents of Progress	
4. Leadership	
5. The Proportionate Number of Exceptional Men	
6. To What Do We Owe Exceptional Men?	
7. The Relation of Exceptional Men to Their Age	
8. The Social Idealists	
9. The Repudiation of Exceptional Men by Their Contemporaries	
10. The Production and Conservation of Exceptional Men	

CONTENTS

xv

CHAPTER

XII. THE AGENTS OF PROGRESS: IDEALS AND PROGRAMS 234

1. The Nature of Ideals
2. Ideals and Values
3. Ideals as Goals and Standards
4. Ideals as Control Forces
5. The Process of the Realization of Ideals
6. Ideals and Progress
7. The Changeableness of Ideals
8. The Vicissitudes of Ideals
9. The Advisability of Not Pitching the Present Statement
of Ideals Too High
10. The Importance of a Program

XIII. THE AGENTS OF PROGRESS: PUBLIC OPINION 245

1. What is Public Opinion?
2. The Content and Formation of Public Opinion
3. Public Opinion not Necessarily Majority Opinion
4. The Part of Suggestion in Public Opinion
5. Propaganda and Public Opinion
6. The Characteristics of Public Opinion To-Day
7. Conditions Necessary for the Formation of Sound Public
Opinion
8. The Nature of the Influential Agents of Public Opinion
9. The Newspaper as an Agent
 - a. The Importance of the Newspaper
 - b. The Suggestive Power of the Newspaper
 - c. General Condition of the Newspaper Press
 - (1) Distortion, coloring, exaggeration, and suppression
of news
 - (2) Propaganda
 - (3) Sensationalism, muck, and sports
 - (4) Syndicated and standardized news and editorials
 - (5) Concentration of ownership
 - d. Outstanding Reasons for These Conditions
 - (1) The Newspaper is a profit-making business
 - (2) Many newspapers are consciously or unconsciously
instruments of control in the hands of large-
propertied classes
 - e. The Newspaper and the Future
10. Public Opinion and Progress

XIV. THE AGENTS OF PROGRESS: EDUCATION 269

1. Education as a Basis for the Operation of the Other
Agents of Progress
2. Education as the Master Agent of Progress
3. The Progressive Function of Education
 - a. Provide an Education That Will Actually "Lead Out"
 - b. Instil a Progressive Philosophy of Life
 - c. Diffuse More Widely the Social Heritage

CHAPTER

PAGE

d. Produce a Better Selection and Utilization of Special Ability	
e. Provide a Balanced Curriculum	
f. Teach the Social Subjects	
g. Develop Mental Alertness and Flexibility	
h. Undertake to Train Character	
4. The Teacher and Progress	
5. Educational Economics	
6. The Mistaken Cry of "Learn to Earn"	
7. Education for Leisure in an Industrial Age	
8. Educational Freedom	
9. The Demand for a Uniform Nation-wide System	
10. The Agents of Progress: a Conclusion	
 XV. THE ENVIRONMENTAL ASPECTS OF PROGRESS	293
1. The Relation of Environment to Progress	
2. The Concept "Environment" as Analyzed by Bernard	
a. Physical Environments	
b. Biological or Organic Environment	
c. Social Environments	
d. Composite or Institutionalized Derivative Control Environments	
3. The Physical Environment as a Conditioner of Progress	
4. The Social Environment as Conditioner	
5. The Social Environment as an Eliciting or Repressing Force	
6. Environment and Achievement	
7. The Control of Environment	
 XVI. PROGRESS AND THE BIOLOGICAL NATURE AND QUALITY OF HUMAN BEINGS	312
1. Significance for Progress of a Biological Study of Man	
2. Degeneracy and Progress	
3. The Qualitative Trend of the Population	
a. The Draft Showing	
b. Types of Degeneracy	
c. Tinkering with Evolution	
d. War as a Dysgenic Force	
e. The Survival Differential	
f. Immigration	
g. Congenital Weaknesses	
4. Eugenics as a Progress Agent	
a. Importance of Biological Control	
b. The Nature of Eugenics	
c. Cautions	
d. Negative Eugenics	
(1) Stricter marriage laws	
(2) Birth-control	
(3) Sterilization	
(4) Segregation	

CONTENTS

CHAPTER

PAGE

e. Positive Eugenics

- (1) Modify the standard of living
- (2) Change class sentiment
- (3) Eugenic education
- (4) Economic agents
- (5) Abolition of certain forms of celibacy

5. Euthenics

6. The Unavoidable Task

XVII. PROGRESS AND THE QUANTITY OF THE POPULATION 339

1. The Problem of Numbers

2. The Trend of Numbers

3. The Ratio of the Birth-Rate to the Death-Rate

a. The Birth-Rate

- (1) Economic factors
- (2) Social democracy
- (3) Social legislation
- (4) Education and enlightenment
- (5) Changing attitude toward women
- (6) Venereal diseases
- (7) Female sterility
- (8) Urbanization
- (9) Lower death-rate and greater expectation of life

10. Birth-Control

b. The Death-Rate

- (1) Modern medical science
- (2) Reduced infant mortality
- (3) Public safety measures
- (4) Improved economic conditions

c. The Continued Accelerated Increase of Numbers

4. The Trend of Resources

5. Striking the Balance

6. Some Social Aspects of a Population Excess

a. Material Welfare

b. The Standard of Living

c. Infant Mortality

d. National Vitality

e. Social Morals and Ideals

f. Educational Standards

g. Status of Women

7. International Aspects of Population Increase

a. General Aspects

b. Emigration and Immigration

c. War

8. Progress and Population

9. The Contemporary Significance of Birth-Control

XVIII. THE POLITICAL AND LEGAL REQUISITES OF PROGRESS 3

1. The Function of the Modern State and Government

2. The Nature of Democracy

CHAPTER

PAGE

3.	The Essentials of Efficient Democracy	
a.	A Population of High Quality	
b.	Unimpaired Discussion	
c.	Equality of Opportunity	
d.	Legal Equality	
e.	Rational Humanitarianism	
4.	The Obstacles to the Proper Functioning of Democracy	
a.	The Tendency to Mediocrity	
b.	Complexity of Life and Divergence of Interest	
c.	Politics and Politicians	
d.	Plutocracy	
5.	Democracy and Progress	
a.	A Flexible Constitution	
b.	Unavoidable Federalism	
c.	The Growing Indispensability of the Responsible Expert Official	
6.	Democracy and the Future	
7.	Legal Aspects	
a.	The Law and Progress	
b.	The Legal Profession and Progress	
8.	The International Democratic Trend	
XIX.	THE ECONOMIC ASPECTS OF PROGRESS	403
1.	The Essential Function of Economic Activity	
2.	The Basic Nature of Economic Achievement for Progress	
3.	The Materialization of Contemporary Life	
4.	Wealth without Well-Being	
5.	The Redistribution of Wealth	
6.	The Increase of Wealth	
a.	The Reduction of Waste	
b.	Thrift, Saving, and Investment	
7.	Leisure and Progress	
8.	Work and Progress	
9.	The Necessity of Industrial Democracy	
10.	The Human Costs of Industry	
11.	The Necessity of Socializing Business	
12.	The Economic Future	
XX.	THE DOMESTIC AND SEXUAL ASPECTS OF PROGRESS	435
1.	The Significance of the Family in Continuous Progress	
2.	The Family as a Means of Expression	
3.	The Emancipation of Women	
4.	Changing Marriage	
5.	The Changing Family	
6.	Changing Parenthood	
7.	Divorce, a Symptom of Maladjustment	
8.	The Progressive Attitude toward Sex	
a.	The Importance of Sex	
b.	Sex and Expression	
c.	Sex Stimulation	

- d. Sex Morality
- e. Sex Education
- 9. Voluntary Parenthood

XXI. THE RACIAL ASPECTS OF PROGRESS 461

- 1. Racial Contacts and Racial Unrest
- 2. The Nature of Race
- 3. Race Prejudice
- 4. Superiority and Inferiority of Races
- 5. Racial Self-Expression
- 6. Progressive Racial Policies and Attitudes

XXII. THE RELATION OF REVOLUTION AND WAR TO PROGRESS . . . 478

- 1. The Significance of Revolution and War in a Study of Progress
- 2. The Nature and Cause of Revolution
- 3. The Costs of Revolution
- 4. The Avoidance of Revolution by a Telic Policy
- 5. The Problem of War
- 6. War as a Progress Factor in the Past
- 7. The Causes of Modern War
- 8. Is War a Progressive Factor in the Present?
 - a. The Economic and Material Costs
 - b. The Biological Costs
 - c. The Political Costs
 - d. The Intellectual and Cultural Costs
 - e. The Moral and Spiritual Costs
 - f. The Next War
 - g. Conclusion
- 9. The Avoidance of War
 - a. The Adjustment of the Economic Causes
 - b. Demilitarization
 - c. Outlawry and Law
 - d. A League of Nations

XXIII. THE ETHICAL REQUISITES OF PROGRESS 504

- 1. The Nature and Significance of Morality
- 2. Progress and the Contemporary Ethical Needs
- 3. The New Ethics
 - a. It is Relative
 - b. It is Scientific
 - c. It is Objective
 - d. It is Socialized
- 4. The Relation of Good Conduct to Environment
- 5. Progress and Moral Inculcation
- 6. Cautions for the Progressive Moralist
 - a. The Morals Inculcated Must not Be Ascetic
 - b. The Morals Must Be Unselfish
 - c. Moral Advance Must not Be Superficial or too Rapid

viii

- d. The Morals Should Be Positive in Emphasis rather than Negative
- e. Benevolence Should not Be Omitted
- 7. The Ethical Future

XXIV. THE ESTHETIC REQUISITES OF PROGRESS 520

- 1. Progress and Beauty
- 2. Art and its Social Function
- 3. The Scandal of Present-Day Ugliness and the Lack of Esthetic Appreciation
- 4. Esthetic Needs
- 5. Hopes for Esthetic Progress

XXV. THE RELIGIOUS ASPECTS OF PROGRESS 531

- 1. The Nature of Religion
- 2. Religion at its Best and its Relation to Progress
- 3. Socialized Living as Concrete Religion
- 4. The Problems Presented by Organized Religion from the Progressive Point of View
 - a. Anachronism and Resistance to Necessary Adjustments
 - b. Excessive Rigidity of Dogmas, Creeds, and Theologies
 - c. The Attitude toward Sacred Books
 - d. Fatalistic and Deterministic Tendencies
 - e. Anti-Rationalism
 - f. Institutionalization
 - g. Thwarting Antagonisms
 - h. The Hiatus between Religion and Life
- 5. Science and Religion
- 6. The Religious Revolution in the Upper Reaches of Western Thought

XXVI. PROSPECT 550

- 1. The Nature of a Final Review
- 2. The Existing Obstacles to Progress
 - a. The Course of Progress is Uncharted
 - b. Beliefs, Passions, Prejudices, and Unprogressive Attitudes Largely Prevail
 - c. The Rigid Adherence to Tradition and Conformity
 - d. The Lag of Thought Habits and the Lethargy of the Masses
 - e. The Fear of Change and Chance
 - f. The Resistance of the Vested Interests
 - g. Institutionalization
 - h. The Lack of the "Facility of Association"
- 3. The Costs of Progress
 - a. Increasing Dissatisfaction and Unrest
 - b. An Increase in Recognized Social Evils
 - c. Frequent Reactions against the Progressive Movement because of Cranks and Panaceas

CONTENTS

xxi

CHAPTER

PAGE

- d. Progress is Accompanied by a certain Amount of Suffering and even Extermination
- e. Successful Living Will Be More and More of a Strain
- f. Progress Is Accompanied by a Certain Amount of Limitation of Personal Freedom
- g. Derangements of all Kinds, Temporarily at Least, Must be Expected
- h. A Certain Amount of Desertion from the Cause of Progress Must Be Expected
- 4. The Necessity of Careful Strategy
- 5. The Necessity of all Progressive Effort becoming a Multiple Movement International in Scope
- 6. The Possibility of Progress

INDEX 575

SOCIAL PROGRESS

SOCIAL PROGRESS

CHAPTER I

SOCIOLOGY AND SOCIAL PROGRESS

I. ORIGIN OF THE WORD

THE word *progress* we owe to the Romans. It is derived from the Latin *progredior*, and means "a going-forward," "an advance." It was first used, as far as we know, in the first century B. C., by the philosopher and poet Lucretius in the fifth book of his *De Rerum Natura* in connection with his description of the gradual amelioration of man's condition by his discovery of fire, the use of metals, the invention of language, and the building of towns. From that time on the term has come into increasing use.

2. PROGRESS A WESTERN CONCEPT

The concept of progress, however, does not have universal currency; it is mainly a Western concept. The Orient has given it little or no thought, though in recent years some notable exceptions have developed. An English lady in India was advising her punkah-puller to try to improve his position and make some advance in life. When he had at last succeeded in grasping her meaning he replied, "Memsahib, my father pulled a punkah, my grandfather pulled a punkah, all my ancestors for four million ages pulled punkahs, and before that the god who founded our caste pulled a punkah over Vishnu."¹ For the great mass of Orientals that which has been is that which shall be, and there is no new thing under the sun. Unchanging status is the ideal; hope and ambition have no place whatever. The mind that can look back with satisfaction four million ages and more and see no change in this succession of periods, nor want any, does not care for the progress idea; in fact, can only with difficulty comprehend it. As we look through

¹Told by R. H. Murray, "The Idea of Progress," *Quarterly Review*, Vol. 234, p. 100.

the pages of Oriental history, or examine the philosophy and modes of thought of Oriental peoples, we find that progress, as the Occidental world thinks of it, is unknown, discounted, or emphatically denied.

But among Western peoples, on the other hand, the idea of progress dominates all others. In our popular parlance we measure all things and events in terms of progress. It is a characteristic expression, if not *the* characteristic expression of the modern mind.² Dean W. R. Inge says,³ "The belief in Progress, not as an ideal, but as an indisputable fact, not as a task for humanity, but a law of nature, has been the working faith of the West for about a hundred and fifty years." We Americans, in fact, are so accustomed to the idea of social progress, and so familiar with progressive ideals and concepts, progressive factors, and progressive movements, that we assume that progress is general and in the nature of things. Among most of us almost anything will receive a hearing if it be declared progressive, while the unendurable insult is the charge that we are unprogressive. Somehow and somewhere we are progressing. In fact, progress is our fundamental stereotype. "The country village will become the great metropolis, the modest building a skyscraper, what is small shall be big; what is slow shall be fast; what is poor shall be rich; what is few shall be many; whatever is shall be more so."⁴ We have made the term one of our favorite fetishes. Of all modern beliefs the belief in progress is perhaps the one which has come nearest to the strength of a religion.

3. FACTORS RESPONSIBLE FOR THE PREVALENCE OF THE PROGRESS IDEA

The exceedingly rapid changes in western Europe and in America during the last century and a half are largely responsible for this present point of view. The astonishing development of industrial technique, the increased wealth production, the spread of democratic ideals and institutions, the opening up of new countries, the acceleration of travel and communication of all kinds, the stupendous discoveries of science, particularly in the field of medicine and engineering, the rise of the social sciences and their applications, and a hundred other factors have given us moderns an exhilarating sense of expansion, liberation, and growing power. These assurances have been powerfully fortified by doctrines of evolution, now widely accepted and popular in many

² A. G. A. Balz, *The Basis of Social Theory*, p. xi.

³ "Idea of Progress," *Outspoken Essays, Second Series*, p. 158.

⁴ W. Lippmann, *Public Opinion*, p. 108. See also A. M. Tozzer, *Social Origins and Social Continuities*, p. 32.

departments of life. These developments have combined to popularize the mistaken idea of a world perpetually and universally progressing.

4. THE PROGRESS IDEA HELD BY VARIOUS TYPES

At one social extreme there are religious persons with whom to doubt progress is a sacrilege because it is to doubt the wisdom of an overruling Providence.⁵ In distinction to these the socialists in the midst of their bitterest denunciations of existing society still manage somehow to retain intact their faith that good is to be the outcome of evil. Just as the orthodox religious believer looks forward to emerging from a life of sin and suffering into the bliss of salvation, so does the socialist's faith sustain him in the expectation that somehow oppression, injustice, waste, and strife are to issue ere long in a world of brotherly love. All the broader cultural movements of to-day, such as literature, music, and art, are more or less influenced by the progressive idea, however much they may differ amongst themselves as to the means by which it is to be attained. The various commercial groups and most of the scientific groups have some notion of progress which affects their thought and action. Occasional scholars make it the keynote of their writings.

5. DIVERSE NATURE OF PROGRESS IDEAS

For most of us, either as individuals, or as members of groups, the attainment of what we want most along our line is progress. This, Anatole France says, is due to the fact that we believe only that which flatters our hopes. Progress is a term which we tend to apply to any process of which we approve the result. But with such a diversity of wants and dislikes due to differences of class, training, social position, occupation, or profession, there is slight agreement of opinion. Personal attitudes and influences of environment almost inevitably warp the judgment. The various bodies of thought, such as ethics, religion, economics, political science, and the various natural sciences, are at loggerheads with each other. Even in our reforms we have been taking into account only certain needs for, or methods of, improvement. Conse-

⁵ On the other hand, there have been religious people, and there are doubtless still some, who repudiate any idea of progress. For them the good life comes after death. Social progress is of Satan. Whatever threatens the *status quo* is essentially sinful. God has designed things to be just as they are, and it lies not in man's province to question them. The reformer is a menace to salvation. But to-day the religious thought is probably overwhelmingly progressive.

vice, and human discord, and the building up of achievement and satisfaction for mankind. Above all, it seeks to produce a social world that will enable the individual to come to his fullest fruition.

8. SOCIOLOGY, THE SCIENCE OF SOCIAL PROGRESS

To-day the sociologist, no less enthusiastic or idealistic than his contemporaries, but much less mystical and imaginary, and much more scientific in his outlook, makes the idea of social progress a fundamental part of his thought. Sociology is for him a study of social purpose and an experiment in directing it. This participation of sociology in questions of social progress has been true from the beginning. Professor Harry E. Barnes says: "Throughout its history sociology has been associated with the elaboration of theories of social progress. In fact some of the most important figures in the creation of sociology as a distinct science were also those who have been most notable as founders of modern conceptions of progress." Auguste Comte, sociology's founder, sought to make it a science that might work out the laws of social order and progress and thus become a guide in the movement for social betterment; in fact, he insisted that all the work of sociology necessarily leads up to a scientific theory of progress. So the idea of progress, which presided at sociology's birth, has been its lodestar ever since.

Most sociologists have taken this task very seriously; each in his own way has attempted to formulate such a theory and float it. This has been due to several causes. The sociologists have recognized that no other science is in a position to develop a scientific theory of social progress if sociology fails to do so, for progress is such an immensely diverse and complex problem that no other social science even tries to view it in its entirety. Second, sociology is not merely a dignified academic examination of the "origin, growth, structure, and activities of society;" it has to have a purpose also. Its only justification, in the last analysis, as a science of society, is its contributions to a workable theory of progress. It must yield information concerning the nature, development, and functioning of society as a whole as a background, and then provide some sort of a workable, though of necessity temporary, theory of human and social ends, and techniques that will enable us to achieve those ends. If it does not do this it is an abortive affair, an upstart science, not fit to take its place among the living sciences vitally related to human life and destiny.*

* Hobhouse, *op. cit.*, p. 11.

Sociology is interested in the principal causes and conditions of social development, a knowledge of social processes, the relations of cause and effect among group phenomena, the march of social thought and events, the origin, development, and modification of institutions, and the problems and forms of social control, *solely* that these may throw light on the problems and tasks of social improvement and welfare; and that it may formulate the scientific policies and methods for moulding the society of the future along right lines. "It is the main business of sociology to furnish to ethics and to the applied social sciences, to moralists, reformers, statesmen, and social workers of every sort a scientific theory of progress."¹⁰

What this all amounts to is that sociology has in mind a better world for the sake of better human beings. In this connection it wants to know what progress is, according to the best knowledge of the present, what its tests or criteria are, what regressive elements or obstacles stand in the way of its attainment along various lines, what positive efforts and agencies are under way or possible to-day.

9. THE NECESSITY OF A KNOWLEDGE OF SOCIOLOGY FOR AN UNDERSTANDING OF PROGRESS

A knowledge of sociology and the other social sciences is necessary in order to participate intelligently and effectively in social progress, for they provide the necessary scientific knowledge and the proper perspective. Wise efforts for social progress require an intimate, unprejudiced knowledge of the various social problems, the factors involved, the reasons for their existence, the possibilities of changes along right lines, and the nature of these changes. An acquaintance with sociology and its allied sciences assists markedly in this. Furthermore, one must have some conception of the sweep of social history and the laws of causation at work in it, some ability to appreciate the significance of present day events and tendencies and achievements, and some capacity to anticipate their logical results in the future, as well as some constructive idealism. Sociology, in a measure at least, stimulates these, and provides fairly sound, beneficent principles as a basis. Finally, sociology is one of the means by which social experimentation, which is fundamental if progress is to occur, becomes more intelligent.¹¹ More and more it provides both technique and personnel. No scheme of social reform can be directly and successfully carried into effect from blue-

¹⁰ C. A. Ellwood, *Sociology in Its Psychological Aspects*, p. 367.

¹¹ See C. H. Cooley, *Social Process*, pp. 402-404.

prints. Thus rational ideas of social progress and scientific efforts in producing it of necessity depend on sociology.

QUESTIONS AND PROBLEMS

1. Is there a universal concept of progress?
2. How do you account for the wide prevalence of the progress idea among Western peoples? Will the Orient accept it in time? Why?
3. Outline on paper your own idea of progress.
4. Describe the content of the progress ideas held by various groups in your community to-day, or those expressed in newspapers and magazines. Evaluate them.
5. What other sciences, in addition to sociology, are concerned with progress?
6. There are people who consider any discussion of progress futile. Comment.

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CHAPTER II

THE HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF THE THEORY OF PROGRESS

I. THE NECESSITY OF AN HISTORICAL REVIEW

THE idea of progress that we are to-day so familiar with, that so generally dominates the contemporary Western mind and that we so easily take for granted, is a wholly modern idea. As we contemplate it in proper perspective with the whole sweep of man's half a million years or more as a background, we note that even those of our so-called "ancients, who, back in early recorded history, first dimly and partially comprehended it, are our contemporaries." In its present form it was unknown and inconceivable before the sixteenth century. But in one form or another, there has existed, in all the ages of history, a persistent belief in some kind of progress, or its opposite; and it is entirely possible that this was true in pre-history.¹ Of course, what is now conceived of as progress has not always been progress, nor would anyone familiar with the history of thought expect it to be, for it is in the nature of things that change, working in a thousand ways, some obvious and others imperceptible, should bring about continual modification in the realm of thought as in all other phases of life. A study of the history of the idea of progress provides an indispensable background for the problem as we face it to-day. In order to discuss contemporary progress intelligently we must have some idea of what people have thought on the subject in the past, the conditions responsible for the presence of the different types of thought, and the changes and trends that have been and are discernible.

The historical treatment here given is in no sense exhaustive or profound. It is simply designed to give the reader in as brief a compass as possible a working knowledge of some of the more prominent progress ideas of history as a background for the succeeding analysis of the idea now current, and its implications.²

¹ Cf. Park and Burgess, *Introduction to the Science of Sociology*, p. 953.

² The first book, as far as we know, to trace exclusively the history of the idea of progress is the *Essai sur l'Histoire de l'Idée de Progrès jusqu'à la Fin du*

Search is being made for concepts of change, movement, development, appreciation of social ends and the means of attaining them, conceptions of ideal states, accelerated well-being, and so on. Anything which has to do with any of these is legitimate subject matter for our treatment. Since ideas come from individuals, and through them affect groups of men in different ages, we are confining ourselves in the main to the discussion of the thoughts on progress of specific individuals, key-men in the different periods. The reader must be forewarned, however, that he need not expect much unity in the ideas of progress as portrayed in any historical review.

A. BEFORE THE RENAISSANCE

2. THE IDEAS OF THE ANCIENT ORIENT

a. **Egypt.** In the ancient Orient, as in the modern, the idea of progress as we are familiar with it was unknown, or very inadequately appreciated. An anomalous phase of the Egyptian mind was that it shifted back and forth from a hedonistic enjoyment of the moment to serious contemplation of the future life. This future life seemed to be at some time after death in this world, as the sculptures, pyramids, and tomb inscriptions, and other evidences, testify. The spirit of the individual would come back and be reunited with the mummy or the copy of the departed one. Moreover, it was taught that in the next world the individual would be held accountable for his deeds in this life. This belief acted as a powerful agent for social control. Occasionally one finds in early Egyptian thought a beautiful idealism that hints at a progress conception. For example, about 2000 B. C. they have a prophet called Ipuwer, who not only passionately arraigned his times, but who also gave constructive and rather idealistic admonitions, which in marked contrast to the spirit of this age of back-look, point toward the regeneration of society and a golden age in the future. The sage looks for-

XVIII^{ème} Siècle, by Jules Delvaille, and published in 1910 by Alcan, Paris. This is, by all odds, the best, the most extensive, and most comprehensive treatment in any language, and is highly recommended. Robert Flint, in his *History of the Philosophy of History*, first published in 1894 by Scribners, discusses the ideas of progress mainly among the French, French Belgian, and Swiss thinkers, although he does touch on many others also. His treatment is very thorough, and until very recently was the best study in English. The treatment of progress is not, however, his sole endeavor in the book. The most recent comprehensive treatment, and the best in English, is *The Idea of Progress: an Inquiry into its Origin and Growth*, by the eminent English scholar, Professor J. B. Bury of Cambridge, and published by Macmillan, London, 1921. This is the best work available for the American reader.

ward to the restoration of the land, doubtless as a natural consequence of his admonitions to reform. He sees also the ideal righteous ruler for whose advent he longs. There is an element of hope that the advent of the good king is imminent and unmistakable. It is the vision of the possible redemption of society through a righteous king who is to shield his own and purge the earth of the wicked. This is Messianism nearly fifteen hundred years before its appearance among the Hebrews, and it is possible that it influenced the genesis of their conception.³

b. Persia. In early Persia Zoroaster pointed out that there will be ethical advance and better social conditions if men observe certain fundamental ethical requirements, such as speaking the truth, keeping one's promise, and keeping out of debt. For him the supreme admonition was hard work, for work was the destroyer of evil; it kept pure the earth, the air, the body, and the soul. The Ormazd religion gave expression to the hope that evil would not last forever; but it did so only fitfully and feebly, sometimes suggesting the opposite and never connecting with the hope of the final victory of goodness any doctrine of gradual progress.

c. India. In early India the thought of social progress could never possess the heart, for human existence was regarded as a mere stage in the course of transmigration. There was the dream of vast chronological cycles, each divisible into four epochs or yugas, which were the stages through which the universe and its inhabitants must pass from perfection to destruction, from strength and innocence to weakness and depravity until a new great cycle begins. It was held that the earliest yuga, said to have lasted 4800 years, was the most perfect, the age of truth and the omnipotence of the gods—a Golden Age in the distant past.⁴ Later on Gautama develops the idea that conduct results in "deed structures" in successive reincarnations, and that these finally lead to Nirvana—the highest happiness—but because of its mythical and metaphysical element it is difficult to identify this with the progress idea.

d. China. Back in the fourteenth century B. C. in China we already have the appearance of the idea of "tao" or "correct way," but it is a guide to conduct of the moment merely, and is highly metaphysical

³ "It is more than possible that the imagination of the literary prophets of the Hebrews was first touched by some knowledge of the Egyptian vision of the ideal age and the ideal king of the tractate of Ipuwer." J. H. Breasted, *Development of Religion and Thought in Ancient Egypt*, pp. 215-216.

⁴ For an expansion of this thought see Robert Flint, *History of the Philosophy of History*, p. 88 ff.

in nature. The prevailing thought is bound up with the Golden Age in the past, when good and wise emperors ruled, and the highest attainment is a reversion to the previous happy state. There is also the conception of great historic cycles through which society must inevitably pass through endless ages with alternating periods of better and worse.

3. THE IDEA OF THE HEBREWS⁵

In Genesis, it is true, we note the legends of the Fall of Man, and later the degeneration of Man and his destruction. But over against this we have the religion of Israel, which was of its very nature a religion of the future, a religion of hope. Expectation was its attitude; in all its parts it pointed forward beyond itself. Still there was no evidence of the ancient Jews having attained to a conscious apprehension of the idea of progress either of a universal or even a national nature, nor is there any distinct enunciation of the idea in the Old Testament.

a. The Prophets. The Messianic Hope is the nearest approach of the Hebrews to the progress idea. It is first found among the literary prophets, such as Amos, Hosea, Isaiah, Micah, Jeremiah, and Deutero-Isaiah. The prophets sought to prepare the people for residence in the ideal future state conceived in ethical and social terms. This ideal state came to center about the Messianic Hope—the hope for the Messiah or coming Deliverer, through whose instrumentality the glories of the future age were to be revealed.

It was the picture of a new perfect society that was to come about by a complete change both individually and nationally, in social relationships, as the result of a new social ethics based upon Jehovah's precepts.

To prepare themselves for residence in this perfect state, the people had to undergo an evolution, a change which was essentially moral in its nature, and which was attainable as the people permitted themselves to come into intimate relationship with Jehovah. This relationship was possible as the people adopted the theocratic law and consciously lived lives having the attributes which Jehovah demanded—righteousness, justice, holiness.

The prophets considered this participation in the good state to be realizable, not for the whole people, but for the "Remnant" or "Good Seed"—those who brought themselves into conformity with Jehovah's will. Even so, it was a broad, general conception, fitted to act as a stimulus to conduct, and a goal for achievement. The greatest weakness,

⁵ For an excellent discussion see Delvaille, *op. cit.*, pp. 5-29.

however, was that this idyllic state was the end, the epitome of the process; there was nothing beyond it.

b. The Apocalyptists. Mainly during the century immediately preceding the birth of Christ and the one following, there appears the Apocalyptic literature, in which remarkably naïve and transcendent perfect future states were pictured. These came at a time of upheaval and uncertainty, a time when earthly continuity as the result of human effort was thought to be fatuous. Hence they are miraculously inaugurated states in which the righteous were to be rewarded. Yet we must grant that in them one finds a universal scope, a sort of philosophy of history, which is new. They grasped the great idea of human history as a unity, as proceeding according to a rational plan and bound to issue in a worthy consummation. Only men were insignificant; it was all His unity, and His plan, and the consummation He desired. Therefore, they did not influence the efforts of social constructionists. The present rule of evil was divinely decreed, and the day of its end was set. Good men had nothing to do but to wait for the next move of the Almighty.

c. Jesus. Jesus took the idea of the Messianic State of the prophets and made it concrete. In his Kingdom of God he gave us a practicable and universally applicable plan of social and individual redemption. The prophets conceived of an earthly kingdom as a political organization inhabited by the select of Israel, governed by an idealized Davidic King, and permeated with the spirit of Jehovah. The future state of the apocalyptists was for some an earthly state, for others a supernatural commonwealth, but whether one or the other, it was to be miraculously and catastrophically instituted by Divine intervention in our earthly affairs. It also was to be made up of select inhabitants who had abided by the will of Jehovah. Jesus's Kingdom of God was to come by the progressive sanctification of individual human beings. When the interests, purposes, and ideals of individual men were brought into conformity with the Divine Will, then we would have the Kingdom of God. It would become an external social order as soon as it was realized internally in the individual. In its realization he gave full recognition to the law of development in human life. He had caught the vision of a gradually established regenerated society, looking not only to personal perfection, but also to the establishment of Society, pure, blessed, and world-wide. When all things which now cause stumbling in life are eliminated, when all people shall be drawn together in a perfect harmony of brotherly love and mutual coöperation, when all good is come, when

all lives are in attune with the Infinite, then will that perfect community be realized. The Kingdom of God is thus seen to be an evolving—a gradual process of social and spiritual improvement. It begins in the hearts and lives of men and does not end until the spirit of God rules in every institution and relation of life. It is both a subjective state of the soul and an objective social order. It is a growth, a development, the unfolding of a principle of life, in its subjective as well as its objective phases. It is a matter of development and expansion. "The earth beareth fruit of herself; first the blade, then the ear, then the full grain in the ear."⁶

There is present in these Hebrew ideas a conception of movement and development which has sustained the progressive hopes of men for centuries. While essentially of a theocratic nature, they, nevertheless, are remarkable at this time. It is not too much to say that they have provided valuable content, at least of an inspirational and emotional nature, for the concept of to-day.

4. THE IDEAS OF THE GREEKS AND ROMANS⁷

In spite of the remarkable speculative fertility of the Greeks, they did not discover the progress idea as we know it, nor even approximate it, but some of them did approach certain lines of thought which have been important in shaping the present progress idea, though they must not be compared with it. The mental environment of the Greeks was not conducive to a full-blown idea.⁸ The Romans, being largely dependent on the Greeks for their ideas, shared their weakness.

Among the Greeks and Romans some conceived of the course of history as a process of deterioration, others as a catastrophe, others as temporary advance, others again as series of cycles. None of them were profound or consistent. In the main they held to the cycle theory, having a vague suspicion that the world processes eternally repeated themselves; that they were pursuing the same course, which was conceived as a circular movement, the working of a wheel always coming back to the point from which it started. Nothing was or could be new under the sun. The majority thought there had been a Golden Age, but that was long past. Moreover there seems to have been the feeling that the age in which they lived was distinctly dull. The Atlantis of Plato beyond the Pillars of Hercules, in which innocence and happiness had

⁶ Mark IV. 26-28.

⁷ Especially valuable is Delville, *op. cit.*, pp. 30-75.

⁸ J. B. Bury, *The Idea of Progress*, pp. 7-8.

reached their highest stage, was now lost, and the utmost man could do was to hold to the rather forlorn hope of returning to this stage. What George Meredith called the rapture of the forward view was denied to the Greek writers. None in this ancient world dreamt of a state of progressive perfectioning and increasing happiness for all mankind. To the Greek the most perfect and desirable thing was the immutable; more than that was not revealed to him at this time.

a. **Hesiod** in his *Works and Days*, written about 700 B. C., imagines a retrogression of mankind from the age of gold to the age of iron. He says: "First was a golden race of men, that with language are gifted. Made by the gods immortal, who hold the Olympian dwellings. They were in Kronos' time when he was the ruler of Heaven. Like to the Gods they lived, and possessed their spirit untroubled, wholly exempt from toil and misery." Then follows a description of the other ages, the silver, bronze, heroic, and iron. Thus there is the gradual descent from perfect man, instead of an ascent; degeneration or "devolution" rather than evolution. Through this work there breathes the feeling that the youth and glory of the world has passed away; that man has fallen; that the race is not what it was; that existence once easy, innocent, joyous, has become difficult and full of woes.

To seek for origins and to note a development from some remote and simple origin is, however, the beginning of the idea of progress.

b. **Thales** (640-550 B. C.) of Miletus is the first whom we know to have instituted any general inquiry into the natural causes of things, an effort in marked contradistinction to his predecessors, who accepted the gods as original agents. For him water was the source of everything. He knew that Homer had called Oceanus the source of gods and men. Perhaps, being a philosopher, he divested Oceanus of his personality, and said that water was the source of all. "It was an answer based on observation, for to a sea-dwelling Greek, water was exhaustless, boundless in its reaches, and more palpably than anything else, water takes many shapes, descends in rain, ascends in mist, congeals in snow and ice, and moisture is wherever there is life."⁹

c. **Anaximander** (611-545 B. C.), also of Miletus, finds his source of all in undifferentiated, unlimited, infinite, undistinguished, imperishable matter. From this as a beginning he worked out both a sort of rude nebular and a developmental hypothesis. This original matter, through an inherent and eternal energy and movement, separates into its original contrary elements, heat and cold. The cold settles down to

⁹ H. O. Taylor, *Ancient Ideals*, p. 306.

the center and forms the earth; the heat ascends to the circumference and forms the bright, shining, fiery bodies of heaven, which are but the fragments of what once existed as a complete shell or sphere, but in time burst and broke up and so gave rise to the stars.

The action of the sun upon the earth when the latter was covered with waters, induced evaporation, which in turn formed pellicules or films with matrixes containing minute forms of imperfect organisms that later gradually developed into all forms of living things. According to him the early ancestors of man were aquatic animals dwelling in the muddy waters that gradually became fitted in every way for life on dry land as the sun formed it from the primeval ooze. The general thought is the one widely accepted to-day among the evolutionary sciences, being supported by geology, embryology, anatomy and other sciences. This belief in a biological advance did not, however, prevent Anaximander from holding also that generation must be followed by destruction in a necessary cycle, that "things must all return whence they came according to destiny."

d. **Anaximenes**, a contemporary of Thales and Anaximander, also sought a source that could be perceived. He saw this source in air, or more especially that thick mistiness wherein air makes itself visible. From air all things are formed by condensation and rarefaction, cooling, and heating. "By rarefaction air changes into fire; by condensation it becomes wind, then clouds, then earth, lastly stones. From the simple bodies compound bodies are then formed."¹⁰

e. **Heraclitus**, also of this time, is the great apostle of change. He makes fire the primitive matter, because on this theory only can he explain the flux of all things. His appeal is to the scientific rather than the philosophic interest. Huxley has said of him,¹¹ "No better expressions of the essence of the modern doctrine of evolution can be found than are presented by some of his pithy aphorisms and striking metaphors." He stated his theory so thoroughly that twenty-five centuries have found little to add to his expression of it.

f. **Empedocles** taught that of the four elements of earth, air, fire, and water, and under the moving power of Love resisting Hate, planets, animals, and man were in succession and after many an effort, and many a futile conjunction of organs, generated and elaborated into their present shape. In him are also found hints of the idea of spontaneous variation and the doctrine of the eventual survival of the fittest. And

¹⁰ V. Zeller, *Pre-Socratic Philosophy*, p. 271.

¹¹ T. H. Huxley, *Evolution and Ethics*, p. 69.

yet he also taught that the souls of men were spirits fallen from a state of bliss going through a cyclic transmigration.

g. **Aeschylus** (525-456 B. C.), the Athenian poet, described in general terms the evolution of civilized society. He makes Prometheus¹² discuss the primitive state of men—how they had eyes and saw not, and ears and heard not, how they dwelt in sunless caves, men ignorant of the signs of the seasons and the simplest rudiments of art, and lived in confusion until he taught them to number, to write, to mark the risings and the settings of the stars, to build houses, to tame and train animals, to cure diseases, to navigate the sea, and practice the various modes of divination. In *Euripides* there is a similar recognition that man ascended to civilization from a primitive barbarian through the agency of a god. In fact it was obtrusively manifest at this time in Greece among many that the origins of all things, so far as they could be traced, were small and feeble. The knowledge of the existence of various rude and savage peoples indicated to the Greek that the civilization he enjoyed had evolved out of a comparatively barbarous social state. It suggested to many thoughtful minds the notion of progress, or of evolution, as we would more correctly put it to-day.

h. **The Pythagoreans.** In the main though the cycle theorists were dominant. The Pythagoreans, for example, were convinced that all the phenomena of the world and human life must repeat themselves down to the smallest detail; the "nth" cycle would be numerically distinct from the first, but otherwise would be identical with it, and no man could discover the number of the cycle in which he was living. Thucydides taught that everything would always be as it is as long as men are what they are.

i. **Plato** (428-347 B. C.) felt that the world was created perfect when it was set going by the Deity, but that he was living in an age of inevitable degeneration and decay, inevitable because it was prescribed by the cyclic nature of the universe. He even goes so far as to give the approximate duration of the respective periods.¹³ And yet in the *Republic* he represents man as seeking through knowledge and goodness to regain his lost paradise. In the *Republic* he presents the myth of an ideal republic which he offers as the blue-prints for men, more likely men of distant generations, to follow in their conscious efforts for improvement, for, in a measure, he conceived of society as capable of directing and controlling its own form and processes by its

¹² *Prometheus Bound*.

¹³ See Bury, *op. cit.*, p. 10.

own deliberate actions.¹⁴ Aristotle (384-322 B. C.) also says clearly, "Everything is a cycle . . . the age of man, government, and the earth itself with its blossoming and withering away." He opposed changes, wanting them to be as few and slight as possible. The salvation of the community lay in preserving intact, as far as possible, the institutions imposed by the enlightened Lawgiver who created this order. Change meant corruption and disaster.

j. The Stoics also adopted the idea of cycles. World after world is created and destroyed in necessary and endless succession, and all things without exception move in the same order from beginning to end. Destruction and restoration take place an endless number of times. It is vain to attempt change or foolish to expect anything new.

k. Seneca. Yet Seneca, a Roman Stoic philosopher, saw clearly that increase of knowledge was bound to come in the future.¹⁵ Nature always has new secrets to disclose to those that seek them, but she unveils her secrets only gradually. These ideas, however, in no way indicate that he had any conception of the progress of humanity. He does not expect any general improvement as the result of the new knowledge. His belief in the theory of degeneration and corruption is uncompromising.

l. Marcus Aurelius. The words of Marcus Aurelius, the Stoic emperor, are also typical of this attitude: "The periodic movements of the universe are the same, up and down from age to age; . . . He who has seen present things has seen all, both everything which has taken place from all eternity and everything which will be for time without end; for all are of one kin and of one form; . . . He who is forty years old, if he has any understanding at all, has, by virtue of the uniformity that prevails, seen all things which have been and

¹⁴ For a fuller account see my *History of Utopian Thought*, 99-120.

¹⁵ The following passages from Seneca's *Natural Questions* are pertinent. "It is not a thousand years since Greece 'counted the number of the stars and named them every one.' And there are many nations at the present hour who merely know the face of the sky and do not yet understand why the moon is obscured in an eclipse. It is but recently indeed that science brought home to ourselves certain knowledge on the subject. . . The day will yet come when posterity will be amazed that we remain ignorant of things that will seem to them so plain. We imagine that we are initiated into the mysteries of nature; but we are hanging around her outer courts." Book VII, p. 25. "How many animals we have come to know for the first time in our days! Many too that are unknown to us the people of a coming day will know. Many discoveries are reserved for the ages still to be, when our memory shall have perished. The world is a poor affair if it do not contain matter for investigation for the whole world in every age. . . Nature does not reveal all her secrets at once. . . They are withdrawn and shut up in the inner shrine. Of one of them this age will catch a glimpse, of another the age that will come after." Book VII, p. 31.

all that will be.”¹⁶ Thus older philosophers, while they approach the idea occasionally and dally with some of its fundamentals, are far from offering a doctrine of the progress of man.

m. The Epicureans were a school of speculation who actually approached the progress idea, but did not develop it in full-blown form, because the historical outlook of the world was not broad enough at that time. They rejected entirely the idea of a Golden Age and a subsequent degeneration. For them primitive men lived a life akin to that of beasts; the existing state of civilization was laboriously attained by the exercise of human intelligence through the ages.¹⁷

n. Lucretius. No more graphic picture of man's primitive condition in a savage state is to be found in any literature, and no more ingenious or consistent conjectural account of the origination of language, laws, customs, institutions, arts, and sciences than those presented by Lucretius in his *De Rerum Natura*.¹⁸ In fact Lucretius invented the term

¹⁶ *Meditations*, IX, p. 28; VI, p. 37; XI, p. 1.

¹⁷ The following passage from Horace is characteristic:

“When men first crept from out earth's womb, like worms,
Dumb speechless creatures, with scarce human forms,
With nails or doubled fists they used to fight
For acorns or for sleeping-holes at night;
Clubs followed next; at last to arms they came,
Which growing practice taught them how to frame,
Till words and names were found, wherewith to mould
The sounds they uttered, and their thoughts unfold;
Thenceforth they left off fighting, and began
To build them cities, guarding man from man,
And set up laws as barriers against strife
That threatened person, property, or wife.”

The Satires, Epistles and Ars Poetica of Horace, Conington's translation. George Bell & Sons, London, 1904.

” “Things throughout proceed
In firm, undeviating order, and maintain,
To nature true, their fixt generic stamp.
Yet man's first sons, as o'er the fields they trod,
Reared from the hardy earth, were hardier far;
Strong built with ampler bones, with muscles nerved
Broad and substantial; to the power of heat,
Of cold, of varying viands, and disease,
Each hour superior; the wild lives of beasts
Leading, while many a lustre o'er them rolled.
Nor crooked plough-share knew they, nor to drive,
Deep through the soil, the rich-turning spade;
Nor how the tender seedling to re-plant,
Nor from the fruit-tree prune the withered branch.

“Nor knew they yet the crackling blaze t' excite,
Or clothe their limbs with furs, or savage hides.
But groves concealed them, woods, and hollow hills;

"progress." But he thinks mainly of advance in the arts, and especially the arts as they affect man's happiness. Nor was he able to discover any promise of steady human progress. In fact, he anticipated a degeneration which was likely to bring about the complete destruction of the universe.

In the main, the Epicureans were interested in a life which was tolerable for the individual here and now. What had been achieved was the result of efforts of man alone. They did not look forward, however, to a regular, continuous improvement in the future; in fact, they felt the possibility of a complete collapse of all, but were not much concerned about it. While these Epicurean theories of the natural develop-

And, when rude rains, or bitter blasts o'erpowered,
Low bushy shrubs their squalid members wrapped.

"And in their keen rapidity of hand
And foot confiding, oft the savage train
With missile stones they hunted, or the force
Of clubs enormous; many a tribe they felled,
Yet some in caves shunned, cautious; where, at night,
Thronged they, like bristling swine; their naked limbs
With herbs and leaves entwining. Nought of fear
Urged them to quit the darkness, and recall,
With clamorous cries, the sunshine and the day:
But sound they sunk in deep, oblivious sleep,
Till o'er the mountains blushed the roseate dawn.

"This ne'er distressed them, but the fear alone
Some ruthless monster might their dreams molest,
The foamy boar, or lion, from their caves
Drive them aghast beneath the midnight shade,
And seize their leaf-wrought couches for themselves.

"Yet then scarce more of mortal race than now
Left the sweet lustre of the liquid day.
Some doubtless, oft the prowling monsters gaunt
Grasped in their jaws, abrupt; whence, through the groves,
The woods, the mountains, they vociferous groaned,
Destined thus living to a living tomb.

"Yet when, at length, rude huts they first devised,
And fires, and garments; and, in union sweet,
Man wedded woman, the pure joys indulged
Of chaste connubial love, and children rose,
The rough barbarians softened. The warm hearth
Their frames so melted they no more could bear,
As erst, th' uncovered skies; the nuptial bed
Broke their wild vigor, and the fond caress
Of prattling children from the bosom chased
Their stern ferocious manners."

Lucretius, *On the Nature of Things*. Metrical version by J. M. Good, Bohn's Classical Library, London, 1890.

ment of man show a remarkable grasp of the idea of social evolution, yet they still lacked certain elements of the idea of true progress.

Other Roman writers have ideas of significance from the point of view of this study. Ovid, for example, gives expression to the popular faith in four ages of continuous deterioration, culminating in the destruction of the world. Virgil offers a strange combination of belief in a fall with belief in advance. He sings of a golden age in the past when suffering and sin were unknown, when men had all things in common, and Nature poured forth her bounties abundantly and spontaneously. But he believes that Jove did away with this easy state of existence in order that man might be forced to evolve the resources of his own mind and utilize those of nature, and that he should, by experience, hammer out the various arts in a course of gradual discovery and improvement. In a beautiful passage he expresses the hope that the simplicity, peace, and happiness of the golden age would be restored. Cicero, while expressing no opinion on general progress, declared that philosophy was progressive, and that study and application were rewarded by new discoveries, and that the "most recent things are generally the most precise and certain." But he could not emancipate himself from the cycle idea. The elder Pliny declares "Each age is better than the last," and admonishes us "firmly to trust that the ages go on incessantly improving." Florus in his *Epitome of Roman History* enunciates the thought that nations pass through a succession of ages similar to those of the individual. But all this is scattering and incidental to their main purpose.

In conclusion it may be said that now and then there were faint glimmerings of the idea of progress among the Greeks and Romans, but they were very vague and general. They never defined nor analyzed it, nor derived it from a satisfactory number of facts. Their historical experience was too limited to easily suggest progress. Moreover, the proper "intellectual climate" was lacking. In the main, their thought was given to ideas of degeneration and cycles, the very antithesis of progress. Even the universal establishment of Roman rule and the civilizing of barbarian peoples did not open a vista into the future. In another age with a different appropriate atmosphere the same conditions and circumstances would likely lead to it, but Rome gave herself over to pessimism, cynicism, and philosophies of resignation and mysticism, rather than any interest in the earthly destinies of human society.

after better methods of research and education were adopted. But Roger Bacon, like all other men, however unique, was a child of his time, and could not disencumber himself from the current medieval conception of the universe. His general view of the course of human history was much like Augustine's. The middle ages developed one of the greatest agents of progress, but it could not delineate its nature. A new enlightenment and a change in attitude were necessary for this.²⁴

B. THE FIFTEENTH, SIXTEENTH, AND SEVENTEENTH CENTURIES

Toward the close of the medieval period we have the beginning of a series of events unprecedented in history which tremendously shook the world, causing a shift of viewpoint and a new insight into the events and the various problems of the world. While the true idea of progress did not yet appear, an intellectual environment was being developed which would be conducive to its birth and growth. The misty veil of credulity and naïveté began to lift, the chains which had bound man's reason were broken, he recovered his self-confidence and came to think and ponder more freely about his earthly destiny. The following events are significant in this spiritual and intellectual revolution.

6. THE EVENTS INDUCING THE CHANGES IN THOUGHT

The Crusades (1096-1273), while primarily religious in nature, were profoundly important for other reasons. Through them the wealth and the knowledge of other men and countries flowed into western lands. They gave freedom to the mind and stirred the imagination of people. New nations, customs, institutions, and people gave a breadth of vision never before conceived of. The *Travels of Marco Polo*, which appeared early in the fourteenth century, drew attention to the size of the world, the broad expanse of civilization, the diverse social forms and institutions of faraway lands, and brought a further recession of the intellectual horizon.

Greater than either of these, however, was that intellectual and social movement, the Renaissance, which began in Italy in the thirteenth century, but really did not express itself until the fourteenth, and lasted until the seventeenth. The threatening advance upon Europe of the Ottoman Turk at the beginning of the fifteenth century, which resulted

²⁴ See Delvaille's account of Roger Bacon, *op. cit.*, pp. 104-110.

in the fall of Constantinople in 1453, greatly accelerated the movement. For a half century preceding the later event, Greek scholars had been migrating westward. They brought with them not only valuable manuscripts containing the Greek classics and philosophies, but also a spirit of culture and learning, the desire for knowledge, and the enthusiasm for independent efforts in human research. Western Europe was thus confronted with a new mass of knowledge which had a most unsettling but beneficial effect. "The Renaissance was a conscious recovery from the longest and dreariest setback that humanity has ever experienced within the historical period—a veritable glacial age of the spirit."²⁵ There was a genuine rebirth of intellect, a passion for new knowledge, and for employing men's capacities to new and better advantage than of old, a yearning for adventure and novelty, a great intellectual restlessness and recklessness, and a supplying of new ideals and new points of view.

The most significant phase of the Renaissance was the way in which it emphasized reform. This phase, called Humanism, instead of engaging in sophistical and useless disputation, characteristic of the preceding age of Scholasticism, took a more human and practical turn, devoting itself to the affairs of life—the mental, spiritual, and social welfare of mankind. As such it tended to illuminate various human and social problems. The early Renaissance, however, was too full of admiration and reverence for the newly recovered treasures of antiquity to look forward to the future; it was not until it was well under way that speculation began to seek and feel its way toward new points of departure. Thus the progress idea does not at first appear.

The spread of this new learning was greatly accelerated and its effect intensified by the introduction of paper and printing into Europe about 1450. The remarkable discoveries by Spanish, English, and Portuguese explorers, made physically possible by the compass and intellectually possible by the Copernican conception of the earth and universe as against the old Ptolemaic theory, unveiled new and heretofore unheard-of expanses of land and sea, which tended to give men realization of the narrowness of their former point of view, and lifted them to exalted attitudes. The Protestant Reformation, while it did not mean a revolt of reason against dogma, did serve to free men's minds in a measure, at least, from the oppression of medieval Catholic thought through its emphasis of the right of private judgment. It also brought about new political and social conditions which eventually encouraged

²⁵ W. R. Inge, *Idea of Progress*, p. 7.

progressive thinking though, to be sure, toleration was no greater after the Reformation than before. The newly founded universities did much also to encourage saner social thinking.

Among the most significant occurrences of all, however, was the scientific movement, reborn in the thirteenth century after its millennium of medieval coma. Science made it possible for man to take great strides in understanding nature, including himself; it drew aside the veil surrounding the mysteries of the universe that had perplexed and cowed him, and consequently weakened the influence of the supernatural and the theological that had made him quiescent and impotent in his own behalf, and made him cast aside his gloomy outlook on life. He formulated the newly discovered truths into laws. He found that he had a new instrumentality in his control whereby he could direct the forces of nature, and apply or utilize them, even if he could not control them. All this gave man a sense of his own power on earth, a feeling that his destiny had been delivered into his own hands in a measure at least.

Men had to be shocked by something sufficiently great to break the spell of the ancient and medieval. The factors discussed above served this desirable function. Their combined effect caused men to take a new view of life and the world; they tended, in general, to give a new confidence to reason, and led men to try to produce a new method of life, and to believe that this was entirely possible. It was the thinkers of this new period that divested the progress idea of its mystic elements, secularized it, attempted to determine its elements and follow it in its most diverse applications. Men were now frankly concerned with life under earthly and temporal conditions, and in this they were supported and encouraged by the new science, which is fundamental in any true idea of social progress. In fact, it is barely possible to conceive of the idea of social progress before the sixteenth century; man did not have the intellectual background or the scientific point of view.²⁶

7. THE WRITERS

a. Ibn Khaldun. Before taking up the thought of early-modern and modern Europe, that of another writer, separated from the European writers both in time and space, must be considered because of its uniqueness, comprehensiveness, and richness in the elements we are

²⁶ For more extensive accounts of the thinkers of this period see Bury, *op. cit.*, pp. 29-143, and Delvaille, *op. cit.*, pp. 121-280.

interested in. This writer is Ibn Khaldun (1332-1406), the Arab historian, teacher, and statesman, and perhaps the first writer in any language to possess the modern ideas of social dynamics and the unity of the social process. The systematic exposition of his theoretical views is found in his *Prolegomena to Universal History*. In the third of the six sections history is exhibited as a process of continuous movement and incessant and inevitable change and development. There are principles of causation underlying social phenomena, and therefore a knowledge of the past may throw light upon the future. Social change is spiral, each plane being somewhat higher and broader than the preceding one, an idea similar to that expressed by Vico three centuries later. While this is essentially philosophy of history, it includes elements that are fundamental in any progress idea.²⁷

The earlier writers of the Renaissance, as would be expected, still reflected the limitations of medieval thought. Complete changes in the thought of a people cannot be made with the speed of a stage transformation scene; the processes bringing about such change require time. But while the thought is mainly classical or medieval, one presently notices a change in spirit.

b. Machiavelli. The Italian philosopher, Machiavelli (1469-1527), is representative of this era. For him the world of human beings is neither better nor worse than it was a thousand years ago; it is always the same. From the ancients, particularly the Stoics, he obtained the idea that while some societies are always advancing towards prosperity, and others are declining, those on the upgrade presently reach the point of maximum attainment and then begin to decline. In his opinion every form of society and government bears within it an element of dissolution and ruin. All imaginable social forms turn ceaselessly in a circle or cycle. Human nature was always the same; man would always have the same passions and desires, weaknesses and vices; badness and goodness are not variable in amount. He says: "The world has always contained the same amount of virtue and vice." How could effects be different? Such theories definitely prevented any conception of an improving social order gradually emerging through the efforts of successive generations in adapting institutions to meet their changing needs and aspirations. Even revolutions are only a redistribution of power; some institutions improve, others fail to do so; the level is the same afterwards as before. The race is condemned to eternal oscillations

²⁷ For a more extensive account of Ibn Khaldun see Robert Flint, *History of the Philosophy of History*, pp. 158-172.

between truth and error. But others of this time took a more emancipated view of things.

c. **Copernicus.** A most significant part in the rebellion against the tyranny of antiquity was that taken by the Polish astronomer, Nicolaus Copernicus (1473-1543). Living in this new intellectual dawning, he did more than almost anyone else to upset ancient theories that were an integral part of the thought complexes of the time. He undermined the prevailing theory of Ptolemy that the earth was the stationary center of the universe, around which the heavenly bodies rotated, and substituted for it the heliocentric astronomy, according to which our world is simply a globular planet, in perpetual motion about the sun like all other planets. This dethroned man from his privileged position in the center of the universe. It also eliminated the distinction between the heavens and the earth.²⁸

His enlightened contemporaries of the Renaissance did not at first accept his theory, however valid the proof, because believing in the dignity of man, they thought it would be violated by an infinite extension of the heavens. Eventually though, after the first great shock of it passed, they were led through the anger stage to the wonder stage, and then to hesitating acceptance, and finally to exultation at the vast new universe revealed. This, as all the other forms which the increase of knowledge took, tended to throw discredit upon the claims of antiquity, blasted the ideas that the ancients were the wisest men, made modern men seem wiser than their forefathers, as well as satisfied with and confident of themselves, and above all, it tended to weaken the smothering and stultifying hold of the church upon thought. Antiquity was now thoroughly repudiated, and eventually the new science was to be vindicated.

d. **More.** Sir Thomas More (1478-1535), the Humanist and ill-fated Lord Chancellor of England, at this time also gave to the world his *Utopia* (1515-1516), a book so vivid and daring that it gave its name to a class of social literature, and played a great part in the social and scientific thought of the sixteenth and following centuries.²⁹ While it is generally thought of as an imaginary picture of an unrealizable, perfect state, its significance is great, for its attitude and its ideals encouraged a breaking away from scholastic formalism and an embrac-

²⁸ Cf. R. H. Murray, "The Idea of Progress," *Quarterly Review*, July, 1920, Vol. 234, p. 104.

²⁹ For more extensive accounts see Delvaile, *op. cit.*, pp. 121-129, and the author's *History of Utopian Thought*, pp. 127-146, or Lewis Mumford's *Story of Utopias*, pp. 59-78.

ing of the free spirit of the Renaissance, with its progressive and humanistic attitude. It indicted the society of the time and hinted at a fairer and juster one. It tended to direct thought into the future and concentrated it on constructive ends. Great problems were dealt with and correctives were offered, modifications of fundamental social institutions were suggested that made for social amelioration, but above all, the ideal as such was reintroduced into progressive thought, and herein lies the chief merit of the book from our point of view.

e. Rabelais. Contemporary also was the French monk, François Rabelais (1490-1553), who, expelled from the Franciscan order for his attachment to science, became one of the keenest and most caustic satirists of his time, as well as a profound student of nature. While to the medieval mind chance explained everything, to Rabelais law accounted for everything. Happenings are not arbitrary, they are orderly, and this knowledge comes through learning, and this learning has just begun. What is needed is examination and complete liberty of conscience. Through this scientific knowledge will increase in the future. At the conclusion of his *Pantagruel* he has the priestess utter to Panurge a prophecy almost on a par with Seneca's when she says: "When you come to your world testify that under the earth there are great treasures and wonderful things. Your philosophers who complain that all things have been discovered by the ancients, and that nothing has been left for them to find out, are obviously wrong. All that the earth has produced is not comparable to what is still concealed in it."

f. Bodin. Among the really great early modern thinkers on the question of the processes of history is the French political philosopher, Jean Bodin (1530-1596), a man of great native force of intellect, great learning, especially in language, law, and history, and large legal and political experience, and consequently a wider range of thought than his immediate predecessors. He sought to substitute a new theory of universal history for that which had prevailed during the middle ages. Rejecting the traditional popular conceptions of a golden age in the past, and a subsequent degeneration of society, he based his study on practical considerations of scientific value, emphasizing particularly anthropological facts in which climate and geography were taken into account. His main thought is found in his *Methodus ad facilem cognitionem* (1566). While he deals with human, natural, and divine history, we are concerned only with what he has to say about the human division. The new and distinctive feature of human history is that its subject is constantly changing, whereas God and nature are always the same;

incessant mutability is its chief characteristic. "History largely depends on the will of man, which is always changing; every day new laws, new customs, new institutions, both secular and religious, come into being and new errors."⁸⁰ Yet man is much influenced in his changing by both nature and God, but particularly physical nature. Accordingly, on the basis of climate and geography, which give to peoples different racial characteristics of body and mind, he attributes to the southern peoples special capacities for the acquisition of knowledge and wisdom; to those of the middle or temperate regions, political ability and commercial activity; and to those of the north, industrial skill and military enterprise.

Chapter seven of the *Methodus* is of special permanent interest to us. Due to the immutability of nature, the changes noted in history must be attributed to man. They are pervaded by law. They follow a certain regularity, a law of oscillation. History is a matter of rise and fall, of temporary advance and then deterioration, and then again advance, and so on *ad infinitum*. But there is discernible through the series of waves a gradual ascent. In other words, history can be compared to a wavy line, the general trend of which is upwards. Every evidence points to the fact that men living in the so-called golden and silver ages were little more than beasts; but from that primitive state they fought their way upwards, with frequent setbacks, until they reached the stage of humanity and social order prevalent to-day.⁸¹

This advance in the past has been due mainly to increase of knowledge. The moderns have evidenced their superiority to the ancients, great as they were, in the new knowledge, scientific explanations of phenomena, and other forms of intellectual productivity, and new discoveries and inventions—especially significant being the compass, gunpowder, and printing—besides advances in geography and astronomy. A new period had dawned which actually surpassed that of the ancients.

Thus Bodin definitely affirmed the certainty of progress in the past; in fact, he soundly and emphatically expressed the view that the modern world had in his time surpassed the ancient, but nowhere does he recognize what would seem, for a modern to necessarily follow, viz., the idea of progress in the future. It remained for Francis Bacon to do this.

g. Bruno. There appears at about this time also the Italian monk, Giordano Bruno (1548-1600), who in 1576, breaking his vows as

⁸⁰ Bury, *op. cit.*, p. 39.

⁸¹ *Methodus*, Ch. VII, p. 356.

Dominican monk, pledged himself to follow the "white star of Truth" whithersoever she might lead. Actually he wandered over Europe for fifteen years, finally suffering a fiery death for his beliefs. An implacable enemy of the priestcraft of his time, he made it his mission to overthrow tyranny, usurpations, prejudices, falsehoods, and superstitions. He sought to demolish the temple in order to rebuild it, to replace the false by the true, to give expanse to the human spirit, to make knowledge free, to liberate humanity from external authority, and also to vindicate the world as possessing a value for man independent of its relation to any supermundane sphere. He left a permanent impression on history, as well as emphasizing certain attitudes necessary in any real progress idea.⁸² Both Bruno and Bacon did much to weaken the strength of authority and tradition, in spite of hostility and consistent opposition to their supposedly infidel, free-thinking, and rationalistic views.

h. Francis Bacon. Francis Bacon (1561-1626), Baron of Verulam, scientist, lawyer, and Lord Chancellor of England, carries the progress idea a decisive step further. Less bold than Campanella, his Italian contemporary, but more enlightened, he foresaw the infinite vista of possibilities in the accumulation of new knowledge about man and the world through experimental research. For him knowledge was above all dynamic and progressive in its effects. This fact he emphasized anew and formulated more precisely than had any other Renaissance thinker. He refused to believe that any limits were set beyond which human intellect, when clarified and purified, and assisted by proper technique, could not penetrate. Nothing was impossible to man provided he hit upon the right key to nature's secrets. He saw more clearly than any of his contemporaries the prospects of scientific discovery and its application to the betterment of man's estate. Bacon was a representative of the Natural Science period, in distinction to the Humanistic, when thinkers had come to believe that man's ultimate regeneration and perfectibility depended primarily, not on reform of laws of property or on social revolution, but on the progress of science and the application of its results to the gradual amelioration of the general lot of mankind. He urged men to amass facts and with them as instruments to evolve cosmos out of chaos.

In the past advance in the subjugation of nature was slow, fitful, and fortuitous. But in his *Advancement of Science* (1605), and also the

⁸² For a brief discussion of Bruno see Alberta Jean Rowell, "Giordano Bruno, His Life and Mission," *Open Court*, Vol. 35, pp. 705-14.

Novum Organum (1620), he emphasized the idea of the possibility of indefinite advance in the future through man's own conscious efforts. Bacon first popularized this great seminal idea—"the greatest single idea in the whole history of mankind in the vista of possibilities which it opens before us"⁸³—an idea that could not have been conceived at any earlier moment, because not until this time did the dynamic social conditions, and the intellectual, historic, and scientific background for it, exist. At the very center of his ideal commonwealth, the *New Atlantis*, (1622), he places a sort of national academy of sciences, which is carried on with a view to deliberately making discoveries for the benefit of men. This is a self-perpetuating group of learned and capable men endowed and working together for the common end of attaining knowledge by experiment, research, and travel, the enriching of the world's store of information by the process of investigation into nature and the ways of men, and discovering the truth and principles which make for progress and happiness.⁸⁴ In this manner could the great "Renovation of Knowledge" be brought about, and the evils of society overcome.

Bacon, unlike Bodin, despised the past, for most of it, he said, rested on misapprehension. He wanted to make a complete break with it, and start anew. On the other hand, he was quite engrossed with the aspirations, the hopes, and the ambitions of the future.

Bacon is often criticized for having made no real contribution to science. The criticism is just, but it is irrelevant. His rôle was that of herald. "I am but a trumpeter," he proclaimed, "not a combatant." Elsewhere he said that he was but the bell that called the other wits together. His greatest contribution lies in the impetus which his advocacy of inductive and experimental methods gave to future scientific investigation. In spite of all this, however, Bacon did not appreciate the contributions of his contemporaries, Galileo, Harvey, and Copernicus, showing that the greatest and most original minds have difficulty in breaking clean with their present and their past.⁸⁵

i. **Campanella.** Thomas Campanella (1568-1629), the Italian Dominican monk, philosopher, university professor (Pisa and Padua), communist, and revolutionist, with his free and eager appetite for knowledge, his knowledge of practical affairs, and a subtle philosophic

⁸³ Robinson, *op. cit.*, p. 247.

⁸⁴ See J. O. Hertzler, *op. cit.*, pp. 146-153, 293-296.

⁸⁵ For an excellent discussion of the period just preceding Bacon see H. E. Barnes, "The Historical Background and Setting of the Philosophy of Francis Bacon," *Scientific Monthly*, May, 1924, Vol. 18, pp. 475-497.

insight, predicted a radical change and the arrival of powerful reforms. He also, while in prison, wrote his picture of an ideal state, *The City of the Sun*.⁸⁶ In his *Apologia pro Galileo* he maintains that it is from observation and from other sense perceptions, and not from opinion, that the real knowledge is obtained through which progress comes. In fact, knowledge is useless if it does not serve as a means of ushering in the dawn of a new age of social regeneration. He is convinced that if man possesses freedom of thought, he can develop new knowledge, and with this bring about the vast changes necessary in the world.

j. **Descartes.** The thinker who brought about the final and complete repudiation of the medieval attitude of mind, and who declared entire independence of the past, was the French philosopher, René Descartes (1596-1650). He probably exercised a more extensive and transforming influence on the future development of thought than any other man of his century. He, with Bacon, stands at the head of the modern epoch of philosophy and science. With them the world shook itself loose from scholasticism and entered on its present path. They brought about an unprecedented intellectual clarification, accompanied by an unprecedented accumulation of facts in regard to man and his environment. In 1637 appeared his *Discourse on Method*, the first title of which was *The Project of a Universal Science which Can Elevate our Nature to the Highest Degree of Perfection*. Basic in it were the ideas of supremacy of reason and the invariability of the laws of nature, the latter being a product of the former. The doctrine of providence was excluded altogether. The avowed aim of this great work was to effect a general revolution in human thought, to determine once for all the method of rightly conducting the reason in the search for scientific truth, and to prove convincingly that it was the right method by showing the number and value of the results to which it led.⁸⁷ He believed that a complete new system of knowledge could be created by observing his prescribed methods, and that it would have far-reaching effects on the condition of mankind.⁸⁸ He also broke with the past. He was proud of the fact

⁸⁶ For discussion see the writer's *History of Utopian Thought*, pp. 153-165.

⁸⁷ See Flint, *op. cit.*, p. 210.

⁸⁸ As to the meliorative power of science he prophesied: "We shall be able to find an art, by which, knowing the force and action of fire, water, air, stars, the heavens and all other objects, as clearly as we know the various trades of our artisans, we may be able to employ them in the same way for their appropriate uses, and make ourselves the masters and possessors of nature. And this will not be solely for the pleasure of enjoying with ease and by ingenious devices all the good things of the world, but principally for the preservation and improvement of human health, which is both the foundation of all the goods and the means of strengthening and quickening the spirit itself." Quoted by F. S. Marvin, *The Living Past*, pp. 181-182.

that he had forgotten the Greek he learned as a lad. Furthermore, he followed what was at this time the unique precedent of Bacon, who published his *Advancement of Learning* in English instead of the conventional Latin, by writing his *Discourse* in his native French, because, as he says, he hoped to reach those who used their own good wits, instead of relying on old books.

The vision of the Golden Age, which had been placed in the past for the men of antiquity, and, for the most part, for the men of the early Renaissance also, now began to lie in the future, and be a tangible objective for Descartes and the men he moulded.

k. Fontenelle. Like so many important men, Descartes' greatness was not perceived by his own generation. It remained for a later countryman of his, the centenarian, Bernard Le Bovier de Fontenelle (1657-1757), for many years Secretary of the French Academy of Sciences, to take his two conceptions, the supremacy of reason and the immutability of the laws of science, and popularize them and make them the property of all educated men. But he also had ideas of his own. He formulated in a short tract, *Digression on the Ancients and Moderns* (1688), the essential points of the doctrine of the progress of knowledge. In fact, he was the first to present the idea of the progress of knowledge as a complete doctrine. Fontenelle finds "the heart always the same, the intellect perfecting itself, passion, virtues and vices unaltered; knowledge increasing." Thus the passing of time makes no considerable difference on the constitutions and faculties of human nature, but the moderns, nevertheless, have superiority over the ancients for they stand on their shoulders, having inherited the intellectual advantages and experiences acquired by the toil of previous generations. Furthermore, we must expect posterity to excel us as we excel the ancients, through improved scientific method and the increase of knowledge. An educated mind is thus, as it were, composed of all the minds of preceding ages; we might say that a single mind was being educated throughout all history. And yet this progress will take place independently of particular individuals. In comparing the life of collective humanity to the life of a single man, he points out that "This man, who has lived from the beginning of the world to the present time, will have no old age, he will be always as capable as ever of doing the things for which he was fitted in youth, and he will be more and more able to accomplish those which are appropriate to his manhood; in other words, and to drop allegory, men will never degenerate."⁸⁹ Now, the progress of knowledge had previ-

⁸⁹ *Œuvres* (ed. 1764), tome IV, p. 126, quoted by Flint, p. 215.

ously been established for the past and present; but Fontenelle projected it into the indefinite future. He went further and maintained that it must be conceived as necessary and certain. He reinforced this by showing that the prospect of a steady and rapid increase of knowledge in the future was certified. This theory of his later expanded into the general theory of human progress. In his *Conversations on the Plurality of Worlds* he also did much to popularize science—an essential preliminary to any progress idea or progressive effort. It disclosed to the general public a new conception of the universe, which men had to accept, and was a potent contribution to the task of transforming thought and abolishing ancient error.

1. **Saint-Pierre.** The development of the intellectual movement of the seventeenth century, which had changed the outlook of speculative thought, led to the extension of rationalism into the social domain, and the conception of social perfection, and the general progress of man in the eighteenth century. With this came the idea that social evils were due to ignorance and prejudices, and could be improved by illuminating ignorance and removing errors, by increasing knowledge and diffusing light. The Abbé Charles Irénée Castel de Saint-Pierre (1658-1743), was of this school. He was a born reformer, devoting his life to the construction of a multitude of schemes for individual and social improvement, as well as being notable as a pacifist. His ideas of progress were a by-product of his particular schemes. In 1737 he published a *Project to Perfect the Government of States*, in which he sketched his view of the progressive course of civilization. The old legend of a golden age when men were perfect and happy, succeeded by silver, bronze, and iron ages, representing deterioration, was the exact reverse of the truth. Men in history had moved up through the iron and bronze ages through the gradual learning of the arts, better security and laws, inventions, and so on, to the silver age in which the Europe of his day found itself. Now reasonable men were considering how to abolish war, and were thus approaching the golden age. But the art of government and the general regulation of society needed vast improvement; and a short series of wise reigns might bring this about. He thought that government was omnipotent and could bestow happiness on men.

In another work on *Observations on the Continuous Progress of Universal Reason* (1737), he elaborated the idea that civilization was progressing towards a goal of human happiness. The human race by the perpetual and infinite succession of generations would find itself at the end of ten thousand years more capable of wisdom and happiness than

it was at the end of four thousand. He thus pointed out the immensely long progressive life ahead for humanity. He also had discussions on tests of progress and the rate of progress and the factors affecting it.⁴⁰ But the progress, he felt, had been confined mainly to physical science; in the fields of ethics and politics men were no better than they were millenniums ago. These weaknesses he did not believe to be irremediable, however, and advocated the founding of political and ethical academies. The Abbé was significant also in connection with the development of the revolutionary ideas of the latter half of the eighteenth century.

m. **Vico.** At about the same time the Italian historian, jurist, and philosopher, Giovanni Battista Vico (1668-1744), published his *Scienza Nuova* (*New Science*), which has been frequently regarded as the starting point of the modern idea of historical progress. He advanced the theory that progress does not take place in a straight line, nor through perfectly identical recurring circles, but rather in a sort of spiral movement in which every turn is a degree higher and more advanced than its predecessor, an idea partly expressed by Ibn Khaldun three centuries earlier. He arrived at this viewpoint as the result of his study of Roman law, pursued at the University of Naples in the earlier part of the eighteenth century. He concluded from it that changes in civilization could be interpreted according to an ordered sequence which has its moving force in the growth and change of the collective mind of mankind from generation to generation. Societies pass through three stages, that in which the world is merely felt (the condition of savages), the state of imaginative knowledge (barbarous peoples), and finally the stage of conceptual knowledge, or civilization. In each of these stages are found characteristic law, institutions, language, literature, and men. While there is a continual recurrence due to the psychical nature of man, each repetition is more advanced. Individuals and nations, while imagining themselves to be following their own purposes, are really, without being aware of it, under the guidance of a great natural design. Thus was emphasized the psychic nature of progress.

QUESTIONS AND PROBLEMS

See end of Chapter III.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

See end of Chapter III.

⁴⁰ See J. B. Bury, *The Idea of Progress*, pp. 136-138.

CHAPTER III

THE HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF THE THEORY OF PROGRESS (Continued)

C. THE EIGHTEENTH CENTURY

THE progress doctrine to be an effective one, more than the sanguine dream of an optimist, must be placed upon more substantial foundations than those heretofore discussed. About the middle of the eighteenth century new lines of investigation were opened up which eventually led not only to a more thorough progress theory, but also to the history of civilization and to sociology. This was an age of rationalism and science, an age during which authority of all kinds, but particularly religious and political authority, were assailed. Theological, ecclesiastical, and aristocratic, in fact, all traditional explanations, forms, and institutions were criticized and denied. With the enthronement of reason and knowledge and a definite repudiation of "the good old times" the idea became current that reform should seek its sanction in the future, not in the past; in advance, not in reaction; and the possibility of indefinite human progress became the stimulating doctrine of thinkers and reformers.

Particularly prominent in the writings of the thinkers of this period is the idea of natural law at work in society. The Newtonian discoveries of the laws which govern the physical universe had influenced social philosophers to believe that society functioned most naturally, not when directed by a human social agent, like the state, but when it conformed to the régime of natural law in sway in the social order.¹

8. THE FRENCH THINKERS

a. **Montesquieu.** Significant in this connection was Charles Louis de Secondat, Baron de Montesquieu (1689-1755), French judge, writer, and author of the famous *Spirit of Laws* (1748). While this work really is an attempt to discover the *spirit* of laws, *i.e.*, to explain them,

¹The most extensive treatments of the subject matter of this chapter will be found in Delvaille, *op. cit.*, pp. 283-718, and Bury, *op. cit.*, pp. 144-259.

to trace how they are related to manners, climates, needs, and forms of government, how they act on character, domestic life, social forms and institutions, in it is also found the idea that phenomena, political and social as well as physical, are subject to general natural laws; in brief, there is a law of laws. He said as early as 1734: "It is not fortune who governs the world. . . There are general causes, moral or physical, which operate in every monarchy, raise it, maintain it, or overthrow it; all that occurs is subject to these causes." This not only excludes Fortune, but also Providence, design, and final causes. It places all phenomena on the foundation of cause and effect. Particularly social acts and products, as he points out in the *Spirit of Laws*, are closely interrelated and are natural results of combinations of circumstances. The recognition of such a cause and effect relationship between phenomena is fundamentally essential in any progress idea.

b. Turgot. The eighteenth century work next to be considered consists simply of two *Discourses on Universal History* (1750), delivered at the Sorbonne by a Frenchman, then only twenty-three years old, Anne Robert James Turgot (1727-1781), later philosopher, philanthropist, governor, and statesman.² Here for the first time the idea of progress is made "the organic principle of history." His purpose seemed to be to trace the fortunes of the race in the light of the idea of progress. "History is represented as the life of humanity, ever progressing toward perfection, from generation to generation, from stage to stage, from nation to nation, and by alternations of rest and agitation, success and failure, decay and revival. None before Turgot, and few after him, have described so well how age is bound to age, how generation transmits to generation what it has inherited from the past and won by its own exertions. . . The progress of humanity means, according to Turgot, the gradual evolution and elevation of man's nature as a whole, the enlightenment of his intelligence,³ the expansion and purification of his feelings, the amelioration of his worldly lot, and, in a word, the spread of truth, virtue, liberty and comfort, more and more among all classes of men. He seeks to prove from the whole history of the past that there has been such progress; and he professes his belief that there will be such progress in the future."⁴ History was an organic whole with a plan progressively realized as the result of psychological forces.

² For an extensive biographical account which touches on his progress idea, see the essay on "Turgot" by John Morley in his *Biographical Studies*, pp. 1-91.

³ He anticipated Comte's famous law of the three stages of intellectual evolution.

⁴ Flint, *op. cit.*, pp. 281-282.

It was connected with the essential faculties of man and the constitutive principles of society. It was a matter of mental and spiritual forces. His view embraced all the elements of social life—science, art, government, manners, morality, and religion. But this process was not uniform or uninterrupted. There were periods of intellectual and moral decadence; there were mistakes and calamities; there were variations in the rate of progress. But the race as an immense whole is steadily advancing. The subject of progress in human nature, the dominant and directing principle in its development, is *intellect*, and the ultimate and general criterion is the degree of intellectual enlightenment prevalent. It was an explanation which was comprehensive and consistent, the most complete up to this time.

c. **Voltaire.** The rationalistic point of view in connection with the progress idea was carried still further by François Marie Arouet Voltaire (1694-1778), especially in his great work, *Essay on the Manners and Mind of Nations* (1756). In it he presented a general concept of history in which he traced the course of civilization, the origins and manifestations of culture, the ways in which people passed from ignorance and crudeness to enlightenment and refinement, in brief, the "history of the human spirit," from the time of Charlemagne to the present. The progress that had come about, the great social and political changes that transformed the world, were due to changes of opinion. Wars and religions in the past, with the prejudices and errors they engendered, had been the great obstacles to the progress of humanity. But reason gradually became more important, and will continue to do so. "We may believe," he said, "that reason and industry will always progress more and more; that the useful arts will be improved; that of the evils which have afflicted men, prejudices, which are not their least scourge, will gradually disappear among all those who govern nations, and that philosophy, universally diffused, will give some consolation to human nature for the calamities which it will experience in all ages." But no final cause or Providence or law of human affairs was at work. Where events were not guided by the universal reason implanted in man (which had been enfranchised less than a century before) they were governed by chance. History was, as it were, the domain of *Sa Majesté le Hazard*.

d. **The Encyclopaedists.** The writers of the famous *Encyclopaedia* of France (1751-1765), important among whom were Diderot, D'Alembert, Helvetius, and D'Holbach, united to preach the perfectibility of man. Like Bacon, they set out to found an "empire of virtue

and to increase human happiness by the growth and spread of science." The sole source of knowledge for them was the observation of nature as summed up in the descriptive and generalizing sciences. They looked forward to a progressively increasing command over nature for the satisfaction of human desires as the sciences should further develop. They optimistically dreamed that at last humanity was on the true path leading to a perfect state where misery should no longer exist, and where all should comfortably dwell in happy concord. They furthermore believed in the indefinite malleability of human nature by education and institutions. Men's miseries and shortcomings, their moral and intellectual inequalities arose entirely from differences in education, from bad legislation, and adverse social circumstances, and "from the pursuit of mischievous and perverse ideals and wrong-headed aims." In brief, we are made good or bad by education, public opinion, laws, government, and other social institutions, and these are within our control. Progress is then an act of will, and its responsibility is upon society. The immediate effect of their philosophy was to cause people to feel that if they struck off their fetters of custom, and law, and authority by revolutionary change they would secure for all men freedom, equality, and unity—a potent doctrine of the French Revolution. The ideas of the Encyclopaedists, like a penetrating odor, permeated the whole thought of the time.

e. Chastellux. A man very much influenced by the Encyclopedists was the Chevalier François Jean de Chastellux (1734-1788), who in 1772 published his *On Public Felicity, or Considerations on the Lot of Men in the Various Epochs of History*. Chastellux is also certain that human nature can be indefinitely moulded by institutions. But war and superstition, for which governments and priests are responsible, must be eliminated; intellectual enlightenment must be advanced; and governments made better, if progress is to occur. This combination of enlightenment and sound rule increases the happiness of mankind.

f. Rousseau. Equally a product of the times is Jean Jacques Rousseau's (1712-1778) theory of historical regress found in his *Discourse on the Question whether the Progress of Sciences and Arts Has Contributed to the Improvement of Morals* (1750), and his *Discourse on the Origin and Foundations of Inequality among Men* (1754).⁵ His answer to the question implied in the first is frankly negative. Civilization is all wrong and vicious, and the more it develops, the more unhappy

⁵ For an excellent and extensive treatment of these discourses see John Morley, *Rousseau and His Era*, Vol. I, pp. 126-180.

and depraved man becomes. Social institutions have transformed the sincerity, confidence, and rude simplicity of the natural man into deceit, suspicion, and a hollow uniformity of conduct. In fact, it is a law of history that morals vary inversely with the advance and decline of the arts and sciences. The causes of this corruption, the arts and sciences, are themselves due to men's vices; for without luxury there would have been no arts, and without idleness, no sciences. Primitive man was free and courageous and temperate; to-day men are in chains. We must return to the ignorance, innocence, and poverty of our nature state. Man is not corrupt by nature, he is good; society has corrupted him. Rousseau does not want to destroy civilization; he would repair it. He attaches his hopes to equality, democracy, and a radical change in education, as outlined in his *Social Contract* and *Emile*.⁶ As he says: "Men individually and society as a whole are capable of indefinite improvement. Nature has set no limits to our hopes, and the picture of the human race freed from its chains and marching with a firm tread on the road of truth, virtue, and happiness, offers to the philosopher a spectacle which consoles him for the errors, the crimes, and the injustice which still pollute and afflict the earth." What was needed for the indefinite progress of mankind was a change in the direction of abolishing custom, law, and other institutions, and of securing freedom and equality so that men's naturally good selves would have free scope.

g. Condorcet. One of the most outstanding of all the progress thinkers of any period is Marie Jean Antoine Nicolas Caritat, Marquis de Condorcet (1743-1794), of the early part of the French Revolution, a man whose thought reflects the influence of the Encyclopaedists, of whom he had been one, and Turgot and Voltaire, whose views he shared. His main work from our point of view is his *Sketch of a Historical Picture of the Progress of the Human Mind* (1795), composed while its author, one time president of the Legislative Assembly and member of the Convention, lay concealed from the emissaries of Robespierre in the garret of a friend, expecting at any moment apprehension and the violent death of the guillotine. Out of this confinement grew the ideas that the evils of life had arisen from a conspiracy of priests and rulers against their fellows, and from bad laws and bad institutions which they had succeeded in creating. But the race would eventually conquer its enemies and free itself of all its evils; even disease and suffering should

⁶For John Morley's accounts of the *Social Contract* and *Emile* see *op. cit.*, Vol. II, pp. 169-300.

almost cease, and truth, liberty, equality, justice, and love universally abound.

In the *Sketch* Condorcet takes the most important step between Vico, Montesquieu and Turgot, and Comte towards a scientific progress concept. He effects the junction between the scientific and the Utopian. He understood admirably that the development of the human race, considered as a single being, a society, was subject to laws which in turn are the results of verifiable knowledge, and that all social phenomena must be accounted for in terms of causation.

However, being a man of his time, he shared with it its theory of the indefinite perfectibility of man. "My aim," he says in the beginning of his *Sketch*, "is to show, by the aid of both reasoning and facts, that no boundaries have been set to the improvement of the human faculties; that man's perfectibility is really indefinite; and that his progress, now independent of any opposing power, has no limit coincident with that of the globe on which fate has cast him." Science and knowledge are to make this increasingly possible as time goes on. As he puts it, "Every century shall bring with it new discoveries and new instruments for discovery. . . . Even our bodily organism will be perfected. With better hygiene and more sanitary houses, a more thorough knowledge of the animal frame, the duration of life may be increased. Death would be the result of extraordinary accidents, or of the even later destruction of the vital forces." Education is also to be emphasized because it makes men acquainted with their real interests. In fact, he proposed to substitute education in place of the sanctions of both morality and religion, as the regenerating principle of human nature.

As a background for progress he traces the development of society through ten successive stages or epochs, nine of which lie in the past, and the tenth in the future. These ten stages really represent the development of the human mind, since each stage is the result of discovery and invention, knowledge, new philosophy, or some other change in the thought attitudes of society.⁷ Condorcet says of this historical picture that he draws that it will "exhibit the order in which changes have taken place, explain the influence of every past period upon that which follows it and thus show, by the modifications which the human species has experienced, in its incessant renovations through the immensity of ages, the course which it has pursued, and the steps which it has advanced towards knowledge and happiness. From these observations on what man has heretofore been, and what he is at present, we shall be

⁷ For descriptions see Flint, *op. cit.*, pp. 327-28, or Bury, *op. cit.*, p. 209.

led to the means of securing and of accelerating the still further progress of which from his nature we indulge the hope."

He inferred from this history of the past three tendencies which he thought were likely to be characteristic features of the future, viz., first, the destruction of inequality between nations and a reign of universal peace, in which wars between nations, like murders, will be numbered among the extraordinary atrocities, humiliating and revolting in nature; second, the destruction of inequality between classes, particularly the distinction based upon inequality of wealth and instruction, perpetuated by laws and other fictitious means, and the inequality of sexes; and third, the improvement of individuals, through the indefinite intellectual, moral, and physical perfectibility of human nature itself. In fact, he indicates that neither the constitution of humanity nor the character of its surroundings are incompatible with endless progress. Knowledge and science are ever growing, their horizons are ever receding, and they are constantly attaining a wider and clearer range of vision.⁸

9. THE ENGLISH THINKERS

The thought on the subject of progress in France could not help spreading to England during the eighteenth century, in spite of the fact that England and France were at war at both the beginning and the end of the century. But English social and political conditions, combined perhaps with British temperament, caused the progress concept to take very different form.

a. Hume. David Hume (1711-1776), for example, took a decidedly skeptical attitude. The world, he thought, has its stages of infancy, youth, manhood, and old age, and man would share in these changes of state. But it is impossible to tell when the world is in its maturity, because changes are so gradual as to be indiscernible in the short space of known history. The same is true of mankind, therefore we are uncertain whether present man is advancing to perfection or declining from it. He did, however, agree that modern man was superior to the men of ancient civilization.

b. Smith. In his *Wealth of Nations* Adam Smith (1723-1790), the philosopher and economist, includes the history of the gradual economic progress of human society, and also the expectation of an indefinite increase of wealth and welfare.

⁸ A very interesting account of Condorcet is John Morley's essay on "Condorcet" in his *Biographical Studies*, pp. 93-164.

c. **Gibbon.** The historian, Edward Gibbon (1737-1794), in his *Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire* states that "we cannot determine to what height the human species may aspire in their advance toward perfection; but it may safely be presumed that no people, unless the face of nature is changed, will relapse into their original barbarism."

d. **Godwin.** The philosophical anarchist, William Godwin (1756-1836), in his *Enquiry Concerning Political Justice* (1793), opens boldly with the thesis that "the characters of men originate in their external circumstances." What man is is a matter of impressions and experiences. Misery is due to ignorance long-standing, vicious habits, coercive human institutions, and restraining and warping influences of other kinds, especially lawyers, sovereigns, and statesmen, and all restrictions upon liberty and equality.

The way of perfection was through the agency of the human will in the form of right education and effort. By sound reasoning and truth man will be victorious. He said, "Make men wise, and by that very operation you make them free." Man is perfectible or susceptible of perpetual improvement, for truth is greater than laws. But in order that reason and truth might rule he wanted unfettered freedom in political and speculative discussion, and accordingly was against censorship and prosecutions for religious and political opinions. No change, however, should come abruptly. There must be a general desire for change, a conviction of its desirability among the masses, before any change is wise. We should desire neither violent change nor the stagnation that inflames and produces revolutions.

In the end truth will conquer; men will listen to reason. They will abandon their present laws, and will form a free society without law, or government, or any kind of force. Science will be used, and all will be equally producers and enjoyers. With all working it will be possible to have a multiplicity of products with half an hour of work a day. Reason shall so dominate sense that reproduction will cease altogether and man will become immortal. Men shall acquire such an empire over their bodies that they will not need sleep, one of the most conspicuous infirmities of the human body. We shall be so full of life that we shall not die. Life can be prolonged by intellect; we are sick, and we die because in a certain sense we consent to suffer these accidents. "There will be no war, no crime, no administration of justice as it is called, and no government. Besides this, there will be neither disease, anguish, melancholy, nor resentment. Every man will seek with ineffable ardor

the good of all." * Brailsford said: "It is a book which only genius could have made so foolish and so wise."

e. Bentham. Jeremy Bentham's (1748-1832) philosophy was based on the idea that every institution and every action must be judged according to its tendency to promote happiness and arrest pain. This search for happiness is the guide and object of attainment in all matters of morality, religion, reform, and legislation. But he feels that "we shall never make this world the abode of happiness," and yet he asserts that it may be made a beautiful garden "compared with the savage forest in which men so long have wandered."

f. Malthus. Thomas Robert Malthus (1766-1834) in his *Essay on the Principle of Population* discussed a sinister problem in connection with progress which both Condorcet and Godwin had touched upon incidentally as an obstacle to overcome, the question of population growth. Godwin was wrong in blaming human institutions for human misery; it is human nature itself that is to blame. Nature has planted in man a sexual instinct so powerful that it will, if left to itself, cause starvation, vice, or death because of the great numbers of human beings, this being due to the fact that food resources do not increase at a parallel rate with population. This doctrine gave a pessimistic turn to thinking. Men realized that these facts could not be easily sidestepped, but must be faced.

g. Owen. Robert Owen (1771-1857), New Lanark mill-owner, writer, philanthropist, student, and pioneer socialist, also stands out, not so much because of the doctrines he enunciated, but because of his personality and his works. His thought has apparently been derived from predecessors and contemporaries. From the French thinkers just preceding the Revolution and from Godwin he got the idea that the social environment, particularly in its institutional aspects, is responsible for the vice and misery that exist, and that by proper surroundings and right education man can be made perfect. From his friend and former business associate, Jeremy Bentham, he received the idea that the object of human society was to increase the happiness of each individual to the greatest extent practicable, that is, the highest degree consistent with the greatest happiness of the whole. Numerous pamphlets, manifestos, lectures, debates, and books spread his ideas far and wide. Most significant of all though was the educational system which he devised, and the model colonies which he set up in an actual attempt to carry out

* Book VIII, Ch. IX, p. 528.

his plans.¹⁰ In many respects Robert Owen was a prophet who saw the vision of a race living in an environment where happiness was the rule.

10. THE GERMAN THINKERS

The German thinkers, while not affected by the same political conditions as those influencing the French or English, were nevertheless part of the general thought life of Europe, and reflected its main emphasis and interests. On the whole, they were highly metaphysical, tended to read into natural and social processes their own favorite ideas, and had considerable difficulty in seeing things as they actually are.

a. Leibnitz. The eighteenth century German writers on the subject of social continuity and progress were all influenced more or less by Gottfried William Leibnitz (1646-1716). He had two great ideas floating through his *Theodicie* (1710) and *Monadologie* (1720), both bound up with the general idea of social evolution. The first was the conception that the historic past is always with us here and now. It survives both in archeological fossils, and, what is of vastly greater sociological importance, it survives also as active, and one gathers psychical, elements guiding and conditioning our daily life. The other was the conception that what we think and feel, what we do and say, here and now, are the great factors in determining the character of the succeeding phases of human and social life. Both are summed up in what he called the "law of historic continuity," and which he expressed in the now famous phrase, "The present is charged with the past and big with the future." This in turn rested on his idea that the universe is not perfect, but full of potentialities, and will develop toward perfection throughout infinite time. It can readily be seen that such an optimism could provide a basis for a doctrine of progress.¹¹ A brief discussion of the great German thinkers of the eighteenth century who were influenced by this thought follows.

b. Herder. Johann Gottfried Herder (1744-1803), in his great four-volume work, *Ideas of the Philosophy of the History of Humanity* (1784-1791), attempted the same task which Turgot and Condorcet planned, a universal history of civilization. In a little work which was the beginning of the larger one, published ten years earlier, he states his thesis: "In my early years when the meadows of knowledge lay before me in all their morning brightness, so much of which the noonday

¹⁰ See the writer's *History of Utopian Thought*, pp. 213-221.

¹¹ Cf. Victor Branford, *The Founders of Sociology*, *American Journal of Sociology*, Vol. 10, p. 119.

sun of our life takes away, the thought came often to me whether, since everything in the world has its philosophy and its science, there ought to be a philosophy and a science of that which concerns us most nearly—the history of mankind in its greatness and entirety.” Consequent study led him to the conclusion that history is a continuous development, a matter of unity and order.

He took up the whole development of life at great length, through its various stages. Life is an onflowing spirit—a stream of celestial fire; both external nature and the several spheres of human life exhibit a connected and progressive series of forces and powers. While the Deity designed the world, he never interferes in its processes either in the physical cosmos, or in human history. Civilization is a purely natural phenomenon in which one people and one age build on another. Events are strictly enchained; continuity is unbroken; what happened at any given time could have happened only then, and nothing else could have happened. Man cannot guide his own destinies; his actions and fortunes are determined by the nature of things, the times, his physical organization, and physical environment. Herder excludes chance and the free play of man's intelligent will; man is definitely related to the universe, the earth. Yet man is destined to incessant perfecting, even though he distinctly opposes the hypothesis of a final and unique state of perfection as the goal of history. He says: “The flower of humanity, captive still in its germ, will blossom out one day into the true form of man like unto God, in a state of which no terrestrial man can imagine the greatness and the majesty.”

Exceedingly important in this advance of man are also the psychological factors which constitute the social heritage, such as customs, traditions, ideals, and education. Those bring about an interdependence and solidarity of generations of men. There is a reciprocal action between individuals and transmission of acquired means of culture from generation to generation, and it is this interconnection between individuals and generations which produces humanity and a philosophy of history. It is in the last analysis a great educational process in which the whole earth is the school. He says: “The history of mankind is a whole—that is, a chain of sociability and tradition, from the first link to the last. There is an education, therefore, of the human species, since everyone becomes a man only by means of education and the whole species lives solely in this chain of individuals.” Welfare progressively develops, and reason and justice, the only elements that make it permanent, become more powerful. But all this progress is a sequence of

unequal and broken causes, of various degrees of civilization in various mutations. Thus is humanity, the final cause of history, attained.

c. **Kant.** The great philosopher, Immanuel Kant (1724-1804), presents his ideas of progress in his *Idea of Universal History on a Cosmopolitan Plan* (1784). In this he conceives of history as the record of the working out or unfolding of the plan of nature, which is the perfect development of all the latent capacities of man. He starts with the principle of invariable and universal law which applies to human actions and human development, even though appearances seem to deny it, as it does to any other physical phenomena. Kant says:

"Whatsoever difference there may be in our notions of the freedom of the will, metaphysically considered, it is evident that the manifestation of this will—namely, human actions—are as much under the control of universal laws of nature as any other physical phenomena . . . History . . . by taking its station at a distance and contemplating the agency of the human will upon a large scale, aims at unfolding to our view a regular stream of tendency in the great succession of events so that the very same course of incidents, which, taken separately and individually, would have seemed perplexed, incoherent, and lawless, yet viewed in their connection and as the actions of the human species and not independent beings, never fails to discover a steady and continuous though slow development of certain great predispositions in our nature. Thus, for instance, deaths, births, and marriages, considering how much they are separately dependent on the freedom of the human will, should seem to be subject to no law according to which any calculation could be made beforehand of their amount; and yet the yearly registers of these events in great countries prove that they go on with as much conformity to the laws of nature as the oscillations of the weather. . . . Individual men, and even nations, are little aware that, whilst they are severally pursuing their own peculiar and often contradictory purposes, they are unconsciously following the guidance of a great natural purpose which is wholly unnoticed by themselves; and are thus promoting and making efforts for a great process which, even if they perceived it, they would little regard."

The problem is to discover a meaning in the senseless current of human actions. Now man's various tendencies and predispositions are part of the final purpose and we must look there for our clew. The motive power which nature employs to develop these tendencies is the antagonism which exists in man between his tendency to enter the social state, and a perpetual resistance to that tendency which is continually threatening to dissolve it; in brief, the forces of communism versus competition. His antiregular inclinations awaken in him all the human powers, drive him to master his propensity to indolence, become ambitious, avaricious, and a seeker of honor. These forces raised man

from the savage state to his present status, and will eventually, he thought, produce an Arcadian life. Nature is to be thanked for competition and enmity, and the striving for power and wealth. Furthermore, these conflict processes must be permitted to freely work themselves out. For this is needed universal peace and a universal federation of nations—a universal, civil, cosmopolitan society, in which the utmost possible freedom shall be united with the most rigorous determination of the boundaries of freedom. Only here can the tendencies of human nature be fully developed. Looking back over history, Kant thought that he could see in its events the gradual consummation of this very plan of federation and peace.

The foundation and motive of Kant's speculation on progress is his ethical theory, however. The progress on which he lays stress, unlike most of the other theorists we have considered, is not scientific or material progress, but moral amelioration. The end to be attained is a reign of reason in which all men mutually treat each other as ends, never as means only. The moral law to be observed is his famous categorical imperative: "Act as if the maxim of thy action were to become by thy will a universal law."

And in all this the goal is the thing. Kant says: "The destination of the human species as a whole, is towards continued progress. We accomplished it by fixing our eyes on the goal which, though a pure ideal, is of the highest value in practice, for it gives a direction to our efforts conformable to the intentions of Providence."

d. Fichte. Another theory of progress largely deduced from certain principles of thought rather than positive scientific research is that of Johann Gottlieb Fichte (1762-1814), as found in a series of lectures on *Characteristics of the Present Age*, delivered in Berlin in 1804-1805. History is conceived as progressive; but progress is not bound up with the interest of human happiness; it is rather a consequence of the nature of his thought. Progress is made clear to him without the aid of history; for his principles are already proved independently of history.

The process of history, according to Fichte, is an indefinite approximation to a continually receding goal of "freedom." As the world ascends goal-ward, men are more and more controlled by reason. The end of mankind on earth is a state where all life shall be governed consciously and deliberately by reason. He discusses the five overlapping epochs in the progress of the world toward a complete regnancy of reason, and places his age in the middle one. The rôle of the wise man is to discover the truths conditional to progress.

e. **Hegel.** A germinal evolutionary doctrine which influenced most profoundly later thinking along the lines of social development, and which at the same time crystallized the more or less nebulous conceptions of history that preceded it, was that found in Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel's (1770-1830) *Lectures on the Philosophy of History* (1823-1827). History is for him not the expression of a predetermined plan, but the result of laws immanent in historical life itself. Each advance proceeds with rigid logical necessity from that which went before. History, which, according to Hegel, was concerned almost wholly with spiritual and moral forces, is a sort of unfolding of the human spirit-cycle, repeating itself in different ages, a sort of inherent self-development.

There runs through all mankind an absolute Idea, or World-Spirit, which contains everything, a sort of sovereign reason. This "Idea," especially the most important phase of it, the Idea of Freedom, is the motive force in human progress. History is simply the unfolding of this Idea in its various phases, a succession of events in a rational process. He says: "The Idea is the Soul-Guide of History." All the material and moral world, nature and history, science, art, and religion are but stages of an idea apart from which they have no existence. But man is after all its subject; Nature is merely the superficial stage setting. The important thing is the action and reaction of human wills and minds. History is the unfolding of the spiritual being in time, the progress in the consciousness of freedom. Particular historic events or forces exist by virtue of the particular wills of individuals or groups; individual ideas are momentary expressions of the absolute Idea. The actual means whereby history is realized are the play of individual, subjective choices of men—a compound of interests, will, and intelligence, but primarily a matter of will, of choices and the actions by which they strive to secure them.

In the historical process there is much human endeavor and struggle. Great men lead the struggle. They are great, however, simply because they "had an insight into the requirements of the time—what was ripe for development." They embody the irresistible force of spirit in their own lives; they are the instruments of the logic of events. The positive affirmation of great men or of a period, in general, contains in it a potential negation. The three necessary categories or fundamental states of consciousness are Thesis, Antithesis, and the Synthesis of the two; or assertion, contradiction, and new combination. Thus history is not a tranquil growth, but a stern force working through opposition to

temporary realization. Every finite phenomenon points, in virtue of its limitations, beyond itself; it is but a moment in the one great whole. Thus every social institution, or custom, or ideal, or any other form into which the Idea casts itself, being an objectification of the subjective will acts, bears within it the elements which will in time burst it, permitting, yes forcing, the Idea to clothe itself anew. Therefore, history is the conflict, triumph, defeat, and virtual adjustment of human wills, only to have this process endlessly repeated. It is a union of contradictions, of extremes meeting, and of the equality of action and reactions. Contradiction becomes the very principle of the social process, the means whereby the Great Idea approaches its summation. The realization of the Idea is thus a matter of continual change, of upward moving forces. This idealistic theory of development guarantees eternal progress, since the syntheses (social institutions, customs, theories, philosophies) always become the point of departure for new developments. Thus there can be no repetition, and progress proceeds by steps. It can readily be seen how this theory gave a conception of progress when its ideas of continuity, fluidity, and change once became incorporated into social thinking.

f. **Schelling.** Joseph Friedrich Wilhelm Schelling (1775-1854), mainly in his *System of Transcendental Idealism* (1800), elaborated a philosophical idea of organic evolution, which had wide influence, even affecting certain biologists. It was the idea that there is universal development, dynamic movement, organic process. Nothing is really dead, mechanical, inorganic. Different phenomena and forces are exhibited as ascending powers, each phenomenon being assigned to a place. Everything is a relation between forces. Nature is visible soul, and soul is invisible nature, and both advance incessantly by an uninterrupted succession of stages and gradations of forms.

History is the evolution of the principle of the absolute which expresses itself more or less in all actions, and by doing so connects and harmonizes them, confers on them regularity and law, and composes out of them, free although they be, a magnificent poem or drama. It is thus progressive self-evolution of the Absolute.

D. THE NINETEENTH CENTURY

In the eighteenth century, as we have seen, the progress idea gained volume and force, but progress was looked upon as a "Law of History" by most of the thinkers—a progressively realized plan in which indefi-

nately increasing knowledge, higher universal reason, and the desertion of ancient prejudices and habits played a very significant part. But instead of the idea being based on actual historical data scientifically handled, they were usually magnificent generalizations grown out of the half truths of over-metaphysical minds. In the nineteenth century science is again emphasized and more and more colors the progress idea. Speculative and metaphysical elements are eliminated, though, to be sure, they are found especially among the early thinkers of the century. The responsibility for progress is not put upon an Absolute, or a formula, or an expanding universal reason, but upon man, who is the agent that develops science and manipulates it in his own interests. Progress thus passes out of the stage where it is thought of as an automatic process logically proceeding from stage to stage. Furthermore, in the nineteenth century the idea also receives the scientific setting of a new biology, a philosophy of evolution and the new social science, sociology. It becomes the guiding spiritual force of the century.

The writings of the men of the earlier part of the nineteenth century, particularly the French writers, included some bizarre elements occasionally. This was due to the fact that the French Revolution upset the thinking of the time and made almost anything possible. This extraordinary upheaval could not but affect the world of thought, even the most independent speculation. Consequently the most impracticable social metamorphoses are often presented as feasible. But men who had been through those years of upheaval and rapid change, who had perceived a political and a social Renaissance crowded into a few decades, could conceive no limits to the possible. Presently, however, thought settled down to saner levels.

a. Saint-Simon. Comte Henri de Saint-Simon (1760-1825) was among those affected by these conditions. One of his main contributions lay in his partial establishment of the new science of sociology, the science of social development. He used the term *science politique* with practically the same connotation that Comte gave to sociology. Like Comte, he also placed it at the head of his hierarchy of sciences.

Saint-Simon disagreed with the doctrine of Rousseau that natural man was perfect and that social influence was responsible for his deterioration from his original purity. The Revolution had definitely demonstrated the absurdity of that idea. The Golden Age is not in the past, where blind tradition placed it, but before us. We must establish the comforting and inspiring notion that the results of our labors lie ahead. Most significant and helpful are the solid inductions of history

and observation and the advancement of science. Particularly helpful is the new study which is to make history a science instead of literature.

The new progress is presented as the outcome of his analysis of history, the law of the two stages, which is a sort of psychological evolution of the race. The mind passes through a succession of religious phases, fetishism, polytheism, and deism, and steadily substitutes for them in one department of inquiry after another positive and scientific conceptions; there is a regular course of change in the human spirit from theological viewpoints to those that characterize a life of scientific and practical affairs. There is a socio-political system that corresponds to each stage of this development described by Saint-Simon.

But Saint-Simon did not devote himself mainly to scientific questions. His chief concern was the all-important question of "social reorganization," which he placed in the future. With the true organization of society there would be a general rehabilitation, and a fuller appreciation of material enjoyment. It was to be an age of industrialism, of labor, of the "exploitation of the globe by association." Only productive industry was to be engaged in, the non-productive and military activities and classes were to be eliminated; an hierarchy of talent was to be established, the positions being assigned on the basis of capacity, which had been sought out since childhood. A complete political reorganization was to occur also, the administration of public affairs being in the hands of trained and eminently fit experts.

All political and economic considerations must be supplemented and controlled by those of a purely spiritual character if social reform was to be assured. The full expression of this feeling was given in his *New Christianity*, the end of which was to ameliorate as rapidly as possible the condition of the poor. Its one doctrine was that "all should labor for the material, moral and intellectual development of the class the poorest and most numerous." It was to be a religion of love, brotherhood, and service. Thus reorganization was to occur in the three domains of science, industry, and religion.¹²

b. Fourier. François Charles Marie Fourier (1772-1837) has to be studied along with Saint-Simon. He was also seeking a new social science, whose sociological laws, when recognized and put into effect, would do away with the poverty and vice and other calamities of the human race, and make possible the construction of an ideal and perfect society. The social world as at present constituted is throughout a viola-

¹² For a more extensive discussion see the writer's *History of Utopian Thought*, pp. 191-197.

tion and reversal of the laws of nature. Over against this he placed his theory of universal harmony—the law of passionate attraction, a deduction from the Newtonian law of attraction in the material universe. The passions under proper conditions tend only to concord; but when checked and thwarted as the present world falsely believes is necessary, they cause misery and discord. When harmonized and given full and free scope and development they will provide a social system as orderly and perfect as the sidereal system. Bound in and restrained they were but straining, chained tigers; given free play, they made for social harmony and happiness. The passions, twelve in number, united together into one mighty all-controlling impulse called “harmonism,” which is “the tendency of the individual to harmonize his happiness with the happiness of all that surrounds him and all the human race,” a passion quite unknown to the present race.

The “phalanx” was the perfect environment where a suitable number of individuals could group themselves together in the happiest and most harmonious combinations possible, and give their passions free play.¹⁸

c. **Comte.** The thinker who has probably done more than any other to promote the present progress idea was Isadore Auguste Marie François Xavier Comte (1798-1857), the great positivist and founder of sociology. His main ideas are found in his two great works, *Course of Positive Philosophy* (1830-1842, six volumes) and *System of Positive Polity* (1851-1854, four volumes). Progress is the very soul of his great system of thought, and in it he attempts to determine its laws and establish the science which makes it its problem.

His famous “Law of Three Stages,” previously elucidated after a fashion by Turgot and Saint-Simon, is really a law of progress, since it is Comte’s description of a continuous intellectual evolution in the past, caused by mankind’s groping after positive methods of thought, its aspiration to penetrate to a knowledge of causes. Actually it is a movement from superstition to science. The human intellect, in the case of individual nations as well as of humanity at large, passes through three distinct stages—the theological, subdivided into the ages of fetishism, polytheism, and monotheism, in which phenomena are explained as due to “fictions” or “mythological” elements; the metaphysical, during which causation occurs by abstractions, or essences, or forces of one kind or another; and finally the positive or scientific stage, in which men devote themselves to observation and classification

¹⁸ For fuller discussion see *ibid.*, pp. 197-204.

of phenomena, and the discovery of invariable relations which phenomena bear to each other. Men are just emerging into this stage of great promise. Comte, being one who caught the new spirit of his time more accurately than most men, sought the facts and the relations of facts, or laws, in connection with social phenomena, particularly the laws of human nature. For this purpose he established the new science of social physics, later called by him sociology, which he based on actual observations of facts, and which he sought to make as scientific as the natural sciences. This new science, with its historical facts and immutable natural laws, would then provide the basis for social control, and also the theories for the reconstruction of the social system of Europe; in brief, the technique of progress.

Since the principle of sociology consists in conceiving social phenomena as inevitably subjected to natural laws, Comte attempts to fix the peculiar character of these laws. These phenomena present two aspects, the static and the dynamic, the phenomena of equilibrium or order, and those of motion or progress. Statics is that division of sociology that deals with the conditions and laws of social order and harmony, society's everyday, continuous existence, the orderly workings of a social cross-section. Social dynamics is the study of succession, or movement—the laws of social evolution—the natural advance or improvement of humanity. The primary agent of this social motion is intellectual development, through which man acquires an increasing influence over his own conduct, society, and nature; and the secondary agents are forces resident in society, such as (a) ennui, that hatred of lethargy and passivity, "that spontaneous moral and intellectual disposition at work in our natures," the urge to exercise our faculties; (b) the fact that human life does not last indefinitely, but that death stops one generation and thus brings a steady renewal of agents with accelerated progress; as Comte puts it, "an indefinite extension of human life . . . would presently put a stop to all progression whatever;" (c) finally, there is the natural increase of population and the concentration and interstimulation which result, which contribute more than any other influence to accelerate the speed of change.

The crowning point of Comte's system was his religion of humanity, discussed in his *Positive Polity*. In this work humanity is not an object of science, as in the former, but an object of adoration and love. This religion is based on the demonstrated truths of positive science. Humanity, the "Grand Being," is the sum-total of all dead, living, or future beings who have voluntarily labored for the progress and

blessedness of man. This is the only Supreme Being that we can know, and satisfies both the need for an external Power to which we must feel subordinated, and one which we can love. Luminous in it are the ideas of service and altruism which grow out of his golden rule "*Vivre pour autres*"—to live for others. Immortality was "to continue to live in others;" salvation was found in union with humanity.

As the end of it all he sees his "sociocracy," or perfect social state. While there is much unfounded idealism in Comte's thought, and while most of his ideas have been repudiated, the stimulus which he gave to a great train of tendencies of thought and effort cannot be accurately estimated. And certainly it is true that he gave weight and power to the progress doctrine.

Following Comte, the idea of progress became almost commonplace; the air was full of it. Nearly every writer in England, France, and America on social and historical subjects mentioned it, at least incidentally. During the next thirty-five or forty years men discussed such subjects as: progress as the result of intellectual forces, or the dominance of reason over instincts and caprice; progress as a matter of irresistible law; the relation of political agents and progress; the various aspects of material progress; education and progress, and so on.¹⁴

II. THE SIGNIFICANCE OF THE EVOLUTIONARY DOCTRINE

The movement that finally gave scientific content and substantiation to the progress idea was the theory of evolution, particularly the theory of organic evolution, first launched about 1850. The evolutionary idea, both in the physical and the human sphere, demonstrated the weaknesses of the eighteenth century progress ideas. It showed that they were merely brilliant guesses, not scientific hypotheses; in some cases merely wishes or hopes, instead of substantiated and incontrovertible facts presented by research, investigation, and experiment. Evolution analyzed and described the real automatic and spontaneous factors in change, its regularities, the nature of the processes of life, and the relationship between cause and effect.

Now evolution does not insure progress, nor is it synonymous with progress; evolution is entirely neutral, it is compatible with either progress or regress, according to the conditions.¹⁵ But evolution did discover and demonstrate man's position in the organic series, his

¹⁴ For a more detailed discussion see Bury, *op. cit.*, pp. 307-333.

¹⁵ For discussion of this point see Chapter IV, sec. 4.

ascent from humble biological beginnings. This was absolutely essential, for as Lichtenberger says:¹⁶ "Unless man is a product of the organic process, organic laws do not apply to him, and he remains forever outside the domain of organic science." It also demonstrated, as Lichtenberger points out,¹⁷ the universality of the process throughout the entire domain of human observation and experience. Thus man's collective life came to be included within the scientific purview. Above all, it emphasized the real possibilities of moving on to greater achievements. It demonstrated the laws and the technique that can be utilized for progressive purposes, if man can learn about them. In other words, evolution provided the facts concerning the processes of change, but it also, by demonstrating the technique of these processes, suggested their manipulation by man in his own interests. The knowledge of evolution thus suggested social control and utilization of evolutionary processes.

Evolution pointed to the future and its possibilities, aroused a new interest in it, and set up the new ethical principle of duty to posterity. It detracted from the old interest in life beyond the grave, which makes for social impotence, and concentrated attention on promoting human welfare in the assured and knowable present and future on earth. It also blighted the doctrine of the radical corruption of man.

a. **Darwin.** The history of evolution in the modern meaning of the word, viz., that of the development of the sum of living beings from less perfect forms of existence by means of natural causes, begins with Charles Robert Darwin (1809-1882), who was the first to establish it as a scientific theory in biology. His thought was set forth in his great works, *The Origin of Species* (1859), and *Descent of Man* (1871). He unified the phenomena of the biological world, including man, under a single concept, and revealed the existence of continuity in a region where up to that time continuity had not been scientifically demonstrated. The flora and fauna of the earth originated by development and not by special creation, and the agencies in the process were the same as those now in operation, viz., the struggle for existence, heredity, variation, and natural and sexual selection. He stressed the principle of natural causation, and encouraged the habit of thinking positively and dispensing with theological and metaphysical causes; he illuminated with facts questions of origins and continuity that heretofore had been explained on supernatural grounds. He emphasized a tendency in nature to modify and improve all living forms so far as to make them

¹⁶ J. P. Lichtenberger, *Development of Social Theory*, p. 266.

¹⁷ *Ibid.*

more fit to survive in their given environment, and hinted at the factors in this process. With him evolution became understandable and believable.

His theory also indicated that human society as well as organic life is the natural product of evolutionary forces, operating over an immense period of time, and that these changes must be accounted for in terms of variation and selection. His work tended to stress anew the necessity of seeking causes, processes, and laws in connection with all social changes. Greater emphasis than ever was laid on the recording of facts and the collecting of data to assist in determining causes and understanding social processes and products, particularly social institutions. He made possible the first clear scientific explanation of change that would meet the facts; consequently, he for the first time put into the hands of the social thinkers the knowledge necessary to effect any social progress as it is conceived to-day.¹⁸

b. **Spencer.** Herbert Spencer (1820-1903), the great contemporary and fellow-countryman of Darwin, develops the evolutionary idea along somewhat different lines, and also extends its principles to sociology and ethics. In his *Social Statics*, published in 1850, nine years before Darwin's *Origin of Species* appeared, he offered an explanation of society in terms of progressive human nature, adapting itself to changing conditions of life. Here are found the germinal ideas that later develop into the ten volumes of the *Synthetic Philosophy*. Through all time there has been going on, and still is going on, a slow but certain process of the adjustment of the natures of men to society, and of the social organization to the nature of its constituent units, which is the result of perpetual interaction between units and aggregate and the preservation of certain qualities by the survival of the fittest and inheritance. All our social evils and imperfections are due to lack of complete adjustment which, however, is being converted into a perfect equilibrium. Eventually all friction will disappear. All tends to the good. All these special changes are merely phases of a process of universal development wrought out in an inevitable way by unchanging forces and tending to continually produce higher and higher and more individuated types. Progress is the certain movement from vagueness to individuation.

He followed up this thought in his *Progress: Its Law and Cause* (1857), in which evolution is declared to be the process of the universe

¹⁸ For an excellent discussion of the further applications of Darwin's ideas to the field of social interpretation see J. P. Lichtenberger, *op. cit.*, pp. 279-302.

and all that it contains. The law of progress is shown to consist in the transformation of the homogeneous into the heterogeneous; and this process is illustrated by examples taken from all orders of phenomena, while the cause of the transformation is found in the law of the multiplication of effects.

Spencer's evolutionary reasoning reached its acme in his *First Principles* (1862). Evolution is a double process involving continuous redistribution of matter and motion. His famous definition is as follows: "Evolution is an integration of matter and concomitant dissipation of motion; during which the matter passes from an indefinite incoherent homogeneity to a definite, coherent heterogeneity and during which the retained motion undergoes a parallel transformation."¹⁹ This concept Spencer then takes and applies extensively in the fields of biology, psychology, sociology, and ethics, the discussion of which constitute the *Synthetic Philosophy*.

In the *Principles of Sociology* he discusses superorganic or social evolution as a part of evolution as a whole. He condenses his whole discussion when he says:

"Social evolution forms a part of evolution at large. Like evolving aggregates in general, societies show integration, both by simple increase of mass and by coalescence and re-coalescence of masses. The change from homogeneity to heterogeneity is multitudinously exemplified; up from the single tribe, alike in all its parts, to the civilized nation, full of structural and functional unlikenesses. With progressive integration and heterogeneity goes increasing coherence. We see the wandering groups dispersing, dividing, held together by no bonds; the tribe with parts made more coherent by subordination to a dominant man; the cluster of tribes united in a political plexus under a chief with sub-chiefs; and so on up to the civilized nation, consolidated enough to hold together for a thousand years or more. Simultaneously comes increasing definiteness. Social organization is at first vague; advance brings settled arrangements which grow slowly more precise; customs pass into laws which while gaining fixity, also become more specific in their applications to varieties of actions; and all institutions, at first confusedly intermingled, slowly separate, at the same time that each within itself works off more distinctly its component structures. Thus in all respects is fulfilled the formula of evolution. There is progress towards greater size, coherence, multiformity, and definiteness."²⁰

In general it can be said that Spencer presented the actual progression of humanity as a necessary fact, a sequel to the general cosmic movement and controlled by the same principles. It was only one exam-

¹⁹ *Op. cit.*, p. 396.

²⁰ *Op. cit.*, pp. 596-597.

ple of the universal, inherent tendency of the cosmos to develop from the homogeneous to the heterogeneous. Evolution was a universal, mechanical, irresistible movement toward perfection. Spencer, probably more than anyone else, made the doctrine of progress a popular commonplace. But later thinkers were to tear his ideas of progress to pieces and repudiate the main tenor of his thought. The well-instructed mind now sees both evolution in general, and human history in particular, as a strange blend of progress and regress. Humanity has not made and cannot make a smooth ascent, and progress is not inevitable.

12. WARD AND THE TELIC IDEA

One other great thinker served to give the progress idea its finishing touches and incline it in the direction which it now generally takes among scientific people. This man is Lester Frank Ward (1841-1913), the great American paleobotanist and sociologist. His outstanding works from our point of view are: *Dynamic Sociology* (1883); *The Psychic Factors of Civilization* (1893); *Pure Sociology* (1903); *Applied Sociology* (1906). Spencer, as we have seen, conceived of social progress as a sort of mechanically determined redistribution of energy which thought could neither accelerate nor retard. Thus progress of society was of necessity slow but sure, a matter of social mechanics working out at their own rate. As Professor A. W. Small puts it:²¹ "The sociological fashion set by Spencer was to treat social forces as though they were mills of the gods which men could at most learn to describe, but, which they might not presume to organize and control." Against this conception Ward rebelled. Spencer, he felt, had completely obscured the psychic elements and exaggerated the physical factors conceived in shaping social combinations and conditions. Ward emphasized the fact that nearly all the progress, material and social, hitherto attained, has come about due to the control of mind over the conditions of life. Progress is, and must be, a conscious and deliberate act on the part of men. Furthermore, the power of the mind is so great that it is possible to inaugurate a new and better era of progress. He differentiates biological and human or social evolution by the familiar formula: "The environment transforms the animal, while man transforms the environment." According to Ward, there is a difference so great between the progress of the past and the progress to be anticipated when mind shall have applied itself to the problem, that we may speak of the latter as

²¹ *General Sociology*, p. 84.

artificial progress, and the former as *natural* or even *accidental* progress. By this he means that society can convert the natural process of evolution into an artificial process; it can shape its own destiny of its own volition or will, speeding up the process, and making it far more economical of energy and materials than any process of natural selection or survival of the fittest. As he puts it,²² such progress can be likened to the calculated course of an ocean liner, as compared with the drifting of an iceberg. This purposeful social action Ward calls "telesis," "the conscious improvement of society by society," *i.e.*, social action based upon intelligent foresight, knowledge of natural and social laws, and action directed on the basis of these laws to ends which reason has approved—the application of all available forces, physical, industrial, spiritual, to the attainment of rational social ends.

The chief instrument through which social progress is to be effected is education, because by means of it the greatest diffusion of the most important extant knowledge among all the members of society can be brought about. In this way does society avail itself of the efforts which investigators, discoverers and inventors have been making to ameliorate the conditions of mankind. Only if the nature and the manner of social forces are known can they be directed into safe and useful channels. Thus education must be universal and equal.

At the end of social effort he has his "sociocracy," or ideal democratic state, from which the present partisanship, ignorance, hypocrisy, and stupidity have been eliminated, and in which government is consciously and intelligently administered by society for its own interests.

E. CONCLUSION

The idea of progress as a definite concept is less than three centuries old. In its present form it is barely forty-five years old. It did not become a generally accepted principle until after the middle of the nineteenth century, and even then only among Western peoples. It is not only modern, but astonishingly recent. Its late appearance in the history of civilization can be largely attributed to those widespread misconceptions which have prevailed with regard to the origin, destiny, and character of the human race and its habitat. Until man recognized change as an unavoidable and continuous fact in history, until man himself is generally recognized as an earthly and organic being whose

²² *Pure Sociology*, pp. 463-465. For more of this thought see *Dynamic Sociology*, Vol. II, pp. 632-633.

whole development and activity is governed by scientific law, until man himself develops instrumentalities for comprehending this knowledge regarding himself and the world in general, and until he recognizes his power of manipulating both himself and the social and natural world, he cannot attain to the present conception of progress; he does not feel *himself* capable of progress, and this is the essence of social progress.²³ Man must be inspired by the awakening consciousness of his growing knowledge and growing power. When this is accomplished progress becomes an ideal which is quite generally and consciously proclaimed and sought.

The progress idea has been a matter of continual growth. As Bury points out,²⁴ ideas have their intellectual climates, and as one closely follows the changes in the nature and content of the progress idea, one notes preceding them gradual changes in the intellectual environment which make possible these new phases. Considerations such as these account for the fact that a true progress idea did not appear in the times of Hebrew antiquity. While the prophets were inspired by religious hope, their ideas of a Messianic state tended to be theocratic and other-worldly; more important, though, it was at most a hope for the "Remnant," not even a national hope. The Apocalyptists and Jesus, to be sure, broadened the hope in scope, and Jesus with his ethical program, and his ideal of the Kingdom of God, made it more concrete and applicable; but it remained a religious hope which a warring, matter-of-fact world could not grasp.

Nor was the intellectual atmosphere surrounding the classical Greek and Roman speculators and savants, with its profound veneration of antiquity and hopelessness of ever transcending it, propitious to the idea. In the main nothing had happened sufficiently significant to shock them out of their old viewpoint, nor was there anything to give them any understanding of natural or social processes. Consequently, social change consisted of a cycle, or series of cycles, with periodic variations of good and bad states, or else a Golden Age was posited in the dim past, followed by a gradual worsening. Only among a few of the Roman writers do we catch glimpses of thinking that seems to point to a conception of progressive evolution.

The pessimism of the early and dominant medieval Church concerning mundane progress, its general feeling that man was incompetent

²³ H. M. Dadourian, "Some Problems of Progress," *Scientific Monthly*, Vol. 15, pp. 349-358.

²⁴ *Op. cit.*, p. 7.

mere pawn of Providence—and that the only worthwhile change that could come would be through the church, did not encourage any thought on the progress idea. Furthermore, with the exception of the thought within the church, it was the “Dark Ages,” and secular thinking did not flourish. This thinking merged into the intellectual impotence and insipidity of scholasticism.

In the fifteenth, sixteenth, and seventeenth centuries there were a series of events which shifted the whole viewpoint of men, concentrating their attention upon their own independent powers and their earthly destiny. Only now were the long-standing obstacles—pessimism, theological bondage, political suppression—transcended and a favorable environment prepared. The progress idea appeared, the leaven for its development was at work, and men were being intellectually prepared for its general comprehension. The significance of knowledge was realized, and a few rare souls were beginning to cry the benefits of science. It was a Renaissance in more senses than one. Humanistic better states were anticipated, sometimes taking Utopian form; later came the influence of the new science and the expression of a confidence in man's ability to work great changes, though immediate realization was not expected, as well as a conception of history that implied its gradual conformity to uncertain infantile scientific hopes.

The eighteenth century writers broke away from all previous concepts and interpretations of social life. It was the age of reason and natural law. Phenomena were now a matter of cause and effect, and could be known and controlled. Man's unhappiness was the result of the conditions that he had created or permitted, and these could be changed if he but willed it. Especially in France the progress idea now had an environment in which it could flourish with tropical luxuriance. The dream of indefinite human perfectibility reigned. But elsewhere metaphysical thought dominated; especially in Germany was progress conceived as the inevitable unfolding of cosmic principles.

Evolutionary principles, first set forth in the eighteenth century, developed their full stature in the nineteenth. Facts presented by research and experiment now interpreted change. Man utilized these facts to control his world, became an intelligent and conscious manipulator, and realized that he could shape by telic effort his own destiny along the lines which science showed to be feasible and desirable.

The whole development of the progress idea hinged directly upon the progressive availability of the intellectual instrumentalities necessary for its comprehension and use. Hence before science was incor-

porated with it, it was little more than vain imagining, optimistic hoping, metaphysical exploration, or brilliant guessing. In general, the development of the progress idea must be correlated with the spread of science. It is this which has made our modern progressive way of thinking of social life and history as different from that of the ancients and medievalists as is the present Einsteinian conception of the universe different from the pre-Copernican idea, and it is this which makes it such a thoroughly modern idea.

QUESTIONS AND PROBLEMS

1. Is there such a thing as cosmic progress? Is the progress idea a product of human life? How, account for it?
2. Account, if possible, for the prevailing conceptions of progress in the different periods discussed above.
3. Why are the progress ideas of so many peoples intimately bound up with their religious ideas? When did the separation come? Account for it.
4. Why has the Kingdom of God idea of Jesus only recently received the attention it deserves?
5. What changes, in general, must occur among a people before they can conceive of a Golden Age in the future rather than in the past?
6. Why did not the progress idea as we understand it appear before the sixteenth century?
7. If there is some other one line of development with which the progress idea as it develops can be correlated, what is it?
8. What difference does it make what men thought about progress in the past?
9. Present in 200 words or less as comprehensive and concise a statement of the historical development of the progress idea as you can on the basis of all your reading.

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CHAPTER IV

THE PRESENT CONCEPT OF SOCIAL PROGRESS: BASIC PRINCIPLES

I. NEED OF DEFINING THE PROGRESS IDEA

THE progress idea, in spite of the fact that it so thoroughly dominates the general mind, is so protean and elusive that attempts to define it are few. Even among the definitions that we do find, there is only limited agreement as to its precise nature. Any historical review of the idea demonstrates this fact, as does a poll of contemporary expressions on the subject. We have recently come to realize, however, that if it is to be a useful idea and if progressive effort is not to be wasted, there is vital need of making the concept fairly precise. Consequently during the last two decades some of our best minds, particularly in the social sciences, have been devoting themselves to this task. First we must distinguish between progress and other concepts which are frequently confused with it.

2. CHANGE IS NOT PROGRESS

Under certain conditions change may result in progress. Furthermore, change is prerequisite to progress. But change is in no sense synonymous with progress. And yet this identification of change and progress is the source of great and frequent confusion. As Balz puts it:¹ "In a social life as dynamic as ours, change is taken as natural, fixity as unnatural. And every change, because it is a change, is likely to be baptized as "progress." Progress means change—and when the belief in Progress is a settled conviction, it is only too easy to regard the proposition as equivalent to this, that any change is Progress." We have mistaken change and growth, especially rapidity of change, for progress. Ferrero shows that it is possible that young societies, such as those of the Americans, change and grow very quickly, like a baby that doubles its weight in its first half year; but this is not progress

¹A. G. A. Balz, *The Basis of Social Theory*, p. xv. Reprinted by and with permission of and special arrangement with Alfred A. Knopf, Inc., authorized publishers.

necessarily, it is merely growing up.² Professor Dewey also points out³ that we have taken certain changes which have been gains in our own comfort and ease as signs that cosmic forces were working inevitably to improve the whole state of human affairs. We have come to think of the release of barriers, such as various inventions which facilitated migration and travel, communication and circulation of ideas and reciprocal criticism, and the production and distribution of goods in a world-wide market as progress. "Persons and things have been endlessly redistributed and mingled. The fixed has given way to the mobile; the settled to the free." But all this change—this mobility and freedom—is not progress, but merely opportunity for progress.

The confusion is probably due to the fact that change is universal and omnipresent. We know that there is nothing fixed or stationary in the universe. Heraclitus established a significant truth when he discovered the eternal flux of things, and definitely fixed the idea. All is constant motion, and changes involving integration and disintegration are always in evidence.

We must expect to find change in the social world as in the natural world. In fact, as John Dewey has said, "Change is the primary social fact as surely as motion is the primary physical fact."⁴ Our most permanent institutions and beliefs undergo constant change, and instead of there being "no new thing under the sun" it would be truer to say that all things are ever new. The many institutions, customs, and beliefs that seem to us so stable are only relatively so. Every generation should expect to find that its successor had a different viewpoint in belief and activity.

And yet most of us are not cognizant of the changing processes around us, owing to our limited powers of perception. The fact that we are part of each change, immersed in it, further accentuates our myopia. When we do become aware of it we mistake it for progress. For there is a certain time conceit. We almost always think that what we have is best. Hence, when we look back and see that it was different twenty or two hundred years ago, we imagine that we have progressed. Usually we have merely changed.

We should never fall into the error of conceiving the idea that in this eternally changing picture the last condition must always be more excellent and perfect than the former. Change is a neutral concept;

² Guglielmo Ferrero, *Ancient Rome and Modern America*, pp. 122-123.

³ J. Dewey, "Progress," *International Journal of Ethics*, Vol. 26, p. 312.

⁴ *New Republic*, April 27, 1918.

it implies no idea of values. *Change is variation, not valuation; movement, not improvement.* It can perhaps best be illustrated by the story of the negro⁵ who had inadvertently broken into a wasp's nest. As he was rushing headlong down a road he was stopped by a white man and asked where he was going. He replied, "I aint goin' nowhere, boss. I'se just leavin' the place where I was at." That is change.

3. EVOLUTION AS SUCH IS NOT PROGRESS

The modern doctrines of evolution originated in the eighteenth century theories of "progress," and these theories sprang from the desire of men like Condorcet to discover a meaning in the world. Herbert Spencer in his *Progress, Its Law and Cause* also identifies the two. He expressly states that "The laws of evolution are the laws of progress." These are perhaps the primary causes for our frequent error in making evolution and progress synonymous. But the words *progress* and *evolution* are by no means equivalent. Evolution may or may not spell progress; degeneration is always a lurking possibility.

Evolution is merely orderly movement from one condition to another, or from one process to another, according to law. It is the view that "new" forms of life emerge from the old by an orderly process of which the factors may be isolated and described. It is simply change due to resident forces and not governed by an outside purpose.

Evolution means "a becoming," but is wholly indifferent to qualitative considerations. Hobhouse says that "The fact that a thing is evolving is no proof that it is good, the fact that society has evolved is no proof that it has progressed." Again he says: "No one has a right to speak of progress, a term which connotes value, in relation to the process of things."⁷ Evolution is not an escalator which will inevitably and automatically raise humanity to a perfect state. It can be manipulated and utilized for that purpose, but it never did and never will guarantee progress. Teggart, for example,⁸ observes that history shows that social evolution is not slow, unbroken progress directed towards some determinable end. "What we do find are the unmistakable results

⁵ Mentioned by C. C. H. Williamson, "Progress," *International Journal of Ethics*, Vol. 31, pp. 403-404.

⁶ The writer is aware of the fact that change occurs according to evolutionary principles; and no attempt is here made to draw a distinction between the two. Both, however, used independently, are often confused with progress, hence their separate treatment.

⁷ L. T. Hobhouse, *Social Evolution and Political Theory*, pp. 8-9.

⁸ F. J. Teggart, *Processes of History*, p. 148.

of constant processes manipulated in fixity or persistence, tempered by other processes which gradually effect a modification of this rigidity."

4. EVOLUTION MAY BE PROGRESSIVE OR REGRESSIVE

In some cases evolutionary processes result in higher forms and functions. This is not true progress, but it does result in spontaneous improvement. Hence it might be called "blind progress" or "progressive evolution," or "accidental progress," to use Ward's term. "This sort of progress we may call blind, as distinguished from intelligent or consciously controlled, meaning by that term that it occurred because of the operation of forces or controls, both physical and biological, outside of the operation of the constructive powers of the human mind."⁹ Of course, evolution, under the control of the same natural forces, may result in "blind regress," or deterioration and degeneration, a breaking down rather than an advance. Thus progress is only one among many possibilities of evolution. At least it is not to be assumed that any and every form of evolution is also a form or stage in progress. For, in evolution as such, no moral or aesthetic or any other value-judgment is implied.

5. THE PRESENT-DAY CONCEPT

To-day the distinction between change and evolution on the one hand and progress on the other is coming to be more generally apprehended. Change and evolution are seen to be, on the whole, merely development, drift, which has been slow and erratic, destroying almost as rapidly as it has built. In the past, with very few exceptions, social groups have not deliberately planned their achievements. They developed spontaneously and naturally according to the needs of the time. Individuals also achieved much of value under the stress of material necessity, or of growing mentality seeking means of expression, but there was no far-sighted social end in view. Consequently improvement of civilization was so slow that at times it seemed stationary and occasionally even recessive.

6. PROGRESS AS SOCIAL TELESIS

At the core of the progress concept, as it is at present maintained, is the idea of "telic" or purposive progress, that is, social telesis—

⁹L. L. Bernard, "The Conditions of Progress," *American Journal of Sociology*, Vol. 28, pp. 22-24.

conscious, directed change of social processes in conformity with evolutionary principles. The originator of this idea is the greatest of American sociologists, Lester F. Ward. According to him, social phenomena should be contemplated as capable of intelligent control by society in its own interest. The power of the mind is so great that organized society can consciously and intelligently adopt measures to accelerate its own advance. Society can convert the natural process of evolution into an artificial process; by intelligently employing appropriate means it can shape its own destiny of its own volition or will. As Ward states: "It is the question whether the social system shall always be left to nature, always be genetic and spontaneous, and be allowed to drift listlessly on, intrusted to the by no means always progressive influences which have developed it, and brought it to its present condition, or whether it shall be regarded as a proper subject of art, treated as other natural products have been treated by human intelligence, and made as much superior to nature, in this only proper sense of the word, as other artificial productions are superior to natural ones."¹⁰ Thus by social teleis he means purposeful social action; artificially directed and accelerated social evolution. Professor L. T. Hobhouse¹¹ also claims that however much the evolutionary process may depend upon automatically working factors, progress depends primarily upon the conscious direction of social conduct and social evolution by the human mind, especially its reasoning and planning power. In his *Social Evolution and Political Theory* (Ch. II) he emphasizes again the fact that social progress is almost exclusively the result of psychological and social forces. Thus, while evolution represents movements toward new positions of stability, progress, instead of leading to stability, carries with it a principle of acceleration.¹²

7. THE VISION OF A CONTROLLED WORLD

As a result of such ideas we now have a vision of a world in the making, of an evolutionary process in which we are active agents, of a social order which we may help to transform into something better.

¹⁰ *Dynamic Sociology*, Vol. II, pp. 632-633.

¹¹ *Development and Purpose*.

¹² The telic idea could not have been conceived much before the days of Ward and Huxley because the great changes that have given man confidence in himself, such as the industrial revolution, wrought by mechanical inventions, and the discovery of coal, iron, and petroleum, the great scientific advances in all lines, the new knowledge of social phenomena, and technique of control provided by the social sciences, had not yet occurred.

We see the possibilities of a conscious and deliberate movement toward social reorganization in the interests of a program of conscious advance; we see that by constructive intelligence and verified scientific knowledge man is capable of directing social change, that society by taking thought can create itself anew. To summarize it in Todd's words:¹³ "Social progress is artificial in contradistinction to racial evolution which is natural and more or less blind; it is the fruit of purpose and design, however vaguely or crudely formulated."

Progress thus is the realization of the conscious, rational ends of a self-directing society. It is a conscious projection of evolution into the future, a recognition that men can form the future. It is a matter of continuous, everlasting, deliberate achievement. It is not an automatic or inevitable levitation. To have it we must be on our guard continually, striving and fighting, tragically and ceaselessly, against destructive forces. It must be won by dint of intelligence and toil, of devotion and application of human desire, patience, ingenuity, and mother wit. It will not come as the result of rest or sleep or feasting or even watchful waiting, but in the willing, hearty, and fruitful expression of all men's normal activities, physical, intellectual, social, or spiritual.

Progress is likely always to be a matter of struggle. The forces that make for progress always have to compete with the forces that make for standstill and regress. The predatory, the selfish, the short-sighted, the reactionary, always have to be overcome, not by spasmodic efforts, but by disciplined persistence illuminated by right ideals. Lord Meath, the reformer, says: "Having had considerable experience in the promotion of social movements, some of which after severe strife, have won popular approval, may I be allowed to warn young enthusiasts that no reform of any consequence, whether social or political, has ever yet been carried to success except after violent and in many cases prolonged opposition. Witness the abolition of slavery, parliamentary reform, women's struggle for equality of rights, and many causes too numerous to name."¹⁴ Because of these conditions progress is the greatest challenge as well as the greatest human art of the age.

Man now has the power consciously to retard or accelerate the process of his unfoldment; his progress is in his own hands. He has latent within him the principles of all powers and advancements, but for these to be made actual necessitates a conscious effort on his part. Thus, if we believe in social progress, we believe that we ourselves, by

¹³ A. J. Todd, *Theories of Social Progress*, p. 506.

¹⁴ *Nineteenth Century*, Vol. 98, pp. 815-816.

means of our intelligence, our adaptability, our power of self-control, and of control over our various environments are able to remove the difficulties and obstacles that trouble us in industry, politics, social relations, religion, and all the other departments of life, and establish a far more satisfactory society.¹⁵

8. THE DANGERS OF THE IDEA THAT PROGRESS IS AUTOMATIC AND A MATTER OF LAW

Under the sway of science and the telic idea men are beginning to see how useless and wrongheaded and demoralizing is the rather widespread belief, even among some of the higher authorities, that progress is a law of humanity—that it is automatic, continuous, inevitable and uninterrupted, and that the world is fool-proof. The “law” of progress is seen to be a rasping misnomer. If there is a law, the study of social facts should make it manifest. Actually, however, such study has effectively knocked the underpinning from beneath any such concept.

By “law” in social phenomena we mean a constant and necessary communication between phenomena, of which one is the antecedent of the essential condition of the other. Now if there is a “law” of social progress, then all phenomena must lead with absolute necessity to others which represent progress according to some determinable test. But this would amount to predeterminism, since the test or standard for it would have to be set in advance, be generally recognized, and be good for all time. This is untenable. Furthermore, it would entirely exclude liberty, and yet the facts of history are the products of free agency. Either we must set aside the question of the law of progress, or deny the fact of liberty and choice in history.

We are also forced to note that if civilizations expand and blossom, they also decay and disappear and patent gains are balanced by obvious losses. This fact was recognized by Walter Bagehot many years ago when he said: “Our habitual instructors, our ordinary conversation, our inevitable and ineradicable prejudices tend to make us think that Progress is the normal fact in human society, the fact which we should be surprised if we did not see. . . . But, in fact, any progress is extremely rare. As a rule . . . a stationary state is by far the most frequent condition of man, as far as history describes that condition; the

¹⁵ For a further discussion of the telic principle see J. Dewey, “Progress,” *International Journal of Ethics*, Vol. 26, pp. 311-322; V. S. Yarros, “Human Progress: the Idea and the Reality,” *American Journal of Sociology*, Vol. 21, pp. 21-23; U. G. Weatherly, *Social Progress*, pp. 234-235, 345-364.

progressive state is only a rare and an occasional exception.”¹⁶ As another writer puts it, “Development is the product not of laws, but of persons, and it carries within it the witness of spiritual freedom. Progress postulates human capacities and the call to realize them.”¹⁷

This idea that there is a “law” of progress is not only contrary to all fact, but it is dangerous. It makes individual effort useless and implies that man is nothing more than the helpless plaything of forces exterior to himself. It begets social irresponsibility and indifference, quietude, and fatalism.¹⁸ It serves as an opiate that lulls our minds into inaction as far as progressive effort is concerned, or it leads to or justifies the rather widespread belief that we can, “as individuals and classes,” safely and assuredly devote all our efforts to increasing our own possessions, intellectual, material, or otherwise, because progress is inevitable. If progress is assured, if it is a law of humanity, and is automatic and spontaneous, why toil and suffer, why make sacrifices and deny ourselves the more or less personal and selfish joys that may hurt others? “Why not eat, drink, and be merry” and let the world and the race take care of itself? This idea is just as bad and paralyzing, as Yarros points out,¹⁹ as the belief that things are going from bad to worse, and that no human effort is of any avail, or as the belief that by a sort of law of compensation things always remain the same, and that no change that takes place affects anything vital or fundamental in human nature and conduct. Any attitude of absolute faith in inevitable improvement tends to reduce the impetus towards progressive achievement by a relaxation of those efforts which would otherwise be directed to that end. And this is thoroughly bad.

The only sense in which there can be a “law” of social progress is when we think of it as continuity of action and thought. Civilization, culture, improvements of all kinds, the effects of education and social discipline, are handed down from generation to generation. The energy and the dynamic of a group is being renewed man by man, generation by generation. The generation that passes away leaves behind it good works, a heritage of art, of science, and of progressive thought that nourishes the next, which in turn will add to that heritage an entailed fortune to succeeding generations. As we become more intelligent and

¹⁶ W. Bagehot, *Physics and Politics*, pp. 40, 211, 206.

¹⁷ Williamson, *op. cit.*, Vol. 31, p. 394.

¹⁸ Cf. J. Morley, “Some Thoughts on Progress,” *Educational Review*, Vol. 29,

Yarros, *op. cit.*, p. 20.

more adaptable, this social heritage may be put to better use year after year, but even with this possibility it would be dogmatic to say that it will be absolutely continuous and uninterrupted. There have been lapses, interruptions, periods of stagnation and even deterioration, and there doubtless will be in the future, though we hope that these periods will become shorter and less frequent. But even in this regard we must temper our hopes. Progress at best is a slow and heartbreaking process. The only laws that are involved in progress are the laws of nature, and the social laws, which are in the main natural laws, and these neither promise progress nor forbid it.

9. THE NECESSITY OF THE TELIC POINT OF VIEW

Progress is not inevitable, nor is it merely a matter of chronology. It is a responsibility, not an endowment; an intended product, not a gift of the gods. It is necessary that the mind grasp the importance of the telic policy as against a policy of drift and complacency. We must develop forethought and insight into causation so that we may become used to the notion of working toward an end; we must more and more foster the experimental sciences so that we may learn how to modify environmental conditions, regardless of their nature; we must develop that constructive imagination and that sober planning power which enables us to work out efficient programs of action; above all else, we must develop among the people as a whole the idea that progress is not automatic, nor that man's state is predetermined, nor that stability, fixity, or permanency are the ideal, but that right change is absolutely necessary, that the rate of social evolution can be enormously accelerated, that we have, or will soon have, the knowledge and the intelligence to determine its direction, and the instrumentalities for carrying it into effect. As Dewey points out, at the present time, it depends upon whether we want progress or not. If we want it, we can have it, if we are willing to pay the price in effort. It is a task by no means chimerical, but scientifically possible. The conditions are at hand.²⁰ Thus the progress ideal is neither a vain imagination nor an idle dream, but a possibility which demands for its realization a wholesome optimism, ceaseless efforts, and the utilization of available agencies. But it would be too much to expect it at once.²¹

²⁰ *Op. cit.*, p. 314.

²¹ Cf. Todd, *op. cit.*, p. 510; H. G. Wells, *Modern Utopia*, pp. 171-172.

10. THE SIGNIFICANCE OF THE GOAL IN PROGRESS

Any telic effort is impossible unless it is directed to the achievement of a fairly definite goal or standard. To know whether or not advance is taking place, it is necessary to have an objective; it is necessary to know whither one is going. Otherwise "we don't know where we're going but we're on our way." Hence, to know whether humanity is progressing or retrogressing, it is necessary to know what its goals are, and whether or not it is deceiving itself regarding these goals. Thus in social progress we have standards made up of those things, or qualities, or those ends to which human beings or groups attach or can rationally attach values, to which all effort is directed, and by which an occurrence or change may be intelligently judged and a value set upon it. "Progress connotes an approach to an end or result which is regarded as more nearly perfect or complete than the antecedent stage in the development process with which the end or result is compared. It involves the selection of some particular stage or organization of the evolutionary process as a norm for comparison, and this norm must be regarded as of exceptional value to which antecedent conditions approach in value."²²

Professor F. J. Teggart²³ holds that "Progress" implies a judgment of value; it assumes a standard—some end or ends, by relation to which we judge historical movements and declare that they mean "progress." Professor Albion W. Small goes so far as to make progress the evaluation aspect of the human process.²⁴ Progress means to be constantly reaching out toward the Better, or the Best, the conscious movement toward a goal for constant improvement.²⁵

It is the guidance of unavoidable change, or the deliberate changing of processes to approximate a definite though temporary goal. In so far as progress is consummated it is nothing more nor less than a process of externalizing or objectifying the social ideals of men.²⁶

Such a goal is a source of inspiration and hope; it serves as an end, and as a means of registering the quality or success of our efforts.

²² Bernard, *American Journal of Sociology*, Vol. 28, p. 21.

²³ *Prolegomena to History*, pp. 91-92.

²⁴ "The Category of 'Progress' as a Goal of Research in Social Science," *American Journal of Sociology*, Vol. 28, pp. 554-576.

²⁵ "Man makes progress because he can conceive what progress is and use that conception as a standard of selection, and as a goal to be reached." F. J. E. Woodbridge, *The Purpose of History*, p. 78.

²⁶ "Progress consists in a sharpening of their [men's] intellectual sight that will permit them to fix their gaze on more and more distant goals, and to penetrate and disentangle increasingly complex conditions." Max Nordau, *Interpretation of History*, p. 344.

If life was one weary round, and we had no goals to serve as milestones of progress, how lacking in inspiration it would be! Pessimism would eat into our system and we would walk as those without hope—simply staggering on blindly. But with a goal we see the purpose of our struggle, and we gladly expend our energies in the great and difficult task. The goal achieved gives a sense of satisfaction and an appreciation of one's power, but the unattained goal ahead is what elicits one's enthusiasm and devoted effort; it puts the savor into life. It is the remedial action, the endeavor of converting strife into harmony, monotony into rich variety, limitation into expansion or freedom that gives the satisfaction of progress.

II. THE SOURCE OF PROGRESS IDEALS

The specific expressions of progress standards and ideals can be traced back to people both above and different from the average. They are usually people of intelligence and reflection, who are unencumbered by any profound reverence for existing institutions and standards; they are either emancipated from, or oblivious to prevailing points of view. Their whole interest is centered about the constructive change, or even the abolition of some existing institution or form. They see it in the future, revised and improved. They are the social idealists, the socially-minded scientists, and even the despised and reviled reformers who yearn for and work toward the ideal they have conceived.²⁷ These ideas or ideals, once launched, are subjected to the perpetual selective process by all who are interested or concerned. Some, of course, die off almost at once because they are too premature, or are not cast in proper form. The others survive and are gradually woven into the very fabric of social thought. They are the object of frequent thought, but are promoted for a long period of their history by a group usually decidedly in the minority—usually the socially-minded and far-sighted individuals. This minority, however, becomes a strong agitating agency, emphasizing both the need and the ideal to meet it, and their views arouse the curiosity and interest of the group in general. Slowly a collective desire for the new step is developed, and finally the idea or ideal comes to be the *consensus* of that which is best along the given line. Then it becomes the foundation of all constructive endeavors in this field. The suppression of the slave trade, the prohibition movement, the efforts to outlaw war, represent various stages in this process.

²⁷ For a more elaborate discussion of these see Chapter XII.

Such a consensus is a fairly safe guide for practical purposes. Under the influence of the élite it will continually change with the times. More and more also the "best" minds who are participating in the formation of this consensus of opinion are ably assisted by new truth provided by science in all its multifarious departments.

12. THE RELATIVE NATURE OF THE PROGRESS GOAL

But progress has no ideal in the sense that there is a fixed and universal social model to which all details ought to conform. It does not involve the idea of some future fixed condition of universal attainment—a sort of millennium in which mankind will have nothing to do but enjoy itself within its safe institutions. We know to-day that one ideal along a given line succeeds another in rapid succession. Here as elsewhere there is continual change. What is progressive to-day may be defective or even reactionary to-morrow because of changed conditions and larger knowledge. What by one person is considered progress may by another be considered retrogression. The standard of progress can be expected to differ for every people of every age of the innumerable ones that still lie ahead of us. Each generation will have a new or revised set of standards in the future as they have had in the past. In fact, since the progress ideal is based on a consensus of the best opinion along a particular line, it must be continually changing, because the sincere thinking individual cannot continue to hold the same ideas on anything very long without changing his mind if he is honest. Fortunately, however, as the social sciences are developing in technique and purpose, what constitutes the social good at any time is beginning to be clearer. Thus the progress ideal, at any given moment, is appropriate only to a given time and place; it is entirely relative. All values are relative, because as they are attained new ones develop.

Each age is a dream that is dying,
And one that is coming to birth.

Above all else, the highest aim of life, be it individual or social, is not the achievement of an ideal of perfection. There can be no such thing, nor would we want it if we could.

"It [the highest aim of life] is not the conquest of the 'Absolute' over the finite and conditional, nor of 'Reason' over the so-called baser desires. It is not even the state of perfect satisfaction of every want. Attainments of this sort would bring human behavior to a static and inert condition,

quite at variance with the fundamental laws of life. The drive behind accomplishment has always been the need to fulfill some prepotent demand *not satisfied within the present environment*. Maladjustment and struggle will probably continue to be the fountainhead of progress as long as the human race exists. Perfection of adjustment would therefore destroy the very stuff of which progress is made. There is no escape from this venerable paradox. We are forced to recognize that the highest happiness lies not in the goal achieved, but in the perpetual sequence of struggle and achievement.

"Life is essentially a process of disturbing and restoring equilibrium, of need and fulfillment. As derived drives, or interests, multiply and diversify, the struggle for adjustment becomes a problem of ever-increasing complexity, and success in the struggle brings a richness and variety of satisfactions not experienced in the more primitive stages. The Summum Bonum lies not in an ultimate attainment, but, in these very cycles of effort and success, new effort and further success, repeating themselves endlessly at ever newer and more intimate levels throughout life. Human progress is thus a *process*, eternally moving. Its current runs in the stream of life itself. The notion that it implies an ultimate and static goal is a philosophic fiction.

"Our conception of progress is therefore to be dynamic in aim rather than static, a struggle rewarded by tentative adjustment rather than perfect and final adjustment. It is a process, biological and mechanistic. It is the exercise of a plurality of living functions, rather than the pursuit of a single fixed and transcendental goal."²⁸

Social motion is not toward an absolute form of society, a forever fixed social state, and the perfect state or perfect happiness, as we conceive it at any given moment, is never attainable, for never does the fulfillment of any endeavor come in its entirety or along the lines of its original specifications. Evolution discredits all attempts to assign to the future a fixed goal, or to expect the attainment of a present goal in its entirety. Thus progress, as Cooley points out, "is a process rather than an attainment. The best is forever indefinable; it is growth, renewal, onwardness, hope."²⁹

Thus the goal of social progress is a moving goal, elusive and receding as we advance, always only partially attained as it stands at any given moment.

"Humanity's perfection will never be attained; it is only possible to work toward it. However far evolution, even directed evolution, should take us we will always be merely approaching Utopia. History shows that society is ever moving toward something different from anything yet realized or even comprehended. Nothing endures, nothing is precise and certain, the

²⁸ F. H. Allport, *Social Psychology*, Houghton Mifflin Co., pp. 425-426. See also John Dewey, *Human Nature and Conduct*, p. 282.

²⁹ C. H. Cooley, *Social Process*, p. 408. See also F. W. Blackmar, *History of Human Society*, p. 17.

present state of social life or social thought is not final, there is no abiding thing in all we know." ³⁰

All is a becoming on the part of ever restless, changing human beings. There is always room for improvement. The progressive should recognize that his ideal is merely one of the moment, imperfect to-morrow, and positively useless day after to-morrow. In thinking of social advance we should allow for thousands of years yet to be lived. We dare not limit the height to which the vital flux of nature through man may arise. The thing to strive for is incessant becoming, not stagnant being; traveling which is a constant arriving and not arriving as the end, for progress must always consist of a series of approximations.

Our analysis of the present progress concept is incomplete until we have examined the content of the present goal and the tests that are offered to determine what is progressive. The ensuing chapter is devoted to such a discussion.

QUESTIONS AND PROBLEMS

1. Is the telic idea audacious in view of man's cosmic impotence?
2. What grounds have we for thinking that social teleosis is possible?
3. Upon what does the continuity of progress depend? Does that mean that no change will occur?
4. Does progress always follow the same goals?
5. Is progress an objective condition or a subjective state?
6. What is the relation of the various social Utopias to progress?
7. How do you account for the fact that there are a considerable number of people who consider all talk concerned with progress to be "bunk"?
8. "The task of setting things right, never achieved, yet never therefore to be remitted, is itself that which makes living worth while. Could we ever arrive we should desist from further effort." (F. Adler, *The World Crisis and its Meaning*, p. 173.) Discuss.
9. Does the "plain man" have to be reckoned with and consulted in the determination and achievement of all progressive goals?

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³⁰J. O. Hertzler, *History of Utopian Thought* (copyright 1925 by The Macmillan Company), p. 307. Reprinted by permission. Henry Jones in his *Idealism as a Practical Creed* expresses the same idea when he says, "Everywhere there is promise rather than full fruition, process rather than possession, arduous endeavor and aspiration without end, rather than the tranquil joys of what is all in all and at one with itself and adequate. There is ever a battle to be won and a negative to be overpowered. . . ." pp. 178-179.

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CHAPTER V

THE PRESENT CONCEPT OF SOCIAL PROGRESS: CRITERIA AND OBJECTS

I. THE MISTAKEN OR PARTIAL TESTS

FUNDAMENTAL in any study of social progress is a scale, or test, or set of tests by which it can be measured. We have to-day tests of various kinds which enter into our daily practical judgments at every turn, which are, however, entirely unrelated and unsystematized, ungoverned by any central principle, and without any truly scientific background. Careless and prejudiced, they are fraught with danger both for those who devise and apply them and for the society that is influenced by them. Other tests need modification or qualification.

a. The Materialistic Tests. The commonest current forms of such dangerous tests are those that have to do with the "biggest," or the "greatest" and "newest," or the "most modern"—tests having to do merely with size or quantity or recency. In the United States, and perhaps in the Americas in general,¹ we have held almost exclusively to such material tests as the rapid increase of riches, rapid increase in areas of agricultural cultivation, bumper crops, increase of production, growth of population in city, state, and nation, prosperity of banks, increased profits and dividends, expansion of cities, increase in the number of skyscrapers, increase of transportation facilities, and augmented means of communication. Bigger schools, universities, and churches with increased enrollment or membership are also frequently offered as examples, without regard to any qualitative consideration whatever. Excellence is confused with magnitude of results.

Equally useless for scientific purposes is the test of "newness" so frequently applied by Americans. Often, of course, the newest is the best up to this moment, but this does not necessarily hold along the lines of the most frequent applications of this test to-day. The same thing is true of modernness as a test of social forms and institutions. Our "better" world, in general, means a materially more comfortable and more extravagant and more modern world. These tests of the street,

¹ See G. Ferrero, *Ancient Rome and Modern America*, pp. 115-138.

the mart, the counting room, the club, are either superficial, the product of social ignorance and limited perspective, or they are due to the fact that we respond to that aspect of life which interests or concerns us most; as individuals, or groups, or nations we crave expansion. That this results in a very partial and inadequate conception is borne out by Walter Lippmann when he says:

"The habit of thinking about progress as 'development' has meant that many aspects of the environment were simply neglected. With the stereotype of 'progress' before their eyes, Americans have in the mass seen little that did not accord with that progress. They saw the expansion of cities, but not the accretion of slums; they cheered the census statistics, but refused to consider overcrowding; they pointed with pride to their growth, but would not see the drift from the land, or the unassimilated immigrant. They expanded industry furiously at reckless cost to their natural resources; they built up gigantic corporations without arranging for industrial relations."²

Nor should we expect progress to consist altogether of improvement of the physical environment, such as warmth or coolness, more food, less disease, fewer accidents, and prolongation of life; nor does it mean merely work, and leisure, and sleep, and adequate wages. The activities to which any of these tests are applied may, now and then, be conducive to progress, but they are not progress, nor are they necessary for progress. Progress is more than material satisfactions or material achievements.

b. The Statistical Tests. Professor Willcox has offered a list of tests that appeal to him as a statistician,³ the main ones being: (1) the increase of the total population of a country, taking over the idea from Adam Smith who declared that "The most decisive mark of the prosperity of any country is the increase of the number of its inhabitants;" (2) the length of life, the experience of the last few centuries being particularly encouraging in this respect; (3) the degree of racial, linguistic, educational, religious, political, and industrial uniformity or homogeneity among a people; (4) the increase of literacy; and (5) the status of the family life and the domestic virtues as determined by the divorce rate.

These tests, like nearly all statistical tests, however, measure mere quantitative change, rather than qualitative change, and are not decisive.

² *Public Opinion* (copyright 1922), p. 110. Reprinted by permission of The Macmillan Company.

³ Walter F. Willcox, *A Statistician's Idea of Progress*, *International Journal of Ethics*, Vol. 23, pp. 275-298.

For example, population increase may mean overcrowding and the whole train of social, economic, political, and ethical ills that follow in its wake; longer life does not necessarily mean better life; homogeneity may mean deadlevelism and stagnation; the increase of literacy may result chiefly in more reading of salacious matter, or yellow journals; and a higher divorce rate may testify to feminine emancipation rather than family decadence. Furthermore, statistical tests cannot search out all the fields that ought to be included; there is so much in life that tables, graphs, and charts cannot present.

We do not want to be understood, however, as maintaining that statistical tests have no value. When a broadly philosophical conception of numerical data is taken, and bound up with a thoroughly socialized conception of progress, a highly successful means of testing progress is available. This is what Professor Alfredo Niceforo has so admirably done in his excellent study, *Les Indices numériques de la Civilisation et du Progrès* (1921), a book that should be available in translation for the American reader. In a later work he has applied his principles of statistical measurement of progress not only in the natural and social sciences, but even in art, especially literature.

c. **The Ideological Tests.** None of the so-called "ideological" criteria, that is, the working out of certain ideas in the world, will suffice. For example, there is the religious criterion of the working out of a divine plan upon earth. This rests upon the acceptance of a very general, and hence ambiguous divine revelation, which means that in the end it is likely to be purely subjective, or manipulated by a church council or conference for its own purposes. Whenever such a criterion has become really effective as a test of social progress it has had to slough off its mystical, supernatural elements and become concrete and even pragmatic.⁴ Or the test may be the spread of a given religion, such as Christianity or Mohammedanism. Here the underlying assumption is that a particular religion, that is, the one the individual or group embraces, is the best. The science of religion, however, demonstrates the folly of such a viewpoint. Every religion is the best from the point of view of its adherents. Judged from a strictly impartial scientific point of view all religions of great cultures in their pure form have admirable elements in them, and in practice they fall far short of their fundamental principles. The ideological criterion may be even more

⁴As is attested by the Sermon on the Mount, Jesus' New Commandment, the Kingdom of God concept, the program of The Federal Council of the Churches of Christ.

abstract and metaphysical; for example, the recognition of an absolute moral law supposed to exist in the universe, à la Kant and followers. Or it may be the realization of a system of universal natural law and rights, or of a resident tendency to perfectibility in man in the manner of the French writers just preceding the Revolution. Or it may be thought of in still more impressive fashion to be the self-unfolding of a Great Idea in the universe (Hegel). All such ideological criteria have little practical value. We need tests more tangible and comprehensible which embody concrete social values.

d. Happiness is not the Goal of Progress. For more than a century many thinkers have contended that progress means movement toward "increased happiness," and this idea is still influential. Lester F. Ward, for example, contended that happiness was both the motive of every particular action and the ultimate end of all action. There could be no improvement unless it tended to secure happiness.⁵ Now, neither biology, psychology, nor sociology have been able to establish a sound foundation for the hedonistic philosophy. Furthermore, happiness is something very indefinite and variable, and highly subjective in its nature. No two people have the same conception of what constitutes such abstract states as happiness or pleasure. What is needed is a more objective conception. As Professor Henke puts it: "Progress is something more than the realization of ends which produce a feeling of pleasure. It is a progressively increased sharing of a growing proportion of the world's population in the things that satisfy the great fundamental interests of human individuals and human society."⁶

We have discovered that there are higher and truer values than the maximization of pleasure and the minimization of pain. To accept pleasure as a test is to take a superficial and, on the whole, a materialistic view of things.

e. The Adaptation Test. Professor C. A. Ellwood⁷ thinks of progress as adaptation or adjustment which results from the increasing control over life and its conditions. He mentions specifically certain evidences which by common consensus of opinion are acceptable. Important are the activities which aid humanity in mastering physical nature, as, for example, mechanical inventions and economic pros-

⁵ This idea is also presented by James Bryce in "What is Progress?" *Atlantic Monthly*, Vol. 100, pp. 145-156.

⁶ F. G. A. Henke, "A Note on the Relation of Ethics to Progress," *International Journal of Ethics*, Vol. 27, p. 491.

⁷ *Social Psychology*, pp. 289-291; *Psychology of Human Society*, pp. 423-428.

perity, discoveries in the realm of physical science, changes in political conditions and in moral standards which make for more harmonious relationships between individuals and groups, and new means of co-operation, new social relationships which harmonize better the interests of individuals and reduce conflict among them, new knowledge of human nature or of ways of living together. In brief, he points out that progress means a better adaptation of social groups to the requirements of their existence, and adjustments to a wider, more universal environment. In his final comprehensive definition he conceives of it as "increasing adaptation to the requirements of social existence which shall harmonize all factors, whether internal or external, present or remote, in the life of humanity, securing the greatest capacity for social survival, the greatest efficiency in mutual coöperation and the greatest possible harmony among all its varied elements."

According to Professor L. T. Hobhouse, social progress must be regarded as the growth in the harmonious adjustment of man to society, of the different types of social organization to each other and of society as a whole to its environment. He says: "Social Progress may be regarded as development of the principle of union, order, coöperation, harmony among human beings."⁸ Again, "The ideal society is conceived as a whole which lives and flourishes by the harmonious growth of its parts, each of which in developing on its own lines and in accordance with its own nature tends on the whole to further the development of others." In other words, progress consists of man and his setting coming into smoother working adjustment.

Professor T. N. Carver⁹ clarifies the matter a bit when he distinguishes between passive adaptation, which is merely the modification of the species to suit the conditions of the environment—strictly an evolutionary process—and active adaptation, the modification of conditions to suit the species. These adaptation tests come nearer to the heart of progress; they are broadly social as to viewpoint and impartially scientific as to content. But even with active adaptation as a test we need to get at the ultimate end of progress, as we now see it, set up definite valuations, and have more light thrown on the technique and details of the process.¹⁰

⁸ *Liberalism*, p. 177; or, *Social Evolution and Political Theory*, p. 127.

⁹ *Sociology and Social Progress*, pp. 1-14.

¹⁰ In connection with the difficulty of finding and applying progress tests see H. Ellis, *The Dance of Life*, pp. 285-301.

2. CONSCIOUSNESS OF SOCIAL SHORTCOMINGS AS AN EVIDENCE OF PROGRESS

Any awareness of social shortcomings indicates that a goal, however hazy, has been determined, which, by contrast, emphasizes present insufficiencies. The very refining of our feelings and standards which makes moral aberrations more apparent is an exceedingly hopeful sign. While it does not imply a conscious step in the satisfaction of the insufficiencies, it does indicate a state of mind which leads to ideals and inventions which do bring it about. Restlessness and dissatisfaction with things as they are are a prerequisite to social progress.

The acceptance of the idea of the Golden Age, so common among peoples prior to the dawning of the idea that man had some mastery over his circumstances, whether placed in the past or the future, was a sign of progress. As we find it among the Egyptians, Hindus, Hebrews, and Greeks, it indicates an appraisal of the conditions of the moment, the results of which show conditions to be utterly unsatisfactory, and since man is not yet capable of a glance ahead in this fearful and custom-bound time, he places his ideal in the past, now mellowed and fascinatingly hazy through the mists of time. After man has learned in a small measure the degree of his mastery over the forces of life, he places his ideal in the future, and it now is a hope and aspiration, but it still criticizes the present.

In the same way a high rate of arrests and convictions for certain forms of crime may indicate a heightened sensitiveness and lead to moral progress through a keener discrimination of acts injurious to the majority of a social group. For example, the arrests for drunkenness under the eighteenth amendment do not necessarily imply a greater amount of drunkenness, but rather a public demanding punishment for the violation of its rising ideals.

But while this consciousness of social shortcomings points to a progressive bent among a people, it still leaves us without specific instrumentalities.

3. THE CONTENT OF THE CONTEMPORARY GOAL: PROGRESS AS SELF-FULFILMENT

Guizot from his appropriate position as an historian of civilization pointed out just a century ago that progress consists of two concomitant and related forms of advancement: the expansion of the mind and faculties of man, and the melioration of the social system. Wherever

the intellectual nature of man distinguishes itself by its energy, brilliancy, and its grandeur, and wherever the exterior condition of man becomes enlarged, quickened, and improved there is progress.¹¹ To-day, after one has finally penetrated through all the variously expressed maudlin social sentiment, the rationalized personal or class prejudices or desires, the half-baked or false logic, the professional bombast of many of the self-styled progressives, and gets at the core of the present progress goal, the inevitable conclusion is substantially the same, though certain valuable additions have been made. Only a distinction must be made between end and means among these two elements. Any philosophical analysis of the problem—and this is, in the last analysis, a philosophical problem—points to the fact that more institutions, or better institutions, or more socialized groups, or any other forms of social machinery or environmental conditions cannot be ends, but merely efficient and necessary means to the real end. And one must finally conclude that this real and final end is the production of human beings, personalities, souls. The fact that society is essential to man does not make society greater than he, for society grows out of the individual, his needs and attributes. Its importance, it has been said, is only his importance under another name. Human beings are the highest thing in the world; they are the originators and bases of all achievement and progress. They are the ends; all else is means to these ends; all other progress flows from them. They are the last, irreducible elements of reality. Any social state consistent with progress is merely the outward manifestation of a fine and genuine individualism.

Progress is mainly concerned with the fulfilment of self, the maximum realization of the various individual potentialities in a socially acceptable way, the harmonious exercise of human faculties and powers. This idea embraces Aristotle's thought that the highest human and social good consists in the fullest activity of our powers permitted by the circumstances, the greatest functional fulfilment and the greatest functional excellence possible, the freest play of initiative, enterprise, achievement, adventure, organization, discovery, creativeness, sociality, and spirituality.

The end of life is the opportunity to live—the ability to realize in part the never stilled urges, longings, strivings, and aspirations that all men are heir to.¹² So far as our immediate experience goes, the one

¹¹ F. P. G. Guizot, *History of Civilization*, I, 23-27.

¹² Cf. Edwin Muir, *Nation*, Vol. 119, p. 142. See also J. Arthur Thomson, *What is Man?* pp. 214-218.

thing that seems to have inherent and therefore a sort of absolute value for us is Life. All other values are derivative from this. Thus progress consists in exercising the powers of living in their highest form in an attempt to achieve and enjoy relative fullness of life.

Making life good in a positive way means making life more abundant—developing to their maximum usefulness the potentialities and abilities of every human creature, and promoting the ideal of freer and fuller living. It means facility of thought, the exercise of the sense of workmanship, the emancipation of creative intelligence, freedom of esthetic expression and unobstructed appreciation of beauty, giving every inducement to the expansion of spirit and realization of purpose, enjoying free play for the spontaneous exercise of individuality and the development of personality, and having the utmost possibility of deepening and beautifying the soul. Progress is man's project for making himself fully at home on this planet; it involves the spontaneous and powerful impulse of self-realization, of achieving the wholeness of his nature—individuality in its finest and fullest stature. It looks forward to a complete man in a world that has become complete through his efforts; an adventurous, original, dynamic, socialized individual making a maximum contribution of self to an onflowing human life.

This completeness of self and of life is most certainly realized though when the object of human pursuit is lifted from the material to the mental, from the mental to the spiritual—when the true object is the flourishing of the human spirit. The real progressive, the one who is concerned with something more than preachment and intellectual effervescence, wants spiritual advance, a society of ever nobler and more spiritualized people, a world ever moved by noble acts, transfused with spiritual motives, and illuminated by the greatest and noblest truths. Progress worthy of consideration must be progress of the human soul and the group soul; all else is insignificant.

If progress is to occur in a large way, life must be placed above the mere satisfaction of the lower personal and material desires. Men must seek to raise human capacities and faculties and qualities, especially aspirations. The object of progress is not so much to help men to live ten years longer, for example, though that is worth while, but to show them how to make those years, worth living, to give them a sense of creative living, however humble they may be, and to provide the conditions that induce this. The end of progress is to make life itself worth living, to make it joyous. We have to-day, and most men through history seem to have had, such an amazing incapacity for joy.

Life to us has always been less worth living than it should be and can be. And yet the human spirit craves joy and the life that makes it possible. It is only in full and free living—in the harmonious exercise of abilities and acquisitions—that the individual receives satisfaction and ennoblement. When life is intelligently original, venturesome, and creative, it is full of satisfaction and exultant aspiration; when it is coercive and thwarting it is depressing, devitalizing, dispiriting.

In no sense does this conception of progress mean a society of standardized or stereotyped individuals. What is wanted is the fulfilment of the infinite diversities and shadings of capacity and personality among people, so that the greatest richness of life can be brought about. The more unique and developed individuals are, the better; the less they imitate one another, the better.

As this idea of progress becomes more commonplace it increasingly includes the concept of a group of individuals of continually higher quality and capacity, each of whom is capable of profiting to the full by the new social attainments of his group. For the full realization of the good life the world must have a higher order of human beings, it must have fewer knotty, unproductive, selfish, shirking, exploiting, cross-grained human beings than at present. We can, of course, make a much better world and life with people as they are, but we need more highly developed and more socialized and spiritualized people for the best possible world with its highest good and its finest adjustment of individual and social ends. What we want is an ever-multiplying race of brawny, brainy, able, developed, individualized men; men who are not imitators of others, but whose strength is their own; men whose characters are their individual selves raised to the power of noblest attainment and highest efficiency; men who have achieved soul serenity and spiritual poise.

Thus the ultimate test of progress is whether we are multiplying the opportunities for human fulfilment, and whether we are developing human capacities and powers—whether we are making possible a quality of living and a quality of men. If we can do this human beings will be making the maximum social contribution, and our social heritage will be enriched in unbelievable ways, making possible a tremendous acceleration in general advancement.

Progress in the broader sense is concerned with all that makes complete self-realization possible. It desires an educational system that will provide a balanced ration and will nourish the whole man, paying due regard to all innate differences. There must be legitimate work

that provides expression for all the innate and acquired talents and tastes and propensities of the individual. The esthetic and intellectual interests must be adequately provided for in work and leisure. The moral and the whole range of social tendencies must be given opportunity for expression. There must be physical and mental adequacy of health. The home, the church, the social and fraternal organization, the government of village, county, state, and nation must provide opportunity for coöperation and free activity. Every department of life must enable the individual to function normally and fully.

The student of progress must be cautioned, however, that this realization of self and fullness of life does not mean a rampant and unrestrained individualism. As someone has put it, self-expression does not mean self-explosion. The realization of progressive purposes demands the spirit of discipline, for the individuality must be adjusted to the social system in which it is set, and in its expression must be in conformity with long-time common weal. Nor does it mean freedom from obligation or responsibility. Unrestrained individualism implies laissez-faire, and laissez-faire means struggle for all and thwarting of life for most men; instead of spiritualizing men it brutalizes them. Achievement of self must be canalized by the highest ethical and social requirements.

Nor can the achievement of self be too conscious on the part of the individual. In human experience the greatness of self has usually been realized in the losing of self-consciousness through devotion to the great challenges or beauties of life. "Whoso loseth his life shall find it." It is in extending the limits of the life of all that the life of the individual is expanded.¹⁸ It is not in the acquiring for self, but in investing self in the doing of the world's work that the fullness of life is realized. Most human beings are most fully themselves when they most fully give themselves to noble public causes.

4. THE INDISPENSABLE SUPPLEMENT TO THE TRUE AIM: SOCIAL WELL-BEING

The most meager understanding, however, of the processes which assist or make possible the highest individual good, inexorably points to the fact that it cannot be attained without general physical and social well-being. The good group with its favorable institutions and efficient organization, its stimuli and opportunities, its sufficiency and

¹⁸ See Chapter XXVII.

leisure, is the starting point, and background, and means of producing the good man. The good man, trying to live the good life, needs a good world to live it in. The process of self-fulfilment is conditioned at every turn by the shaping power of environment, especially social environment, over human nature. To be sure, social processes do not to any great extent determine the nature of the potentialities of human beings, except through the biological incidence of the processes affecting the selection of mates, but they do determine the way the potentialities develop for good or ill.¹⁴ The very social nature of the individual and the part society has in his shaping make favorable social conditions a basic necessity. Personality and society are inextricably related. So practically progress is dependent upon social conditions and general social well-being.¹⁵ As Guizot pointed out, it means a combination of self-fulfilment and a continually better human society in every respect. But the only test of a society is whether it produces better human beings; an improved civilization is one that shows improved individuals. It must never be forgotten that better individuals are the end. Good group life, excellent institutions, all constructive social agencies and movements, all ethical ideals of service and welfare, all individual sacrifice and devotion, all control and modification of all environments, all provision of opportunities, are means, merely means, for living, means for producing nobler, fuller, freer, more creative men, who can really live as their capacities enable them; conditions that make possible the unfolding of man's worth. No group, regardless, can ever transcend this as an end. Men are the end-term of human life.

Thus what is wanted is a completely developing personality, and a humanity from which that self derives its depth and fullness. This means that our progress goal also includes the maximum known human well-being as a standard of value. The idea connotes or implies, amelioration, or improvement, or enhancement of human and social conditions; it also postulates the importance of increasing welfare of human society, though the nature of that, to be sure, is in process of continual change.

A basal problem of progress is the discovery of social goods or values the increase of which constitutes the goal to which progressive efforts are being guided. Since welfare is such an important phase of progress, progress is essentially an ethical problem, and consequently to be thoroughly scientific it must have ethical norms, fundamental

¹⁴ See Chapter VIII.

¹⁵ Cf. F. W. Blackmar, *History of Human Society*, pp. 14-15, 16.

bases of a quite definite and unequivocal character.¹⁶ Its aim is to bring about a good society in which the adjustments secured among its individuals will be the best conceivable. It wants a society which is good for its members, regardless of class, race, or creed; a society that more and more provides the more permanent and valuable satisfactions of life for all, and the increasing ability both to work toward the attainment of these satisfactions and to enjoy and appreciate them to the full as they are attained; in brief, an increased success in living.

Progress looks to the appearance of a moral, intellectual, cultural, and consequently a spiritual, universal society, which has risen above materialistic and egoistic or partisan interests to the fullest altruistic life, a society in which most of the ends of to-day have been given their rightful place as means merely. But as Patrick points out, "Such a fair field for activity for *all* members of the group, and for successive generations, involves an integrated and stable social life, and that involves a high degree of self-control and social discipline."¹⁷

This close connection between social and individual good imposes a great responsibility on society, for society can promote fullness of life and well-being by its own wise, adequate, and humane systems of life, or it can thwart it by harmful or wasteful arrangements. For many society builds either poor life, or full and abundant life; it makes for ultimate poverty or richness, according as it provides or withholds the physical sufficiency, the leisure and recreation, the beautiful and healthful conditions, the fineness and variety of interests, the educative and cultural contacts, the stimulating atmosphere, the incentives, and the abundance of opportunity. Most of this book is a facing of facts connected with this responsibility.

Concretely, at this moment, progress means such things as better grades of human beings through the elimination of the unfit, the abolition of poverty and socially created want, and all the biological and social conditions that make for delinquency and crime, the humanizing of criminal codes, the redemption of offenders while restraining them, freedom from every kind of autocracy, or class rule, or oppression, or repression, the discarding of antiquated ethics and soporific religion, escape from old and cramping conventions and institutions, provisions

¹⁶ "The object of social effort is the realization of ends to which human beings can reasonably attach value, that is to say, the realization of ethical ends; and this being understood we may suitably use the term 'progress' of any steps leading towards such realization." L. T. Hobhouse, *Social Evolution and Political Theory*, p. 11.

¹⁷ G. T. W. Patrick, *Psychology of Social Reconstruction*, p. 47.

for a freely formed and uncontrolled public opinion, the creation of social and economic conditions making possible the maximum educational and cultural opportunities for all according to capacity, the development of a family ideal adjusted to this new age, socialized law and business, the more complete democratization and socialization of governments, the bringing about of industrial, racial, national, and international peace, concord, and justice, equality of opportunity of every kind, reasonable comfort for all, intellectual and spiritual joys for all, and so on. It means the enlistment of the energies of this generation in the task of building a new social world that will be good for all the individuals living in it; that will enable them in turn to develop to the full their life capacities. Of course, it also means the removal of everything that now frustrates the best in man.

The perception of the developing self, developing in history as well as in the individual life, the projection of the ideal life before us and the gradual filling out of this ideal by all the achievements of a slowly perfecting humanity, the pursuit of this ideal by one's self becoming wiser and greater minded, but always in fellowship with others in family, in country, or in the world, with whom and for whom we have to live—these are the characteristics of the present progress ideal. Just in so far as these things are actually in process, so far is man progressing. We may summarize the matter by saying that social progress is measured in terms of the individual and is obtained through the degree to which society or social groups gain control of the factors promoting individual well-being and fulfilment.¹⁸

5. THE COMPOSITE NATURE OF THE PROGRESS TESTS IN PRACTICE

As we face the matter of the application of these tests to-day, however, we find that no single universal criterion will suffice. Progress is so many-sided, and its manifestations are so numerous and varied, that we must have specific adaptations of the general tests of progress for every major department of life. In other words, there will be as many sub-criteria of progress as there are departments of life in which valuation must be exercised; wherever a special concept of value is necessary to determine advance, there will be needed a separate criterion or test. Thus we will need criteria in the moral, economic, religious, political, biological, physical, educational, racial, cultural, esthetic, and other

¹⁸ A. O. Bowden, "The Meaning of Social Progress," *School and Society*, Vol. 22, p. 539.

fields to enable us to estimate their stage of advancement. It may even be necessary to subdivide these to take care of the various manifestations in each field. These numerous tests all along the line must all, however, be in agreement with the basic criterion of progress; that is, they must be standards or combinations of standards that can be measured in terms of tangible, general human good. They must all represent higher worth from one point of view or another, but not lower worth from any point of view.

6. THE NECESSITY OF HAVING OBJECTIVE TESTS

The progress tests cannot be a matter of subjective opinions, else the efforts of people conflict, and result in no lasting general good. What makes many contemporary concepts of progress so unsound from the point of view of the social scientist, is the fact that the personal or class equation bulks so large in them. In so far as the tests are subjective or left to individuals they are colored by individual eccentricities and prejudices, selfish aspirations, bias, and emotional make-up, for our desires, whether good or bad, go far in influencing the thought content and the reactions of our minds. Therefore we must appeal from individual judgments to objective standards or combinations of standards which can be measured in terms of tangible, general, human and social good, which are impersonally and generally applicable, and which receive the approval of social science.

7. THE DETERMINATION OF THE TESTS

Walter Bagehot¹⁹ writes of "verifiable progress" as that which ninety-nine one-hundredths or more of mankind will admit to be such. Immediately one questions, though, whether it would ever be possible, even in the most spectacular cases, to get ninety-nine one-hundredths of mankind to even concern themselves about an issue, not to mention a registration of approval. Any serious student of progress will admit that while those who really devote themselves to social progress in a scientific way are very decidedly a minority, they are a very capable and intelligent minority. It is to those specialized minorities that we must go for our criteria. We must fall back on standards which, while not recognized by everybody, would be agreed to by a majority of thinking and educated men along a given line in any advanced nation. In

¹⁹ *Physics and Politics*, p. 207.

short, what we can practically seek is not a full and complete or a generally acceptable conception of a standard, but rather "the greatest common denominator" of the opinions of thoughtful individuals. Thus for criteria in the biological field we must go to socially minded geneticists and eugenists; in economics, to the economists with the long perspective and the social spirit; in the field of morals, to the practical ethicist, and so on. Our standard will be the consensus of those who are intelligently concerned along a particular line.

8. SOME SUGGESTIVE MULTIPLE TESTS OF PROGRESS ²⁰

A. *Moral Progress*

Individual ethical consciousness.

Increasing self-control and capacity for self-rule.

Self-censorship.

Sense of social obligation.

Realization of importance of making maximum individual contribution.

Growth of humane impulse.

Valuation placed on human life.

Socialized and rationalized ethical standards and codes accompanied by favorable supporting public opinion.

A constantly growing and adaptable ethics.

Unselfishness—personal, class, group.

Social justice.

Positive ethical demands rather than negative.

Growth of equality.

Elimination of social stratification.

Respect for the law.

Coöperation and voluntary association.

Improved sex relations.

Reduced immorality, both commercialized and clandestine.

Reduced illegitimacy.

Sound attitude on divorce and its causes.

Emancipation of women.

Reduction of vice and other anti-social conduct.

Purity of literature, art, drama, cinema, etc.

Growing social consciousness.

Wise treatment of unfortunate members of society—blind, deaf, feeble-minded, insane, poverty-stricken, paupers.

Care of children.

Improved inter-personal social relations.

²⁰ Cf. A. W. Small, *General Sociology*, pp. 718-727; U. G. Weatherly, *Social Progress*, pp. 189-191; A. M. Tozzer, *Social Origins and Social Continuities*, pp. 28-34; Blackmar and Gillin, *Outlines of Sociology*, pp. 448-450; C. C. Peters, *Foundation of Educational Sociology*, 274-275; M. Parmelee, *Poverty and Social Progress*, pp. 449-451.

Increasing life.

- Lower death rate.
- Lower infant mortality.
- Reduced sickness rate.
- Increased span of life.

Athleticism.**Breeding and discovery of improved and cheaper food supplies.****Improved health.**

Disease prevention.

Health education.

Degree of diffusion of constructive provisions for health, like baths, laundries, comfort stations, milk stations, school and public nurses, medical dispensaries, and open air schools.

Public sanitation and hygiene, including inoculation and quarantine.

Preventive medicine as well as curative.

Development of dietetics.

Prevention of food and drug adulteration and contamination.

Solution of population congestion problems.

Improved dwellings and workshops.

City planning and zoning.

Improved and abundant water supply.

Improved sewage systems and garbage disposal.

Playgrounds and breathing spaces.

Control of venereal disease.

Rural health work.

Improved industrial environments and processes.

Temperate living.

E. Educational Progress

Increased literacy—wider general diffusion of social achievement and knowledge.

More schools, more and better teachers, better attendance.

Education for a full life—occupational or professional, cultural, humanistic, citizenship.

Increased provision and use of libraries, and museums,

Availability of good literature of all kinds.

Adult education.

Character education.

Discovery and development of superior ability.

Education that individuates rather than standardizes.

Education for leisure.

Closer coordination and systematization of the various educational agencies.

Avoidance of materialization of education and manipulation by patrioteers.

Elimination of qualitative variations in educational systems among states and nations, interstate and international coordination of educational systems.

F. Religious Progress

Emphasis on spirituality rather than ecclesiastical machinery.
Less fanaticism and emotion, and more rationality.
Less adherence to time-worn creeds and dogmas.
Less fear-religion.
More socialized religion with scientific attitude.
Religious toleration.
Reconstruction of God, immortality, and other concepts.
Less destructively competitive denominationalism.
Federation of religious effort.
Local, national, and international enlargement of sphere of religious activities.
Development of the brotherhood of man and "Kingdom of God."
Religion as functioning force in human affairs.

G. Domestic Progress

Sane sex attitudes.
Sensible and adequate preparation for sex-life, marriage, and parenthood.
Better prepared and more conscientious home-makers, male and female.
Better marriage laws, sustained by public opinion.
Understanding of causes of divorce and broken homes, and reduction of these causes.
Cultivation of domestic virtues for new age.
Spiritualization of the home.
Voluntary and responsible parenthood.
Scientific and devoted child care.
Improved parent and child relationship.
Comprehensive study of modern domestic problems.
Improvement of economic and professional conditions basic in establishing a home.
Rational attitude toward illegitimacy and illegitimate child.

H. Esthetic Progress

Widespread love for noble and serious art.
Greater diffusion of esthetic taste.
Increase in artistic creativeness and all circumstances and conditions that promote it.
Appreciation of art galleries, and concerts.
Avoiding effeminization of culture in a competitive industrial age.

I. Intellectual Progress

Supremacy of reason over emotion and feeling.
Greater intellectual power—through elimination of mental defectives.
Greater ability to apply knowledge.
Inventions, idealism, discovery.

Appreciation of ideal values.

Advance of science, spread of scientific curiosity.

Confidence in expert, scientist, prophet, élite.

Growth of spirit of toleration.

Growth of decision by compromise instead of by struggle.

Independent individual thought and decision.

Growth of research idea and means.

J. Recreational Progress

Park systems.

Supervised playgrounds.

Social centers.

Democratic art museums.

Municipal theaters.

Elevation of conceptions of recreation.

Decommercialization of recreation.

National provision of recreation grounds.

Public recreational programs.

K. Racial Progress

Knowledge of origin and nature of races.

Scientific information on race mixture.

Racial understanding and elimination of prejudice.

Racial toleration, equity, and coöperation.

Wise direction of migrations.

Cultural opportunity for races.

Freedom of racial self-expression.

9. CONCLUSION

Even though these numerous tests are in general the product of the socially intelligent and interested minority, we shall never have progress on a large scale until they, or better ones, become widely diffused, generally accepted, and the effective basis of social choice and effort. Two per cent may determine what constitutes progress and what its tests are; fifty-one per cent, or somewhat less, may succeed in inaugurating a new step under favorable conditions; but only the largest possible intelligent and understanding majority assures the march of progress.

QUESTIONS AND PROBLEMS

1. Why discuss the objectives of progress if people disagree about them?
2. What are some of the criteria of progress that we meet with every day in the newspapers, shops, living places, and clubs? Give an estimate

of each in the light of our concept of progress. Account for the different views.

3. What do you think of the statement that "there will be as many criteria of progress as there are standards of valuation?"
4. Does the maxim, "The greatest good for the greatest number," serve as a reliable general test of progress?
5. Give in one statement each the index of progress stressed by the following men (Todd, Ch. VII): Marvin, Crozier, Henry George, Kropotkin, Ogg, Hobhouse, Osler, Ashley, H. G. Wells, D. S. Jordan, Asquith. Which of these do you consider the best statement? Why?
6. What does Lester F. Ward consider as the most important indices of progress? (*Pure Sociology*, pp. 346, 448, 454.)
7. What tests of progress does Carl Kelsey offer? (*Physical Basis of Society*, pp. 387-397.)
8. Summarize and evaluate the tests offered by Giddings. (*Principles of Sociology*, pp. 356-360; *Inductive Sociology*, pp. 249-278.)
9. On the basis of Todd, pp. 143-147, draw up a list of the opposites of progress to-day. Add as many others to this list as you can. Which are the most serious? Why?
10. List what you would consider to be positive progressive forces in your community.

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CHAPTER VI

THE PRESENT CONCEPT OF SOCIAL PROGRESS: ATTITUDES AND PROCESSES

I. PROGRESS AND MENTAL ATTITUDES

MENTAL attitudes play a crucial part in social progress. The wrong attitudes may block progressive measures everywhere, while without the right ones no progress can occur. Whether considering the attitudes of the individuals in authority, the individuals of the mass, or the attitudes of the group as a whole, we run into something quite rigid and almost impenetrable. A satisfactory definition of a mental attitude is difficult to obtain. Certainly it is neither a prejudice, nor an opinion. A prejudice is really "a crystallized attitude, dealing with a certain situation forming a kind of mental or character excrescence."¹ Nor is the term synonymous with an opinion, for an opinion may be repudiated when the real test of action comes, while the attitude is found in one's acts.² An attitude is something more fundamental than either of these; it is, as Thomas and Znaniecki point out,³ "a process of individual consciousness which determines real or possible activity of the individual in the social world." Mental attitudes seem to be of a strongly emotional nature, though there are unmistakable cognitive elements. But they appear to function like habits—deep-seated habitual ways of reacting to life. They have to do with motive, the control of motive, the impulse back of action, the extra-intellectual forces and controls that determine specific actions. At any rate, they cause the individual to arrive at decisions and judgments that affect his interests, prejudices, and certainly, as mentioned above, his activities.⁴

¹ F. E. Williams, "Mental Attitudes and Social Progress," *Survey*, Vol. 51, pp. 307-308, 361.

² E. S. Bogardus, *Fundamentals of Social Psychology*, The Century Co., p. 45.

³ *Polish Peasant in Europe and America*, Vol. I, p. 27.

⁴ "An attitude is a tendency to act toward or against some environmental factor which becomes thereby a positive or negative value. It is less innate than a desire, more clearly defined, more definitely selected by a person, more cognitive. It incorporates not only affective and cognitive but volitional elements. . . . They [attitudes] represent almost as many levels as there are persons holding them." Bogardus, *op. cit.*, p. 45.

Due to the inflexibility which they give to the reactions of folks, they are of vital importance in a study such as this. This is especially true of the attitudes not in conformity with progressive ends. As Williams indicates, "The importance of the attitude lies not in its goodness or badness, but in the effect which it has upon our recognition of facts and the bearing of the facts."⁵ The problem that is presented is "what lies back of the attitude of the individual; how these attitudinal walls are to be scaled, or better, broken and the energies of the individual set free to rational intelligent use." The gathering and interpretation of social facts is vastly important if progress is to occur, but we must not think that as soon as the facts and their concomitant truths are available, people will everywhere set about correcting the conditions they demonstrate. For "before the facts lie attitudes—our attitudes and the attitudes of others and the problems of what we and they think of the facts and why we and they think as we do." Thus folks rationally assent to the facts as outlined by the sciences, physical and social, but their attitudes cause them to be "fundamentalists," or against the child labor amendment, or reactionaries in government, or revolutionists, or anti-vivisectionists, or opposed to conservation of resources, or the imparting of birth control information. Hence mental attitudes are all-important factors in their bearing on social progress. They are walls that keep facts from going through, though they be hurled with the force of a modern high explosive.

In the last analysis it would seem that progress, both personal and social, is a matter of changes in attitudes. The change of attitude comes first. The minds of men take a new orientation which gives a different coloring to life; the structure and conventions of their lives change, and later, often much later, comes the visible change of social structure. So the technique for changing them would seem to be one of the keys to progress. This technique is a matter for social psychology. Already we know that the changing must be done through imperceptible modifications of a single attitude, or a few attitudes at a time, rather than a complete change.⁶ We are, however, mere novices in understanding either their functioning or their manipulation and control.

⁵ *Op. cit.*, p. 307.

⁶ "Attitudes . . . are difficult to change if they have originated in or been connected with emotional experiences. Situations producing these experiences thus require careful research, for in them is found the chief difficulties when changes in attitudes are contemplated. All individual and social changes come through personal experiences." Bogardus, *op. cit.*, p. 61.

2. THE PROGRESSIVE ATTITUDE AND THE OTHER ATTITUDES TOWARD CHANGE

Professor A. B. Wolfe has done us a great and valuable service in his keen and clear-cut analysis of and distinction between the different current attitudes concerning change.⁷ The scale of attitudes he likens to the solar spectrum in which from left to right are noted in order radicalism, liberalism or progressivism, conservatism, and reactionism, each with its various degrees of intensity and its shading into the adjacent attitudes.

Conservatism is that mental attitude which causes those who have it to accept and desire things-as-they-are, and disapproves any change or proposal of change which has to do with the fundamental aspects of thought, economic organization, and social relations. The conservative prefers everything to be just as it is—objecting to reversion or conscious change. In brief, “Don’t rock the boat.” He believes that change is bad and undesirable *per se*, and humanity does or ought to long for safety, stability, and routine. In fact, he fears anything new and unfamiliar.⁸

“Reactionism,” as Wolfe defines it,⁹ “advocates a return to some previously current but now abandoned mode of thought and system of organization.” The reactionary wants change, and in this he is unlike the conservative, but he wants change backwards, a return to a previous *status quo*—a bringing back and renewing of the old. The tried and proven past alone offers safe ways and means. Only by reverting to the life of the past over which time has now cast its pale but attractive colors, can there be contentment and prosperity. While the conservative is not in agreement with the reactionary, because the reactionary desires a reversion which would interfere with the conservative’s world-as-it-is, he is nearer the reactionary than the radical; he prefers leaning backward to leaning forward, if he must lean either way, and his sympathies and natural responses are far more likely to incline toward the reactionary.

At the other extreme from these we find radicalism—“the attitude of those who desire and advocate speedy, deep, and thoroughgoing innovative reform or revolution, either in regard to certain aspects of social

⁷ *Conservatism, Radicalism and Scientific Method*. The writer wishes to acknowledge his dependence upon this work in the preparation of this section, especially Chapters II, VI, VII, and VIII.

⁸ Cf. Editorial, *New Republic*, Oct. 29, 1924, p. 216.

⁹ *Op. cit.*, p. 12.

relations and processes or to the whole social order.”¹⁰ The radical is restless, eager for change, hungry for social adventures and dubious experiments, always ahead of the law of the group, and he thinks everybody else ought to be also. Through history he has chafed under absolutism, authoritarianism, and all sorts of class dominance and class privilege, and as a positive expression has been and is directing his efforts to the securing of rapid, accelerated democratization. There are various degrees of radicalism. Socialism, for example, would enormously increase social control, and make the state supreme, while anarchism would abolish all coercive forms of social control regardless. Radicalism at any moment is an attitude which demands thoroughgoing and rapid innovation, usually objected to and obstructed by conservative opposition.¹¹

Between these extremes stands progressivism, or moderatism. The progressive wants improvement, and he wants it as quickly as possible, but he does not want it to come about by leaps and jerks and revolutions and crises as does the radical, but in opportune fashion, by conscious direction of social evolution, planned endeavor, small steps, and continuous readjustment. It is not mere innovation that he wants, but directed change that will bring society nearer to the standards which his constructive imagination has more or less definitely formulated as the next logical and possible step in social evolution.¹² In contrast to the conservative, the progressive is not actuated by fear of change, but is attached to it. He is sensitive to social conditions and critical of them and, moreover, having a constructive imagination, sees in his mind's eye a society devoid of present weaknesses; his mind is accustomed to functioning in the realms of prophecy and speculations and ideals, which the conservative cannot or will not enter. The progressive does not refuse to face problems or to see solutions for them. He will not pretend that all is well in modern society, but, on the contrary, recognizes that much of it requires mending and reconstruction. The progressive realizes that if this Great Society is to be realized, change must come, and since it will come anyhow, he wants to direct it in those desirable channels that lead to his goal, and he usually has an imagination fertile in devising working programs. Not only is he unafraid of social experiment, he

¹⁰ Wolfe, *op. cit.*, p. 15.

¹¹ Cf. P. A. Parsons, *An Introduction to Modern Social Problems*, p. 211; W. T. Root, "The Psychology of Radicalism," *Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology* Vol. 19, pp. 341-356; U. G. Weatherly, *Social Progress*, pp. 143-151; V. S. Yarros, "Contemporary American Radicalism," *International Journal of Ethics*, Vol. 31, pp. 351-369.

¹² Cf. Wolfe, *op. cit.*, p. 13.

welcomes it and sets it in motion, but his experimentation and research are controlled by scientific principles and conducted in a scientific spirit.

The progressive tries to get down to basic principles; the conservative regards basic principles as settled; the radical does not concern himself about them, he sets his own conditions. The progressive is mentally alert and flexible. He is constitutionally averse to accepting his ideas or his ideals on traditional authority; he is unfettered by any worshipful attitude toward the superior wisdom of the past or the present. He has the will to doubt, to challenge sanctified assumptions bravely.¹³ He regards social institutions of all kinds not as ends to be held in reverence but as expedient means, and as means they are not only open to scientific analysis and criticism, but to rational adaptation and transformation. In fact, he looks forward to institutions as he hopes they will become in the future. Nor is the progressive an obedient servant to the herd instinct. He is a nonconformist, who moves across the current or against it. He feels that he has a part to play which is not consistent with mass feeling. Nor is he ever satisfied, but is continually goaded on to new efforts for the common good. "No sooner is one job done, than his active mind has conceived and planned another."¹⁴

He battles for the ideal and against perverting and cramping forms. He seeks not to destroy, but to fulfil. He is not less loyal, but more loyal than his fellows; and he chastises and criticizes because he loves. Hence it is usually against his will that he finds himself in opposition to the current authorities. He is forced into it, for the error which he attacks is not recognized as an error by most others. Thus he is often estranged from many good but conservative and short-sighted men; and he suffers because he sees the good yet to come, while most men only see the good that is.¹⁵

3. THE SPIRIT OF PROGRESS

There is a spirit which inspires and sustains the progressive, and pervades all progressive thinking and all progressive programs and movements—the spirit of progress. In so far as it can be grasped it

¹³ Cf. W. C. Curtis, *Science and Human Affairs*, pp. 302-308.

¹⁴ The writer has drawn most of the points in this paragraph from Wolfe, *op. cit.*, pp. 159-162.

¹⁵ See Henry Jones, *Idealism as a Practical Creed*, pp. 61-66; U. G. Weatherly, *Social Progress*, pp. 105-155; V. S. Yarros, "Science, Dogma and Bias in Social Reform," *Open Court*, Vol. 35, pp. 457-458. For a slightly different point of view on the general attitudes toward progress, see H. W. Schneider, *Science and Social Progress*, pp. 24-26.

is a beautiful though sturdy fabric woven of a complex of elements. It is an aspiration, a spirit of reaching out for the fulness of life, the exercise of the soul within us; but it is also a resentment against all that hurts or frustrates or dehumanizes, a dissatisfaction with all that is static or dead or archaic, a nonconformity amidst mediocrity and crowd-mindedness. It is a spirit of adventure and initiation and experiment; it ever seeks to penetrate new and unknown territory, exploring, prospecting, surveying, and clearing for new human good. It is a spirit of search for purpose and function, a valuation of all the elements of life. It is a creative spirit ever seeking to crystallize the uniqueness of individual capacity in the form of more sublime artistic expressions, more beneficent social forms and institutions, more efficient agents of living; it actually seeks to create its own world; it is vibrant with endeavor and desire for achievement. It is a spirit of tempered control of self and society in the interests of the ideal. It is a spirit of absolute truth that strips the artificiality off the world of make-believe; a resolute facing of the world as it is. It is a spirit of tolerance for all that is honest and sincere, however different; a spirit of intolerance for injustice, dishonesty, misrepresentation. It is a spirit of courage in the face of ridicule, of flaming zeal in the face of indifference, of sacrifice in the face of loss, of devotion in the face of opposition. It is a spirit of confidence and faith that the human spirit will more and more come into its own; a spirit of steadfastness in effort; it refuses to be discouraged by adversity or desertion. Above all, there moves through it the spirit of humanity, the love of neighbor, of friendship, of sympathy for those unfairly treated; it is the spirit of the socialized conscience. It is a spirit that embodies all the great qualities, and gives life a new coloring, history a new movement.

"I held it truth, with him who sings
To one clear harp in divers tones,
That men may rise on stepping stones
Of their dead selves to higher things."

4. THE RESISTANCE TO PROGRESS

Progress meets always with resistance and obstacles of all kinds. The bulk of the human race has ever fought its own advancement. Its great men have always been accepted under protest; forward movements have always been resisted not only by the reactionaries but by the entire multitude; the path of progress is strewn with the bones of martyrs to

great causes who were overwhelmed by public disapproval. Whenever man has been confronted with a new idea which was counter to the dominant interest or thought he has sought to stamp it out. His cries against those new ideas have been "heresy," "sedition," and "disloyalty," and his actions against those who presented them have been ostracism, banishment, and death. Socrates, when thought was rigid and decadent, was accused and condemned for "corrupting the youth" and given the hemlock. Jesus, when religion was largely form and hypocrisy, and ethics a hollow philosophy, was arraigned before Pilate with the charge, "We found this fellow perverting the nation." Galileo, sentenced to death for "disregard of authority," was forced to swear that the earth did not move. Nor are our own people an exception.

"We of this great republic complacently affirm the glory of our national achievements, and are not without temptation to acclaim them as proof of superior craft and judgment. But herein do we forget that we are on record as having cast our vote against every move that has contributed to the present century's development. Not one of its essential factors came into play without an earnest effort on the part of the public to thwart it. We, the people, have stood squarely against each and every innovation that has moved the world beyond the days of Washington.

"We raised our voices in contemptuous protest against the first projected highways. Had the locomotive awaited its signal from the people, it would not yet have started. When the electric telegraph was shown to us we brushed it aside as a toy, and laughed its inventor to scorn when he offered to sell us his rights for a few thousand dollars. We put into jail as an imposter the first man who brought anthracite coal to market. We broke to pieces Howe's sewing machine as an invention calculated to ruin the working classes; and we did the same thing to the harvester and binder. We scorned the typewriter as a plaything. We gathered together in mass meetings of indignation at the first proposal to install electric trolley lines; and when Dr. Bell told us he had invented an instrument by means of which we might talk to one another across the town, we responded with accustomed ridicule, and only the reckless among us contributed to its being.

"When seventy years ago, William Lloyd Garrison preached the abolition of slavery, we tied a halter about him, and dragged him through the streets of Boston. We rained anathemas upon the memory of Jenner when his disciples undertook to vaccinate us. We hooted Dr. Simpson as an atheist for introducing anesthetics in his surgical practice. We repelled the efforts of our first health officers to establish rules of public hygiene. We stormed in righteous wrath against Robert Ingersoll for suggesting that Moses made mistakes; and when Darwin presented his 'Origin of Species,' our outcry was a perfect whirlwind of denunciation, a tempest that blighted men's reputations and cast out professors from universities and clergymen from pulpits.

"There is that in our blood as a social organism which craves fixation. Man's first business after the Deluge was to anchor the earth to heaven, and from that time to this have we labored to the same purpose, striving ever to hold the world immobile.

"Every discovery and every new thing that has been instrumental in changing the thought and activities of man, came into being in the face of the world's opposition. Each in turn was rejected as unholy or a toy without worth. The advent of each of them found man content with the means at hand. No conscious need of his called other implements to his aid. Necessity was not the mother of any of them. It had no place, no use, for them, until each for itself had created a new field of need and industry. The necessity was not of the world's providing. It sprang from the things themselves."¹⁶

This resistance to change is an obstacle which only generations of social education and change of social attitude will remove. Men in masses have feared the iconoclast and the new departure. They must be taught that both of these are fundamental if desirable change is to occur; in fact, that almost all the desirable change of the past has come only by means of these.

5. THE RATE OF PROGRESS

Progress comes at varying speeds, differing widely from time to time, and place to place. In some departments of life it may be quite rapid, in others completely absent; in fact, in the same society there may be stagnation, and even reaction along some lines while progress is occurring in others. For civilization is not always moving, nor is its movement always progress; on the contrary, it remains stationary for long periods, and often falls back.¹⁷

In general, when progress does come, it is usually gradual, even grievously slow and painful. In any given line it is most rapid at first, and then it gradually slows down until it stops.¹⁸ Sudden progress may occur, but in general it does not come by leaps. Humanity moves on by the gradual accumulation of impulses and causes, the slow elimination of obstacles, not by explosions. Sometimes, indeed, progress is so slow that the aptest illustration is that of the almost imperceptible movements of the hands of the clock.

Certain fundamental results of social experience and certain basic facts in connection with social strategy are involved in the question of

¹⁶ Clifford Howard, "Progress," *Atlantic Monthly*, Vol. 105, pp. 121-123.

¹⁷ Cf. A. O. Bowden, "The Meaning of Social Progress," *School and Society*, Vol. 22, p. 541.

¹⁸ E. G. Conklin, *Evolution of Man*, p. 161.

the rate of progress. Progress must be a step-by-step process, the result of consecutive and concurrent action of countless causes. Each step in advance develops out of preceding stages. Each one is a matter of fractional improvements, temporary makeshifts, compromises, and careful applications of various principles. The train of existence cannot be interrupted, but merely directed and accelerated. The prohibition amendment was not the result of a quick and momentary agitation. Behind it lay sustained efforts over two or three generations, a long series of local successes and victories, mingled with failures, disappointments, and setbacks. The new step in advance always proceeded from the immediately preceding advance or failure. The seedling does not immediately become the perfect tree, nor the ovum the perfect animal. The heavily seeded and tasselled grass does not become magnificent Nebraska corn at once, nor can the small, scrawny, bony, leather-hided wild boar be converted into the huge, fine-boned, meaty, and succulent Iowa porker in a generation. Progress is infinitely detailed, and each detail must be continuous and unified with the preceding and with each other detail.¹⁹

Even when the telic view has been arrived at, we see that sound progress cannot be brought about by some social magic which in a second or an hour, or even a year, transports men from the sordid world of that which is to that which they want and anticipate, but that *reform and change must be gradual and slow*.²⁰ No general policy could be put into practice instantly, for forethought and planning involve patience and time, and human experience teaches that the best always costs most and comes with infinite slowness.

No new truth ever emerges without displacing some honored and precious belief. Such beliefs are not given up without struggle, nor should they be. There would be a certain treachery in the abandonment of a cherished conviction merely at the dictum of an authority, however esteemed. Every claimant ought to meet the most searching tests, and find acceptance only when approved. Progress is mainly a matter of habit construction and attitude formation. It comes chiefly from the breaking down of former methods of social adjustment and the building up of new ones—a devious and often a roundabout process. It should come, in the main, through a successful flank movement, instead of a brave but suicidal frontal attack. Weaknesses and wrongs and errors cannot be removed at once, since they may be as much a part of the

¹⁹ See Robert Flint, *The History of the Philosophy of History*, pp. 104-105; W. Weyl, *The New Democracy*, pp. 269-270.

²⁰ This is Mr. Sidney Webb's tersely expressed principle of "*the inevitability of gradualness*."

social structure as the favorable or desirable elements. The old props cannot be passionately kicked out unless new and better ones are already in place. If removed too quickly, they endanger the whole edifice. As in the treatment of the ills of our bodies, sudden cures may cure one thing, but cause several other troubles elsewhere. If anything is hurried too much, it will protest. In any reform, growth and organic adaptation must be taken into account. If the reformer is too precipitate, he strains the social tissue. He must often be content with half-reforms. There must be adequate time for readjustment if the improvement is to be permanent. It is disastrous to force society prematurely to a higher level.²¹ In moving the world from its present position to any ideal goal all the intervening ground must be traversed. Progress should be a slow, gradual process, guided by the products of knowledge and experience.

Whatever else its tactics be, the progressive movement must keep pace with the masses of its probable supporters, marching just far enough ahead to be able to lead. To proceed at a much faster rate than the psychological development of the mass is to court a swift and powerful reaction. Progress at the expense of some cramping due to moving slowly is actually better than to sacrifice it to the whims and passing passions of a great radical uprooting and then to have the serious and unavoidable recoil. Reform must be gradual to enable those to be reformed to be psychologically acclimatized. Let us progress by all means, but let us make sure of our steps by moving circumspectly and wisely. Such a course finds allies for progress; it does not make so many enemies. However, though compromising in tactics, the real progressive is uncompromising in principle. He is constant to his fixed ideals. His course is like that of a sailing ship; he tacks with the wind, but keeps always in mind his general destination. Thus he compromises, not because he loves his cause less, but more.

Knowledge of the necessary slowness of progress should save the progressive from discouragement if his reform is not effected at once; in fact, if he wants it to be permanently successful he should want it to be slow. Furthermore, though progress is a long-time proposition, mere lapse of time cannot, or at least should not, invalidate the arguments which maintain the hopes of those who labor for a constantly better society. It is only the unwise progressive who gives up his scheme of reform as hopeless after a few years of agitation. Progress is a condition brought about by laborious effort, accompanied by infinite dis-

²¹ Cf. E. J. Urwick, *Philosophy of Social Progress*, p. 92.

appointment and innumerable failures. Sir Horace Plunkett, it is said, had fifty failures before he had one successful agricultural coöperative society in Ireland. It is such a spirit which makes progress possible. It rests on eternal experimentation.

Particularly must the youthful advocate of reform keep these facts in mind. Thackeray in *Pendennis*²² mentions some of the obstacles and difficulties that are likely to cause discouragement: the necessity of submitting to circumstances stronger than the young reformer; of marching as the world marches towards reform but at the world's pace; foregoing schemes as impracticable on account of opposition or as immature because against the sense of the majority; forced to calculate drawbacks and difficulties, as well as to think of reforms and advances; and compelled finally to submit, to wait, and to compromise.

Need we worry lest progress comes too fast? It will always be a difficult task. Its course is full of pitfalls; the discouragements are many; there will be frequent relapses, and even some of the most acute thinkers of the day will assure the progressive that he is pursuing a will-o'-the-wisp, and that ultimately he will be betrayed into a morass of uncertainty and dejection. At best progress has very hard sledding. Maeterlinck in *Our Social Duty* advises us never to fear that we shall be drawn too far or too rapidly. As he says: "There are men enough about us whose exclusive duty, whose precise mission is to extinguish the fires that we shall kindle." "At every crossway on the road that leads to the future, each progressive spirit is opposed by a thousand men appointed to guard the past. Let us have no fear lest the fairest towers of former days be sufficiently defended. The least that the most timid among us can do is not to add to the universe deadweight which nature drags along."

Nevertheless the processes of progress can be enormously hastened. While we need not, cannot, and should not, cure everything at once, we should take every chance that comes to do so. As Walter Weyl says: "We dare not make a virtue of slowness, nor exalt the snail as the only true reformer. Just as they who surrender themselves to celestial Utopias cease to care for progress upon a too, too solid earth, so they who content themselves with walking, when they might run or fly, see the long years pass without worthy progress."²³ The progress processes depend on mental forces and these can be adapted and readapted much

²² Chapter LXII.

²³ *The New Democracy* (copyright 1918 by The Macmillan Company), p. 269. Reprinted by permission.

more readily than organic adaptations. The habits of human society and of individuals can be changed more easily than can cells, or tissues, or nerves. In addition to this the spiritual forces make possible even more rapid changes than are prepared for by alterations of habits and attitudes.²⁴ The speed with which progress is achieved depends upon the success with which mankind manipulates the social forces over which it is the function of social science to give us control.

6. PROGRESS MAINLY A PROBLEM OF CONTROL, ESPECIALLY SOCIAL CONTROL

Progress is essentially the process of man's increasing control over the forces of nature, society, and human nature.²⁵ These the progressive must learn to control in the service of man. As noted above, progress to be consistently so, must be telic, previsional, with well defined aim, and the bases, forces, and processes that make progress possible, and the obstacles that thwart and delay it, must be understood and controlled. Man cannot trust blindly in social progress as he once trusted in a benevolent Providence. He has to control the various forces and processes, or become their slave. So progress has come to be a demand for a technique for controlling forces and guiding change. Its immediate aim is an increasing control over all the conditions of life; its final goal, however, is complete mastery, complete control, over these conditions.

Progress, thus, in some respects, is doing something which some men have learned to do in the past, only it is doing it on a larger scale than has even been tried before. In other respects it is a process of discovery, of developing new techniques and agents. But whatever it is, it requires the participation of everybody, if possible, for if progress is to be universal and effective, each individual must be at least neutral. It is preferable, of course, that he be an active factor in the process of control. To bring this about every one must be educated to the progress idea, converted to it, as it were. And then when we have an efficient general conception of progress, we need a synthesized movement involving all the available creative intelligence, constructive ability, and collective efforts, for its achievement. All must be subordinated to gen-

²⁴ E. J. Urwick, *op. cit.*, p. 93.

²⁵ "Progress consists solely in the subjection of nature to man and of his own instincts to reason and his selfish interests to the common good." G. Stanley Hall, *The Message of the Zeitgeist, Scientific Monthly*, Vol. 13, p. 111.

eral human interests and welfare. All must be coördinated and a general control exercised for mutual benefit.

The natural sciences, with their well developed methods and techniques, and their skillful and efficient applications, have given us a control in their realm that is the wonder and glory of this age. True, socially motivated engineering and industry must more and more control and manipulate the material conditions of existence, but the marked acceleration of discovery and improvement of method here is not a crying need to the extent that is true in the social realm. The greatest control needed at this moment is a well developed social control. By social control we mean the control over individuals and groups, over their energy and capacities, in the common interest. At present this control is haphazard and quite inadequate. It lacks substantial background and effective technique. All is more or less of a confusion, especially a confusion between means and ends. Our knowledge and control of social life has not kept pace with its growing complexity, and we are further behind than ever before. We need that knowledge of social processes that will give us the same control in the social realm that men have acquired over nature. What this means, in the last analysis, is that all the social sciences must be put on a firm scientific basis, appropriate and reliable means of collecting data determined, the results coördinated and integrated, and then constructively applied to the organization and reorganization of society. Only as this is done will a mastery over the social environment be obtained comparable to that which advance in the natural sciences has given us over nature.

At present our social control is woefully unscientific.

"Our social rules and regulations, our customs and standards, are largely the products of chance and fumbling. Many of them are merely hit or miss solutions for social emergencies. And what is more, many of them are merely survivals whose original value has been lost. Our social control is still extremely 'empirical,' without reflective control. Our policies are not controlled experiments, but usually represent the easiest way of getting out of a particular difficulty; and hanging on as they do after their short-lived usefulness is past, they cause more difficulties than they solved."²⁰

We need genuine experimentation as a basis for our control, not the hit or miss trial and error procedure.

"Our efforts sometimes prove effective by the law of chance, but more often they are ineffective, because blind. Just as an animal learning by the


²⁰ H. W. Schneider, *Science and Social Progress*, pp. 34-35.

trial and error method is very restricted, compared with the knowledge gained by scientific experimentation, so trial and error progress is very restricted compared with progress based on science. The cause of the ineffectiveness of the trial and error method is quite evident. It is due to its ignorance of its limitations, of impossibilities. . . . As long as social problems are attacked in an uncontrolled hit or miss fashion, social progress will be slow, sporadic and accidental."²⁷

Each social problem must now be thought of as a separate enterprise for social consideration and study. Poverty, disease, vice, crime, intemperance, economic, political, and personal exploitation, war, are definite situations which challenge human ingenuity and effort, and which must be made subjects of extensive research and experiment.

7. THE PROPORTION OF A GROUP NECESSARY TO INAUGURATE A PROGRESSIVE MEASURE ²⁸

Logically and on the face of it one would expect that if 51 per cent were in favor of a change it would be enough. Actually it may take more in some cases, and less in others. For example, in the struggle over progress along a certain line the 40 per cent of conservatives who resist



this change, or any change, may more than hold the 60 per cent who desire the change. The conservative minority opposing the progressive move are in agreement. On the other hand, the 60 per cent (and it may just as well be more), while they are in favor of progress along the particular line, are not agreed on just what they want or how they want to bring it about, and pull in different directions, thus neutralizing each other's progressive efforts, and are stopped or even dominated by the unified "won't" power of the conservatives.

Progressive effort along a particular line thus does not become effective until it is a particular change and until it has enough adherents to

²⁷ H. W. Schneider, *Science and Social Progress*, p. 35.

²⁸ The writer is partly indebted to Professor E. A. Ross for the general principle involved in this analysis.

dominate the conservatives and resist the tangential progressives. This may be a minority of the whole, but it is then the dominating group. In general the unified progressive element must be considerably more than a majority in order to dominate public opinion. This is further necessitated by the fact that the conservatives resist change more bitterly than the liberals press it, for most liberals have been standpatters along some line and know how the conservatives feel, while the reverse is not true.

8. THE CONDITIONS FAVORABLE TO PROGRESS ²⁹

a. A Time of Social Faith and Hopefulness. It is obvious that a courageous optimism is one of the most essential qualifications for progressive effort. Pessimism, fatalism, or the *blasé* attitude, if widespread, are absolutely paralyzing. And yet to-day there is among so many people a mood of accepting the source and origin of social shortcomings as if they were the inevitable order of things, and consequently they devote their energies to merely dodging some of the more pestilent consequences. There are others who morbidly dwell on the past and present sins and sufferings of society and give up in despair, as they view through their black spectacles the magnitude of the task ahead of them. Despair and apathy must be cast out of our minds, past failures must be seen in their proper light, and society viewed with hopeful insight.

We dare not lack the decisive boldness to follow the mandate of our new faith against whatever obstacles, be they within us or among us, that tend to check the initiative of this new age. To permit hypnotic blindness, despair, or even hesitation to-day is cowardice, the shirking of social duty, the fear of great deeds by little men. As Shakespeare has it:

"Our doubts are traitors
And make us lose the good we oft might win
By fearing to attempt."³⁰

We dare and can act to prevent disaster, ruin, and cowardly quiescence, and put to work the new spirit of this age, the new faith in man's ability to conquer the world and correct his own inhumanities.

b. A Time of Social Idealism and Invention. Civilization has been built up largely through invention and discovery, in both the physical

²⁹ See also E. A. Ross, *Civic Sociology*, pp. 189-191, and A. B. Wolfe, *Conservatism, Radicalism and Scientific Method*, p. 313. Also note Chapters IX-XIV of this study.

³⁰ *Measure for Measure*, Act. I.

and intellectual realms. The progress of the future likewise can only come when the social inventor, the idealist, the dreamer are at work, freeing themselves from the prevailing commonplace interests, customs, views, and prejudices, conceiving the higher possibilities of human evolution, constructing ideals of a better society to serve as a goal, and finding means and agencies and principles whereby the better society can be brought about. Inventions and ideals are the seed that ripen into right change. They stir the imagination of men, and imagination is prerequisite to reform; they create centers of influence and imitation from which the knowledge of the desirable thing radiates and gradually becomes incorporated into social thought.

c. A High Level of Intelligence and Will. While a high level of intelligence, discipline, foresight, and will do not assure progress, progress is contingent upon their development; they increase its possibilities and provide opportunities. They are conducive to greater invention and idealism and mean an advance of science and all other intelligence agencies. They imply a better comprehension of progressive principles and a more intelligent united effort for their realization. They make possible a greater social self-control. What is needed above all else is a mental capacity to discard the obsolete in favor of a better device and a truer knowledge. Of course, a general spirit of intellectual tolerance is also needed, lest man's new ideas be stifled from fear of disapproval. A society which actually welcomes, applauds and rewards new ideas will have the greatest and richest collection of ideas and programs to select from.

d. A Plastic Social Structure. A fluid, flexible society having a high rate of change is best. Progress can come only when social change is comparatively easy, because then selective processes work much more readily and quickly. At such times much less energy is wasted in overcoming inertia and social friction. The "cake of custom" is prevented from forming; traditions and ancient beliefs are more or less impotent as influence factors, and institutions are in a state of flux.

Of course, there is always the possibility that during such times of change the group will reach wrong conclusions, make mistakes, and lose the opportunity for progress. Thus wise leadership is needed to mold the plastic public opinion and make it intelligent—in brief, to guide dynamic change.

e. Wealth, Surplus Energy, and Leisure. These are always necessary for any creative or constructive work. Müller-Lyer³¹ states: "At

³¹ *The History of Social Development*, p. 307.

whatever point we look, it is evident everywhere in the history of inventions that these are not due to necessity, but that they are rather the free daughters of leisure and plenty. . . Inventions cannot be made to order; they depend on the undisturbed play of thought and fancy which appears uncalled for in the mind which is free from all great cares. Necessity leads to industry, but leisure leads to invention." Leisure is the opportunity for discovery, invention, and achievement of all kinds. But it is entirely contingent upon economic advancement and a substantial material civilization, for wealth, the product of these, is a surplus which makes leisure possible. The development of new, or the improvement of old food resources, new inventions, or machinery, or new processes in farming, or the various other departments of industry, efficient labor saving devices, the curtailing of the rate of population increase, and the utilization of wasted power resources, should result in advance in economic technique and an increase in wealth, which in turn make possible, or should make possible, more adequate resources, the shorter day, higher education for the rank and file, better conditions of life, a greater supply of physical, mental, and social energy, and a larger period of leisure for all. Thus leisure with its other embellishments should automatically and spontaneously result in an increase in culture and progress. Actually, due to prevailing attitudes and influences, this is not always the case. We do not transfer enough energy from purely economic to generally progressive pursuits, nor do we substitute for the joys of life's physical comforts and the mere amassing of wealth the satisfactions of progressive achievement. But we will have to learn this, for, as man advances in knowledge, he learns continually how to master nature and manipulate its resources at will, and harness its energies and productivity for his purposes. Are these conquests going to be used for the purely animal ends of comfortable existence, or for human progressive ends?

f. A High Level of Ethical Attitudes. Right material, legal, and social conditions are not guarantees of progress. There must also be in play among at least a considerable part of the population certain high ethical attitudes, well incorporated in the daily reactions of the people, to serve as stimulating and disciplinary elements. Especially important are the centripetal forces, as Professor Patrick calls them,⁸² such as self-sacrifice, loyalty, devotion, and allegiance. Man wants to give himself, and he must be loyal to something. If these forces can be enlisted for progressive ends much good can come, as the long history of man-

⁸² *Psychology of Social Reconstruction*, pp. 97, 105, 108, 187, 191.

kind shows. Needed also are a people who in their development have been trained to temperance, moderation, and conservation; to restraint, self-control, self-denial, limitation of desires, and resistance to temptation; to heroism, love, mutual respect, and a sense of individual responsibility. The spiritual and ethical element is so significant in progress that technical proficiency is an empty shell or a runaway machine without it.

9. THE STAGES IN A PARTICULAR PROGRESSIVE MOVEMENT ⁸³

Any study of completed reform movements, such as the abolition of dueling, slavery, piracy, the persecution of witches, or the consummation of the woman's suffrage movement reveals like stages in their development.⁸⁴ It must be remembered that these stages are not definite; there is much overlapping and running together.

a. Aggravation. The recognition that there is a serious social evil becomes fairly acute, though the evil may have existed for centuries. This recognition in turn rests upon the fact that a new perception of needs has been arrived at. Among the causes for aggravation, often most numerous, complex, and interlaced, are noticeable the growth of civilization or spontaneous social evolution that produces new difficult social situations, a new moral, educational, or religious advance, or the institutionalization of the evil. That part of the people who are socially and morally sensitive is disturbed in feeling.

b. Initiation. The more severe the aggravation, the more general is the recognition of the need of change, and the more urgent the pressure upon the progressives and reformers to engage in the processes of initiation of such changes. This process may occur suddenly, as in the case of woman's suffrage, or gradually, as in the case of dueling. The success of the initiating movement depends upon the quality and ability of the leaders, the methods of procedure adopted, the general intelligence of the people, the peculiarities of the particular social situation, such as political, economic, and ethical conditions, and a host of other factors. The most important factor, however, is the initiator. For it is his chief function to make such an impression on society that the reform will be started. This he usually does by arousing a small group to action, who in

⁸³ This analysis is based in part upon an unpublished manuscript on *The Social Psychology of Reform Movements* by Mr. Roy M. Youngman, the preparation of which was carried on under the supervision of the present writer.

⁸⁴ In E. A. Ross, *Social Psychology*, pp. 346-354, Blackmar and Gillin, *Outlines of Sociology* (revised), pp. 361-364, and F. H. Giddings, *Descriptive and Historical Sociology*, pp. 134-185, are indicated steps in the formation of group decision, a study closely allied with the present one.

turn convey their spirit to the masses; they determine the strategic moments, formulate policies, decide on ways and means, and act as leaders of leaders. A periodically published journal, pamphlets, public addresses, newspaper and magazine articles, and semi-public assemblies are helpful also if properly used.

c. Discussion. If the process of initiation has been properly carried through, the evil and its reform become a matter of widespread public controversy, in the course of which the people make up their mind. It is the period of agitation, investigation, debate, and usually of extensive organization. The people's ignorance must be illuminated, their prejudices overcome, their questions answered, and their opposition or indifference converted into active support of the reform. Of course the reactionaries, the institutionalized dignitaries, the vested interests, and other interested opposing groups become alarmed and active. Seeking to evade the issue they try to stop discussion, cut off all agitation, and humiliate or calumniate the leaders of the reform. This opposition will be fierce in the degree the evil is institutionalized, commercialized, and custom bound. So all manner of social institutions are enlisted, if possible, on both sides of the question, including especially the power of government, the press, nation-wide organizations, political parties, the home, the church, and the school.

d. Outlawry. Out of discussion comes a decision to correct the evil. The decision of the public, or at least the effective minority, has been consummated, registered, and brought into action. In one way or another the reform has captured the imagination of the public. The truth has been learned, the conscience of the public has been aroused, and is ready to act. The evil is outlawed. It still is carried on, but mainly under cover. The violator of the new addition to the moral or social code is looked down upon. While there is still some controversy, the opposition is very weak and rapidly retreating. Finally votes are taken, legislation is passed, and laws are placed on the statute books.

e. Enforcement. Crystallizing the new taboo in law does not end the matter, as is commonly believed. The law must be applied and enforced before it becomes effective. If this is conscientiously and successfully done, the evil is finally eradicated. The desire to practice the evil has been erased from the people's consciousness, and a new moral level has been achieved. The natural history of completed reform movements indicates that in general, each of these stages must occur in any great progressive change if it is to be successful.

10. THE COURSE OF PROGRESS

Progress, when it occurs, is not in a straight line, but is shifting and uneven, up and down, from one side to another, for, as some one has said, "the way is rugged and often uncharted, and the steps, where they occur, are illcut and slippery." It is shunted off onto sidings by all manner of forces, is dammed up by obstacles, is thinned out by too rapid temporary development, is forced underground by dominant reactionism, and is attracted this way by some opportunity or favorable circumstance. Progress moves in three dimensions and at various rates of movement. In each of the different departments of life progress may be, and usually is, pursuing these various directions independently though contemporaneously. Only by the most marked smoothing of the curve, or curves, of the motion of progress can it be said to be in a fixed direction.³⁵ Actually the path of progress, even along a single line, goes like a mountain road, which turns upon itself in zigzag cuts, or in spiral curves, so that even when ascent to a new height has been made, the perception of this is difficult. It rarely occurs continuously in the same direction.

11. CAUTIONS TO BE OBSERVED IN PROGRESS ³⁶

a. Start with Things as They Are. Professor T. N. Carver ³⁷ states in his pithy way that "The greatest and most deadly of all intellectual vices is the unwillingness to see things as they are, or the propensity to believe that to be true which one wishes were true." This applies especially to the progressive. Facts must be faced. Progress must be made from the materials, human and otherwise, at present available. Nothing is more wild or false than the oft preached doctrine that the only way to remedy the world's ills lies through the destruction or abandonment of the present social order. This philosophy forgets that everything must be built up by thought and toil; that achievement is built upon achievement; and that the destruction of any part of it makes the world poorer. Such destruction would give no advantage.³⁸ In fact, it would leave the progressive without a base to work from, without a point of departure. It is particularly true that any better social state

³⁵ Cf. A. J. Todd, *Theories of Social Progress*, pp. 105-106. See also C. C. Peters, *Foundations of Educational Sociology*, pp. 282-285.

³⁶ The reader is urged to supplement this section with E. A. Ross' "Canons of Social Reconstruction" in his *Principles of Sociology*, pp. 549-554.

³⁷ *Essays in Social Justice*, p. 8.

³⁸ F. H. Giddings, "Right to Achieve," *Unpartisan Review*, Vol. 12, p. 379.

must be made from the same *human* materials and factors as those available to-day. Progressives make no headway with their reforms unless they propose changes in line with the social processes that have brought society thus far on its way.

"Men must start with what they find and build up from that; if they find good, make it better; if bad, eliminate it, or improve it. Humanity can never transcend the conditions of its existence. Movement toward Utopia calls for a conception, not of the best imaginable world at the moment, but the best possible world. We must focus our efforts on the scientific and the practicable. The fulcrum for raising society must be found in things as they are. The ideas that you expect to disseminate and use as the basis of your reform may not be too far removed from the current thought of the time, nor may the discrepancy between what you want and what is, be too great." ³⁹

b. The New Is Not Always Good Nor Is the Old Always Bad.

The absurdity of clinging to the old when better methods are available is only equalled by the folly of discarding the old merely because it is old. But there are so many to-day for whom mere difference between our own and past conditions is regarded as an indication and measure of progress. This situation is reflected in such common expressions as "behind the times" and "up-to-date." Among the legions who look upon progress from this angle, one finds a pitying and patronizing attitude towards the past just because it is past, the old because it is old, or even a condemnation of these, and an admiration for, and even worship of, the most recent. But "Progress . . . intelligently apprehended, does not involve that flippancy irreverence for the past so often associated with it. It offers no encouragement to the chase after vagaries in which so many moderns indulge, as though all that is old were belated and all that is novel were true." ⁴⁰ In fact, the new may be untried—mere mental driftwood, while "the light we have for the future shines upon us from behind"; or, put a little differently, we of necessity have to stand on the scaffolding erected by our forefathers. Real progress is not to make new, or to make quickly, but to make better. It consists not in cutting loose from the past, but in sifting the experience of the past for helpful elements. To cast off as mere irksome restraint the guiding and controlling principles handed down from the past, without first making sure of something better, is the denial of progress.

c. Beware of Clamor and Noise. When Elijah went up into the mountain, the Lord was not in the wind, nor in the earthquake, nor in

³⁹ J. O. Hertzler, *History of Utopian Thought* (copyright 1925 by The Macmillan Company), pp. 305-306. Reprinted by permission.

⁴⁰ H. E. Fosdick, *Christianity and Progress*, p. 204.

the fire, but in the still small voice. It seems that the greatest things are usually done in a quiet way. Noisy propaganda and clamor and hullabaloo, in spite of their wide use at the present time, are not the means of achieving great and durable reforms. They may bring temporary results, as in elections, but even here they usually result in misrepresentation and over-emphasis. Experience seems to show that there is no permanence in conversions by such methods; the converts are stupefied and drugged by noise and sentiment, vagaries and high-sounding phrases. When the effect wears off, society is no better off than it was before. The most effective means of producing progress is the dissemination of truth about things, and truth does not need to be shouted. The results seem to be slower this way, but they are self-motivated after they begin and do not require the hysterical maunderings of the propagandist to carry them through. Since most people in time recognize truth, we need to place our emphasis on clearer vision, reflection, the development of a sense of proportion, and the discovery of the relation between things, rather than on noisy panaceas and nostrums. When this is done progressive effort is sane, intelligent, and sound.

d. There Can Be No Progress Without Emotion. Thinking alone will not bring progress; it is not merely a matter of facts, blue-prints, and knowledge of the better thing. It must also have strong and favorable sustaining emotion behind it to make it dynamic.⁴¹ The springs and motives that have led to action and decision in the crises of great world events in the past have not been purely intellectual. There has always been a mighty emotional urge heaving beneath the guiding and knowing reason. Among human beings emotions, sentiments, and preferences are as significant, and perhaps more frequently in effect, than factual, cognitive powers. This simply means, therefore, that if progress is to become widespread the idea must become deeply imbedded in the desires and emotions of people generally; it must become part of their values and preferences, so that their actions are more or less unconsciously guided by it. For these are the dynamic elements that release the productive and constructive powers of human beings. Hence he who would propagandize for progress must not fail to play upon the emotions as well as reason—but not overdo it.

Of course there are certain emotions, sentiments, and attitudes the

⁴¹ "Men are not governed by abstract principles, but by passions and emotions." Leslie Stephens. "Affection, propensities, passions are the great springs of human life." Auguste Comte.

genuine progressive will not try to exploit, such, for example, as superstitious fear, personal hatred, prejudice, greed, lust, jealousy, vanity, suspicion, or love of notoriety; while, on the other hand, he will aim to stir the nobler ones as parental love, sympathy, hatred of injustice, patriotism, moral indignation, hope, love of security, public spirit, and so on.

e. The Social Control Exercised Must Not Be Excessive or Repressive. The method whereby the control is exercised by society over the individual or group in the interests of progress presents another problem of significance. Every one likes his own way; no one cares to be restrained. Every one wants to be free to develop and live. If the control is excessive or repressive, it tends to quench enthusiasm, reduce energy, suppress initiative and spontaneous activity, discourage or crush the exercise of constructive imagination, invention, discovery, and achievement in every field as well as produce a dangerous unrest and discontent. Human beings will admit but a limited degree of regimentation of their lives without rebellion, especially if the control is of an external or institutional nature. If this excessive control occurs it means the halting of progress. On the other hand, if no control is exercised, there is the possibility of impending chaos, threatening disaster, disintegration, the dissolution of civilization. A golden mean between these two extremes must be found, and social science must determine where it is to be at any given time in a particular department of life. The greatest freedom compatible with good order and permissible social action should be maintained.

The control should not be applied too abruptly or rigidly. Those constructive stimuli that make for a spontaneous self-control should be substituted for the "Thou shalt nots" wherever and whenever possible.⁴² There are, of course, cases where immediate rectification of evils by any agent available is necessary, but, in the main, if the situation possibly permits it, instead of the compulsions, legal and otherwise, and the indiscriminate persuasions now so widely used, there should be employed the highly socialized and refined agents of control. Thus one of the general conditions essential to social progress is the establishment of an equilibrium between freedom and control. Neither can be dispensed with, and neither can be permitted unqualified supremacy over the other.⁴³

⁴² Cf. E. S. Bogardus, *Fundamentals of Social Psychology*, pp. 342-347.

⁴³ Cf. U. G. Weatherly, *Social Progress*, pp. 380-382; J. Q. Dealey, *Sociology, Its Development and Application*, pp. 344-345.

f. The World of the Future Must Not Be Too Highly Standardized or Regimented. Professor G. T. W. Patrick discusses this point at length in his *Psychology of Social Reconstruction*.⁴⁴ Man, he points out, cannot be contented in a world where all is organized in the interests of perfect peace, perfect equality; where danger and planning have been eliminated; where life has been made altogether easy and safe and comfortable, even though that is the fundamental aspiration of so many people, as is borne out by one writer who sighs, "One longs for the day when the house of civilization shall be completed, so that we can dwell in it in peace." The society which we are planning for the future must have zest in it. Life has always been for men a growth, a struggle, a speculation, a development; a matter of effort and change, of competition and achievement, of romance and adventure. Man is a being that strives, initiates, constructs, ventures, and the totality of human interests must find expression. It is the planning and the achieving, not the condition of equality and prosperity, that give the maximum satisfaction, that make life a career. If man does not have these his life becomes insipid, and he suffers boredom, ennui, and unrest, and ultimately his group will stagnate and degenerate.

g. We Must Beware of Pampering the Race. A difficulty that threatens as soon as one thinks of the progress of the future is that of spoon-feeding the race. There is always a danger of scientific invention, with its new labor and mind saving devices, its comforts and luxuries, pampering the race too much. Life must not be made too easy and safe and fool-proof. It is true that if faculties and powers are not used they deteriorate.⁴⁵ We cannot place too much confidence in the artificial arrangements and institutions that the progressive régime constructs to bolster up the individual and keep him in line. There will always be times when the individual will have to be "on his own," and he will need the experience that comes from the strains of independent action and a certain amount of hardship to give him the ruggedness to survive the emergency. If men do not develop this self-reliance they become helpless—helpless as Lord Avebury's ants, who almost starved to death in sight of food because they were used to having it put into their mouths by slaves.

h. We Must Not Confuse Quantitative and Utilitarian with Qualitative Change. If one has a philosophic conception of the present progress ideal, one questions the widely heralded and much lauded new

⁴⁴ Pp. 83-89, 110-113.

⁴⁵ Cf. W. R. Inge, "The Spoon-fed Age," *Living Age*, Vol. 325, p. 66.

labor-saving and time-saving devices, the many new mechanical inventions, and some of the medical and agricultural arts. One is led to ask the use of these practical achievements.

"Suppose that we do, for example, succeed in shortening by six hours the journey from New York to Chicago, or in lengthening by five years the average span of man's life, or in making two blades of grass grow where one grew before. What shall we do with those extra six hours or five years and what will the increased population do which is made possible by a greater food supply? It may all mean a merely *quantitative* increase in the total amount of living—by no means a self-evident advantage." "

i. The Need of a Unified Attack on the Part of the Reformers.

Little general progress can be made until there is greater coöperation and unity among the reformers. While there is much that is commendable along this line in the main, each reformer or each group or organization is still working for its own panacea, and perhaps even discrediting the efforts of the others in order to exalt its own. Reform, as all else, needs to be depersonalized and socialized. Leaders need to forget something of themselves, their great sacrifices, the overwhelming importance of the special problem they are working upon and the program they have devised, and make their movement part of a great well correlated and well synchronized universal effort. They must especially beware of unjustly attacking their colleagues who do not agree with them as to methods of procedure. Often reformers are over-free in hurling their accusations of insincerity and cowardice at people who are as firmly convinced of the necessity of a particular reform as they are, and as conscientious in expending effort in its behalf, but differ as to program or time—differences quite permissible in a field still so little subjected to scientific procedure as social reform.

Above all, it is exceedingly necessary for the reformers to find some method of handling or eliminating two types that do any reform movement much harm and impair its long-time effectiveness. One of these types is the psychopathic martyr, who may be said to be the victim of a martyr psychosis. He is the unbalanced emotionalist who can be neither reasonable, scientific, nor tolerant, and who automatically damns anyone who does not hysterically shout for his own particular half-baked solution of the social problem. He is the whirling dervish of reform and

"F. B. Sumner, "Some Perils which Confront us as Scientists," *Scientific Monthly*, Vol. 8, pp. 265-266.

helps about as much as most whirling dervishes do.⁴⁷ The other type is the recently developed, self-conscious, egoistic, professional martyr, the type who for advertising purposes, for income, for political gain, for notoriety, or for egoistic satisfaction, make much ado about their martyrdom. If there is one thing that cools the enthusiasm of the self-respecting, common-sense progressive more than anything else, it is to see these persons elbow their way into the spotlight. The situation is further aggravated when they begin to exercise their "holier than thou" propensities among other reformers. Incidentally they bring anathemas down upon the whole group of reformers. Their martyrdom to be effective should be undergone with a bit more humility, and a little less name-calling.

QUESTIONS AND PROBLEMS

1. Is the progressive attitude a safe one to assume toward any problem in any department of life?
2. Why are the progressive and his idea nearly always resisted? If we were entirely rational how would we treat them?
3. "In America, where we boast of being especially concerned with progress, creative-mindedness is usually neglected, it is often positively stifled, and it is not infrequently treated as a symptom of grave disorder." (R. W. Brown, *The Creative Spirit*, preface.) Account for this.
4. In order to get at some of the forces or influences that assist people in getting rid of antiquated, inherited ideas that prevent them from seeing new light and from acting in accordance with changing needs, make a tabulation, among people of liberal or radical religious opinions that you know, of factors that led them to discard the old obstructive traditional points of view.
5. It is a general opinion among progressive thinkers that progress is impossible without adding something in the way of restrictions on men. Why is this?
6. Do you know of any reforms that have failed because they were precipitated too hastily? Does this mean that no attempt at acceleration should have been made?
7. Paracelsus (1493-1541), the founder of modern medicine, said in the preface to his *Great Surgical Remedies*: "I dedicate this book to those to whom the new is worth more than the old, simply because it is new." Was this idea progressive in his day? Is it progressive to-day?
8. To what extent are progressive ideas and action on the part of the individual a matter of temperament?
9. What are the dangers of superficial optimism and self-complacency?

⁴⁷ Cf. L. L. Bernard, *Introduction to Social Psychology*, pp. 504-506.

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CHAPTER VII

PROGRESS IN THE PAST

I. PURPOSE OF THE QUEST

THE first thing that the average man thinks of when progress is mentioned is the progress of mankind in the past. He has a belief that somehow man's career to date has been one of stupendous and undeniable progress. This is not a fundamental matter in our study, since we are concerned with a survey of what is meant by progress to-day, what its agents are, and what the present state of affairs is with respect to the need for and the possibilities of progress, but a brief treatment is due the subject as a means of providing a background and a point of view, if for no other reason. When we try to answer the question, "Has there been progress?" we assume a very difficult task, however, for the past is a veiled and tangled series of events which it is very difficult to inventory accurately.

2. THE SIGNIFICANCE OF THE STANDARD

Since the standard is the important thing in progress, we cannot call the occurrences in social history progress unless a standard is introduced by which it can be measured. When we say that there has been progress in history, we mean that a standard has been introduced by which social evolution has been measured and toward which it has been found to favorably incline. When we say that a nation, or the Western World, has progressed in the past we impute as a standard the present status along a particular line, and contrast with it the condition of the nation or world a generation, or a century, or a millennium ago. In other words, we are comparing the past with the present; if we find things less good in the past as compared with the present, keeping our basic progress test in mind as a final criterion, we can say that there has been progress.

But even with a fairly definite standard any attempt to measure or evaluate civilization is exceedingly difficult. If we pick out certain things or threads and dissect them, we can show great accomplishment;

while, if we fix our gaze on others, we conclude that results are small. "The results of such anatomical investigation," as Havelock Ellis suggests, "admit of the most diverse interpretations, and, at the best, can furnish no adequate criterion of the worth of a complex living civilization."¹ We deceive ourselves if we let any such partial examinations stand for the whole. Care must also be taken to guard against loose thinking. It is so easy to compare the worst, or the best, of our age with the selected best or worst of all the past. Both the sunlit haze softening the outlines of the past and the intense glow of the time-conceit of our present era must be diffused. Our problem is to determine whether the total or average level of human good has increased. For this comparison of present and past there is required an extensive and intimate historical perspective, giving information on a variety of threads of social evolution, and observation in a succession of social efforts. That we will do all this poorly in what follows is admitted; accurate tools and adequate materials for a satisfactory scientific evaluation are not available at this stage of historical knowledge.

3. THE SIGNIFICANCE OF THE TIME ELEMENT

In any fair estimate of progress in the past we must have in mind the entire situation; all the data must be considered. This, however, is very difficult; in fact, is almost impossible to obtain, because of the enormous expanse of time involved. It is now rather definitely known that man has been on the earth for something between one and two million years, though, to be sure, our concrete evidence only goes back half a million years, and some of that is vague and controvertible. What we call civilization with something approaching a fairly reliable record of history only goes back 8,000 years or so.

At best our study can only take us back a half a million years, for it is only during this period, as far as we now know, that we have anything at all in the way of evidence of human and social achievement. But this is a long time. Even 8,000 years is a long time. The various natural elements destroy and obliterate, and what nature does not do, man himself has effaced by war and other forms of destruction. Many ancient cities are but heaps of dust, and ancient cultures are now represented by débris—fragments and relics. Even after there are understandable written records one knows that they do not give a complete picture, nor are they likely to be altogether impartial. Remorseless time

¹ *The Dance of Life*, p. 301.

has dimmed the record; our knowledge is vague and piecemeal. At best we can consult with only a semblance of accuracy the last few moments of man's career on earth. All that we are positively sure of is that man is an ancient—a very ancient—sojourner on this planet.

4. CIVILIZATION AND PROGRESS

In any study of progress in the past, the difficulty always arises of distinguishing between civilization and progress. They are not synonymous terms. As already pointed out, progress means an advance toward better or ideal physical, mental, moral, or spiritual conditions, or those conceived of as better; it is movement toward a condition of higher quality as determined by some ideal, or set of ideals.

Civilization, on the other hand, is a state of social culture, characterized by a relatively high status in the arts, science, institutions and ethics of a people. It usually implies an advanced state of material and social well-being, the result of the collective activity of many generations. It is not a question of biologically different individuals with superior hereditary powers and capacities, but rather a superior social environment, or social heritage. The child born into the most advanced civilization is not inherently more civilized than one born under the most primitive conditions. It is simply born into an advanced social environment—one which has the habits, knowledge, standards, values, and machinery of civilization. In general, civilization is a relative term used to signify a state of mankind in advance of savagery and barbarism. The nature peoples are savages; they are entirely dependent upon nature and secure their food from wild plants and animals, wear little or no clothing, live in caves, rock shelters, or rude huts, have only the simplest tools and weapons of wood, bone, and stone, and the most rudimentary social order. Barbarism forms a transitional stage between savagery and civilization. The barbarian has acquired some control over nature and something of what we call culture, though it is rudimentary. He has a certain amount of agriculture instead of depending entirely upon hunting and fishing, he has some domestic animals, and usually some knowledge of the use of metals. Civilization is a still greater freeing of man from subservience to brute natural conditions. The environment has been readjusted and reshaped until it has become quite artificial. The foods, the clothing, the shelter of the civilized man are all results of his determination to change his environment rather than himself. Civilization is also characterized by religion and philosophy, litera-

ture and art, law and liberty, mental, social, and spiritual achievement. W. Flinders Petrie says that the essentials of civilization are four: justice, security, toleration, and acquisition of knowledge,² and that the permanent loss of any one of these requirements would decivilize any nation. But civilization is not a fixed standard of institutions, or of mental and moral cultivation. It is a relative term.³

When one thinks of the transition of the race from savagery to civilization, where it has occurred, one sees something that might be called progress, for we know that there was a time when the whole human race had no more claim to be called civilized than the Australian Bushman has to-day; and that somehow the greater part of the race has risen far above that condition. The movement toward civilization and the evolution of civilization has meant the slow and gradual development of the higher and more complex institutions—the higher standards of art and knowledge and commerce and politics and religion and ethics—which do, in spite of all their defects, raise us to a level of thought and action which is as high above that of early man as his level was above that of the ape-man. Of course, this advance was not continuous and unbroken. Civilizations perished time after time, and a new section of the race had to learn its lesson over again, often with very little aid from its predecessors. Nor has civilization always been for the best. It has occasionally destroyed as much as it has contributed.

In conclusion we may say that in the remote past of so-called civilized peoples, progress occurred beneath civilization, and that their very civilization is the product of innumerable progresses; while to-day progress in general occurs within a civilization; it is adding to a civilization in a qualitative way; it is the enriching and ennobling of a civilization. If to-day we have among a people a wise use of leisure, and encouragement of education, a rich and harmonious social life which emphasizes goodness and beauty and order, an increasing spirituality—if we have a life in which there is a refining, a softening, a socialization, an elevation and purification of the individual as well as the community, a life in which self can come to a considerable degree of realization—we have a civilization in which progress is occurring.⁴

² What is Civilization?," *Contemporary Review*, Vol. 119, pp. 42-56.

³ Cf. V. S. Yarros, "Facts and Measures of Civilization," *Open Court*, Vol. 37, pp. 210-211; F. Guizot, *History of Civilization*, Vol. I, footnote, p. 18; H. Ellis, *The Dance of Life*, p. 289. See also F. W. Blackmar, *The History of Human Society*, pp. 13-17; F. Adler, *The World Crisis and Its Meaning*, p. 112; J. H. W. Stuckenberg, *Sociology: the Science of Society*. Vol. I, Ch. XV.

⁴ Cf. A. Niceforo, *Les Indices numériques de la Civilisation et du Progrès*, pp. 40-45.

5. THE QUALITATIVE NATURE OF SOCIAL CHANGE IN EARLY GROUPS AND SOCIETIES

While the data are few and inadequate for a complete and scientific summary, the history of man from his dawn to civilization gives rather impressive evidence of human change which falls into the category that we have spoken of as "blind progress," or "progressive evolution." We note man's rise as the earth's greatest species, his development, his struggle upwards, his gradual conquest of nature and the faint beginnings of his conquest of human nature.

All through the geological ages we note the ascent of life; then man himself appears as the crowning point of a long, long evolutionary process. In the river drift, on the sites of his ancient camping places, in the débris in caves, and on the walls of caves we obtain evidence of his life. Beginning with the eoliths, supposedly produced by the race of *Pithecanthropus Erectus* or a contemporary race appearing around a half a million years ago, so feebly and crudely chipped that many experts fail to see human workmanship in them, there is a gradual evolution, without gap or leap or sudden advance in intelligence, from these to the always more elaborate tools and weapons as well as the rise of art forms of various kinds. In fact, these products are so numerous and so clearly representative of different stages, that we have already divided them into the Old Stone Age and the New Stone Age, and have further subdivided the Old Stone Age into the Lower Paleolithic and Upper Paleolithic, each consisting of four culture periods.⁵

In the Pre-Chellian, the first of the four Lower Paleolithic culture periods extending down to about 125,000 years ago, we find in the culture stations hand-stones and scraping tools of flint that clearly indicate retouching. In the Chellian culture period, probably that of the Piltdown Race, extending from approximately 125,000 to 75,000 years ago, we note hand-stones now produced in four definite shapes: almond, ovaloid, disk, and lance-head, each probably with some specialized use. In the Acheullean Period, coming some 75,000 to 50,000 years ago, there is an abundance of highly perfected tools, blades, scrapers, borers, planers, all regularly and finely chipped according to some special technique, as well as implements of bone in the form of needles, probably used to sew skins together. Here also are the first positive evidences of

⁵For extensive descriptions of these periods see H. F. Osborn, *Man of the Old Stone Age*; A. Keith, *Antiquity of Man*; J. M. Tyler, *The New Stone Age in Northern Europe*.

the use of fire in the layers of charred wood and bones frequently found in the industrial deposits of early Acheulean times. The Mousterian culture of the Neanderthal men, extending from about 50,000 to 25,000 years ago, does not show such marked advance in weapons and tools, perhaps due to the fact that a communal life was developing which encouraged social advance, the development of imagination and tribal lore, and the beginning of religious belief and ceremonial. This is borne out by the ceremonial interment and the evidence of food offerings at the type station of Le Moustier in France.

The Upper Paleolithic opens with the advent of that great prehistoric race, the Cromagnons, the first real *homo sapiens*, the same species of man as ourselves, and they appear as the chief race throughout. They entered Western Europe between 30,000 and 25,000 years ago. The first culture period of the Upper Paleolithic, the Aurignacian, extending down to about 20,000 years ago, shows all sorts of advance; there are ceremonial burials, with every evidence of special burial customs such as laying the corpse in an east-and-west direction, burying weapons and food, and using perforated bone ornaments, as well as color, with all that this implies in the way of a conception of survival after death; there are drawings that seem to show the use of houses or huts; there are the highly differentiated implements of war, industry, and art in flint and bone; there are the microliths that may have been used as money, and the discovery of characteristic natural products of stations far removed, indicating intercourse, barter, commerce; and the multiplicity of art objects in the form of drawings, paintings, engravings, or sculpturings of women, hands, bison, horses, cave-bears, reindeer, mammoths, etc., expressing emotion and imagination.

The Solutrean culture, extending from about 20,000 to 15,000 or 16,000 years ago, and brought into Europe by the Brünn, Brûx, and Predmost races while the Cromagnons were temporarily eclipsed, shows an exceptionally high grade workmanship in the fashioning of flint, in fact, the flint industry here reaches its climax. The engraving and sculpture are not so rich as in the Aurignacian. The Cromagnons are again the dominant race in the next period, that of the Magdalenian culture, extending from 16,000 to 11,000 or 12,000 years ago. Here the art is the most skilful and fascinating of the entire Old Stone Age, including composite pictures for the first time; bone and horn implements become a distinctive feature, while flint implements are merely used in shaping bone and horn. From the nature of the remains there must have been an extensive tribal organization and rather minute specialization of

labor industrially, politically, religiously, and esthetically. It is the culmination of Paleolithic culture.

In the last culture period of the Paleolithic, the Azilian-Tardenoisian-Maglomesian, extending from 12,000 or 11,000 to 8,000 years ago, other new culture elements appear with the new races, the Furfooz-Grenelle, the Ofnet, and the Teutonics. One notes a disappearance of painting and sculpture, probably due to the weakening of the Cromagnons, but the appearance of geometric and conventional designs that doubtless had some economic or religious significance, or perhaps represent the early stages of an alphabet, a deterioration of bone and horn work, unique burials and some evidence of a domesticated dog.

The beginning of the Neolithic or New Stone Age cultures and industries in Western Europe, some 7,000 years ago, marks one of the most profound changes in all pre-history. "Man is merging into civilization. Most of the germs and many of the determinants of our modern institutions and civilization can be recognized in the habits, customs, and life of the Neolithic period."⁶

Their kitchen middens or refuse heaps show extensive deep-water fishing (for which they had to have good boats), as well as hunting over wide territories; their stone sepulchres (dolmens), burial mounds, and menhirs indicate careful burial, a high type of religion, and great engineering skill. Then there were also the carefully and ingenuously constructed pile dwellings on the lakes, as well as the equally clever pit-dwellings on land; the agriculture with its bone, horn, and stone implements in the form of ploughs, picks, and hoes; the domestication of horses, dogs, cattle, sheep and swine, as well as the domestication of the grains, wheat, barley, and millet, and various fruits and vegetables (about 170 plants in all); the magnificent and useful pottery, the plaiting and weaving, the careful art work, the musical instruments, especially the string and bow instruments and the drum, and their nature religion and their folklore. This shows village life, a highly organized economic life, ability to coöperate, a well-developed family life, a degree of political organization, and sufficient leisure for art, music, and folklore. The Neolithic is followed by the Metal ages, where man is adding to his other accomplishments the use of copper, bronze, and iron.

It is difficult to avoid the conclusion that man unconsciously and haphazardly has advanced in the direction of greater well-being during this stretch of a half a million years. Before this time man was so low in intelligence that he did not even think of knocking two flints to-

⁶J. M. Tyler, *The New Stone Age in Northern Europe*, p. vii.

gether to give a better cutting edge to one of them, or to recognize as valuable an accidental occurrence of this nature. But during this long expanse of pre-history and early history there is evidence of a slow and clumsy adjustment to nature, a development of the agencies of social life, a growing humanness with all that that implies, and an advancing artistic, moral and religious life. Man slowly learned articulate speech—a development that made possible generalization and thought, and the unbelievable expansion in the powers of individual expression. He discovered fire, one of his most useful tools—a tool that made him independent of climate, mastered the night for him, gave him control over materials, and offered him as food scores of things inedible before. He domesticated animals and developed agriculture, which in turn eased his labor, gave him permanence of habitat, a settled way of life, a home, and an economic surplus. He had brought social organization to a degree of perfection, and had consequently already achieved a certain internal order and cohesiveness, protection, security of life and property, and freedom of movement. He had at least rudimentary means of writing, which enabled him to transmit his hard-won lore and experience on to succeeding generations, create a common heritage, and found a crude system of education.⁷ He had also been developing the rudiments of all the modern economic powers; he was manifesting creativeness and inventiveness in both industry and art; he was learning to adapt means to ends in utensils, weapons, clothing, and dwellings; he was developing esthetic powers, religious emotions, spiritual ideals. There had been a continually accelerated realization of human purposes through a gradually increasing skill in detecting the environmental materials and forces which could be turned to account in their realization, and at the same time a flowering of truly human, intellectual, and spiritual elements. It is a consistent and unequivocal story of a very gradual advance in humanness and the realization of humanness. Man was on the threshold of civilization. Has man progressed since?

6. HAS MAN PROGRESSED BIOLOGICALLY?

While there is ample evidence of a constantly augmented and improved social heritage, the historic period is not long enough compared with the prehistoric to conclude that man has degenerated or advanced biologically. Very early in man's biological career there were, of course, the gradual, though marked, changes incidental to the transition from

⁷ Cf. Will Durant, "Is Progress a Delusion?" *Harpers*, Vol. 153, pp. 742-751.

pre-human ancestors to man. No less an authority than Huxley, however, observes that man has made no physical progress since the days of recorded history. Professor E. G. Conklin goes so far as to say, "In bodily evolution man has made no very marked progress during the last twenty thousand years at least,"⁸ and Dean Inge gives the same impression.⁹ Remy de Gourmont also pointed out often that there was no good reason to suppose that we contemporary men are in any way superior to our savage ancestors, who had at least as good physical constitutions and at least as large brains.¹⁰ Certainly there is no positive evidence for a progressive evolution of either man's physical body or of his intelligence, particularly during the last two or three thousand years.

The race is apparently at a standstill, if not actually regressing in this respect as the result of the increasing complexity and artificiality of life. As Holmes points out, in every line of evolution advance is most rapid at first and then slows down until it stops. In those lines where human evolution has gone farthest and fastest it has practically come to an end. This seems to be true notably of the brain and the nervous system, both of which seem to-day to be out of balance with vital functions. Of course, there have been some minor changes for the better in the human body, such as an increasing resistance to certain diseases due to the elimination of those persons who were more susceptible. But more frequent are the physiologists who point out such evidences of physical decline as degenerative changes in teeth, hair, and toes, a weakening of the sense organs, the increasing difficulty of child-bearing among women, and the increased resort to artificial feeding of infants, the continually greater problem of contending with degenerative diseases such as diabetes, nephritis, cerebral hemorrhage, and cancer, the functional impairment of vital organs, such as the stomach, heart, kidneys, and lungs, and increased insanity. Are these due to more strains imposed on a slowly changing organism, insufficient data about the men of the rather distant past which causes us to characterize all men of the age by its survivors alone, or to an actual deterioration? Certainly no entirely satisfactory answers have been given as yet.

If we take biological progress to consist in better organic adjustment to environment, there has been little or none. Our ability to suffer less

⁸ "The Trend of Evolution," in *Evolution of Man*, p. 162.

⁹ "Idea of Progress" in *Outspoken Essays*, 2nd series, 173.

¹⁰ Mentioned by H. Ellis, *The Dance of Life*, p. 298. In this connection see also A. M. Tozzer, *Social Origins and Social Continuities*, p. 28; E. M. East, *Mankind at the Crossroads*, p. 19.

and live longer is due to medical triumphs. The defeat, partial or entire, of leprosy, bubonic plague, typhus, diphtheria, typhoid, and yellow fever, gangrene, and syphilis, are due to the conquest of the microbes involved, and not to any permanent improvement in the defenses of human beings. Where disease depends on the constitution of man himself, little or nothing has been accomplished.¹¹ It seems to be safe to conclude, in general, that man does not seem to be improving physically, nor are any revolutionary changes to be expected.

7. INTELLECTUAL PROGRESS VS. A RICHER SOCIAL HERITAGE

Judged by mental power, man has probably advanced little or none in the last few thousand years. It is quite possible that a modern man may *know* more and even *do* more than an ancient, or even than his parents, but there is no evidence that there has been a corresponding increase in man's intellectual faculties.¹² There are not and have not recently been individual minds with the superior mental capacity of that of Isaiah in prophetic power, of Plato in philosophy, of Aristotle in science, of Thucydides in history, or of Phidias in sculpture. The tragedies of Aeschylus, Sophocles, and Euripides, and the comedies of Aristophanes and Menander have not been surpassed by any later age, if it has equalled them. Nor is it possible that these superior minds sprang into being without natural predecessors whose names are sunk in oblivion.

Those who have devoted much thought and study to this subject are of the opinion that no modern race is intellectually equal to the ancient Greeks. In addition to producing a larger number of illustrious men than any other race in an equal period of time, the general level of intelligence of the citizens was probably higher than is true of any nation to-day.¹³ Francis Galton goes so far as to maintain that the average ability among the Athenians in the period of their glory was as far above that of Englishmen of his day as the average ability of the English is above that of the African negroes.¹⁴

Excellent evidence of high mental capacity goes back even earlier than the Greeks.

¹¹ L. Darwin, *The Need for Eugenic Reform*, p. 64.

¹² E. G. Conklin, "The Trend of Evolution," in *The Evolution of Man*, pp. 162-163.

¹³ *Ibid.*, p. 162.

¹⁴ *Hereditary Genius*, p. 330. There may be some question as to Galton's conception of the mental ability of the African negro.

"The earliest known architectural work, the great pyramid of Egypt, in the mathematical accuracy of its form and dimensions, in its precise orientation, and in the perfect workmanship shown by its internal structure, indicates an amount of astronomical, mathematical and mechanical knowledge, and an amount of experience and practical skill which could only have been attained at that early period of man's history by the exertion of mental ability no way inferior to that of our best modern engineers. In purely intellectual achievements the Vedas, the Mahabharata of ancient India, the Iliad of Homer, the book of Job, and the writings of Plato, will rank with the noblest works of modern authors."¹⁵

It is equally significant that Confucius, Gautama, Zoroaster, Socrates, Plato, Aeschylus, Sophocles, and Euripides were all alive in the fifth century B. C. Is any century to come likely to be distinguished by a more brilliant constellation of intellects? Neither should we forget the Alexandrian group of scientists early in the Christian era: Aristarchus and his discovery of the rotation of the earth; Archimedes and his attitude toward applied science; Hipparchus, the founder of trigonometry; Hero, the writer of the treatises on mechanical devices, and others.

Nor dare we forget those ancient and nameless men who discovered fire and its uses, and learned how to plant wheat and make bread or its equivalent, and how to make pottery, to smelt iron, to construct the first boat, to steer by the stars, or make the first alphabet, who first conceived the idea of one God, or who invented the golden rule. These also were capable of sound and solid thought.

Any student of antiquity is struck by the large number of supposedly modern ideas and contrivances that were commonplace in former times. Frederick Lynch has stated that "There is not a question we are discussing to-day, not even a phase of a question, that has not been discussed in every age by the great philosophers, and not a new political or social scheme that was not touched upon or advocated by Plato or Aristotle or Bacon or someone, and not an ideal we are urging to-day for a new world order that has not been hinted at in almost every century, and hardly a discovery in the world of thought and ideas that someone has not anticipated."¹⁶ As someone has stated it, "The ancients have stolen all our good ideas." Certainly we have no unimpeachable grounds for self-conceit.

In conclusion it may be said that Western man has not advanced intellectually since the days of the Greeks, and perhaps not since the

¹⁵ A. R. Wallace, *Studies, Scientific and Social*, Vol. II, Ch. XXVII, p. 494.

¹⁶ *Christian Century*, Aug. 5, 1926.

Cromagnons.¹⁷ Alfred Russell Wallace actually says, "There is . . . some reason to think that the intellectual high-water level of humanity has sunk rather than risen during the last two thousand years; but this is not absolutely incompatible with the elevation of the mean level of the human ocean both intellectually and morally."¹⁸

When we examine present-day man's *social* inheritance instead of his *natural* inheritance we find what seem to be true progressive elements. We men of to-day are not markedly different in intelligence from the man of ancient times, nor even from the savage of the present day. We simply *know* more; our social heritage becomes continually richer. By means of language, tradition, writing, and archives, the experiences—the achievements and contributions—of past generations are handed on to present and future ones, and each generation thus receives the accumulated knowledge and science of the past. In this way there has occurred not only an accumulation of the materials and fruits of civilization, but also the improved methods of using these social achievements. Thus we are in a real sense "the heirs of all the ages." Having the knowledge and wisdom of the past to build upon, each succeeding generation has the ever higher vantage ground from which to start in original research, and the furtherance of knowledge is perpetually advanced. "We have risen step by step, on the ladders and scaffolds erected by our predecessors; . . . we can now mount higher and see further than they could" even though we are not, on the average, greater men intellectually than they were.¹⁹ Anatole France also points out that our marvellous modern achievements are merely the result of accumulated intellectual resources and an expanded knowledge as to how to employ them, and concludes that "the inventor of wireless telegraphy is not more intelligent than the inventor of the wheel."²⁰

It is this growing body of knowledge and experience and technique of control that has made telic progress possible. Through it we have gained a new understanding of history, and a new control over nature and human nature that has given our future largely into our hands.

¹⁷ For a more complete discussion see E. G. Conklin, *The Direction of Human Evolution*, pp. 65-69; W. C. Curtis, *Science and Human Affairs*, pp. 315-319; W. I. Inge, *Outspoken Essays*, second series, p. 173.

¹⁸ *Op. cit.*, p. 495.

¹⁹ A. R. Wallace, *op. cit.*, p. 493. In this connection the following quotation is also significant: "Newton himself on one occasion remarked, 'If I have seen farther (than other men), it is because I have stood upon the shoulders of giants.'" E. A. Burt, *Metaphysical Foundations of Physics*, p. 202.

²⁰ "Last Pages," *Dial*, Vol. 86, pp. pp. 223-230, especially p. 225.

It is in these respects that modern man has come to be the intellectual master of the ancient. It is in the sense of these additional mental agents or tools that there has been intellectual progress. We can say that generations really do show intellectual progress if they succeed in preserving the creations of preceding epochs, and erect on them as a basis more complex and elevated creations of their own. But here also a question arises that we cannot answer, that, however, casts its shadow upon the above reflection: "Are we progressing in proportion to our increasing enlightenment?"

Another hopeful sign in connection with intellectual progress is the fact that no previous generation of thinkers has been so humble on the whole as is that of to-day, so ready to confess their ignorance, and to recognize the tendency of each new discovery to reveal further complexities in the problem. We are freer than any previous age from the various prepossessions and prejudices which hampered other periods, notably the eighteenth century. This humility and eager research are both signs of intellectual greatness. Furthermore, there is a greater amount of constructive thought in the world at the present time than ever before. Problems of all kinds, social, political, and economic, which before were barely touched on are now handled with breadth and thoroughness. But here, too, intellectual advance has been too localized. Only a certain small section of mankind has carried science and speculation in general to the present ascendant point. Unalloyed progress must rest upon a broad diffusion of intellectual means.

Here also, however, there are new, hopeful processes at work. Significant is the fact that modern popular education brings to fruition many talents which in former years would have remained undiscovered and mute. This means a very real progress.

8. THE CASE FOR MATERIAL PROGRESS

The case for progress along material lines seems quite secure. There were, of course, long ages when man's dependence on external nature was nearly absolute, and when those devices and inventions by which he overcomes hostile powers of nature or harnesses them to do his bidding were still unknown. But in recent ages, especially during the last century and a half, man has made a marvellous and altogether unprecedented advance in knowledge of the universe and its complex forces; consequently there have been great changes in the material environment. Especially notable have been the discovery of the power

of steam and the invention of machinery run by steam. These have put a magical weapon into the hands of the human race. They not only increased the productiveness of labor, but they changed the conditions of work, and stimulated new inventions and readaptations of old ones. It has been noted that there was little difference in lighting power between the lamps used in the days of the pyramids and those used a hundred years ago; between the lighting of the city streets in the days of Pharoah and in those of Voltaire. In travel Nimrod and Noah were on an equality with Franklin. When Abraham sent a message to Lot, or Ruth to Naomi, or David to Jonathan, the method was as efficient as any open to George Washington. Robert Bruce traveled like George III, and Ulysses may have sailed as fast as Paul Jones. With steam and machinery this changed, though not at once.

There are still people living who can tell us of a time when there were few factories; when there were no electric lights and telephones; when practically all clothes were made either in the home or to order by neighbors. Any of us who are over thirty years of age can remember the days before the automobile, the phonograph, the airplane, the various electrical household appliances, factory canned fruits and vegetables.

Professor Clow tells us that if we go back 200 years we get into another world altogether. There were no railroads, no steam engines, and scarcely any machinery. Spinning and weaving were done by hand. Houses were heated by fireplaces, if at all, and newspapers and books were made in such a cumbersome and slow fashion that few people had them. Three hundred years ago there were no eye-glasses or other optical instruments; there was almost no printing, and firearms were just coming into use.²¹

On the scientific side our age is incalculably beyond any age that preceded it. By means of his chemical, electrical, and mechanical inventions, man has made application of his new scientific knowledge to an infinite variety of purposes, capable, if properly utilized, of supplying all the wants of every human being, bringing about a greater saving of human labor, and of adding much to the comforts, enjoyments, and refinements of life. The secrets that lately have been wrung from nature have enabled men so to manipulate or control her energies by various devices and processes that the conquests of to-day, as for example, air engineering, or the newer developments in radio,

²¹ F. R. Clow, *Principles of Sociology with Educational Applications*, p. 279.

or the fumigation of entire forests by airplanes and special gases, have ceased to astound this generation.

We have wealth in all forms that would have left Croesus stupefied with astonishment, and this wealth provides the material basis for progress; if properly distributed it brings increased leisure for mental, moral, and social improvement.²² There is generally a higher standard of living. There probably never was a time in the world's history when there was so little suffering from want of the necessities of life, and so many conveniences and comforts for every class in the community. This fact is brought home to one when a comparison is made of the conditions of the laboring classes to-day and some previous age. In entire sections of England, France, and Germany, even as late as the early eighteenth century, when actual serfdom no longer existed, the common people had meat but three or four times a year, their bread was of rye and oats, husks and all, salt was a great luxury, small fruits and mean garden stuff formed the bulk of their food. A sheriff of this time reporting to the king says: "We must not be surprised if people so poorly fed lack force; they also suffer from nudity, three quarters of them wear half rotten cotton clothing winter and summer; they lack the strength to work and have degenerated into mere animals not unwilling to be rid of life. Those we draw for the army will have to be built up for a year before they are fit to fight. . . ." ²³ In the zenith of France's glory in the reign of Louis XIV grim hunger stalked the land.

Our means of transportation and communication have drawn the whole world together and made possible an international division of labor with all the increased satisfactions and wealth that that implies, an improvement both in the distribution of food—which has done much to prevent famine and starvation—and the distribution of population, a freedom of intercourse, an international understanding and exchange of ideas that unavoidably comes with an exchange of products, and an international culture and thought life. This in a measure has dispelled some of the fears existing between nations, for unfamiliarity breeds antipathy and dislike. "It is hard to fight, maim and kill people whom you know and have associated with in business, recreation, or the pursuit of scientific and artistic aims." ²⁴

²² On this point see Blackmar and Gillin, *Outlines of Sociology* (revised), pp. 453-454.

²³ Quoted by F. W. Fitzpatrick, "Ruminations," *Open Court*, Vol. 36, p. 274. Note the entire article, pp. 272-281.

²⁴ V. S. Yarros, "Is there a Law of Human Progress?" *International Journal of Ethics*, Vol. 31, p. 154.

Bacteriology, surgery, and preventive medicine have, in recent decades, diminished the death-rate and increased the span of life beyond all expectations. The average expectation of life is already nearly three times what it was in the year 1600. Vigor and endurance, in spite of adverse living conditions, have probably held their own. Through antitoxins dread scourges have been eliminated, or at least reduced in significance. By means of sanitary engineering yellow fever, bubonic plague, typhus, hookworm, and other diseases of that type have been reduced in importance. Sanitation and hygiene have spread all through the Western world. For a thousand years, says Michelet, Europe was unwashed. That is no longer absolutely true. Two thousand years ago there was nowhere as much thought for the health and comfort of the mass of people as is common to-day for horses and cattle. As Alfred Russell Wallace says: "The bounds of human knowledge have been so far extended that new vistas have opened to us in directions where it had been thought that we could never penetrate, and the more we learn the more we seem capable of learning in the ever-widening expanse of the universe. It may be truly said of men of science that they have now become as gods knowing good and evil; since they have been able not only to utilize the most recondite powers of nature in their service, but have in many cases been able to discover the sources of much of the evil that afflicts humanity, to abolish pain, to lengthen life, and to add immensely to the intellectual as well as the physical enjoyments of our race." ²⁵

But there is another side of the question of material progress that must be faced. It is true that material abundance and comfort and prosperity can create conditions that are favorable to individual and national advance if properly used. But have they been properly used? Man has unquestionably made great strides in the mastery of nature and in the heaping up of material wealth, but this wealth is as yet very unevenly distributed and enjoyed, and it has furthermore been gained in many cases by exploiting limited resources at the expense of unborn generations. Equally bad is the fact that most of the advance has been absorbed by a terrific multiplication of the world's population. Furthermore there has been stirred within us by our very conquests a restless desire for still more expansion and wealth. Comfort, leisure, and material goods are among our most important ideals. Even though it has long been the custom to hail all new inventions and all new contrivances devised by the ingenious brain of man as tokens of

²⁵ A. R. Wallace, *The Wonderful Century*, p. 378.

progress, we must remember that they are nothing of the kind. They are merely instruments, contrivances, "paraphernalia of civilization," many of which only contain potentialities for advancement which fructify as they are properly applied.²⁶ In some respects Thoreau was right when he said, "Our inventions are improved means to an unimproved end." Our science also has not yet been harnessed for democracy. It has been merely producing machines so far. We are not using science to any marked extent for the greater human and social purposes.

With out material advance there has come a growing strain. Life is so full of appliances, and is lived at such a fast pace, that many energies never are expressed as they should be, but are dissipated in unavoidably living strenuously. Physically we are comparatively at ease; mentally we are more violently strained than at any previous time. The civilization that has given us hot water on tap and luxurious limousines has brought us in the aggregate no contentment. We have not rebuilt ourselves as we have rebuilt our civilization. It has given us what Patrick calls a "wild display of centrifugal forces." As such it "has brought no essentially valuable human product, no great literature or art, no Grecian temples, no Gothic cathedrals, no Shakespearean drama." Spiritually it is wearing us out.

9. THE QUESTION OF POLITICAL PROGRESS

The democratic movements of the last century seem to be clear gain. While wealth and prestige still play their part in securing political advancement, there is an increasing measure of freedom and an equalization of political opportunity. While the political boss still flourishes, the immigrant upon whose power he has depended, is rapidly being assimilated, thereby probably marking the passing of the boss. Class rule is more and more being limited by majority rule. The broader social effects of democracy are also in evidence. Slavery, serfdom, and, to a certain extent, caste have almost disappeared, and the slave and serf of old is now a citizen, and usually also a voter. More recently women have been given political and legal equality and the franchise, and are rapidly winning for themselves social equality and a greatly enlarged sphere of action and influence in society. Education, at least elementary education is everywhere beginning to be free and universal. Social legislation of all kinds has tended to equalize opportunities. Labor has, theoretically at least, won the right to organ-

²⁶ See L. Darwin, *Need for Eugenic Reform*, p. 63.

ize and act collectively. Increased taxation has begun to be placed upon large fortunes, incomes, and inheritances. These various democratic movements have tended to equalize opportunity and have proceeded in the direction of the development of the individual to the limits of his capacity. Most of the great advances have come during the last century.

"The late Alfred Russell Wallace called the nineteenth century 'the wonderful century.' Wonderful it was, and not merely on account of mechanical and scientific achievement. The century of constitutional changes, of liberal reforms, of suffrage extension, of the establishment of popular and secular education, of trade unions, of factory legislation, of the rise and development of Socialism in its various forms, of cautious but important applications of science to punishment for crime, of the development of daily, weekly and monthly journalism, of the free and circulating libraries, of cheap editions of the most humanizing and elevating forms of literature; the century of Godwin, Fourierism, Owen, Comte, Louis Blanc, Proudhon, Carlyle, Mill, Toynbee, Ruskin, Maurice, Kingsley, Morris, Marx, Mazzini, Emerson, Thoreau, Gladstone, Bright, Cobden, Henry George, and a host of other sincere and penetrating thinkers and critics of social maladjustments—that century was marvellous in a social, ethical and economic sense as well! And it planted seeds that have yet to yield rich harvests in many fields."²⁷

Equally noteworthy have been the growing idealism and the deeper visions of better things. Our disappointment and humiliation as the result of the Treaty of Versailles with its spectacle of hatred, greed, revenge, and the display of narrow and selfish nationalism, the mighty cry for fair play and justice as is evident both in national and international affairs now, the slowly arising spirit of international brotherhood, the peace movement, and other recent developments give evidence of a lifting up of hope and vision, a grasp of finer things. Important also is the fact that international law, though important chapters are still to come, has made much headway since Grotius wrote his epoch-making work.

IO. MORAL PROGRESS IN THE PAST

We are justified in maintaining that moral progress has occurred if we can find from age to age a sense of right which has become more subtle, sensitive, and clamant; a sense of duty more profound and

²⁷ V. S. Yarros, "Moral Progress in the Light of History," *Open Court*, Vol. 35, pp. 732-733.

compelling, a horror of violence and injustice more immediate and pronounced; a gradual transition from evil to good, from vice and crime to virtue, from indifference to love, consideration, and pity for one's fellows. But that which consists merely of changing from what was right under one set of conditions to what is right under another set is not moral progress, but merely necessary adjustment. What evidence is there of a real moral advance?

If this search is to be carried on efficiently and fairly, certain limits must be determined and adhered to. Important are the following: the need of keeping within the safe limits of recorded history; the importance of considering only nations that have been in the vanguard of civilization; the desirability of comparing these with ourselves to-day. We must devote ourselves to what was formerly done and considered to be all right, and compare that with what we do and consider evidently to be all right.

When we look back and compare the degree of social welfare which we now enjoy with that of former times we seem incontestably to have forged ahead morally. Many of the enormities of earlier days have completely disappeared from civilized life. Cannibalism, which once prevailed all over the world, is now confined to the most backward of savage tribes. In general, respect for human life has increased. For example, we no longer take human life for mere amusement as was done in the Roman arenas. In the treatment of prisoners of war there has undoubtedly been improvement. In the past it was not uncommon for the conqueror to destroy the entire population of a city. When Caesar took Gaul, it is said that he found three million people. He killed a million, enslaved a million, and left a million on the land. To-day, *as a general rule*, prisoners of war are not killed or reduced to slavery. There is also a decreasing use of capital punishment. In ancient Rome slaves could be put to death for the most trivial offense, or for no offense at all. Milder forms of punishment have gradually been substituted for capital punishment during the last century. While the punishment for theft, pocket picking, and other minor crimes was death as recently as the early years of the Industrial Revolution, to-day few criminals, even first degree murderers, are punished with death. In a former age thousands were put to death for witchcraft; to-day we recognize no such crime. During the Spanish Inquisition thousands were done to death for heresy; that is unheard of to-day. The modern man is not allowed to put to death his wife or his son. Infanticide, practiced among nearly all ancients, is abhorred by modern man and

our moral and legal codes have banned abortion. Among the ancients suicide was considered to be an inalienable right and was widely practiced. It is not as prevalent now as it once was, and even its attempt is quite generally recognized as a crime. Our wars are more destructive of human life chiefly because we are able to make them so. The ancients made theirs as big and destructive as they could. In general it would seem that modern man is far ahead of the ancients in the value he attaches to human life; in fact, human life seems never to have been more highly valued than at present.

The Western world, at least, seems to have made an advance in its consideration for women. While the ancient Greeks reached a high degree of intelligence, their wives and mothers were little more than slaves. The only women who enjoyed freedom and recognition were the cultured prostitutes. Conditions were only slightly better among the Hebrews and in ancient Rome. But now, after centuries, woman has gained the right to stand side by side with man. She has as much voice in the control of her children as her husband, she can marry or not as she sees fit, she can transact business, she is a person before the law, she enjoys political rights with man, and is rapidly entering all the professions.

Like improvements are noticeable in the treatment of children. Infanticide is rare. A father cannot sell his children into slavery. Children cannot be forced to marry to increase the wealth of parents or relatives. There is some recognition of the fact that the illegitimate child is not personally responsible for its condition. The state is more and more protecting the life and welfare of the child, in seeing that it gets proper food, clothing, education, and even recreational facilities such as parks and playgrounds.²⁸ Slavery and serfdom have been virtually abolished in all modern states.

We also respect the right of animals to life and comfort to-day. Early in the nineteenth century we note in England an organized movement for the prevention of cruelty to animals. Since that time the movement has gradually spread until many laws have been enacted prohibiting certain cruel animal sports and the mistreatment of animals. These changes are probably due to a great humane sentiment sweeping over the world.

There also seems to be some improvement in the relations of the sexes. Prostitution was a recognized institution among the ancients.

²⁸ On the treatment of children as a gauge of progress see F. S. Marvin, *The Living Past*, pp. 268-272.

Among the Greek intellectual men it was approved, and their only female companions were prostitutes. In the Roman Empire prostitution was so open and popular that a law was made forbidding members of the nobility from enrolling as prostitutes. Pagan temples and religious rites were dedicated to prostitution; schools of prostitution existed in some cities, and children were trained for the life. While the church condemned it, it crept into the monasteries and convents and prevailed until the Reformation. To-day the prostitute is an outcast at least, the institution is relegated to our backstreets or carried on secretly, and the men who patronize it do not advertise the fact from the house-tops.

Our treatment of dependents shows advance. So far as possible, dependent children are to-day placed in homes instead of being herded in factories as was the case in England a century and a quarter ago, or in orphanages as was quite generally true until very recently. The paupers and poor are beginning to be treated in such a manner that they are rehabilitated for normal life. The aged are cared for by means of old-age pensions, boarding out, and old people's homes.

Delinquents are dealt with more humanely and also with a view to reintroducing them into society. Juvenile delinquents are now treated here and there as befits their immaturity and irresponsibility. In a measure we are getting away from the hatred and contempt felt for the criminal and are avoiding vindictive punishments. We do not torture and kill in the old ways. We try to punish only the responsible. We also recognize the large degree of community responsibility for both the offender and the offense. There have been marked changes for the better in prison treatment and discipline, and in the humanization of criminal codes.

Defectives are dealt with more humanely. We do not expect the blind, the deaf, and the dumb to beg for a living. We try to make them self-supporting and provide adequate social and cultural interests for them. The mental defectives are treated with humanity, and the attempt is being made to gradually eliminate them. The insane are not dealt with as possessed of evil spirits. Nor do we confine them in jails, alms-houses, dirty cellars, or outhouses any more, or chain or manacle them, except in extreme cases. To-day, whether dependent, delinquent, or defective, there is some institution or program of action which is aiming at the betterment of each group morally, socially, and economically. We are seeking a better and fuller life for all our less fortunate fellows.

In the outlawing of barbarous and cruel sports, in the new attitude

toward race problems—as in many other manifestations of the human spirit—we can see evidence of a considerable humanitarian and moral advance. When we recall that this recent humanitarianism has developed in societies characterized by impersonal relations instead of the personal and sympathetic relations of the clan or tribe, we see what a real achievement in humaneness it is.

Still more worthy of consideration is the fact that our sensitiveness to social evils has increased. It is quite possible that if we have made progress, it is this progress itself which is responsible for a certain amount of our awareness of misfit. For progress enhances sensitivity and desire, and both of these bring an increase of suffering. As Professor Patrick points out, "It is a hopeful sign that we have become so sensitive to injustice, so conscious of social evils, so intolerant of wrong-doing, so repelled by the horrors of war, that our own era, which is really clean and wholesome and peaceful and righteous as compared with past periods in human history, seems to us so imperfect. Thus there is, at any rate, this element of hope in the situation that there must be some spark of divinity in the human mind, since we compare the present, not with the real past, but always with an ideal future."²⁹ It would seem from some points of view that there has been a developing and deepening of moral ideas, and also a more honest attempt to try to live them.³⁰

On the other hand, this moral advance may not be as complete as it seems. Some of it may be due to the fact that modern civilized society must have a stricter regimentation of its life in order to protect itself against the problems and conditions that would develop without these requirements. If these restraints were removed it is quite possible that civilized man would revert; in fact, there seems to be evidence to support this view.³¹ Furthermore, moral advance in one respect is often accompanied by moral deterioration in other elements. We find progress in some moral values and regress in others; there is never general advance. "While there may be in societies such a thing as moral improvement, there is rarely or never, on a large scale, such a thing as unmixed improvement. We may gain more than we lose, but we

²⁹ G. T. W. Patrick, *The Psychology of Social Reconstruction*, Houghton Mifflin Co., pp. 21-22.

³⁰ Cf. T. H. Green, *Prolegomena to Ethics*, Chs. III, V; J. S. Mackenzie, *Manual of Ethics*, Chs. III, VII; J. H. Muirhead, *Elements of Ethics*, Ch. V; S. H. Mellone, The Price of Progress, *Hibbert Journal*, Vol. 19, pp. 9-14; John Morley, "Some Thoughts on Progress," *Educational Review*, Vol. 29, pp. 1-17; F. Guizot, *Civilization in Modern Europe*, Vol. I, pp. 32-39.

³¹ Cf. W. R. Inge, *op. cit.*, pp. 174-175.

always lose something. There are virtues which are continually dying with advancing civilization, and even the lowest stage possesses its distinctive excellence." ⁸²

II. CONCLUSION

The optimist will contend that slowly but surely the world grows better. This, he says, is somewhat evident from a bird's-eye view of history, but even more apparent when one gets a bird's-eye view not merely of the six thousand years or so of recorded history, but also the many thousands of years of prehistoric social development of which the historic period is but the last chapter. It is doubtless due to the type of facts on the progressive side of the sort mentioned above that the present progress idea was suggested to the nineteenth century thinkers. If it had not been for such apparently demonstrable progress the idea would doubtless have withered and disappeared. Judged by the progress principle discussed in this work, the progress of the past that is clear and irrefutable has been largely the result of haphazard and often accidental contributions of a small number of originative individuals; it has been largely halting and unsystematized. But even this progress has been the fruit of men who freely dedicated themselves to the good and accepted for their task the work of making things better. Occasionally also these consecrated, thinking individuals grouped themselves into an organic association for effecting the change, and thus accelerated it.⁸³ All the progress in the past that has occurred has only come by effort and trial, by failure and success.

It is doubtless true that the race has learned something and is not repeating all its old mistakes. Moreover, until a century or so ago there was little organized thought along progressive lines. At the present time there is a greater amount of constructive thought in the world than ever before. Problems of all kinds, whether economic, industrial, ethical, political, or social, are now handled with breadth and thoroughness. The creation of the world-state that men have dreamt about since the days of Plato is now nearer to being a possibility than ever before.

In conclusion it must be said that while we think we can specify many ways in which man has advanced, it is also possible to point to phases in which he has stood still, and perhaps even declined. Is the progress ultimately greater than the decay, and is every deterioration offset by greater development in other directions? Probably most of

⁸² W. E. H. Lecky, *History of European Morals*, Vol. I. p. 154.

⁸³ I. W. Howerth, "War and the Progress of Society," *Scientific Monthly*, Vol. I, p. 195.

us think that it is, and yet the question is a complex one, and by no means admits of an offhand answer. "It is possible to prove that mankind has gained and is gaining in material power, in knowledge, and in the extent and diversity of social organization; that history shows an enlarging perspective and that the thoughts of men are in truth, broadened with the process of the suns; but it is always possible to deny that these changes are progress."³⁴

Progress, as Cooley further points out, is essentially a moral category, and the question whether it has taken place is one of moral judgment. That development has occurred is certain, but whether a moral endorsement can be given this development is a question. Certainly there has been no general progress, nor any unqualified progress. Actually to demonstrate progress in the past is almost impossible. Manifestly the answer to the question, "Has there been progress?" depends upon the point of view and upon the standards we may choose to accept.

QUESTIONS AND PROBLEMS

1. Why distinguish between civilization and progress?
2. List, as far as you can, all the different advances made by primitive man in the Old and New Stone Ages. (See Osborn, *Men of the Old Stone Age*; Tyler, *The New Stone Age in Northern Europe*.) Rank them in the order of their importance as progressive occurrences, keeping the basic test in mind.
3. What are the definite evidences of progress in the last 8000 years? Are there any evidences of standstill or regress? What?
4. Is thought on the question of progress in the past an evidence of progress?
5. T. Davidson (*Aristotle and Ancient Educational Ideals*, 154) says that Aristotle was "the best educated man that ever walked on the surface of this earth." If that is true, has education progressed?
6. What evidence is there that man will not advance in physical and mental capacity?
7. Has there been religious progress in the past?
8. What can be said of aesthetic progress in the past?
9. In what ways is man better off than he was a century ago, in your opinion? A millenium ago?
10. Has your home community progressed in the last ten years?
11. What is Cooley's attitude with respect to the question of progress in the past? (See *Social Process*, pp. 406, 408.)
12. What is your own personal conclusion concerning progress in the past?
13. Would an absence of progress in the past discourage you from expending effort for progressive purposes now or in the future? Why?

³⁴C. H. Cooley, *Social Process*, pp. 406-407. See also p. 408.

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CHAPTER VIII

THE SHAPING OF HUMAN NATURE

I. HUMAN NATURE AND PROGRESS

JUST as sociology has found from experience that it can make no headway either as a science or as social service unless it has an ample understanding of human conduct and its causes, so no discussion of social progress can go very far without noting its precise relationship to and bearing upon human nature. For without a wide knowledge of human nature and its prevailing forms of expressing itself in conduct, it is impossible for society to do much to control its own social processes in the direction of progress. Human nature and human motives must be put into all the basic hypotheses about any social readjustment that lies ahead.

Progress demands considerable flexibility in the make-up of human beings.¹ It implies an improvement of and increase in their virtues and diminution of their vices. Furthermore, since it rests on necessary change, it calls for an ever-increasing diversity and range of human faculties with the possibility of development in every direction. Just as economic, political, and other social institutions must be changed with new needs, so must human nature itself be changed. This is doubly important because this psychic nature not only reflects but also initiates forms of human interaction and coöperation; it serves as the basis of social institutions, and lays out the course over which these forms and institutions shall run. Progress positively cannot go on without an expanded capacity for adaptation.

The question then is whether or not human nature can be continually shaped or modified to meet the requirements of the new ideals of progress as they rise. Of what is human nature made? Is it forever fixed, or can it be shaped or reshaped?

Human nature, some insist, is always the same. We always have been and we will be forever at the mercy of our instincts, passions, grievances, animosities, and interests. The extra-human world alone can change; this is our only hope for the future. But do modern

¹ Cf. R. H. Gault, *Social Psychology*, p. 203.

anthropology, psychology, and sociology support this view, or do they maintain that human nature is that which it has the power of becoming?²

2. WHAT IS HUMAN NATURE?

Outstanding writers on the question of human nature are not agreed as to its exact constitution. Professor Ellwood, for example, states that "By human nature we mean the nature with which the individual is endowed by birth, and not that which he acquires through the influence of his environment after birth. It is, in brief, the original nature of man. This is the nature, in other words, which organic evolution has given man, while his acquired characteristics are the gift largely of civilization or his social environment."³ Professor Balz is thinking also of "original constitution" when he says, "Human nature is . . . a name for the collection of generic traits, tendencies, capacities, powers, functions, expressing an inherited organization."⁴ Professor Cooley, on the other hand, contends that "By human nature . . . we may understand those sentiments and impulses that are human in being superior to those of lower animals, and also in the sense that they belong to mankind at large, and not to any particular race or time."⁵ Again he says, "Human nature is not something existing separately in the individual, *but a group-nature or primary phase of society*, a relatively simple and general condition of the social mind. It is something more, on the one hand, than the mere instinct that is born in us—though that enters into it—and something less, on the other, than the more elaborate development of ideas and sentiments that make up institutions. It is the nature which is developed and expressed in those simple, face-to-face groups that are somewhat alike in all societies; groups of the family, the playground, and the neighborhood. In the essential similarity of these is to be found the basis, in experience, for similar ideas and sentiments in the human mind. In these, everywhere, human nature comes into existence. Man does not have it at birth; he cannot acquire it except through fellow beings and it decays in isolation."⁶ He further states, "It [this view] simply means the application at this point of the idea that society and individuals are inseparable phases of a common whole, so that wherever we find an individual

² See in this connection Charlotte P. S. Gilman's poem, *Similar Cases*.

³ *Introduction to Social Psychology*, D. Appleton & Co., New York, p. 51.

⁴ A. G. A. Balz, *The Basis of Social Theory*, p. 59.

⁵ *Social Organization*, Charles Scribner's Sons, p. 28.

⁶ *Ibid.*, pp. 29-30.

fact we may look for a social fact to go with it. If there is a universal nature in persons there must be something universal in association to correspond to it. . . . What else can human nature be than a trait of primary groups?"⁷ Professor R. E. Park also inclines somewhat to the view of Professor Cooley when he says: "Man is not born human. It is only slowly and laboriously, in fruitful contact, coöperation, and conflict with his fellows that he attains the distinctive qualities of human nature." And "What is meant by original nature is not confined to the behavior which manifests itself at birth, but includes man's spontaneous and unlearned responses to situations as they arise in the experiences of the individual."⁸ While these latter views come closer to the prevailing emphasis in the analysis of human nature, both views are really included in the broader conception of present-day thinkers. Now when we think about human nature we are thinking about more than man's biological equipment. We see that both the original and the developed are present, but that the original elements are gradually diminishing both in number and importance as the significance of the social and the environmental influences are becoming better known. Professor E. L. Thorndike⁹ states the matter very clearly when he points out that human nature is a product of two factors: (a) the tendencies to response rooted in original nature, and (b) the accumulated effects of the stimuli of the external and social environment. At birth man has only his hereditary biological equipment, which consists mainly of a bundle of random tendencies to respond. He has reflexes, ductless glands, what has been called instincts, or "innate potential responses" as Bogardus¹⁰ more recently refers to them, and undeveloped intellect. These form the potential basis for the development of human nature. Through experience and the stimuli of association a vast superstructure of habits, emotions, cognitive powers, feelings, desires, interests, attitudes, controls, and other character elements are built on or developed from these innate elements.

When we speak of the nature that is "human" we mean those elements of psychical make-up which characterize and differentiate the human species from all other animal species. The inborn tendencies, the so-called instincts, which Ellwood stresses are important, but even here man's instinctive equipment at birth is vastly different than that of the young of the lower animals. His equipment, by its very defi-

⁷ *Social Organization*, p. 30.

⁸ *Principles of Human Behavior*, pp. 9-16.

⁹ *The Original Nature of Man*, pp. 1-7.

¹⁰ *Fundamentals of Social Psychology*, p. 8.

ciencies and weaknesses, hints at the part which other forces, that do not much affect animals, must play to make him human. Particularly unique is the development of man's high mentality, the various phases of which blend into temperament, personality, and character.¹¹

Is this nature of man something forever fixed or is it largely a shaped product? We contend that the latter is true.

3. WHY SOME OBJECT TO ITS MODIFICATION

There is always a tendency for a man's practical attitudes toward human life to color his theories. This is true of those who object to the possibility of modifying human nature. Like the Malthusian doctrine of population a hundred years ago it is being used by those on top, or those in socially strategic places, to justify their position and also as a pseudo-scientific explanation for the miseries and depravity of those at the bottom. Most of those who oppose the idea of the modification of human nature, or who reject the results of disinterested inquiries into it, have their own reasons for so doing. Consciously or unconsciously they are themselves acting on a theory of human nature which suits their special needs. If they accept the idea that human nature is essentially mobile, they betray their own interests. As Herbert Croly says:

"Those who believe it to be immobile and consequently condemned to total depravity are not determined in their belief by scientific motives, no matter how scientific an appearance their theory wears. The belief is the expression of a wilful craving for mastery rather than of a disinterested search for truth. The immobilizers of human nature are really seeking to dominate it, to prevent its escape from their grip, to confine it to the business of working for them and their fellows and to thwart some essential part of it without any scruples about compensation. They are rationalizing a vested interest by incorporating its prestige and continued victory in the constitution of mankind."¹²

People maintaining the immobility of human nature contend that reform ideas are idle dreams because "human beings can't be changed."

¹¹"A man is both a repository of past racial and biological activities and experiences, an accumulator and organizer of new experiences on such a basis, and finally, a dynamic instrument of reaction in the light of purposes and desires, some of which he has also inherited and some of which are the product of his personal span of existence and consciousness." D. B. Leary, "The Modern World Order and the Original Nature of Man," *International Journal of Ethics*, Vol. 32, p. 320.

¹²Herbert Croly, "Regeneration," *New Republic*, Vol. 23, p. 45. See also A. J. Todd, *Theories of Social Progress*, p. 4.

therefore don't be such a fool, save your breath, and "sit down and stop rocking the boat." They want all the barriers possible erected against the loss of the domination of human nature. The only means of escape from its natural depravity must be by some miracle of purgatory or grace. The prevalence of such an attitude, of course, paralyzes efforts for human liberation and elevation. It admits to no prospect of human nature being better than it is. It creates a fatalistic attitude in human beings toward their weaknesses and shortcomings, whether individual or collective.

On the other hand, those who contend that human nature is fundamentally capable of being shaped into better forms, by their very hopefulness suggest to individuals and groups the possibility and the desirability of improvement. In fact, they will by their behavior tend to create the kind of human nature which corresponds to their belief. Finally, they have the advantage of having the highest scientific authorities on their side.

4. THE NATURE OF INSTINCT

Heretofore the so-called "instincts" have been thought of as the most unchangeable and fixed part of human nature, the biggest and most permanent obstacle to its modification. We have referred to them in various ways as a people's stock in trade at birth; permanent, universal, psychical acquisitions biologically transmitted; those congenital and unlearned activities, tendencies, or dispositions that we have at birth apart from all training and experience; the psychical aspect of race heredity; preformed pathways in the nervous system. They have been considered to be endowments inherited from the lower creatures, characters and tendencies "that have been slowly evolved in the process of adaptation of species to their environment and that can be neither eradicated from the mental constitution of which they are innate elements nor acquired by individuals in the course of their lifetime."¹⁸ The conditions for survival operating through time running far back into pre-human days selected out those individuals who had certain traits or dispositions. These developed to maturity and reproduced their kind. Their progeny were again subjected to these conditions and again the better adapted survived. This continuing generation after generation both accentuated and diffused these desirable traits in the species, and caused them to strike root deep into the neural

¹⁸ W. McDougall, *Introduction to Social Psychology*, pp. 22-23.

system. The reason why men therefore were so uniformly endowed with the whole collection of instincts was because they were descendants of those who had the natural characteristics enabling them to successfully meet the "tight squeaks" of life.

Among the psychologists and the social psychologists there has been the greatest diversity of opinion regarding the numbers of these universal innate characteristics. They have given us lists running from a few up into dozens, including such instincts as sex, parental love, pugnacity, gregariousness, curiosity, constructiveness, acquisitiveness, emulation, self-assertion, resentment, repulsion, hunting, play imitation, flight, fear, subjection, modesty, cleanliness, sympathy, and even crawling and walking.¹⁴ This confusion has caused some to doubt the existence of instincts altogether, considering them as explanatory assumptions, or as abstractions, rather than realities.¹⁵

In spite of this lack of agreement as to number, as well as the disagreement as to their exact nature, and their relation to reflex and habit, they have been ordinarily spoken of as the essential springs of motive forces of feeling, thought, and action, whether individual or collective; as the foundations from which personality developed; as the elementary factors upon which character was constructed; and as the root of societary life and action. This gives some idea of their significance in connection with this study. In recent years, however, there has been a gradual modification of the idea of instinct, in a direction much more favorable to the point of view of those working for social progress.

A significant influence in modifying the older idea of rigid instincts is the fact that every species, in order to survive, has to be adapted even more to possible future conditions than to the present or past. Only those whose instincts are highly adaptable to the future can have any chance of surviving in a rapidly changing environment such as we find at least in civilized human societies. What this amounts to is that in all species which live under the possibility of rapid changes in the environment, instincts must be plastic if the species is to survive. This is, of course, especially the case with man, and possibly even more the case with civilized man than with nature peoples. Plasticity of the instincts in man means the possibility of bending them in many directions, and so of building up on them many different acquired habits

¹⁴ For "Classification of Instincts" see L. L. Bernard, *Instinct*, pp. 148-171; W. E. Hocking, *Human Nature and Its Remaking*, pp. 56-60.

¹⁵ See for example, Ellsworth Faris, "Are Instincts Data or Hypothesis?" *American Journal of Sociology*, Vol. 27, pp. 184-196, also Hocking, *op. cit.*, p. 37.

as the situation may demand. Instincts are not therefore adapted to the future in any mysterious way, but simply through plasticity. Man's instincts thus are such as to make possible his adaptation to wider and more complex environments than those under which he developed. Therefore, they must be so numerous as to lose their identity and have almost no fixity whatever.

Intelligence has also been a powerful influence in changing the expression of instinct. It is said that "Every conspicuous advance of civilization is a consequence of instinctive energies thrown into new channels by increasing mentality." Thus progress lies in the directed outgrowths from the instinctive and intuitional core of the common heredity. With the growth of intelligence responses to external stimuli and to internal instincts become less immediate and direct. Memories of past experiences come to modify or inhibit instinctive responses, and these responses are no longer as fixed or mechanical as when instinct acts alone. The more intelligence one has, the greater is one's freedom from purely instinctive acts. Furthermore, in man there is the central current of the will which controls, more or less, all of his responses, and which, as the individual grows older, becomes stronger and quicker in springing to a position of control. And, as Conklin says, "More than anything else, that which distinguishes human society from that of other animals is just this ability—incomplete though it is—to control instincts and emotions by intelligence and reason."¹⁸ In other words, of all animals man has the greatest power of habit-forming and habit-breaking.

Instinct is now coming to be thought of as a very general and undifferentiated but basic and automatic survival and reproductive urge, fulfilling direct life-conserving functions, the particular expressions of which at a given time and place are largely the results of habits. At best it is among human beings a fusion of innate elements and habit. For untold ages among men there has been a very long growth period during which constant parental care and protection have been needed. During this period many so-called instincts were rarely brought into play, and many an habit-action taught by parents or acquired from them by suggestion-imitation took the place of instinctive action. The basic phenomena among men are far too complex to be accounted for in terms of fixed instincts. If man has instincts at all, he must have a very large number, and they must be much more complex than those of brutes. Thus man is almost entirely without instincts, in the sense

¹⁸ E. G. Conklin, *Direction of Human Evolution*, pp. 93-94.

that instinct is attributed to animals. He does, to be sure, possess instinctive tendencies, but of mechanically perfect responses to definite situations he is largely destitute. Furthermore, instinct is supposed to be an adjustment of the organism to environment, and environment is continually changing of itself, and for a half a million years or more man has had the power of changing the environment within limits owing to other powers that he has. Thus, the very fact that man has none of the animal protective equipment, such as horns, wings, poison-sacs, claws, thick skin, quills, fangs, tusks, vile smell, sting, or ready means of flight such as long legs, indicates that for untold ages intelligence, experience, contrivance, ingenuity, and such like, have played a large part in his survival. These, however, do not fall within the realm of instinct; and they vary much among individuals and can be developed. Man, moreover, is not marked for a particular habitat or diet, nor for mastery over any particular part of nature; he is a generalized creature, not characterized by many fixed traits. Furthermore, the expression of so-called instincts among men is different everywhere; every basic reaction taking forms depending upon the immediate physical and social environment. For example, the food urge, being bound up with survival, is everywhere present, but what constitutes food, and the way it is obtained and consumed, is a matter of local group experience—habit and custom. People whose food-getting and food-consuming propensities were developed under certain conditions and at certain times and places, might conceivably go hungry and even starve elsewhere, whereas the peoples there present, having a set of habits and customs of their own, flourish. Similarly the desire to gratify the sex urge is everywhere present, but experience, association, social forms and prejudices, and law determine when, under what conditions, and among whom it does occur.¹⁷ In fact, as Allport shows,¹⁸ the act of pairing itself has to be learned. Thus preservation leads to such activities at one time and place, and others at another; and sex activity takes this form here and that form there.

Instinct in its purest form is displayed only by animals fairly low in the scale of intelligence, for example, the insects. Fabre's famous studies of the insects show this beautifully. The wonderful things the insect does are governed by instinct, otherwise she is an utter idiot. Even in the

¹⁷ See C. O. Whitman's account, for example, in his *Behavior of Pigeons*, p. 68, of the male ring dove reared from infancy among carrier pigeons who would not mate with females of his own species, but only with carrier females, thus showing the strength of social agencies in modifying sex relations.

¹⁸ F. H. Allport, *Social Psychology*, pp. 71-72.

higher vertebrates few instinctive modes of behavior remain purely instinctive; they are modified by intelligence and by habits acquired under the guidance of intelligence or by imitation. Among men instincts are, indeed, little more than a complex series of native reactions which are modified by experience, circumstances, and social traditions, and built up into permanent habits through the influence of successful adjustment.¹⁹ The bundle of random tendencies to respond that man has at birth are soon almost completely submerged by means of the mechanisms of habit and character. "In other words, the original nature of man is," as Comte said, "an abstraction. It exists only in the psychic vacuum of antenatal life, or perhaps only in the potentiality of the germ plasm. The fact of observation is that the structure of the response is irrevocably changed in the process of reaction to the stimulus."²⁰ In brief, what has been considered to be instinctive behavior among men is, in reality, in only a very limited degree inherited predisposition to act; mainly it is activity which is *learned* in a particular social environment. Uniformity of complex environmental influences has been mistaken for uniformity of complex human endowment.

5. THE SHAPING OF INSTINCTIVE BEHAVIOR²¹

What has been thought to be fixed and inherited instinctive behavior is to-day really seen to be behavior patterns integrated under environmental influences. The individual's actions are immediately due to over-instinctive ends, that is, ends which are not innate or biological in any immediate sense, but dependent rather upon the acquisitions arising out of social institutions. The shaping or reshaping starts in earliest childhood when the instinctive tendencies soon lose their original form, and are modified by the group attitudes and ideas. Any trait, we now see, may be modified and the instinctive tendencies may be swerved and attached to almost any objective.

The human organism has generally evolved into a highly complex and highly modifiable type. This modifiability is to a considerable extent subject to intelligence.²² In fact, as Bernard points out,²³ the

¹⁹ See A. D. Weeks, *Control of the Social Mind*, p. 138; A. M. Tozzer, *Social Origins and Social Continuities*, pp. 55-56; L. L. Bernard, *Instinct*, pp. 523-524; and E. R. Groves, *Personality and Social Adjustment*, p. 153.

²⁰ Park and Burgess, *Introduction to the Science of Sociology*, p. 68.

²¹ For further information on this section see L. L. Bernard, *Instinct*, pp. 26-106, 509-534; F. H. Allport, *Social Psychology*, pp. 43-83.

²² Cf. W. E. Hocking, *op. cit.*, p. 41.

²³ L. L. Bernard, *Instinct*, Henry Holt & Co., pp. 57-58.

organism comes in time "to be detached in large measure from its origin, and has fallen predominantly under the direction of the massive and persistent psycho-social environment with its large accumulation of valuations and interests, institutional and otherwise. This psycho-social environment, which has come latterly to control the conscious or directive organization of the higher brain centers, has thereby largely displaced the autonomic and instinctive organization in the control of this same higher brain organization. The psycho-social environment, which probably arose originally as a stabilizer and as an aid to the carrying out of vegetative and reproductive ends, has become in large measure master of the whole organism and shapes its ends subject only to the limitations of inheritance. Thus instinct comes in its manifestations largely to be subjected to environmental control." Further on in the same work Bernard states: "The instincts are very early overlaid by acquired habits in the process of adapting the individual to his environment and these habits are in turn overlaid by other tiers or stories of habits in which the native character of instinct ever constantly diminishes in proportion and intensity, until the child who has reached a rational age is reacting in nine-tenths or ninety-nine one-hundredths of his character directly to environment, and only in the slight residual fraction of his nature directly to instinct. The influence of environment is cumulative in our lives and the decline of the influence of instinct is progressive."²⁴ It is only in such a manner as this that man's vast range of adaptability can be accounted for.

In the last analysis, it means that man is dissolving or shedding his instincts and is substituting for them control through the growing, self-perfecting institutions and other influence-forces of his social environment.²⁵

Thus, to the extent that man's predetermined and inherited psychic make-up is being replaced by those elements acquired from the social environment, there is opportunity for shaping of instinctive action. This is strengthened by the fact that, more and more, man is gaining the power to shape his environment, and he is discovering continually what this right environment should include. Finally, man by bringing the right environmental influences to bear on the human young from

²⁴ L. L. Bernard, *Instinct*, p. 524.

²⁵ "Man is able to dispense with instinct because he has a highly complex and well organized social environment, and in so far as this environment is improved and becomes more adequately organized to meet his present and future needs it replaces his instincts in the evolutionary process of selection or it represses and transforms them in the progressive character development of the individual." Bernard, *ibid.*, p. 530.

THE SHAPING OF HUMAN NATURE

the day of birth on can develop those habit-acquisitions in the members of the group which are the basis and substance of the desired action-response of the individual.²⁶ Man also in his increasingly complex and changing environment must continually develop untold new habits if he is to be properly adjusted to his environment. Presumably, according to any of the older theories of instinct, man cannot develop new instinct with sufficient rapidity to meet these needs, nor are complexes or combinations of instincts adequate. In this manner the least changing element of human nature under stress of necessity becomes one of the most changing. But constant oversight and direction are required to shape the expression of instinct to constructive and beneficial ends.

6. SELF AS A SHAPED PRODUCT²⁷

As we peer beyond instinctive behavior we note that the entire self of the individual is to a large extent socially conditioned in its development. By self, of course, we mean that complex of instinctive drives, emotions, feelings, desires, attitudes, interests, ideas, intellectual and dynamic powers that characterizes the individual. It rests partly upon the innate potentialities of the individual, but it consists mainly of the great superstructure built on this. Of course, the superstructure is unique in each case, because of its foundation, but it is also a molded thing, shaped by the conscious and unconscious forces of the social environment—partially a product of its medium. We start in life merely as a bundle of potential selves. Our real selves are then built up out of our social experiences, not only the molding but the materials of which it is made coming from the environment.

While consciousness exists only in the individual every aspect of consciousness has been socially conditioned. It was the relations of individuals to one another, the mutual adjustment and control of activities, that caused individuals to discover themselves. It is in the "give and take" of social life that we learn and develop practically all of the phases of consciousness characterizing our adult life.

The very mind of the individual is a social product. Everything points to the fact that it has been developed in and through the interactions necessary in the social life-process, the necessity of communication, coöperation, construction, joint preparation for the future. It

²⁶ On this general point see L. L. Bernard, "Neuro-Psychic Technique," *Psychological Review*, Nov., 1923.

²⁷ For a superb discussion of this point see A. J. Todd, *Theories of Social Progress*, pp. 3-79.

seems to be social in its nature from the start and to be largely both a product of, and an instrument of, association. The very content of his mind—his knowledge, beliefs, ideals, even his precepts and concepts, or at least his interpretation of them, come from the group. This does not mean that the individual's mental life is entirely submerged in that of his group. He is capable and does develop variations of his own, but the general nature of the individual minds does not vary widely in make-up.

The emotions, such as anger, sorrow, joy, sympathy, are social in expression, and are only aroused through association, and depend largely upon the experiences, attitudes, and actions of other people. The sentiments, such as admiration, respect, pity, shame, jealousy, and love, are organized complexes of emotions, and are entirely a matter of social values, and are social both in development and expression. The habits of action and thought, the bases of character in the individual, are to a very large extent shaped by the opportunities and circumstances surrounding the individual, and the training to which he is subjected. The whole willing phase of mind is governed and given content by the stimuli, approvals, and controls exercised by the group.²⁸

The "self" is thus a constantly changing and developing entity, a combination and re-combination of instincts, habits, emotions, motives, feelings, desires, cognitive elements, ideas, precepts, and concepts of every variety of shade, texture, and capacity for combination. These elements recombine continually as the result of different stimuli, all of which, directly or indirectly, come from the environment. Thus self is a product in the making of which even relatively insignificant factors play an unexpectedly important part. Jean Paul Richter said that "No man can take a walk without bringing home an influence on his eternity." The world in which we live through our social heritage tends to select from our stock of incomplete tendencies and potentialities the qualities it wants or those necessary for the individual to make his proper adjustment to it, and these are completed, strengthened, shaped, and more or less crystallized. We are our world and do not know it, nor can we avoid it, for we are human because we are part of society. The very differences among us, even among brothers and sisters, are because none of us are placed in identical environments. This is quite

²⁸ Herbert Croly summarizes this in characteristic fashion when he says: "The individual is a social product. The conversations in which he participates through the agency of his own consciousness and within the privacy of his own soul are only the subjective echoes of a process of social adjustment. It is a social logic which determines their meaning." *Op. cit.*, p. 42.

independent of physical heredity and variations in the germ plasm. The very fact that each one of us creates a different environment for the other causes a variation of some significance.

All this means, however, that if society properly manipulates and shapes the social heritage and the environment it can elicit or discourage human psychical elements, and thus within broad limits, make the sort of "selves" it wants. The evidence all points to the fact that "self" can be made right if we know how. The chief problem, therefore, connected with the self has to do with the understanding of the conditions under which the self develops.

7. THE GROUP ENVIRONMENT AS A MODELLING FORCE

Distinctively human nature is second nature socially acquired. If man from birth could be excluded from all social contacts made in groups he would remain a naked savage and a dumb brute, without developed feelings or emotions, speech, sentiments, will, ideas, or ideals. He would differ little from animals. There are, for example, cases on record of so-called "wild" children, children that at an early age were lost in the woods or other wild country uninhabited by human beings and by good fortune survived. They were, however, devoid of human association through part or all of their childhood and youth. They are characterized by a vegetative type of existence, automatic reactions, unconsciousness of self, absence of language and social emotions, and other traits most rare among the general run of human beings.²⁹ This means that the rough material with which the human being starts life is moulded and organized and given its full human significance by the group in which he moves. If a child of to-day could be subjected from birth to the group environment of some two or five or ten thousand years ago, he undeniably would exhibit marked differences in his "self" or "human nature." He would develop and reflect in his entire make-up the very different civilization and culture of that age. He would not, for example, feel any unusual aversion to slavery, gladiatorial games, or infanticide, because the group ethic or culture permitted such practices. Likewise a Homeric Greek baby or one of Nero's time, reared from birth in the life of the United States of to-day, would not show qualities which would mark him off from

²⁹ For a description of eleven well authenticated cases see Maurice H. Small, "On Some Psychical Relations of Society and Solitude," *Pedagogical Seminary*, Vol. VII, pp. 45-48. The best collection of instances of this type is found in August Rauber, *Homo Sapiens Ferus* (Leipzig, 1885).

his contemporaries, and suggest a relationship to those far-off times. Who in the United States, where the group has made over (for better or worse) thousands, yes, millions of immigrants of all classes, races, and nationalities, and produced even greater changes among their progeny, can deny the modelling power of group environment? The child that is born in the United States to-day grows up under very different influences from those which surrounded the children of twenty-five centuries ago, or those which surrounded the child of Armenia, or Italy, or Russia a generation ago. He is trained along different lines and subjected to different restraints; his material thus yields different results. The human twig is bent this way rather than that. The modelling process, working by suggestion and imitation in all their various manifestations, as well as by overt control, has done its work before the critical powers are fully awake. In fact the base for criticism reflects the content of this process. What is criticized is that which departs from it.⁸⁰

The standards of right and wrong, the likes and aversions, the attitudes, yes, even the prevailing passions of groups differ vastly from place to place and time to time. But it is these which determine the prevailing expressions and acts of the individual members of the different groups. At any given place and time these are the result of what we call the civilization of a people; that is, the fund of human experience that has grown year by year and century by century as the result of all kinds of internal and external conditions, and has expressed itself in the form of social institutions of one kind and another, the folkways and mores, the traditions and conventions, the social ritual of the group. And man, fitted by long centuries of selective influences for social life bears their impress; in fact, is in his whole career an externalization of them.

Man's need of his fellows is so great that he will not, if he can help it, do anything to forfeit their favor, esteem, or approval. Therefore he will abide by the group's standards and desires.

Thus the whole complex of thoughts, feelings, desires, and impulses which we find among human beings is very largely a product of social and cultural conditions. And the changes in human nature are not structural changes within the mind itself, but social changes, environment changes (produced by new adjustments).

When people say that man has probably not changed much in thousands of years, what is really meant is that the part that is passed on

⁸⁰ Cf. A. D. Weeks, *The Control of the Social Mind*, p. 24.

by heredity has probably not changed much. Biologically modern man is doubtless similar to the Cromagnon, but no thinking person would contend that he is similar culturally. That difference is due to the changed social environment. Variations in human nature from one age to another are mainly variations in the cultural expressions of human nature.

8. THE PLASTICITY OF HUMAN NATURE

In a world where change and development have been universal through unthinkable time, a world where change has been taking place with increasing velocity, human nature has had to be plastic. It is so to-day. Professor Todd poetically states that "Human nature is not a fixed quantity. It is infinitely diverse and infinitely malleable; infinitely sensitive to change. It is a weathercock; it is thistledown rather than the fixed star or adamant we are urged to believe."³¹ It is no longer thought of in scientific circles as a dead-weight standing in the way of right change. Structurally it is highly plastic, adaptable, and educable.³² Technically, human character is largely dependent on the cerebral cortex which develops after birth. Furthermore, as Child points out,³³ immediate stimulation is responsible for the direct formation of structure and function. There is also the contention of psychologists, based on experiments of Pavlov and others, that habit-formation is as profound in its effects as biological structure, and that, consequently, any desired behavior patterns can be formed in the child by early training.

We must conclude that it may be almost indefinitely modified by social institutions, ideals, attitudes, and other phases of the social environment. If traditions, customs, and other elements of the existing environment can be modified there is no reason to believe that man's nature will offer any unsurmountable difficulties to attaining a much higher ethical and spiritual stage. He has already changed from an ape-like savage to his present human mental stature, and any reasonable goal can be conceived of as within reach. In the past our very emphasis upon the rigidity of human nature has distracted our attention from the significance of erroneous ideas and beliefs and customs

³¹ *Op. cit.*, p. 77.

³² Cf. Hocking, *op. cit.*, pp. 9-11; C. A. Ellwood, "The Modifiability of Human Nature and Human Institutions," *Journal of Applied Sociology*, Vol. 7, pp. 229-237. The same is also in his *Christianity and Social Science*, pp. 13-22.

³³ C. M. Child, *Physiological Foundations of Behavior*, Chs. I. II.

and mores among a people. It is entirely possible that war is far more a matter of attitudes than pugnacity. To-day humanity is the architect of its fortune, the conservator of its own destiny. It must bear the responsibility for what it is to be.

9. PROGRESS AS A MANIPULATION OF THE SHAPING AGENCIES

People are likely to say after such a discussion as the one above that in spite of all the assertions and demonstrations to the effect that human nature is plastic and modifiable it does seem that human nature changes little if at all. This is certainly true. But it is due to the similarity of the stimuli which shape or induce human nature. In fact, we wonder why human nature remains as it is, or why it does not improve, but at the same time we continue in force the very activities, customs, and institutions which are mainly responsible for making it what it is. As Professor Max Otto puts it,

"We deplore strife and bloodshed, but hold the instinct of pugnacity responsible, meanwhile strenuously resisting any attempt to alter the relations of life which make just such results inevitable. We blame the acquisitive instinct for our money madness, and the sexual instinct for our immoralities, yet meet every attempt to change the conception of property rights and sex propriety as a treacherous attack upon the foundations of civilized society. . . . Each new generation gradually grows to resemble the one that preceded it not because each is an unfolding of an inborn, unalterable nature or a set of hard and fast instincts, but because the innate physical and mental energy of each new generation is received and molded into habits by the same environmental forces."⁴

Obviously something in the way of change is necessary. Human nature to-day is much the same as it has been in the recent past because we have never yet set ourselves systematically to the task of shaping human nature and social environment along the lines that make for advance. Certainly if progress is to occur this must take place.

Just how far and how deep we can go in securing a different human nature by modifying the circumstances of its development cannot yet be exactly determined, but everything does point to the fact that human nature is potentially progressive and that when many desire it and many work for it, results will come. By focusing attention upon the improvement of the environment in which his nature functions and upon changing the stimuli which actuate his motives and impulses, man may

⁴ M. C. Otto, *Things and Ideals*, Henry Holt & Co., pp. 153-154.

achieve in a few generations the results which he has vainly striven for during history by other methods still being used, such as attempting to change the heart. *It is not converting the individual, but converting the conditions that make him that offers the greatest promise of success.* As social evolutionary processes have made the modern man out of the neolithic man, so directed social evolution can make or expedite the making of the desirable man of the future. Since men are largely artificial products, artifice can be employed to remake them. Man's creative efforts have had much to do with making him what he is; and they must have more to do with making him for the future.

This, however, must come about as a matter of will. It must come by man consciously and wilfully taking over the responsibility for building the environment that will shape the right kind of self. But men must want it, or will to have it, then this willing must be used as a motive force in manipulating all the various factors that are capable of serving as shaping agencies, such as praise and blame, current ideals, reigning traditions, social attitudes, public opinion with its social maxims and standards, religion and the church, legislation, the family with its ethics, organizations, humanitarian and otherwise, all the various schools, and others; in brief, all the various educational agencies.³⁵ Man is the creator of these; he can also recreate them, difficult and dangerous as it is. Progress from the beginning has depended on the quality of the changes in the environment. These changes reacting upon individual education, training, or development produced a corresponding effect in the individuals. The directed change of the environment will produce similar results. The change thus brought about may reveal new possibilities of character. But behind it all are men considering themselves as objects to be judged, altered, and improved; men by their own efforts shaping themselves and each other by suitable agencies.

The first and the great step in this process is to inform the public and prove to it that both human nature and its environment are plastic. Apparently few people, either statesmen, reformers, clergymen, or business men, are acquainted with this fact, yet the whole development

³⁵ "If it were possible to control the learning of all individuals in the way both of ideas and emotional attitudes as they come on the stage of life, it would be possible to modify the whole complex of our social life, or our civilization, within the comparatively short space of one or two generations." C. A. Ellwood, *Christianity and Social Science*, p. 19.

"The saving fact for social reconstruction is that . . . there lies within the power of education and social control the vast resource of redirecting the expression of human nature and substituting preferred activities for those condemned by experience." A. D. Weeks, *The Control of the Social Mind*, p. 20.

of a favorable social will depends on this. Governed as we are by ideas and ideals, the value of publicity for the idea of adaptability can scarcely be overestimated. The next great strategic problem is to cut the channels through which human energies may flow to acceptable ends. Careful knowledge of social and psychological technology, the best constructive efforts, and the greatest degree of caution are necessary. Leaders with a wide knowledge of psychology as well as practical experience, men who know genetic causation, are necessary. And each form of control—each agency—is a subject for independent study and observation.

The last problem that scientific candor forces us to admit is to know definitely what we want in the way of human nature in the new progressive world. Certainly we know fairly well what we do not want it to be, but to discover just what desirable elements or characteristics in the way of attitudes, impulses, desires, and so on are needed is a problem that will take much research and clear thinking.

"The great task is the progressive discovery and creation of those circumstances which will enlist man's powers in the interest of the best attainable human nature. If the men and the women dedicated to this venture . . . succeed in arousing the interest of the average citizen in this movement; if they succeed in getting him to see that human nature is not something fixed and given, but something mutable and acquired, not something hidden away in human bodies ready to bubble over, but something created out of original capacity and environmental stimuli; if the average citizen can be brought to see this truth and to apply it, he will be enlisted in the greatest movement of our time, and will help to inaugurate a spiritual renaissance outranging in social significance any that has preceded it." "

QUESTIONS AND PROBLEMS

1. Why must human nature be reckoned with in any consideration of progress?
2. "No social reformer should attempt reformation who does not possess some information regarding the psychophysical nature of the creature to be taught or reformed." Discuss.
3. What light does the way in which self develops throw on the matter of social progress?
4. What can be said in general as to the plasticity of human nature?
5. Is the conception of human nature here indicated inconsistent with the conception of progress outlined above?
6. If human nature is so plastic, why are we not perfect human beings, and why do we not have a perfect world?
7. To what extent are we responsible for the human nature of the future?

"M. C. Otto, *op. cit.*, p. 239.

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CHAPTER IX

THE AGENTS OF PROGRESS: INTELLECT AND KNOWLEDGE

I. INTELLECT AS DISTINGUISHED FROM THE OTHER HUMAN PSYCHOLOGICAL REACTIONS

INSTINCT, in so far as it exists in pure form, is composed of those unlearned, inherited psychical tendencies or dispositions which are characteristic of a race or a large group of individuals due to the fact that they have been bred in and accentuated by a long selective process. These innate tendencies or dispositions are the result of generations of successful adjustments of the organism to certain features of the physical mainly, but also to an extent the social environment. They are set off automatically and always in the same way whenever the organism receives a certain stimulus, and cause a type of phenomenon which is, in the main, unreflective, non-discriminative, immediate, and uncontrolled in operation.

Habit, including much of what is commonly and mistakenly spoken of as instinct, is not biologically transmissible, and is composed of ways of reacting to a given situation learned or acquired by individuals or groups of individuals during their lifetime; these begin as conscious acts but are repeated so often as to become unconscious, automatic "second nature."

By *feeling* is meant that agreeable or disagreeable tone of consciousness which accompanies an activity. It is the quicker-than-thought subjective valuation which the organism gives to a proposed activity, this valuation being the result of racial or individual experience in the past. When the activity is one which has, in general, in the past history of the species been advantageous, the resulting feeling is usually pleasurable; when, on the other hand, the activity is one which has had disadvantageous effects, the feeling is usually disagreeable and painful. If conditions change, however, these implications will probably not be realized.

Intellect is a sort of compensatory power which man, the highest form of life with the most complex and changing existence, possesses

to make up for the deficiencies of instinct, habit, and feeling. These latter are only capable of adjusting the individual to the old, repeated, and more or less familiar factors or problems of the environment. The human individual and the human group are, however, continually confronted by new, unforeseen, imagined, or future situations which must be met. Intellect, in its various phases, is the objective cognitive side of the mind which is concerned with the adaptation of the individual to these environmental factors. It is the projective as well as the objective side of mind. It has given man a capacity for adaptation to and control of complex environment such as no other animal possesses; it marks him off from other species and makes him *the* progress animal.

An important element of intellect is *remembering*, that is, thinking an idea thought before and knowing it. Through memory the mind gradually builds up an environment of its own ideas and values. Another vital phase of cognition is *imagination*, the process of mental trial and error whereby the consequences are revealed in advance or in the absence of their actual performance. A very important aspect of this, from our point of view, is constructive imagination—the conceiving of institutions or modifications of institutions, or programs, or other methods, which, from the individual or social point of view, are seemingly highly advantageous in solving serious social problems. The highest of all intellectual capacities is *reason*, the most complex of all the devices of consciousness. It goes beyond perception and conception. It is discrimination, correlation, comparison, direction, organization, construction. It enables man to take account of factors neither present nor tangible to the senses, remote perhaps in both time and space. All the systems of philosophy and religion, all the tenets of science, and all the achievements of science and the arts, all man's mastery over nature and self, all man's methods and anticipations of social betterment, all the explorations of the unknown are the products of reason. By means of it man deliberately sets before himself desirable ends, seeks to comprehend the best methods of attaining these, and performs the resultant activities with conscious observation, comparison, and experiment. It is this which makes possible human achievement. Reason has probably only begun its great transforming work. A comparatively late development in mental evolution is *volition* or will, that phase of consciousness which has to do with choice, decision, determination, and action. It is controlling action by ideas, and is the source of man's drive—a very necessary element because of man's hatred of thinking.

2. THE INTELLECT AS A SOCIAL FACTOR

Inasmuch as the intellect is developed to control activities in individual and collective life which cannot be controlled in any other way, we must recognize in the fullest degree its crucial importance in the sphere of human and social activity. In fact, the distinctive character of our human social life is due to the modifying influence of intellectual elements. All those complexes that we group under culture and civilization are almost entirely intellectual achievements. Intellect always has been and is now the supreme device for controlling activity and modifying environment in such a way that societies and civilizations may come about.

Particularly is intellect important in the higher stages of social development. Here, where life has become complex and varied, its problems numerous and involved, man's automatic equipment, and social precedents, and habits, and customs become increasingly useless in bringing about the necessary adaptations. Consequently, these adaptations take on a more and more intellectual character. In fact, reason is the great social transforming power, if properly utilized. Human history is, on the whole, a movement toward the increasing supremacy of intellect and toward the progressive rationalization of human knowledge and human activities. The intellect thus stands revealed as the final social factor, the basic operative power.

3. THE THEORY OF THE

There is an old proverb which says, "Ideas rule the world." Professor Alfred Fouillée, a French sociologist, in developing the same idea has gone so far as to interpret not only society, but everything else in terms of what he calls *idea-forces*.¹ His is a philosophy of ideas as forces in evolution. Now the exclusive emphasis upon ideas as evolutionary forces leaves out of consideration many other highly important factors, and implies also a use of the term *evolution* unacceptable to-day. But if we confine ourselves to social development, certainly if any purely psychological elements are entitled to be called forces at all in human society, as Professor Ellwood points out,² intellectual elements are entitled to be so designated. With the growth of civilization, ideas and concepts of the intellectual life come to be more determining in the

¹ See his *L'Evolutionisme des idées-forces* and *La Psychologie des idées-forces*.

² *Sociology in its Psychological Aspects*, pp. 264-265.

social life process than the factors of the physical environment. In fact, civilization is in many respects the substitution of an "idea environment" for the objective environment. Ultimately ideas really do appropriate and utilize for man all the forces of nature and human nature that he thoroughly understands. H. G. Wells also says, "Human progress is largely . . . a clearing and an enlargement of ideas."³

4. SOCIAL PROGRESS AS INTELLECTUAL ACHIEVEMENT

Progress being a telic achievement is entirely due to intellectual forces, for intellect is the dynamic, active, and constructive agent. Instincts, habits, feelings, and emotions, while indispensable conditions, have not been instrumental in building up civilization; if we depended on these we should still be beasts. The history of civilization's advance is the history of intellectual advance; for the mind is the directive agent, and as Lester F. Ward says,⁴ "The mission of the directive agent is to guide society through no matter how tortuous a channel to the safe harbor of social prosperity."

Henry Thomas Buckle in his famous *History of Civilization in England*, which really applies to all Europe, devotes most of that famous work to the part of intellect in progress as compared with physical nature, leaning decidedly in favor of intellect. In Europe he noticed a diminishing influence of physical laws, and an increasing influence of mental laws. The real mover is the intellectual one. He says:⁵ "The intellectual principle has an activity and a capacity for adaptation which . . . is quite sufficient to account for the extraordinary progress, that, during seven centuries, Europe has continued to make." He devotes all the rest of the three volume work to a demonstration of the fact that the progress Europe has made from barbarism to civilization is entirely due to its intellectual activity.

And when we stop and think what has been done in the way of controlling natural and social phenomena in the last few centuries, we almost hesitate to think what can happen. And as Ward comments:⁶ "When we realize that all this is the result of thought set in the right direction and devoted to things which are, as we have seen, essentially dynamic, we may truly say that *thought is the sum of all forces.*"

Careful students of progress are everywhere agreed upon the part of

³ *Outline of History*, Vol. II, p. 429, footnote.

⁴ *Pure Sociology*, p. 466.

⁵ Vol. I, p. 182.

⁶ *Op. cit.*, p. 468.

intellect in progress. Professor C. A. Ellwood says:¹ "The origin and development of human culture or civilization, the rise in human society of special institutions of social control, such as government, morality, religion and education, all human social progress, in a word, can only be understood through the understanding of that collective mental life which human groups have developed on the basis of man's higher mental, and especially intellectual, evolution." Again he says: "The intellect and its ideas are human instruments of adjustment—the means by which social progress can be rationally planned and humanly controlled. Hence, the scientific program of . . . socially organizing and directing intellectual activities as a basis for furthering progress is not a chimerical one, but rests upon a solid foundation in psychology and sociology." Thus the determining factor in human progress must be psychical rather than biological or physical. It is doubtless true that in so far as progress is conditioned and determined by the action of human beings, there is nothing else to trust, in the last analysis, save intelligence.

It must be remembered, however, that progress through intellect rests on the conscious psychological disposition favoring progress—a deliberate individual and social mental attitude favoring progress—and will acts toward it. Intelligence in its broader sense must be invoked, that is, a conscientious intelligence, for "intelligence without a conscience is as undesirable as an unintelligent conscience."

5. THE WASTE AND NEGLECT OF INTELLIGENCE

The most important factor in progress is the wise use of all the mental capacities of a people, for intelligence is, at this moment, a limited resource as truly as are the forests. It is possible that the general mental level among a people can be raised, and if this occurs progress is almost assured. The real problem of the present, however, is increasingly to utilize the waste of potential mental energy, now so largely expended in non-useful or harmful directions, or not used at all. Real progress will never come until society grasps the fact that there are enormous possibilities of social achievement lying dormant in the minds of its unskilled, illiterate, poorly trained and lazy citizens. There is to-day a vast, incurious stupidity, the result of neglected minds atrophied from disuse. These undeveloped and hidden mental resources reduce to insignificance the undeveloped natural resources. Because intelligence

¹ *Introduction to Social Psychology*, D. Appleton & Co., p. 42.

is so remarkable an instrument, it should be cultivated for its own sake and carefully conserved.⁸

What progress has come heretofore has come in the main from the intelligence of the classes that have had intellectual opportunities and stimuli. When the masses also have suitable opportunities to develop and use their brain capacity, progress should occur by leaps and bounds.

6. THE NEED OF EXERCISING INTELLIGENCE

"The waste of incompetency and the curse of mediocrity are upon us. We have utterly lost all power of discriminating between the best men, things, ideas, books, and the second or even the tenth best." So cries the late Professor G. Stanley Hall.⁹ There is to-day so much good intellectual and reasoning power available and so little of it really being used for progressive ends. How much habit in the world, how little intellectual grasp; how much impulse and how little thought! In what a large majority of cases habit, impulse, and emotion rather than reason govern us, and in pure animal fashion we let them dictate our line of action. If we are really to progress, however, we must pull ourselves together and begin to sincerely and conscientiously use these intellects of ours. It is well to remember that intellect, like most else, grows and improves by the very toiling and stretching that it does.

7. IMPORTANCE OF THE BEST CONDITIONS FOR THOUGHT

Since intelligence is in every way so vitally important, not only to progress but also to the maintenance of the civilization acquired, it is necessary to do everything possible to abolish conditions which interfere with or impair its free working. We cannot think well when we are distracted or overfatigued, when we are devitalized by intoxicants and narcotics, when we are overfed or too hungry, when we are too hot or too cold. Hence, the tensions of a carelessly or haphazardly adjusted life, the wear and tear of crowd and city life, the long day spent at machine tending or other monotonous toil, the use of narcotics and strong liquors, gluttony on the one hand and starvation on the other, wealth and poverty, must be definitely branded as obstacles to thought. Temperance, sufficiency, and leisure are absolutely necessary to the fullest efficiency of intellect; for aloofness from the pressure of practical demands, or from the drag of indiscretions, enables thought to

⁸ Cf. A. D. Weeks, *Control of the Social Mind*, p. 240.

⁹ "The Message of the Zeitgeist," *Scientific Monthly*, Vol. 13, p. 115.

clarify its concepts, purify its method, enlarge its vision, and construct its abstract and simplified world.

8. THE NATURE OF KNOWLEDGE

Intelligence has many aids in carrying on its peculiar functions, some of which are its own by-products. Knowledge is one of these—a very important element of the cognitive phase of consciousness. Knowledge depends entirely on memory, or the social substitutes for memory. It consists of accumulations of ideas, values, methods, experiences, truths—human achievements of all kinds, products of intellect, stored up in the individual or social mind. Knowledge, as distinguished from intelligence, is not a machine, trained to work easily, rapidly, and steadily in a dynamic way, but a store of valuable information for the use of intelligence. Man does not waste or lose his valuable experiences and achievements, but files away all the data connected with them in his memory, or else through language, writing, and archives of various sorts confides it to his own or succeeding generations. This latter form of storage we speak of as the “social heritage” and it is by far the most important means of retaining knowledge. Mind can only be improved by selective heredity, but even here sober biologists tell us, it is not capable of indefinite improvement.¹⁰ The social heritage, on the other hand, is of a cumulative nature; it is a great treasure of valuable information, which is being added to constantly, making each generation the heir of all the preceding generations; each generation, as it were, standing on the shoulders of the preceding one. Thus while the individual minds may not improve much, each mind does come into the easy possession of a prodigious store of organized knowledge; and instead of an improved biological inheritance we have a rapidly augmenting mental inheritance, available for anyone. In general, it is true that this mass of accumulated information is the product of the keenest and wisest men who have been working in the different fields of knowledge. This has been examined and criticized from all angles until that which remains is in large measure capable of definite proof. This it is which is offered to the oncoming generations, and which is usually accepted by them and used as the basis of their studies.

The social heritage thus serves a marvellously useful function, for instead of making of the mind, through memory, a safety-deposit box of useful equipment for civilization, it leaves it free to function as the

¹⁰ See, e. g., E. G. Conklin, *The Direction of Human Evolution*, pp. 67-69.

finely devised machine it is. Thus capable minds are not overwhelmed or actually prevented from working by a great mass of specialized information, but are permitted to exercise the sterling capacities of perspective, judgment, and constructive ability. This does not mean that all the individuals of the group do not need a generally diffused wisdom. They do. It is necessary for every person to have a general civic and cultural knowledge, for only in this way is the individual suited to his conditions of social life. But to burden the mind with a vast amount of knowledge learned for its own sake is a misuse, yes, an abuse, of mind. A mind trained to think and act is far more useful than one capable of retaining the names, addresses, and telephone numbers of a thousand persons. Notebooks, filing systems, and directories can render this latter service far more efficiently, but there is nothing else to take the place of the former.

9. THE SIGNIFICANCE OF KNOWLEDGE

Knowledge is the foundation of the directive power of the mind; it gives the mind the material to work with as well as the methods and cautions to be observed. It assists man to preserve and establish himself within the natural order, to provide himself with more favorable conditions of existence, and the background for all his constructive activity in making his world and himself better. Max Nordau says: ¹¹ "Progress in knowledge permits all resources of nature that can be used by man to be more profitably employed, the evils and dangers that threatened him to be more frequently avoided, pleasure to be increased, discomfort lessened, and the average duration of life to be prolonged."

It has been a particular form of knowledge, the knowledge of the laws of nature, and the relationships of men to one another, which has enabled men to make those complex adjustments which we term civilized social life. Or, as Lester F. Ward put it: ¹² "Civilization has been brought about through human achievement, and human achievement consists almost entirely in knowledge." What marks us off from our ancestors is the changed environment, which, in turn, is a matter of a different accumulation of knowledge transmitted in books or customs of people or handed down from mind to mind. Knowledge forms the very basis of civilization. All civilizations, all governments, all the fine products of a higher life are based upon knowledge.

¹¹ *Interpretation of History*, p. 242.

¹² *Applied Sociology*, p. 106.

The very thought life of man improves as knowledge grows. Professor Franz Boas¹³ says in this connection: "It is . . . not surprising, that, with the advance of civilization, reasoning becomes more and more logical, not because each individual carries out his thought in more logical manner, not because the traditional material which is handed down to each individual has been thought out and worked out more thoroughly and more carefully, but because more and better knowledge becomes available."

Knowledge is especially significant in this new telic world. Now that we have gained the power to remodel our social order, we need the scientific, historical, psychological, and social knowledge that will make our meddling safe. Heretofore man has been the puppet of cosmic forces. Now he has consciously and with determined purpose entered upon the task of directing his own fortunes. To do this successfully he requires, among many things, a vast and well-diffused knowledge.

10. KNOWLEDGE AND PROGRESS

In general, it can also be said that it has been the slow accumulation of knowledge through the activity of the human intellect which has been the basis of social progress in the past, and it is also very safe to say that all future progress is contingent upon a continuation and acceleration of this process. It has always been by means of knowledge that man has acquired the materials and methods and means of progressing.¹⁴ When we think of the ways in which we are quite sure that we have achieved real progress, they turn out to be ways in which the accumulation of real knowledge has been the guiding principle. On the other hand, when we calmly think of the ways in which there is standstill, we find a sacred theory or dogma hovering over the mass. It is through proper information that the intellect is capable of manipulating nature and human nature in conformity with telic ends. It is through the power that knowledge gives that the individual breaks away from the thralldom of his environment, physical or social, liberates himself from custom and creed and prejudice and preconceived notions, in fact, is enabled to command all that is injurious or retarding, and take a new and independent stand which leaves him free, yes, urges him, to advance. Knowledge suggests or calls up the possibilities of better and higher

¹³ *The Mind of Primitive Man*, p. 206.

¹⁴ "Progress has always advanced in the same way throughout the course of human history. . . . It consists in a widening and deepening of knowledge." Max Nordau, *op. cit.*, p. 356.

demands. It causes the intellect to appreciate the importance of an ever-improving and broadening environment; it is a liberalizing and civilizing agent. Salvation has always come in this way.

Without knowledge men have suffered the blight of ignorance. When ignorance reigns, the world suffers from bigotry, superstition and fatalism, and life is filled with fear, suffering, helplessness, narrowness, and despair. But knowledge dispels these fears, and brings relief to the suffering and hope to the despairing. As man has attained knowledge he has grown in power and culture and understanding. Life has become finer and fuller and freer and more livable. In our ignorance and superstition we tortured sick people with unmeasured cruelty and suffering in order to drive the evil spirits out of them. But to-day, knowing about it, we attribute disease to germs, and fight the germs without torturing their victim. Everywhere truth has dispelled darkness, softened harshness, eliminated cruelty, and given men the means to pull themselves upwards as fast as they cared to go; everywhere it has increased the opportunities and possibilities of life; everywhere it has enriched it and added to its majesty and glory. It is also knowledge which has made possible the necessary adaptability in social institutions and in human mentality—departments of life where the most resistant rigidity reigns.

Then, too, the progressive or reformer must have facts—not as his end, but his beginning, for they serve him as material out of which to fashion a vision of things to be—to be if those who know the art can embody his vision in forms concrete and congenial to life.

There is ample evidence of the efficacy of knowledge as an agent of progress. The elimination of alcohol is a case in point. Professor Ellwood ¹⁵ has said:

“Without any change in geographic environment or biological conditions and without any radical change in the economic system, but simply through the accumulation and diffusion of knowledge regarding the physiological and social effects of alcohol and the inculcation in the young of standards and habits corresponding to such knowledge, the most progressive societies of the present seem about to sweep away the use, if not of all at least of the stronger alcoholic beverages. If by the accumulation and diffusion of knowledge and the inculcation of corresponding standards such a revolution can be brought about in the long standing mores of civilized nations regarding alcohol—mores defended by privilege and vested interests—then there is every reason to believe that rational changes and adaptations in every phase of the social life can be effected by the same means.”

¹⁵ C. A. Ellwood, *Introduction to Social Psychology*, p. 306.

To-day knowledge is becoming international, which increases its usefulness as a progress agent. Future generations using knowledge for progressive purposes, in a systematic and universal way, will bring about infinite improvements in the material comfort and spiritual nobility of living.

II. HISTORY AS KNOWLEDGE FOR PROGRESSIVE PURPOSES

History, as Voltaire said, is a vast storehouse from which one takes that which is to one's use; in fact, one finds in history the materials for the technique of progress. History gives a scientific and realistic explanation and interpretation of the background of contemporary life. It enables us to trace back scientifically every human institution, every generally accepted idea or inherited mode of thought, every standard of value, every important invention, to antecedents and conditioning circumstances. It gives a picture of continuous cause and effect, showing the types of causes that produce certain effects, desirable and otherwise. This is highly advantageous, for without a thorough and systematic knowledge of the various effects on human well-being—material, intellectual, and moral—of different lines of action, the reformer or progressive is impotent. History takes the place of impossible experimentation with human and social phenomena by providing an array of completed processes. It provides an extensive display of mistakes and successes.

History throws a tremendous amount of light on the regularity of events and the course of trends and tendencies, which enables the knowing person, within limits, to anticipate future changes and conditions as the logical result of certain causes. Through this predictive power we are capable of exercising a very useful social control.

It also explains, or at least accounts for, the processes that have brought society thus far on its way, and also throws a vast amount of light upon the difficulties that confront our civilization. In history we find the sort of beacon lights that mankind has been willing to follow upwards, a source of enlightenment of no little significance for the social reformer, inasmuch as these serve to illuminate the way of social accomplishment.

History shows the folly of persistently and blindly holding to certain class attitudes, ideas, and activities, or to antiquated explanations of things. It shows social institutions and beliefs as living things, unconsciously and slowly created by man, vitalized by his mind, and grow-

ing and decaying with his growth and decay. It presents what men have thought and willed and discovered, and why they changed. It shows the influence of ideals and other products of the imagination in shaping both social events and human spiritual stature.

No progressive can expect to get far without a thorough knowledge of history; not the history that is composed of the traditional, pedantic, episodic narrative synthesis of the spectacular—mainly political and military events—but rather that available knowledge of all that has happened to the race in the past, and the processes through the operation of which man has everywhere come to be as he is; really an inquiry into the human experience of all the time occupied by the generations of men.¹⁶ Finally, it shows both the possibility and need of modification of man's past achievements, and as such it is a decisive weapon to use against the conservatives.

12. SOCIAL SCIENCE AS KNOWLEDGE FOR PROGRESSIVE PURPOSES

The most serious and bewildering problems facing the progressive are social and economic problems. There are the innumerable problems connected with city life—morals, congestion, housing, sanitation—the agricultural problems, the disorganization of industry with its cycles, unemployment, the immigration problem in all its various phases, the labor problem, political corruption, wealth concentration, disease control, inter- and intra-denominational religious difficulties, the quantity and the quality of the population. These and a hundred others require the earnest and devoted attention of all the sciences, but more especially the social sciences, economics, psychology, sociology, political science, ethics, and eugenics. For tinkerers, jacks-of-all-trades, enthusiastic amateurs, are not competent to handle problems of gravity and complexity. And yet men are woefully ignorant; too ignorant, in fact, to know that they are ignorant. This ignorance can only be illuminated by the right kind of knowledge. One of our most urgent needs, therefore, is to distribute the social science that we have among the masses of people.

While the social sciences have no absolute or forever perfect solution for any of these problems, they have much ready information of value, much of it already tested or else checked with the facts of history, to offer. For they are not concerned with mere academic compilation of

¹⁶ For a more extensive account of the social use of history see the writer's article, "The Sociological Uses of History," *American Journal of Sociology*, Vol. 31, pp. 173-198.

data of various kinds, but have, as their ends, positive and constructive welfare activities. This, the social scientist tries to put to use, but the opposition and lack of appreciation makes this difficult. Some way must soon be found to popularize this knowledge, even to the point of making it a fad.

13. MAN'S FEAR OF KNOWLEDGE

Men have not always been willing to use knowledge, this potent agent of progress at their disposal, for their advancement. "Ignorance is bliss," we say; "What I don't know won't hurt me." Many prefer the bovine somnolence of ignorance to the alert and dynamic life of knowledge. For others knowledge is unsettling and they fear it. *Status quo*, quiet, absence of disturbance is what they want. Why be upsetting things when things would somehow ramble along anyhow? Others again—quacks, some religious groups, adventurers, and fakirs—profit by ignorance and are foes of knowledge, at least for the masses. Bigotry, intolerance, prejudice, and closed minds are either due to the lack of knowledge or the deliberate refusal to face or accept truth; usually the latter. Thousands of men prefer to shut out light and knowledge so that they can believe dogmas. Of course, such persons in time lose their importance, but their inertia retards the whole progress of the community.

The wealth of new facts and valuable generalizations discovered in recent decades is immense, but it remains for the most part a monopoly of a small body of trained men. This is partly due to the failure of public education to take it up and make it part of the equipment of every school child. But mainly it is due to the fact that the average man is more or less indifferent—even hostile—to new truth. What we need before we can expect much progress is a technique whereby knowledge can be humanized.¹⁷

14. DIFFUSION AND THE WIDE USE OF KNOWLEDGE

No nation will progress, however, unless the ideas of achievement and the knowledge of their effective use are rather equally and widely diffused and generally appreciated, for if this knowledge is held by but a few, the people or nation are seriously handicapped. The fundamental problem before society, if it is to progress, therefore, is to multiply its knowledge in every way possible, diffuse it as widely as possible, and

¹⁷ See in this connection J. H. Robinson's *The Humanizing of Knowledge*.

increase the ability to apply it to the concrete conditions of life. Buckle says,¹⁸ "The changes in every civilized people are, in their aggregate, dependent solely on three things: First, on the amount of knowledge possessed by their ablest men; Second, on the direction which that knowledge takes, that is to say, the sort of subjects to which it refers; Third, and above all, on the extent to which the knowledge is diffused and the freedom with which it pervades all classes of society."

When only a few possess knowledge it has little value. In fact, it may be injurious, due to the inequalities engendered and the possibility of exploitation. But when everybody has it, no one individual or group has the advantage, and society as a whole moves forward. In fact the value of knowledge to society depends upon the degree of its diffusion. It is similar to the principle of progression that applies to diamonds, where the value of the diamond is relative to its size.

Knowledge is not a good in itself; it must be wisely used to be good, and it is only wisely used when it is used by intelligent and moral people for social ends. Intelligence and knowledge may become so disconnected from life that they become irrelevancies, and their activities mere fantastic elegancies, or they may become so perverted that they become agents of deterioration.

QUESTIONS AND PROBLEMS

1. Just what is the function of intellect in progress?
2. What are some of the most valuable mental traits from the point of view of progress? (Balz, *Basis of Social Theory*, pp. 244-247.)
3. What do we mean when we say, "Thinking makes it so?"
4. In what ways could we prevent intelligence from being wasted or from lying idle?
5. What part does the so-called "intelligentsia" play in progress?
6. What was Condorcet's opinion concerning the relation of progress to knowledge? (See pp. 43-45 of Chap. III, or Bury, *Idea of Progress*, pp. 208-211.)
7. What lines has the progress of knowledge in the past chiefly taken?
8. What are some of the different methods of obtaining necessary social knowledge? (See Hertzler, "Sociological Uses of History," *American Journal of Sociology*, Vol. 31, pp. 173-174.)
9. Why is the average man so indifferent to knowledge? (Robinson, *The Humanizing of Knowledge*, pp. 15-28.)
10. What types of knowledge, in your opinion, are most necessary for progress just now?
11. How do you account for so-called "fundamentalism"? What is the "cure" for it?

¹⁸ *History of Civilization of England*, Vol. I, p. 162.

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CHAPTER X

THE AGENTS OF PROGRESS: SCIENCE AND INVENTION

I. WHAT IS SCIENCE?

SINCE the beginning of the human epoch man has been concerned about the causes and effects of all phenomena that came within his observation, both natural and social, and he has attempted to deduce from these observations general truths, which he passed on to posterity, and the principle of which he attempted to apply to the crude control of these phenomena. Driven by the needs of self and group preservation and by curiosity, his intellect demanded knowledge—explanations of things, long before any “laws of nature” were formulated. In fact, he demanded information which his feeble powers were not fitted to attain. By a simple extension of the method of anticipating results which he employed in investigating the simpler and more patent details of his accustomed environment, he launched out into imaginative explorations of the unknown and anticipated the totality of phenomena. But having once produced an explanation of the whole, he thereafter forbade further investigation and made doubt of the accepted explanation of things an impiety or heresy. Consequently curiosity came to be in bad odor. In Greek legend, for example, the miseries of the world were ascribed to the fact that Pandora was curious. Until a short time ago in Western civilization, the dogmatic deductions of things, at an early time among most peoples embodied in religion, were under no conditions to be subjected to doubt or test. Man’s impotence became a virtue and faith an attribute of piety. But some seven centuries ago this spirit of curiosity and truth-seeking—unable to be any longer suppressed—broke through, and among the very monks themselves. Since then the march of science, in spite of condemnations, proscriptions, excommunications, and inquisitions, has been continuous until it is to-day recognized as the tool *par excellence* of modern civilization. But what is the nature of this tool?

Science, as we understand it to-day, must be viewed from three different points of view. *It is first, a technique or method of truth finding.*

It is a process of investigating phenomena and of studying all kinds of pregnant facts: those of the cosmos; the earth, its substances, forces, fauna and flora; man as a mechanism, as a human being, a moral and spiritual entity; and men as associated individuals in groups. It seeks answers for the questions: What? How? Where? Why? By careful research it attempts to find the facts in connection with all these phenomena. It also seeks to discover a new synthesis of what is already known, or in the way to get known. Thus from this point of view science, paradoxical as it may seem, is really an art, the art of inquiry and of careful and correct thinking. As Schneider points out,¹ there was a time when thinking was not an art, but a spontaneous activity, a process of random inference. But with the development of scientific method, the art of inference has been established.

The scientific method is made up of the successive steps of observation, reflection, comparison, and the discovery of similarities of correlation and sequence, analysis, experimentation and trial, the generalizations or deductions or inductions or inferences, and finally verification, each pursued with the greatest degree of thoroughness, persistence, completeness and system possible. In the earlier stages science is thus analytical and critical; in the latter, synthetic and constructive. In a few words, scientific method consists in suspending judgment until the bearing of all available relevant facts has been made explicit; and it includes a diligent search for the facts that have a bearing upon the case in point. At bottom it is the practical application of intelligence. It is for these reasons that natural science makes constant use of the laboratory and experimentation, while social science is resorting more and more to statistics and other fact finding techniques. Each science, of course, must work out its own specific technique, but the general principles given above are almost universally observed. Thus "The trained man of science . . . uses his powers of observation to discover the facts of nature, his inventive ingenuity to propose various possible hypotheses for the explanation of the facts, his power of logical reflection to think out, or deduce from each hypothesis, in accordance with previously acquired, pertinent knowledge, just what ought to happen if the hypothesis were true, and his impartial faculties of verification to decide which hypothesis, if any, is competent to explain the observed facts."²

In the second place, science consists of a mass of systematized or

¹ H. W. Schneider, *Science and Social Progress*, p. 1

² W. M. Davis, "The Reasonableness of Science," *Scientific Monthly*, Vol. 15, p. 196.

methodized and verified knowledge. It is a collection of facts bearing on different problems as they have confronted man, presented, not in the random fashion of the newspaper, but with all the due regard for logic, order, clarity, illustration, classification, and honesty of the textbook. It adds many humble lists of knowledge to the great treasury already existing. It is more than knowledge, it is systematized and organized knowledge, accurate and dependable, expressing in general terms the relations of phenomena in a communicable form. "In science the facts bearing on a given problem are presented as completely as possible and are classified with reference to their significant bearings upon the problem."³ The relations among phenomena that science expresses are true in some cases of the precise kind described, untrue in others. The relations hold true whenever these precise phenomena occur. Historically, therefore, science is simply the progressive rationalization of man's knowledge—organized common sense, to use Huxley's expression. It takes ordinary experience, enlarges it, classifies it, renders it accurate, reduces it to order, and systematically records it. This record is thus both an adjunct to memory, and an aid to orderly and purposeful observation.

A very important portion of science as verified knowledge is made up of the *laws, principles, and generalizations built up on this knowledge*—each with their proper explanations. These are statements of similarity, sequence, and constant correlation between cause and effect. Science is after all an inductive process, that is, the derivation of a generalization from the details of experience, and the generalizations thus slowly built up form the very basis of science. It reduces the multiplicity and variety of phenomena, natural or social, to general principles, simple and general laws. It has as its aim unity and simplicity, and is thus a clarifying element. Thus through science we are able to detach ourselves from the world and see it undisturbed by the personal and the particular.

These generalizations at first are known as theories or hypotheses, due to the fact that they are still, to an extent at least, in the conjectural state. They are laws on probation, like a bill before a legislature. They are the partially sound crystallization of ideas concerning a certain phenomenon. As investigation and experiment in other fields substantiate the original conclusion, we come to call them *laws*, i. e., accurate statements of what happens under certain conditions. Law in science, however, does not mean a command or ordinance as it does in the political

³ Edman, *op. cit.*, p. 368.

realm. "A law in science," as Slosson points out,⁴ "is simply a description in the fewest possible words of what happens. It is a summary of all that is known on that subject at the time it is formulated." As a matter of fact, there really are no laws in science. What we call "laws" are simply the memory schemes we employ to aid us in grasping a whole collection of facts concerning a particular condition at one time, the well-digested statements of observed and verified relations and sequences.⁵

In the third place, science consists of all the means of carrying on the world's work by means of the application of scientific technique and laws. This is the phase often referred to as applied science. It consists in the principles of all the sciences which men use to control nature and human nature in the interests of human welfare, in the enlargement of human comfort, security, and powers. In this connection we are thinking of all the sciences, natural and social, at work, doing the things which give them reason for existence; we are thinking of science, not merely as a method or a storehouse, but as a power at man's disposal, as a pragmatic control of human affairs. It is this phase of science that we have in mind when we think of aerial navigation, the measurement of Betelgeuse, synthetic foods, engineering exploits, elimination of yellow fever or bubonic plague, radium, operations on the heart, atomic experimentation, the Einstein theory, the drawing up of new municipal charters, the functioning of legislative reference bureaus, intelligence testing, eugenics, experiments in suggestion, the psychology and sociology of reformation, social religion, the development of social statistics, the determination of the laws of heredity, and the "new" history.

In general Bernard⁶ summarizes the matter very well when he says: "It [i. e., science] studies nature, discovers the laws of change and correlation in phenomena, and makes use of these principles and data for the bringing about of further and better articulated adjustments and correlations wholly within the limits of natural processes." Or as Professor Ellwood⁷ puts it: "It is a superior instrument of adjustment, of knowledge of, and control over, methods and forces." Science is man's tool in the discovery of facts, their presentation for use, and their application to the problems of everyday life.

⁴ "New Wonders of Science," *Independent*, Vol. 108, p. 446.

⁵ Cf. L. L. Bernard, "Scientific Method and Progress," *American Journal of Sociology*, Vol. 31, pp. 1-18.

⁶ L. L. Bernard, "The Conditions of Progress," *American Journal of Sociology*, Vol. 28, p. 44.

⁷ C. A. Ellwood, *Sociology in its Psychological Aspects*, p. 272.

2. SCIENCE AND RESEARCH

In the last analysis, science is the outcome of research, the result of inquisitive but methodical minds deliberately engaged in the search for truth. Scientific research is not a thing isolated, but is fast being recognized as part of the necessary work of the world. It is the organized technique of science itself for its own propagation. It is, so to speak, the reproductive process of science. By it we mean the slow and laborious process of discovering and making available the facts and truths of physical, social, and human nature, which have a definite and fundamental bearing on the different problems of life. It is the method of discovery.⁸ By means of research we discover what happens when given material is used in a given way. Such discoveries are the only genuine explanations. They reveal the conditions to which actors must conform if the ends we desire are to be attained. Its justification rests upon the broad basis of the value of the intellectual progress of mankind. If advance in verified knowledge from generation to generation is desirable, then research must be undertaken as a service to mankind. It is part of the intellectual bread of the community, part of the bed-rock on which rests its efficiency.

Research or discovery seeks the truth, which is a comparatively new quest for most people. People have not wanted the truth, but rather what "seemed good." People in general accepted what they liked to accept, even though they accepted myths, poetic fancies, and gross misapprehensions, not submitted to any rigorous tests of scientific or historical criticism.

Research may lie in any field or branch of knowledge that is treated in a scientific spirit. Thus a very important branch of scientific research is social research—a phase of particular significance in this study. Social research is the research principle applied to social phenomena. It is concerned mainly with research on the conception of man himself, his origin, history, habits, institutions, control, and progress, all, in fact, that has a bearing on his nature, conduct, and welfare. It studies man's development, his traditions, beliefs and customs, his races, classes, groups, societies, families, his mental nature, both as an individual and as a member of a group, and his emotions and attitudes. It is interested in history and education, the state, the church, cosmopolitanism. It is

⁸ We do not want to imply, however, that all useful discovery has been the result of deliberate effort. Some very notable discoveries have been the result of chance, as, for example, Newton's discovery of gravitation through noting the fall of the apple.

concerned with civilization, revolution, man's wanderings, culture, products, his relation to his environment, his commerce, his spirituality, his inventions, his increasing powers of control, his adaptations of all kinds, all his problems. It seeks truth about economic schemes, religious schemes, political schemes, ethical schemes, family schemes, social schemes. It is concerned also with man's aspirations, his hopes, his desires, his dreams, his visions. It has become the very essence of all his progressive effort.

3. SCIENCE AND INVENTION

The end term of scientific effort now and all through the human career has been invention. Defined in the words of Lester F. Ward, invention is "the perception of utilities and the utilization of properties and forces locked up except to the key of intelligence in the apparently dead and lifeless material objects or invisible and intangible in the subtle forces of nature. . . . If we carefully analyze an invention we shall find that it consists *first* in recognizing a property or force, and *secondly*, in making material adjustments calculated to cause that property or force to act in the manner desired by the inventor, presumably to his advantage."⁹ In brief, invention is taking certain known—often recently discovered—properties and forces and recombining them and making them work in a new and useful way. In the social sphere also invention consists in the building up of new elements, institutions, or ways of living through a selection and recombination of old elements. As Ward points out,¹⁰ there is a reciprocal relationship between discovery and invention: discovery leads to invention, and invention leads to further discovery. The wider knowledge provided by discovery leads to new formulæ or processes or machinery of one kind or another (i. e., inventions) which serve as the agents of further discovery.

The fact must be emphasized that inventions are not the result of a single stroke of genius. Each invention is the result of the collective wisdom of the ages bearing upon this particular work. It reflects man's ability to profit by the attempts, mistakes, failures, and successes of those who have wrestled with similar problems in the past. Thus each invention is the result of a whole series of contributing circumstances, a product of its own time and its own culture plane, and could probably not have been brought about very much earlier than it was.¹¹

⁹ Lester F. Ward, *Pure Sociology*, pp. 524, 569.

¹⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 525.

¹¹ "All inventions occur through the mating of traditional knowledge with fecundating conditions." C. H. Cooley, *Social Process*, p. 17.

4. THE RELATIVITY OF SCIENTIFIC TRUTH

All truth that science provides is relative. Just as the cosmic explanations of nearly all the earlier religions were the best generalizations that the profoundest and most inspired intellects of their age could form upon the basis of their existing knowledge of the universe, so our generalizations, even when we reduce them to laws, are merely the best that we can do with the superior instruments of observation and research that are available. This we call the truth, but it is merely the best approach to truth down to date. Science cannot gratify the desire of men for certainty. No scientific "law" is to be regarded otherwise than as a working hypothesis—provisional, approximate, and merely useful. As Professor A. B. Wolfe points out, a scientific generalization must always be read with the proviso, "so far as we know," or, "as far as the observation shows." If man's powers of observation and logical inference were infinite, then we could have absolute knowledge, but man's knowledge is finite.¹²

We thought the larger implications of Newton to be entirely true, but Einstein's work has necessitated a modification of some of these. Thus the truths of science are something like mathematical curves, which, while they continuously approach a straight line, yet unless prolonged to infinity itself, never actually attain it. Scientific information, since scientific method is constantly improving in every way, continuously approaches, but never completely attains, absolute truth.

5. THE SPIRIT OF SCIENCE

When we are thinking of the spirit of science we are thinking for the most part of the spirit of the real scientific man—the researcher and the man who thinks scientifically. Our treatment will be based on that idea. The researchers are the questioners, the discoverers, the pathfinders, the pointers-out. They are the detectives in the romance of knowledge, the pioneers of new civilizations. They are also the reassorters, the selectors, the combiners, the illuminators of knowledge and truth. They give meaning to things that would otherwise pass unnoticed. They appreciate the indescribable romance of science, the triumphs of discovery, and the dawn of new ideas.

The scientific spirit is a spiritual element. It is that which prompts

¹² Cf. A. B. Wolfe, *Conservatism, Radicalism and Scientific Method*, p. 216.

men to spend long days and sleepless nights trying to fathom the depths of the unknown so that the world may be better. It is stimulated in the first place, not by the personal ambition of the investigator, but by the vision of "the larger life," the essence of which is truth. Its fundamental virtue is a profound admiration and passion for truth, whatever it be and through whatever channels and at whatever costs it may come. Huxley on one occasion is supposed to have said: "I would sooner be damned and be right than be saved and be wrong." The scientific attitude of mind involves a sweeping away of all other desires in the interests of the desire to know. For one fact, fairly treated, leads to another, and this to another, so that facts treated as they ought to be lead to a larger life. To be sure this seeking for truth means a larger life for the investigator, however humble he may be, but the search for truth cannot avoid fulfilling the altruistic function of making the world a better place to live in.

In order to pursue truth the better, the scientific man develops a meticulous precision of observation, measurement, and statement. He thus needs such qualities as earnestness, devotion, honesty, diligence, and system. Nor does he lie or consent to be compromised, nor does he knowingly have any traffic with untruth, or half-truth, or what he surmises might destroy truth. The scientist, as opposed to the quack, is also against the spirit of secrecy and exclusiveness. He invites all men to share his methods and results. This is particularly true of the medical profession. He has or should develop a boundless, insatiable curiosity, and a lifelong passion for acquiring facts and understanding the relationship between them. Paul of Tarsus said: "Test all things and hold fast that which proves to be good." This is a fair statement of the spirit of true science: prove all things and hold fast that which is good.

The man inspired by the scientific spirit will be open-minded, disinterested, impartial, fair-minded, as devoid as possible of emotion or sentimentality, subjective bias, personal expectations, and prejudicial attitudes. He will have the greatest possible mental alertness and flexibility and emancipation from dogmas of any kind, or preconceived methods or views. The scientific attitude involves a suppression of hopes and fears, loves and hates, and the whole subjective emotional life, until we are able to see things frankly, without preconceptions, without bias, without any wish to see things other than as they are. Each new social problem, for example, involves new methods of procedure and minds trained to detect new truths. At no time can the social explorer be absolutely sure or dogmatic; neither can he rely with full assurance

on his successes, even of yesterday. Hence he is modest in assertion and willing to delay judgment until the necessary facts are known and to change even cherished judgments when the facts command.

He must show an entire insensibility to cherished motives, faiths, beliefs, traditions, even mores; his must be a calm and clear spirit of free inquiry, a fearless winnowing and searching after truth, and an implicit willingness to follow free inquiry to an unwelcome conclusion.

"Research holds nothing sacred. It looks for the origin of Man, of the World, of Religion, of God, of Institutions, of Society, of State, of Church, of Man's relations to Man, of Man's relation to Woman. It does not shrink from any depth, nor is it dizzy at any height. Research is not even content with what it finds, but would fain be a Creator, and make new worlds, new beauties, new loves, new hates, new passions, new things, new animals, new men, and new women. Research is not only passionate and disinterested, it is audacious, ambitious, fearless."²²

It is idle to blame science for its assertions. It has gone on and will go on undisturbed in its search of truth, even if it does upset ever so many illusions, however sacred they may be, and leave some of us without hope. The scientific man cannot accept a closed scheme of thought, nor can he abide by a finished statement of the world. Rootedness of ideas and proscription of inquiry can have no place in his thinking. Inasmuch as research is continually laying bare new realities, he refuses to conclude the case, for the evidence is not all in. He has a half-belief that the most important witnesses may be still in waiting, and will continue so until he learns how to call them in. The things which yet lie hidden may overturn his settled conclusions, as the theory of evolution or the hypothesis of the atom have already done. To the uncovering of these hidden truths, all the machinery he can command is devoted. This often leads him to seek in humble and often unpleasant places. The air, the soil, the slime, the refuse of the world give him much valuable information. To the scientific mind the slimiest, vilest bit of earth may have the secret he seeks, and will hold it forever from him who merely sits and thinks. To enrich the already multitudinous world with discovery of as yet unknown facts and forces is his aim. Consequently he expects revolutionary changes and is disposed to readjustment and revision, nor does he suppose that they will destroy valuable things, since the truest is always the best. Radium, or bacteria, or the Einstein theory may alter certain highly important hypotheses, but

²² J. B. Shaw, "Spirit of Research," *Monist*, Vol. 32, p. 538.

they do not destroy the scientific man's confidence in science, nor do they make it a less serviceable instrument.

The scientific man is tolerant of new truth, teachable concerning new methods. He will not be chafed and irritated by the theories and convictions of his fellows. But he insists on maintaining a critical attitude. He will not run along with others for the sake of holding the same opinions they do, nor does he permit himself to become credulous or fanatical in his maintenance of certain contentions. He is positively intolerant of everything that seeks to retard the advancement of ideas and ideals, the promotion and acceptance of truth, the purification of thought and life.

The truly scientific man sees the importance of persistence. The work of research is often monotonous and discouraging. There is much chaff for every kernel of grain. So much of it is a test of a person's absolute integrity, of his tenacity of purpose, his willingness to stand by his profession, of love for truth where there seems to be no truth. The scientific spirit is, in a way, a refining fire, that seeks out the good gold of character and resolve.

Finally, the scientific man is never content, but is always aspiring and producing.

"The Spirit of Research is the aspiring soul of man beating its wings against its limitations. In itself it finds the power of flight, the power of vision, the power of creation. It is not confined to what is in the field of view of a microscope, however minutely accurate. It is never content with the habitation it has built, however convenient the furnishings.

"The Spirit of Research inspires the mind 'to creep from fancy to the fact, and thus find progress, man's distinctive mark.' The Spirit of Research is like Socrates, who wished to know not only what seemed to be true, but what it meant for the Soul and how far it could carry man on his upward flight. The Spirit of Research is LIFE with its two wings: Intelligence and Sympathy. It is on its forward flight, impelled by the urge of an inner power. It rests but a moment on any crag, however solid; it drinks but an instant at any spring, however fresh; for from the beginning of the World it has had a Vision whose beauty, whose intoxication, whose smile eternally say: COME."⁴

Consequently, for the real researcher, the important thing is to be engaged in some productive endeavor in the discovery or dissemination of truth. With Carlyle he feels it necessary to, "Produce! Produce! Were it but the pitifullest, infinitesimal, fraction of a product, produce

⁴ J. B. Shaw, *op. cit.*, pp. 551-552.

it in God's name! 'Tis the utmost thou hast in thee: out with them."

6. THE CONTRIBUTIONS OF SCIENCE AND INVENTION TO PROGRESS

Science as an effective instrumentality in the hands of man has just begun to make its contributions. Barely three thousand years of what might be called scientific research are behind us, and most of this has been more or less haphazard and unconnected, the work of individuals usually fighting poverty and group opposition, or at least doubt.¹⁵ And yet what a startling change has come in the world as the result of this work. If only the last one hundred and fifty years is taken, one notes changes revolutionary in their effect.

A century and a half ago man was dependent upon his own or other animal power, or that provided by the very inefficient use of wind, water, or steam. To-day by cleverly devised turbines and engines he steals from water and coal the strength of millions of horses and harnesses this to machinery that has increased his productivity a thousand-fold. Formerly if he wanted to travel on land he was dependent upon his own good powers of locomotion, or the assistance given by the horse or other animals. He himself or his brutes were his carriers. His pace was slow and his powers were feeble. To-day the steam engine, the electric motor, or the gas engine carry him wherever he wants to go on land, or sea, or in the air. He has locomotives that can easily draw a train of one hundred and twenty-five cars, carrying the grain yield of twenty square miles or more, and ships that can transport a small city. He can travel in veritable palaces on wheels or afloat and while so doing enjoy the comforts of the best appointed homes. He can move at the rate of 200 miles an hour on land and 250 miles an hour in the air if he wants to, easily exceeding the speed of any other form of life as far as is now known. He can travel several hundred feet below the surface of the ocean if he wishes, or seven miles above it. By these means a man can to-day cover as much territory in a year as his ancestors covered in a lifetime. The earth has shrunk to a tiny fraction of its original size, and almost every part of it is to-day easily and quickly accessible to every other. The globe can be circumnavigated now, including liberal stop-over privileges, in less time than it formerly took to cross the Atlantic Ocean. Man can even travel in the air in Pullman-like

¹⁵ M. E. Haggerty, "Science and Democracy," *Scientific Monthly*, Vol. 1, 257-258.

airplanes, and even use the air as a means of conveying mail or even grand pianos. A century and a half ago man laboriously and slowly cut his grain with sickle, scythe, or cradle, bound it by hand, and threshed it with a flail or by means of oxen. To-day by means of a mammoth harvester he cuts a swath thirty feet or more wide, threshes, blows out the chaff and straw, puts the grain in sacks, and loads them on a wagon alongside, the while moving at the fastest rate that the horse-drawn wagons receiving the grain are capable of moving.

Formerly he could talk as far as his voice would carry and communicate as far as he could see his neighbor's light. To convey a message to distant parts took weeks, months, and even years. To-day by means of telephone and telegraph, with wires or without, he can by walking across the room talk across a continent and communicate with almost any inhabited spot of the earth's surface, and do so almost with the quickness of thought. The world has become a whispering gallery in which all men are in touch with all others. He can to-day hear better music in his own home by means of phonograph and radio than even kings could hear formerly, and can hear it more frequently. He can see moving pictures of human activities—romance, pageantry, adventure, history—and see them much better presented than kings and princes enjoyed on the stage a century ago.

A century and a half ago we illuminated the darkness by candles or whale-oil lamps, in a manner so poor that bedtime and darkness were almost synonymous. To-day by means of electric lights we have almost eliminated darkness, and bedtime is as we make it. It was once said that one cannot predict the weather, but to-day with our vast meteorological information and excellent international coöperation, we can forecast it a week ahead.

Mineralogy has revealed natural resources that have changed the whole trend of civilization. Chemistry has provided us hundreds and thousands of materials of kinds that our ancestors never dreamed of, many of them from what once was waste. By synthetic processes it has enabled us to provide ourselves with products no longer available in their original forms, or existing in insufficient quantities. Biology in all its various applications has assisted us, through bacteriology, in hygiene, surgery, agriculture, and the preservation of foods; through the discovery of the Mendelian principles of inheritance, in the improvement of our cultivated plants, domestic animals, and has even hinted at human improvement; through its various applied forms it has made possible a development and conservation of many valuable living resources.

Astronomy has assisted by providing us with accurate time, and helping our mariners, physicists, and map-makers in other ways.¹⁶

To-day the average expectation of life is more than fifty per cent greater than it was a century and a half ago. The infant mortality rate is but a fraction of what it then was and the death-rate has been practically halved. This has been made possible due to the discovery of germs and their control in many cases, the stupendous advances in medicine, bacteriology, surgery, sanitation, public health, and the use of antiseptics. Plagues, pestilences, famine and the like are almost unheard of in normal times; the adulteration of foods has been almost everywhere outlawed; deficient human elements necessary for life or vigor have been synthetically developed; dread diseases, infections, and growths have been conquered, or are well on the way to being conquered.

Science and invention have not been confined to the putting together of material forces in new ways, nor has discovery been confined to an understanding of the workings of physical nature. Quite as important, though much more recent, and far less effective to date, has been the application of scientific technique to social and human phenomena. The better understanding of human nature and human society has become one of the most important phases of scientific discovery. Among the contributions of the recently developed social sciences we must note the study of the nature and development of mind; the analysis of human nature, its modification and control; the analysis of social forces; its revelation of the nature of the crowd mind and its development and control; its analysis of public opinion and its formation, uses, and abuses. Social science has given us fairly accurate information on the question of population growth and its relation to resources, on man's relation to or determination by environment, on the origin and classification of races, and some information on the solution of race problems. Social science has helped us in discovering social origins of all kinds. It has demonstrated the purposes of government, the development of different types and the factors responsible, evaluation of different types and the improvement of government with a suggestion of agencies to be employed. It has been mainly responsible for social and labor legislation. It has provided us with a pragmatic ethics and assisted us in applying it to the different departments of life; it has thrown a vast amount of

¹⁶ M. E. Haggerty, *op. cit.*, p. 258, calls attention to what would exist if we could imagine the result of eliminating science and its achievements from our modern life.

light on criminals, their treatment and prevention, and on the elements of public right. It has assisted us in the problems of mental pathology, the testing of intelligence, and the adjustment of men to their tasks, or vice versa. It has demonstrated the technique of social change and how to utilize it. It has presented to us essential modifications of religion and the family.

Science has corrected our educational systems, reduced drudgery, multiplied the yield of labor, increased the time for leisure, removed fear from the world. It has given humanity power over its surroundings, and enhanced comfort and well-being. It has given us more time for reflection. It has given us more abundant life. It has, in brief, given us a tangible, intelligible, and within limits, a controllable world, in which we can have a certain measure of confidence, and peace, and understanding.

Many of these contributions of the past have had most unexpected and far-reaching results. Gunpowder made the peasant a match for the bravest knight, so that the latter could no longer trample him in safety. Hence it had a mighty levelling influence. Printing and paper made available for all what a few nobles and clergy had enjoyed, and tended indirectly to dispel the dogmas, illusions, and fictions whereby the commonalty had been duped and controlled. The compass made all the world available, encouraged the invention of means of transportation, led to discovery of continents, and eventually to the international division of labor. In time it will doubtless lead to a federation of the nations of the world. Thus science and invention have made innumerable and vastly important contributions to progress, and have demonstrated that they are agents which, if properly used, will insure progress in the future. As anthropological, ethnological, and archeological researches show, man has been utilizing science and invention, feebly and crudely, and quite ineffectively, at first, to be sure, for untold ages for making his important social changes, in building up his civilization, and acquiring that increasing mastery over nature and human nature which is synonymous with progress. They are the means whereby all accomplished changes have been effected, the means whereby man's action has become telic.

7. THE LIBERALISM OF THE SCIENTIFIC POINT OF VIEW

Science has made for the liberal or progressive attitude as we find it to-day. It has accustomed men to the idea of change. Continually it has

been making fundamental discoveries that have necessitated either the scrapping of old notions or their dissolving and recrystallization into a new theory. Realizing that everything is in a state of continual flux, scientific men take the attitude that the new, while strange, is not necessarily dangerous, but may be highly advantageous.

Science has tended also to eliminate the attitudes of humility, of resignation, and stoical endurance of men in the face of physical and social phenomena. It has freed the mind from ancient fatalism, from superstition, and unreason.

It has given us also the critical spirit, the boldness to question methods and appraise them from the point of view of their efficiency in producing desired results. It maintains this critical attitude toward earlier wisdoms and virtues, precedents, traditions, constitutions, and conventions so that hold-overs and shams disappear. It dissipates the illusions of nature and the errors of reasoning based on these illusions, and substitutes for them truths revealed by prolonged observation, experimentation, and reflection. It tries to eliminate idle speculation and web-spinning. It provides in men a growing receptivity to new interests and ideas of new needs.

It has demonstrated that cause and effect is the law which runs through the universe—a law which punishes those who violate it, but which gives magnificent returns to those who abide by it.

Like all liberals, the scientist looks forward to the future. The past is not nearly so interesting or so important as is the future. And in this future the spirit of truth is progressively coming into its own.¹⁷

8. THE STUMBLING BLOCKS IN THE WAY OF SCIENCE¹⁸

There are many difficulties in the way of accurately and adequately observing facts, and in the way of discussing or using such information. In the first place, the bias and subjectivity—the “personal equation”—of the observer, though he is trying hard to refrain from “doctoring” the results or making out a case, is a difficult element to handle. Inasmuch as scientific observers are human their class views, interests, ambitions, motives, or ingrained habits of thought bias both their observations and their deductions to such an extent that two honest men

¹⁷ In connection with this see W. C. Curtis, *Science and Human Affairs*, pp. 302-313.

¹⁸ In this connection see A. B. Wolfe, *Conservatism, Radicalism and Scientific Method*, pp. 220-251, for an excellent treatment.

will sometimes come to exactly opposite conclusions concerning the same problem.

Lack of understanding of the nature or purposes of science on the part of the common people prevents their assisting in scientific work, or contributing as they might to its support. Misled by bigoted leaders they damn it and even thwart it. Especially is this true when science seems to conflict with deep-seated religious beliefs or prejudices. Andrew D. White mentions, for example,¹⁹ the opposition to the use of anesthesia. The orthodox argument was that it was circumventing the divine plan of suffering or pain as a means of reminding fallen man of his sins. Happily, however, some one was able to prove scriptural support for anesthesia in the fact that when God created woman he caused a "deep sleep" to fall upon Adam before removing the rib. A third factor is the "monkey-chasing" legislators who see fit to sit as scientific and educational critics and authorities. A fourth obstacle is made up of those vested social and political interests, such as hereditary upper classes, "old families," municipal governments, and certain professions, who object to scientific effort, particularly in their own fields of life, because it would be likely in time to bring about change and unseat them.

9. SCIENCE AS A PROGRESS AGENT ²⁰

The idea of progress has been linked with science at every turn. In our study of the development of the progress idea in Chapters II and III we noted that it came into existence with the appearance of rationalism and the flowering of science in the eighteenth century. It was only as man became emancipated from dogma and superstition, grew in knowledge, and became aware of his powers as a manipulator of nature that he felt himself capable of progress. So Marvin, in correlating the idea of progress with the development of science, exclaims, "Progress is the offspring of science."²¹

Science, first of all, through its insight into natural processes and its well-developed technique, has given man a method of progress. As we have already seen, progress in the last analysis is mainly a problem of control. Science enables man to exercise this deliberate control over

¹⁹ *A History of Warfare of Science with Theology*, p. 127.

²⁰ For further reading on this point see I. Edman, *Human Traits*, pp. 407-416; H. W. Schneider, *Science and Social Progress*, pp. 26-27; J. Dewey, *Democracy and Education*, pp. 262-267.

²¹ F. S. Marvin, "Progress: The Idea and the Reality," *Contemporary Review*, Vol. 118, p. 235.

his own and nature's affairs. It is man's "quickest and easiest way of grasping the universe." To know the connection between causes and effects is to be able to regulate conditions so as to produce desirable effects and eliminate undesirable ones. The broader and more penetrating the knowledge of natural and social processes, the more extended become the limits of man's control. It indicates the constructive uses to which everything may be put. As man's power and control have increased he has taken courage and assumed an ever more aggressive attitude, for he now conceives of himself as a continuous creator. He looks back and sees that in the short space of three centuries man has changed in revolutionary fashion from a superstitious creature cowering before nature to a confident and vigorous master.

Secondly, man's faith is sustained by the innumerable and almost incomprehensible achievements of science—achievements that a few centuries ago were unimaginable. There is so much evidence to-day to show that man is controlling where he once was controlled. Progress has always followed the victories of science. The fruits of his control are everywhere evident, and have been science's keenest stimulus. It is the knowledge of the achievements of science that has demonstrated to men that they now have a capable tool and a technique for progress; it is this which has made men willing to assume the further responsibilities of progress. Science now furnishes the groundwork of a great rational faith in man's capacity for indefinite progress. In fact, so generally known have come to be these impressive achievements of science that the expectations of the unscientific outstrip the scientist's sober estimate of probabilities.

Thirdly, science has led men to look to the future instead of the past. In this progress also agrees and has its hope. Every new conquest has suggested many more not yet achieved, but within the range of human possibility. We feel that the past achievements are but a drop in the bucket as compared with what is still in store. Consequently we can face the future with the firm belief that science, if we will, can do away with evils once thought inevitable. We are beginning to think that most of the hindrances to a better world that exist at present can largely be remedied by a deeper knowledge of science. It has opened before us illimitable vistas of real progress towards a continually better human society. The services of science to progress have just begun.

It behooves the progressive to be a scientist, and the scientist to take seriously his great task. The scientific spirit must be deepened and diffused until it permeates everything like a soul, for progress offers new

and unprecedented motivation for man to mobilize all his energies and clear his title of conqueror. The instrument of progress is science itself, which has miraculously begun, is doing more, and may end by doing everything.

"Henceforth, as never before, progress is committed to the hands of the intellectuals and they must think harder, realizing to the full the responsibilities of their new leadership. Science in its largest sense is from this time forth to rule the world. The age of *laissez-faire* is ended and research, discovery, investigation, and invention, which have done so much already, must now take the helm and be our pioneers in this new era. In everything it is the expert who must say the final word. Thus our prime duty is to inventory and especially develop and devise every possible new way of fostering the spirit of original research in this new day that is now dawning upon the world, and in which it is the inestimable privilege of this generation to live. We can not too clearly realize or too often repeat that research is in the very center of the current of creative evolution and has the momentum of all the developmental urge behind it. Its spirit is to the new era what the Holy Ghost was to the early church.

"Man is only just starting his career as an investigator so that research is not only the apex of creative evolution and the highest vocation of man but is the greatest joy that life affords to mortals. He who reveals and teaches us to command more of the world without and within us is the chief benefactor of the race, the true prophet, priest and king in our day."²²

IO. SOCIAL SCIENCE AS A FACTOR IN PROGRESS

Science has concerned itself mainly with the control of the physical world. Hence most of the contributions of science of far-reaching significance to date have been the products of natural or physical science, as compared with social sciences.²³ Moreover it is the achievements of physical science that have caught the folk-imagination. When scientific achievement is mentioned to the people they think immediately of conquests made in the control of the physical world, including man as a physical organism; they think of the Panama Canal, or the 1632-foot span of the Bear Mountain suspension bridge, or the latest success in aerial navigation, or the transmission of photographs by telephone or radio, or the most recent mammoth locomotive, or they think of medical or surgical feats, such as the use of radium in cancer treatment, or the work of the Mayos or Carrel, or the conquest of yellow fever or

²² G. Stanley Hall, "The Message of the Zeitgeist," *Scientific Monthly*, Vol. 13, pp. 113, 116.

²³ Among the social sciences are usually included economics, psychology, political science, sociology, ethics, jurisprudence, and history.

leprosy. Rarely do they think of some achievement in social science. In fact, they know little or nothing of such a pursuit as social science. This is largely due to the fact that the achievements of social science have been neither so numerous nor so spectacular. This can be attributed to several factors. In the *first* place, the advance of the physical sciences has far outrun the development of the social sciences. Tangible external nature has always attracted man's attention more than the internal and psychical. It is no "happenstance" that astronomy was the first science. Then, too, the institutions and customs and other factors of the social environment have been accepted unthinkingly as part of the unchanging nature of things, while change and motion in physical nature are obvious and unavoidable. Thus the physical environment was discovered much earlier, and physical science is older and has been in effect much longer. In the *second* place, the social sciences have been the offshoots of philosophy and metaphysics, with their dialectical and logical methods. That also has retarded them in acquiring really scientific methods of investigation. *Thirdly*, until very recently, the social scientists were prone to use some parts of scientific method, but leave the most important parts untouched. They "generalized" and drew up "laws" which were too sweeping and speculative, and were based on very slender factual data. Then the speculative element, which was concerned with the way society had to or ought to behave under certain conditions, was entirely too prominent. This led the natural scientists to ridicule the pretensions of the social subjects to a scientific status. A *fourth* factor is the inability of the social sciences, except in a few rare instances, to carry on controlled experiments. Human beings, unlike the physical world, or the animals exclusive of man, are free and independent agents, masters of their own lives, and in no way submissible to test-tube or breeding-pen procedure, except with their own consent, which is rarely forthcoming. Hence the mechanisms and forces operative in society are controlled with much less success than mechanical forces and processes. Furthermore, social phenomena are so intricate and interrelated and involved that particular phenomena can only with difficulty be isolated for observation and experiment. Then, too, if experimentation were possible, it would be difficult due to the long periods of time required. Consequently social science, if successful, must become highly complicated in order to discern and allow for all the variables that must be considered in making any worthwhile observation. This sort of discovery process has been very slow in putting in its appearance.

There is, however, a crying need for scientific effort in all the social

sciences. Especially is this true in connection with social progress, which is, after all, a series of human and social problems rather than physical problems, problems of social control rather than physical control. The sciences occupied with the problem of human conduct and human control must be fostered in every way. We are to-day highly successful in producing wealth, but have done little to insure its proper distribution and use. We have permitted our churches, schools, law courts, governments, and other institutions to remain as they were in the pre-scientific and pre-democratic era, with the result that often they are poorly adjusted to the times. We have done much to produce good automobiles and good milch cows, but little or nothing to produce good human beings. We have done much to predict the weather, but almost nothing to predict revolutions. We have learned how to deal with the ills of individuals, but not with the ills of groups. Our social rules and regulations, our customs and standards, our dominant conceptions and attitudes, our institutions, are largely products of chance, hit-or-miss expedients for social emergencies, or survivals whose original value was long since lost. Of careful reflection and intelligent and scientific adjustment and construction there has been deplorably little. Until scientific methods become dominant and effective in social affairs, social control, and hence social progress, will be largely guesswork. The social sciences, as John Dewey puts it, need to trust more to positive energy, to intellectual competency, to competency of inquiry, discussion, reflection, and invention organized to take effect in action in directing social affairs.²⁴

It is gratifying, however, to note the rapidly growing host of those engaged in social research of all kinds, and the increasing popularity of the social sciences in educational institutions the world over. It is equally gratifying to note also that scientific methods peculiarly adapted to the problems of social science are becoming more and more widely used. These methods are the essential methods of scientific research, viz., observation, comparison, generalization, and verification, which have been so successful in the natural sciences, but these general principles are being modified and made fit for the special needs of social research. These new sciences are and will continue to supplement and tend to complete the imperfect structure of organized knowledge with a vast body of scientific knowledge characterized by special social reference and utility, data that actually have to do with the relations

²⁴ John Dewey, "The New Social Science," *New Republic*, Vol. 14, April 6, 1918.

that exist in so far as these are discernible. The concern of social science is to find out what particular changes are going on, how their consequences may be forecast, and through what further changes within our command they may be directed to the better of two possible results. For this we do not need lofty logical constructions, but methods of observing concrete changes. Scientific methodology is more and more supplanting dialectic and speculation at least among liberal, educated people.

Certain methods of fact-finding have been especially emphasized in recent years among the social sciences. Significant are the facts presented by history; *i.e.*, the available knowledge of all that has happened to the race in the past, and the processes through the operation of which man has everywhere come to be as he is. Here he gets an extensive record of social and human phenomena, carried on under all sorts of conditions and in all conceivable degrees. Through this the social scientist has been and is able to substantiate or correct his generalizations based on present observation.²⁵ For him who cares to examine history, the causes and effects involved in the events of the past can be noted. From these past experiences future events may be predicted within limits by the trained student. Full of promise also are statistical methods of observation, record, and analysis, now being rapidly introduced and refined, by means of which these numerical data regarding various social phenomena are being collected, recorded, and utilized, both in the establishment of facts and general social laws and in the treatment of many particular problems. A special phase of the statistical method that social scientists are now beginning to utilize is the case method, though, to be sure the social researchers use it with necessary modifications. Individuals, families, neighborhoods, and communities are subjected to social case analysis, which consists of isolating and studying the various aspects of the particular case, then as rapidly and widely as possible making comparisons of case with case, finally perceiving and recording the recurrence of uniformities of pattern or type.²⁶ Most recently we have had suggested the social psychological

²⁵ J. O. Hertzler, "The Sociological Uses of History," *American Journal of Sociology*, Vol. 31; pp. 173-198.

²⁶ See F. H. Giddings, *The Scientific Study of Human Society*, Ch. VI; S. A. Queen, "Some Possible Sociological Uses of the Case-Work Method," *Journal of Applied Sociology*, Vol. 9, pp. 322-326; E. F. Young, "The Scientific Study of Social Case Records," *Journal of Applied Sociology*, Vol. 9, p. 283-289; G. A. Lundberg, "Case Work and the Statistical Method," *Social Forces*, Vol. 5, pp. 61-65; E. W. Burgess, "Statistical and Case Study Methods of Social Research," *Sociology and Social Research*, Nov.-Dec., 1927.

method.²⁷ This consists of social psychological observation and behaviorist analysis of mainly contemporary group phenomena, especially group mechanisms, since the group is the source of all necessary social data, with the greatest degree of objectivity possible. This has produced much new understanding of heretofore decidedly misunderstood social phenomena.

It is well to note though that no matter how rigorous the technique of social investigation which is evolved, we can never have "laws" in the sense in which that word is used in the natural sciences. The best we can hope for are notions which are more thoroughly experimental, and which will give us in place of the uniformities of the exact sciences, trends or tendencies of social behavior which will form the basis of our real social science.

Under the sway of methods such as these the social sciences are in transition, and most of them are becoming genuinely scientific and experimental. With these changes each has changed its emphasis. Once, for example, psychology dealt with the soul; later with mental faculties; then with states of consciousness; and now psychology is the name of the science that deals with behavior that is observed, experimented with, and, within limits, controlled. Most of the other social sciences have experienced a like shift of emphasis.

It is entirely conceivable that in a short time the products of social, ethical, economic, psychological, and political science will bear favorable comparison with the fruits of present scientific investigation in the physical realms. "There seems to be no limit to the achievement which the human race can reach by applying to all fields of behavior the methods of precise investigation and formulation that have accomplished so much in the physical sciences."²⁸ In fact, it is already true that there is hardly a political, or economic, or social problem of our time which the light of science could not illuminate, and which the men of science could not solve.

II. SCIENCE AND THE FUTURE

Even though the achievements of science in general loom up before us in such a stupendous way, we must remember that science is still in its infancy. Far from completing its conquest of nature, it has barely

²⁷ See E. C. Lindeman, *Social Discovery*.

²⁸ H. Neumann, "Science Teaching: Ethical Values and Limitations," *Educational Review*, Vol. 65, p. 228.

begun. The discipline of thought and the methods that have carried humanity so far are destined to carry it still further. We have not decades, not centuries, not merely thousands of years before us; but, as astronomy assures us, in all probability we have millions of years of earthly destiny to realize. A practically interminable series of ages, apart from special catastrophes, open out for further exploration and adventure. And yet consider what has been done in but a few thousand years through scientific thought and achievement. And in spite of the fact that scientific endeavor has not been greatly encouraged by the acknowledged rulers and leaders of mankind, that no provision for research has been made in any large way, and that actually many obstacles have been laid in its way by the public under the inspiration of its leaders, religious and otherwise. What will it be when we actively promote scientific research? Who can set bounds to what may yet be achieved? What will the eons on eons before us bring to mankind in the way of power? We can barely foreshadow things that are too vast to grasp; things that even the most luxuriant imagination of present men can barely compass. There is no marvel that we cannot expect to see issuing from the scientist's closet. The impossible is only impossible now. To-day we can face the unknown with the strong conviction that mankind will ultimately comprehend much that has seemed unknowable. The possibilities of science for the future defy all estimate or prophecy.²⁹

Already man has discovered the existence of stores of energy so vast that they stagger the imagination. It is true that our physicists have not learned to exploit these inexhaustible sources of power, but that is only a question of time. There is, for example, radioactivity and all that it implies, and the conversion of sunlight into electricity. There is also the larger thing, atomic energy. These new sources of energy when tapped will supersede the old. Steam and the internal combustion engine, which have, with electricity, within one century revolutionized the world, will become as obsolete as canoes burnt out of tree trunks, and their machines will only find places in museums.

An inconoclastic discovery whereby sunlight can be converted into electricity may some day break upon the world from some laboratory. And what revolutionary effects such a discovery would have!³⁰ The

²⁹ "For those who come after us, if not for ourselves, the life that now is will possess greater possibilities than those ascribed in the past to a life beyond the grave." W. C. Curtis, *Science and Human Affairs*, p. 9.

³⁰ See H. F. Wyatt, "The Race," *Nineteenth Century*, Vol. 87, p. 373.

possibilities of atomic energy are even more astonishing and revolutionary.⁸¹

It is possible that other planets, nay, other systems, may yet be brought within range of human control to an extent sufficient to supply substitutes for the failing of our central luminary body, the sun. Such speculations as these may be daring, but they do not exceed the bounds of reasonable probabilities. They open up vistas in which the hope of progress may legitimately expand.

12. THE MORAL RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE USES OF SCIENCE

Science in recent years, particularly since the war, has been much blamed for its non-moral, indifferent attitude toward human welfare, and its willingness to lend its marvellous resources to the forces of degeneration and destruction. New inventions have been as fruitful in producing more and more effective ways of destroying the life and work of man as they have in protecting and promoting them. "Science, the indictment reads, shows the race how to commit suicide, how to ruin and wreck the structure of civilization so slowly and laboriously erected in the course of the ages."⁸² But in any consideration of science as an agent of progress it must be borne in mind that it is and always will be only an explanation of phenomena and a technique for their utilization; not a force in itself, but a liberator and utilizer of forces, merely an instrumentality, a tool, something wholly within the realm of means, not ends. And a tool in itself accomplishes nothing, is incapable of either good or bad. As such, science is a mute, impartial and unmoral agent or machine, capable of being put to any use that the wit of man devises. It has no conception of values. The vast powers, the command of energy transcending conception which it gives, is the servant of whatever aims men choose, making it a tremendous power for good or evil. The same scientific training equips men for the discovery of an anæsthetic as for some poison gas, the production of the most deadly explosives as of the most effective soil fertilizers. The wireless telegraph lends itself as readily to signalling the position of a prospective victim to a submarine as it does to appealing for help for a vessel afire. Science makes any action more effective. The moral responsibility for the uses of science rests not upon science, but upon

⁸¹ Wyatt, "The Race," *Nineteenth Century*, Vol. 87, pp. 368-370. For various other magnificent anticipations of various possibilities in motive power, engineering and social effects see this remarkable article (pp. 367-376).

⁸² V. S. Yarros, "Remaking of Minds and Morals," *Open Court*, Vol. 36, p. 337.

the men who direct its employment. It itself is morally indifferent. It tells us how, but not about fundamental rightness or wrongness.³³ Science is a power which is dangerous to the good when wielded by the evilly disposed or the ignorant, but dangerous to entrenched evil and incompetence when wielded by men of social ideals. The lines of its investigations will depend on what the individual or group wants to know, and how it will be used depends upon the standards, desires, and habits of the individual, and the traditions and ideals of the group.

In many respects mankind has proved itself unworthy of the gifts placed at its disposal. Science has been used for destructive purposes to such an extent that misery is everywhere at hand and danger enshrouds the future. Science has made possible much of the recent "scientific" warfare, with its resultant train of evils. The advance of aviation coupled with that of chemistry, menaces with ruin in the next war the lives and the abodes of all the peoples involved. Submarines and flying torpedoes are another instance, as are also the guns capable of shooting thirty miles or more, and the battleships which are floating fortresses, or the bombs capable of laying waste a whole countryside. Machines traversing the air more swiftly than bullets, machines able to emit waves of force capable of blasting cities and destroying entire populations, are but examples of the terrors which the future of science offers.

"It is the men and women in science who invent weapons and instruments of destruction, and they do so, first, because they are not mere or pure scientists, but nationalists, patriots, citizens or subjects as well, and they are told that patriotism demands of them loyal performance of such functions as "the State" may assign to them, and, in the second place because it is a fact that any weapon is utilizable in defensive as well as in offensive operations. The weapon itself is not criminal; the men who order its use may be criminal—or imbecile. Chemical warfare is horrible, but it may be resorted to, of course, to punish and repel brutal aggressors, enemies of human peace and happiness. The men of science cannot know how their inventions will be used. They may even be misled and duped by cunning politicians and diplomats in a given case and made to believe that they are rendering laudable patriotic and humanitarian service, when, by ingenious inventions, they are helping to win a particular war."³⁴

Due to the lack of positive humanitarian direction, science has intensified and even created new social evils, in addition to war, which squander life shamefully. It has made sexual immorality and other

³³ See M. C. Otto, *Things and Ideals*, p. 181.

³⁴ V. S. Yarros, *op. cit.*, p. 338.

vices less dangerous of consequences. Its product, the machine, has not assured enjoyment, contentment, and peace, but worry and discontent, artificial needs and unreal satisfactions, class and international war; it has mechanized and materialized man, and subjected him to a vicious and heartless exploitation; tools have also allowed modern science to vastly increase the possibilities of human hurt and ill health. The diseases and deaths from the manufacture of phosphorus matches are a single example of additional health perils. It is entirely possible that science misapplied may cause to vanish all the garnered products of centuries of endeavor, art and literature, laws and ethics, together with that acquaintance with the physical processes of the universe which is the boast of our day. Science may not only destroy civilization but itself.

In the opinion of those most qualified to speak, science has not yet assumed, or been accorded, that part in the affairs of mankind which it is fitted to play, and must play if the world is to derive benefit rather than destruction from its onward march. The discovery of new ways of utilizing the resources of Nature is admirable as far as it goes, but in itself it is of trivial importance compared with the manner in which this information and technique is utilized. The function of science is human amelioration, and the continual production of a better and safer and happier world, which only is of real importance. If it does not do this there is no justification for its existence. At the heart of science's task is the problem of life in its essentially human aspects. The world of formulæ and machine dare not forget man and his world. If science does, then life degenerates into an impotent and fatalistic waiting for another world, or it becomes a strictly materialistic and sensual civilization. If science does not help unfold this better life it is not progressive, but the reverse; it is prostituting itself to baseness, and unavoidable brutality.⁸⁵

We cannot get the better world by mere extension of scientific conquests without thought of ends, especially the moral quality of ends. If science is to be used for progressive purposes, the activities of the scientists must be disciplined by strict ethical considerations; the personnel must be socialized, be filled with the progressive spirit, inspired with humanitarian ideals rather than egoistic or materialistic desires.

Since the attitude of science is influenced by public opinion, this

⁸⁵ "The real problem which dominates all others is how to place knowledge in power, and how to displace the ignorant self-seekers whose blind egotism is ruining the world." H. F. Wyatt, *op. cit.*, p. 866.

means in the last analysis that society itself must want to escape destruction and to apply scientific discoveries constructively and ethically instead of destructively and selfishly. The group must have the moral courage to insist that all the facts that are coming to light about the disordered social life of to-day, due to the misapplications of science or any other element, are acted upon by its scientists in the interests of general well-being.

Above all else the average scientist must acquire or be given a much broader social perspective than he now has. The fundamentals of ethics, including the nature of social responsibility, group solidarity, and the part of social ideals must be part of his training. A greater contact, coöperation, and frank discussion of problems between the scientists in different fields, especially between the natural and social scientists, is also highly desirable and necessary. The scientist must go beyond the formula and the process to the longtime human and social effect.³⁶

The findings of the sciences, even the social sciences, constitute only a partial instrumentality in progress, however. They only provide the means. What is needed are patterns for the whole of life, ideals, or ends, to follow or approximate by means of the sciences. These are the subject of the second chapter hence.

QUESTIONS AND PROBLEMS

1. G. Stanley Hall once wrote, "As man is the highest and best and as mind is the best thing in him, so research is the supreme function of the mind, the true heir of the kingdom and of all the promises." What did he mean?
2. What is the difference between research and dialectic as means of determining truth? Has dialectic no place in progress?
3. Show how one scientific fact leads to another. (F. S. Marvin, *The Century of Hope*, pp. 238-262.)
4. To what extent can inventions be encouraged by awards and rewards?
5. Does science discover final truths? What is its significance?
6. Professor W. C. Curtis says (*Science and Human Affairs*, p. 291), "Science is obliged to exploit its material triumphs in order to gain support in its combat with the idols of the past." Discuss.
7. What is meant by scientific skepticism? What is its value? (See Curtis, pp. 302-308.)
8. Why are not all scientists liberal?
9. Does science at present aim at progress?
10. What can you say of social science as a progress agent in the future?

³⁶ The reader is urged to peruse Prof. M. C. Otto's chapters on "Science and the Higher Life" in his *Things and Ideals*, pp. 156-223.

11. List all the vicissitudes of science that you can think of.
12. Has science in the past been used for the best ends from the point of view of progress? (Read G. T. W. Patrick, "The Next Step in Applied Science," *Scientific Monthly*, Vol. 8, pp. 118-128, or *Psychology of Social Reconstruction*, pp. 240-253.)
13. George Sarton said, "The man of science is great only to the extent of his devotion not simply to truth, but to other men." Discuss.
14. What are the forces that will cause science to be used solely for ethical ends?

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CHAPTER XI

THE AGENTS OF PROGRESS: EXCEPTIONAL INDIVIDUALS

I. THE SIGNIFICANCE OF EXCEPTIONAL MEN IN HISTORY

THINGS are the pawns of men. Man has always been the active agent in any social change, in the sense that none of these social changes could take place without man. Particularly all deliberate change must be universally attributed to the thought and action of individuals by whom it is impressed on the mass. But these changes have not come indiscriminately from any or all individuals of the group. For the mass, in the main, resists change, abhors new ideas, and constitutes itself the champion of the old.¹ Furthermore, it is true to-day, and it has also been true all through history, that not all members of a group are on a par as possible contributors to life. In any group there will be geniuses, men of capacity, and others, again, who are ordinary, or even below the average in general capacity or social productive power. While it is conceivable that the exceptional men would have been unproductive without the ordinary men, yet they, though relatively few in number, have actually been the individuals responsible for the great changes and achievements of history. Their products—material, social, spiritual, and ideal—are among the most significant factors in the development of civilization. As Ward has it:

“Even a cursory glance of human history reveals the fact that there are immense differences among men. . . . Human achievement has been the work of a very small number of individuals. Whatever the great mass may have done in the way of preserving, perpetuating, and multiplying copies—in a word, through imitation—the number who originate and invent, who investigate and discover, is surpassingly small. And yet it is these that are the proper agents of civilization. If we combine all departments of achievement and embrace all time, the aggregate number of these agents is of course considerable, yet it forms a very small fraction of the entire human race. But the social value of these few agents must not be underestimated.

¹J. M. Gillette, *The Conservation of Talent through Utilization*, *Scientific Monthly*, Vol. 1, p. 153.

If it is foolish to worship them as heroes, it is equally unwise to ignore their true significance in the history of the world.”*

Carlyle comes to an equally significant though more extravagant conclusion when he says :

“The history of what man has accomplished in this world is at bottom the history of the great men who have worked here. They were the leaders of men, these great ones, the modelers, patterns, and in a wide sense creators, of whatsoever the general mass of men contrived to do or to attain; all things that we see standing accomplished in the world are properly the outer material result, the practical realization and embodiment of thoughts that dwelt in the great men sent into the world; . . . no time need have gone to ruin; could it have found a man great enough, a man wise and good enough; wisdom to discern truly what the time wanted, valor to lead it on the right road thither; these are the salvation of any time.”*

Civilization is, as it were, an inverted pyramid that rests on the apex, which is the exceptional men. The instruments and content of our present civilization and the particular direction of our development are due to the herculean efforts of individuals, formers and reformers.

2. WHO AND WHAT ARE EXCEPTIONAL MEN?

Among the exceptional men we include the great inventors and scientists, the great political thinkers and leaders, the prophets and reformers, the artists and poets, the moralists, philosophers, and religious thinkers, and above all, the idealists. These, of course, are all relatively scarce. They are the men and women who chart the course of human life, and devise the means of moving men in this course, who help mankind out in its emergencies, in brief, the men who achieve or are responsible for the achievement. They are the men with great intelligence—at least along certain lines. They are the discoverers, the originators, the initiators, the people with wider vision along one line or another, men active in effort, eager for achievement. They are above the scope of mere imitation and absorption with the current social products; the traditional, the accepted, and established become for them an object of skepticism and inquiry, and hence of reconstructive activity. They are the people of foresight and creative imagination—a combination of imagination and reason; they are intuitive and see clearly what average men comprehend dimly, if at all; they are the

* Lester F. Ward, *Applied Sociology*, Ginn & Co., p. 132.

* Thomas Carlyle, *Heroes and Hero-Worship*, Lecture I.

coördinators of thought and activity, the formers of new combinations of facts and details to take care of new situations; they feel new human possibilities. Whether in thought or in practical life, they are able to know and to discern universal values; theirs are personalities lit by contact with these universal goods. They have a superior consciousness of truth, and are means of making truth available to their fellows. They are men of great hope and faith, great and sincere convictions, great disinterestedness; they envy not, they seek not their own, they think no evil. They represent intelligence, toil, wisdom, love, faith, supreme human experience.

The exceptional man, even though rare, is not however, something unique, a biological sport or mutation, a miracle, a transcendent creature apart from the rest of human beings. He is one of us, part of the world order, only certain qualities are more pronounced in him than in average men.⁴ The difference between normal capacity, talent, and genius is largely one of degree. If even normal capacity under average conditions were developed along the line of its major manifestation, it might develop into talent and even genius. Conditions have been such that many a great man has never developed nor been discovered.

3. EXCEPTIONAL MEN AS AGENTS OF PROGRESS

Every progressive movement in the past has been in subjection to an impulse from without. Never does the impulse spring from the race itself. This impulse comes from the exceptional individual.⁵ Huxley, in a letter to Kingsley, 1863, said: "The advance of mankind has everywhere depended upon the production of men of genius." All progress comes from individuals, and all resistance to progress from the mob. As Clifford Howard puts it, "The history of human progress is but the world's commentary upon the gospel of the Individual." All the views, discoveries, and inventions that have contributed to progress are the products of exceptional men. The exceptional men thus have a decidedly important and indispensable function to perform. They are the creative and constructive agents, the causes of achievement, the initiators of all new movements, and, as in the past, so in the future, they will play a vital part in progress. In fact, an imperative condition of the continuance of progress is a succession of exceptional

⁴ Gillette, *op. cit.*, *Scientific Monthly*, Vol. 1, p. 151; C. H. Cooley, *Social Process*, p. 17.

⁵ See G. H. Bonner, *Progress*, *Nineteenth Century*, Vol. 97, pp. 10-19.

men. "We may conclude, therefore, that if society is to be improved and if the lives of the great body of human beings are to be endowed with more and more blessings, material and spiritual, we must look to the men of talent, the men of achievement, and to them alone, for the initiation of these results." ⁶ *They are the instruments that both develop and utilize properly for progressive purposes, all the other agents of progress.* The future is, and always has been, in their hands. They are the rare people who can achieve practically anything they aim at. Therefore, if progress is desirable, the talent by means of which that progress is secured is also valuable and necessary.

4. LEADERSHIP

A significant type among the exceptional men are those known as leaders, and they play a very important part in progress. For they are the ones who shape group behavior. Most men are mere imitators, merely followers, dependent upon leaders for the behavior changes they make as social situations change. "Group behavior is almost always a matter of following a leader. In other words, the method used by human groups to adjust themselves to new situations, especially when these situations are complex and difficult, is to copy the action-patterns, proposed or illustrated, by the relatively few individuals who are the leaders of the group." ⁷

The type of social change which occurs is thus a reflection of the type of leadership which prevails, for, after all, the leaders direct the processes of social control, as they direct most of the other social processes. Thus it follows that whatsoever is achieved in the way of progress is the direct result of a type of leadership.⁸

It depends upon the production of leaders—of men possessing common sense, initiative, daring, enthusiasm, creative and constructive power, but also at the same time, men with discipline, flexibility, poise, patience, great human and social loyalty, and devotion and understanding. These constructive and reasonable leaders need to know how to appeal to the best instead of the worst elements in human nature, and also not to expect miracles, but to know how to act in conformity with scientific evolutionary principles.

The most difficult leadership task of all is to get the plain man

⁶ Gillette, *op. cit.*, p. 154.

⁷ C. A. Ellwood, *Psychology of Human Society*, D. Appleton & Co., p. 335.

⁸ E. S. Bogardus, *Fundamentals of Social Psychology*, p. 457.

actually to follow the leader through to the new thing. The plain man is not so readily moved. In the past he has boycotted reform, as he has boycotted philosophy and idealism. Furthermore, he resents an air of superiority or arrogance. And the plain men are to-day strong enough and numerous enough to refuse their consent to the leader. Hence, the leaders must beware of intellectual arrogance or tactless claims to superiority and privilege. "They can only mold and make society by winning its sympathy, affection and confidence." Thus they are first of all educators, and should act as competent educators do. Coercion, fanaticism, supercilious airs, contempt for the led must be entirely absent. That the ideal combination of leadership essentials in single individuals is not numerous is a patent fact.

5. THE PROPORTIONATE NUMBER OF EXCEPTIONAL MEN

The approximate number of exceptional men in a given unit of population is very difficult to determine. Nor is it likely that any two given units would furnish the same percentage. Yet it is well to know at least whether they are generally numerous or scarce.

Among the earlier estimates of talent, still thought of as highly reliable, is the study by Sir Francis Galton entitled *Hereditary Genius* (1869) in which he made a computation of the number of men of eminence in the British Isles. His studies were based respectively upon a catalogue, *Men of the Times*, a special obituary list published by *The Times*, in 1868, and a study of older obituaries. According to his estimate he found in turn 250, 238, and 250 eminent men per 1,000,000 male adults. On the basis of this he stated, "When I speak of an eminent man, I mean one who has achieved a position that is attained by only 250 persons in each million of men, or by one person in each 4,000."

Lester F. Ward in his *Applied Sociology* discusses at length Odin's study, which shows that the number of eminent men in France and French regions from 1300 to 1825 varied a great deal for different parts, as, for example, Paris with 123 per 100,000 and Geneva with 196. Freeman says⁹ that leadership in the professions, in business and in larger political life" is confined to the upper five or ten per cent, and Cattell commenting on this states, "I should prefer to guess that nine-tenths of the leaders would be placed by our tests in this group." Roger W. Babson, the eminent statistician, reports that 2 per cent of

⁹ *The Century Magazine*, December, 1923.

the population are responsible for all our "progress," that they control and use the other 98 per cent, who are mere ciphers.

Among recent guesses, that of Professor F. H. Giddings is probably the most reliable. He says: "All accumulations and controls of societal energy are generated in grades A and B. They carry the entire load of constructive societal work (not of supervised toil). All progress is their achievement. And it is probably true, as tests of more than one sort have indicated, that not more than $4\frac{1}{2}$ per cent of our total population (described as Grade A) is capable of discovery or creative activity, and that not more than 15 per cent (Grade A plus B) is capable of leadership."¹⁰

While these data demonstrate that no accurate figure can be given, they also demonstrate that exceptional men are rare, and that it is probably their scarcity which makes them so valuable.

6. TO WHAT DO WE OWE EXCEPTIONAL MEN?

Galton in the above mentioned book maintains that that rare combination of capacity and zeal which he calls genius is entirely the product of hereditary factors; that genius is omnipotent and nothing can prevent or affect its development. Galton's disciple, Professor Karl Pearson, agrees with him in this. For them exceptional men are "born, not made." Over against these we have most of those who have thought and observed on this subject contending that genius and talent, like all other forms of human ability, are also the product of circumstances. Lester F. Ward at the other extreme feels that by far the larger part of the potential genius of mankind to-day remains undeveloped due to inadequate conditions for drawing it out. So important does he consider the social and physical environment that he devotes eighty-five pages (pp. 147-232) of his *Applied Sociology* to the great work of Odin¹¹ who considers in detail the effects of the physical, ethnological, religious, local, economic, social, and educational environment upon the production of certain kinds of genius.

Exceptional men are determined in a rude way by heredity. The potential ability has to be there to begin with. You cannot make an oak tree out of a cabbage. But this capacity is not so omnipotent that

¹⁰ F. H. Giddings, *Scientific Study of Human Society*, University of North Carolina Press, p. 206. For other studies on the number of eminent men see J. McKeen Cattell, *American Men of Science*, 2nd ed., p. 537.

¹¹ *Genèse des grands hommes, gens de lettres français modernes*, par A. Odin, Tome premier, Paris, 1895; Tome second, Lausanne, 1895.

it can develop in spite of opposing forces or without favorable circumstances. "In other words," as Gillette says, "it is a product of all the factors at work in its being and environment, and the internal can not manifest itself or its powers without the presence of the external. Modify the external factors to a perceptible degree and the individual is modified to the same degree." (p. 155) J. McKeen Cattell on the basis of his study of one thousand "American Men of Science" concludes that:

"The inequality in the production of scientific men in different parts of the country seems to be a forcible argument against the view of Dr. Galton and Prof. Pearson that scientific performance is almost exclusively due to heredity. It is unlikely that there are such differences in family stocks as would lead one part of the country to produce a hundred times as many scientific men as other parts. The negroes may have a racial disqualification, but even this is not proved. The main factors in producing scientific and other forms of intellectual performance seem to be density of population, wealth, opportunity, institutions and social traditions and ideals. All these may be ultimately due to race, but, given the existing race, the scientific productivity of the nation can be increased in quantity, though not in quality, almost to the extent we wish to increase it.

"If scientific ability were innate, each tending to reach his level in spite of environment, then a potentially great man of science would become such wherever born, and we might expect a favorable environment to produce mediocre men but not great men. But this argument is answered by the small number of scientific men from certain regions of the country. Differences in stock can scarcely be great enough to account for this; it seems to be due to circumstances."²²

7. THE RELATION OF EXCEPTIONAL MEN TO THEIR AGE

The exceptional man is a product of his age and is bound up with its life. Moses, Socrates, Jesus, the Cæsars, Bacon, Copernicus, Galileo, Napoleon, Lincoln, and the others, did not come to their several peoples and times or their several departments of life at random, independently of conditions. Each came "in the fullness of time." Each was the product of a period of social gestation when various movements, ideals, and other machinery of life were coming into existence and making the great man. Each was a sort of focusing point of the tendencies of their age along certain lines. Great men seem to sum up in their own personality and activity the striking tendencies of their age, and perform offices which are of consequence to it. They are not arbitrary

²² J. McKeen Cattell, *American Men of Science*, 2nd ed., pp. 553-554, 555.

or contingent existences, but the highly accomplished representatives which every people produce.

And yet, while exceptional men are products of their age, inextricably bound up with it, they are singular products of their own mental processes, each one able to lift himself partially above his age, in his own way and measure an epoch-maker, producing a new life not commensurable with the old life.

"He takes what was and so combines it anew as to produce what is to be.

"They [the exceptional men] profit by the geniuses that have gone before them; inheriting the best of the past. But they put out this inheritance at interest and get greater and more rapid returns than the average person. They compose a sort of apostolical succession, transmitting their superior knowledge on from generation to generation. It is also true that the genius can only work with the material he finds ready at hand; he must employ the language and methods of thought prevalent at his day, and can advance only a measurable distance beyond his contemporaries; it is that which makes him a genius. He penetrates a step or two beyond, and finds strange new meanings in what has been inherited."²³

It is also true that not all ages produce the same quality or quantity of exceptional men. Their production is a matter of the right time and the right conditions. There has doubtless been many an age in the history of a given people when most of those of great potential capacity remained undeveloped due to lack of need or opportunity. The background must challenge the exceptional man to draw him out of it. The old maxim "Great times produce great men" is true to a considerable extent. Times of ferment, of crisis, produce the great thinkers and leaders.

8. THE SOCIAL IDEALISTS

A group of exceptional men of special significance in our study are the social idealists. These are the social inventors, the prophets, the seers, the announcers of new verities, the architects of new social states. They are men and women who have conceived the higher possibilities of human good, and who propose to eradicate the social and moral shortcomings of the present.

They are the independent spirits, pioneer thinkers, the objectors, dissenters, insurgents, iconoclasts, who refuse to be enmeshed absolutely in the confusions of their time. With intellects superior to the average intellect, a social perspective given only to a few, and a vision

²³ J. O. Hertzler, *The History of Utopian Thought* (Copyright, 1923, by The Macmillan Co.), p. 261. Reprinted by permission.

which enables them to peer decades and even centuries into the future. they proclaim ideals and states which are above the comprehension of the mass, and champion the causes for bringing these into being. They are of that advanced and uncompromising minority who lead the way to better things and keep alive the demand for them. They are the standard bearers of man's ideals and aspirations. While average men merely follow the beaten track, and not without a great deal of delay and lingering by the wayside, the idealists, true intellectual pioneers, cut a rough path through the wilderness of the future and gladly follow it through however lonely and untrodden ways.¹⁴ Of course, the path will be changed and improved as others traverse it, but the idealist originally laid it out because others could not and would not do it, nor did they see why it should be done.

Sometimes after they have "sized up" a particular problem or situation they are forced to advocate a marked modification or even the destruction of an inefficient and time-worn institution. But they do this without malice, simply that a new and better one may be built in its stead. They are really the conceivers of constructive and progressive possibilities.

As a result of their great love of humanity they advocate their changes, firm in the faith that the general well-being can only be secured by such a pursuit. They feel assured that they are on the side of righteousness and truth (and history has usually proven this claim). They want a better world, not for themselves, but for others, for all. They are men who, having beheld the beauties of the ideal world (which eventually is the real), care no more for anything except to make the actual world its true reflection. What they do is not for fame, it is not for wealth, it is not for any profit within the giving or the comprehension of their fellows. They are impelled by impersonal motives that are akin with the divine. Giving up all thought of self, they are willing to forego personal comfort and happiness and devote their lives to unthanked sacrifice and service, yes, if necessary, even willing to undergo persecution and death, in order to proclaim the ideal and guide the race toward its attainment. And, as Plato says, having enkindled within themselves the light of divine ideas, they help to enkindle that light in others, and by so doing lift up the whole world

¹⁴ "They see where others are blind, they hear where others are deaf. They point out profundities, complexities, simplicities, involutions, analogies, differences and dependencies where everything had seemed as plain as a pike staff." J. H. Robinson, *The Humanizing of Knowledge*, p. 17.

to constantly higher levels. They, in the end, rule the destinies of mankind, because they alone see the vision without which the people perish. Through their sacrifices and service they become greatest by being the least.¹⁵

9. THE REPUDIATION OF EXCEPTIONAL MEN BY THEIR CONTEMPORARIES

The story of society's treatment of its exceptional men constitutes a very sad chapter in the history of humanity. Society has given many of its benefactors small thanks for their pains. The innovator, the initiator, the theorist have ever been shunned and even condemned. Society in its thick-headed way has protected itself against them by any means that would serve. To-day we call them "cranks," "visionaries," "radicals," "heretics." In the past, even the recent past, indifference, derision, obloquy, scorn, denunciation, ostracism, persecution, even death, have been their reward.¹⁶ A Socrates may be given the hemlock, a Jesus may be crucified, an Hypatia may be stoned, a Savonarola, or a Bruno may be burned at the stake, a Harrington may be imprisoned until insanity and death overtake him, a Condorcet may be starved in a garret, a Lovejoy may be shot from ambush and killed, a Garrison may be mobbed and dragged through the streets, a Gandhi may be imprisoned and weakened almost to the point of death by confinement, suffragettes may be falsely accused, arrested, jailed, and mistreated by prison guards. The invention, the innovation, the ideal they advocate is so far superior to that which exists, that it criticizes the present condition. It runs counter to the current of established habit and sentiment. So intent are people on the maintenance of that which is that they frequently will not budge before facts, regardless of how clearly and forcibly they are presented. If that which is is crystallized into institutions, the task of the exceptional man is still more difficult. Hence all those whose slender intellects are so vigorously fortified by prejudice or perverted by propaganda, against all new, and therefore potentially disagreeable ideas, are full of resentment and horror. Therefore they protest, and if their protest is not effective, they seek to get rid of the cause of the innovation, the exceptional man.

¹⁵ For an extensive treatment of a special group of social idealists see the author's *The History of Utopian Thought*, especially pp. 258-263.

¹⁶ Lord Macaulay in his *Essay on Mackintosh* said: "The author of a great reformation is almost always unpopular in his own age. He generally passes his life in disquiet and danger." For the original statements along this line see *Matthew XIII. 57* and *Mark VI. 4*.

For this reason these exceptional men have never, or rarely, been called, nor has society been prepared to welcome them. It has never had any conscious need of them. They remain more or less impotent in their own age because their ideas are too far beyond the ready comprehension of the mass. But their inventions become incorporated into the matrix of thought and are passed down to a time when the need for which the invention had been devised becomes acute, when they are finally adopted. Thus in time, a century or a millennium later, the exceptional man gets his hearing and his cause may triumph. Their greatest influence is on distant posterity. After the lapse of centuries they produce more effect than they were able to do at the moment they promulgated their ideas.¹⁷

If our exceptional men had not been habitually disregarded, we should be immeasurably more civilized and farther advanced along the lines of social progress; we should have been enjoying for generations the advantages contributed by their suggested social inventions and innovations; we should have been preserved from many disadvantages and perils that we have suffered; we should be much closer to the time when man's inhumanity to man would be a thing of the past. But while we honor by statues and laud as saviors those whom a previous generation reviled, or stoned, or crucified, we continue to abuse the exceptional men of our own generation. The progressive must needs stop and ponder this situation.

IO. THE PRODUCTION AND CONSERVATION OF EXCEPTIONAL MEN ¹⁸

It is generally recognized that exceptional qualities in men exist in much larger measure than we have commonly believed. Biology teaches that genius is not limited to aristocracy, but that a great amount and variety of talent goes to waste among the masses. It is kindled at times, but is extinguished for want of opportunities for its proper manifestation and development. The Jeremiahs and Lincolns appear in spite of circumstances, but they are rare. Lester F. Ward points out that in all classes are born individuals of exceptional qualities, and all would manifest it if the obstacles now existing were removed, or opportunities offered for its development. He thinks that the amount could easily be increased a hundred times, and if women were taken into account,

¹⁷ For the details of the process whereby innovations are finally accepted see the writer's *The History of Utopian Thought*, pp. 268-278.

¹⁸ Prof. Gillette's article mentioned above is by far the best and most authoritative writing on this subject. It is recommended to the reader.

as they surely should, it might be multiplied by two hundred times, and incidentally the improved environmental conditions would raise the mental capacity of the average man. But with the increasingly complicated barriers and meshes of modern society, and in spite of the new opportunities, it is still difficult for genius that is not born right to "come into its own." H. G. Wells says: "England alone in the last three centuries must have produced scores of Newtons who never learned to read, hundreds of Daltons, Darwins, Bacons and Huxleys who died stunted in hovels. All the world over there must have been myriads of potential first-class investigators, splendid artists, creative minds, who never caught a gleam of inspiration or opportunity."

These exceptional qualities can be brought into fruition by the proper means. Inasmuch as exceptional men have such an indispensable creative and contributive function to perform, it behooves us to produce as many of them as we can. Progress will be accelerated to the degree that we increase the number of exceptional men.

The society that wishes competent men must find means of selecting them and training them in advance, before the situation arises in which they will be needed. It needs to study the biological, psychological, sociological, and ecological factors that unite to produce exceptional men, and then to develop these so as to multiply such men. In the past men have noted the conditions that favor the development of such men and likewise some of the obstacles to their appearance. These observations and studies offer valuable suggestions as to the methods of social control and social direction which will bring all these latent exceptional qualities into active operation. If we do not do this we are grossly wasteful and careless in the utilization of our dynamic progress agent. As Gillette says, "One of the problems of the proper conservation of talent consists in finding a method of discovering and releasing this valuable form of social energy." The statement of Rousseau that "the great souls can find their way alone" is not true. To neglect or ignore exceptional qualities is almost a criminal waste of gifts of nature to us. We cannot be thoughtlessly inattentive. Such qualities must be produced and conserved.

The first task is to find embryonic exceptional powers wherever they exist, whether it is in our primary, secondary, and preparatory schools, or in the factory, or elsewhere, for, as we have seen, they are scattered through all classes and sections of the community. This task falls upon the intelligence and character testers, as we now see the problem. While their work is still in an embryonic condition, mental

tests, moral tests, and special ability tests are being devised and perfected, a variety of highly useful experiments are being carried on, and a vast store of valuable information and experience is being accumulated which promises rich results in the near future.

Having discovered exceptional individuals in the rough, we should next put our opportunities for developing them to the best advantage. Fundamental, of course, is a vigorous stock of good physique and sound mentality, to furnish the basis for parentage from which capable offspring can develop. Our educational system ought to be, and in time may be, the primary factor in doing this, but its usefulness along this line at present is dubious.¹⁹ But an educational system is conceivable and attainable which familiarizes youth with all the fields of achievement, and which makes a choice possible; which is in harmony with individual intellectual proclivities and tastes. It should be a system which develops powerful interests which lead to concentration of attention and to activity, and also one which trains the individual to observe, to relate ideas, and to form conclusions readily.

The benefits resulting from economic achievement should be as widely distributed as possible among all classes. This includes ample means insuring freedom from care, economic security, leisure, and the wherewithal to supply the apparatus of research, or any other physical conditions necessary for the greatest contribution.²⁰

But providing this moral and financial recognition and the means of doing work is the very reverse of our procedure in the past. Robertson quotes from a letter of Kepler to his friend Moesten: "I supplicate you, if there is a situation at Tübingen, do what you can to obtain it for me, and let me know the prices of bread, wine and other necessities of life, for my wife is not accustomed to live on beans."²¹ The founder of comparative psychology, J. H. Fabre, all his life had his work stunted and crippled by poverty, and countless researches which he was the one person in the world qualified by exceptional abilities and experience to undertake had to remain unperformed because he never could afford the meager necessary equipment. A more equitable distribution of wealth and income, legal machinery for making available for the community some part of the great profits which often come with some particular invention, the control of monopoly, the reduction of

¹⁹ See Gillette, *op. cit.*, p. 163.

²⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 162.

²¹ T. B. Robertson, "The Cash Value of Scientific Research," *Scientific Monthly*, Vol. 1, p. 146.

the working day, the minimum wage, and the subsidizing of talent are suggested frequently as possible means. Important also is a stimulating environment and a life full of contacts with the great thoughts of the time, through travel, intelligent conversation, education, reading, observation of life with its vicissitudes, aspirations, problems, and toil, and facilities for social and intellectual intercourse. All these serve as incitements to development, they show possibilities, and inspire effort.²²

Significant also is a social position capable of producing a sense of self-respect, dignity, and reserve power which alone can inspire confidence in one's worth and in one's right to enter the lists in order to achieve.

By means such as these, we will in time conserve our exceptional abilities, or prevent them from being wasted on inferior tasks. When that time comes progress will move forward at an astonishing rate.

QUESTIONS AND PROBLEMS

1. Are all men equal contributors to progress? Why?
2. What are the factors producing exceptional ability at any given time?
3. Carlyle said, "Great men are not born among fools." What did he mean?
4. Why are some of the products of exceptional men not used in their own age?
5. What conclusions do you arrive at after consulting De Candolle's "causes" that favor the production of men of science in any century? (See Ward, *Applied Sociology*, p. 146.)
6. Give in outline form M. Odin's facts concerning the factors responsible for the appearance of great men in France. (Ward, *Applied Sociology*, pp. 147-221.)
7. Why must men usually be above the normal or level of the average to be productive of progress measures?
8. Schopenhauer said that every great thinker has had only one great thought, but his whole life barely sufficed to think it through fully to the end. As far as you know, what are the facts?
9. Is the voice of the people always the voice of God?
10. "Leaders of thought must match their day if they are to have any efficiency." Discuss.
11. "The great man is even more result than cause." To what extent is this true? Not true?
12. "The flourishing of the higher individualism is the indispensable condition of social progress." Is this inconsistent with democracy?
13. How can society determine whether the would-be reformer of its own generation is a tiresome and dangerous crank or a real social benefactor?

²² See Gillette, *op. cit.*, p. 163.

14. What do you think of the endowment of men who show exceptional abilities as we now endow institutions?

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CHAPTER XII

THE AGENTS OF PROGRESS: IDEALS AND PROGRAMS

I. THE NATURE OF IDEALS

JUST as the choicest products of a people are exceptional men, so the choicest products of exceptional men, from the point of view of progress, have been the social ideas they have given the world. The capacity of forming realizable ideals is a prerogative of the intellect arrived at the human stage. It is the presence of the ideal element in man that distinguishes him abruptly from the brute. "Man is certainly an animal that when he lives at all, he lives for ideals."¹ And yet ideals are a natural consequence of natural powers. They are natural powers, however, shot through with spiritual and eternal elements until they transcend themselves and become the exponents of that higher reality which causes men to push untiringly on to further and further attainment. It is ideals that leave men the promise of self-motivated advance. They are expressions of new human possibilities, projections of man's potentialities.

These ideals play a part in life and in progress the importance of which cannot be exaggerated, for they are improvement schemes that have a rare power of getting themselves realized eventually. Amidst continual social change and maladjustment the rare, discerning, socially-minded, thinking men seek a new center of social gravity, but not being instantly able to procure what will bring harmony and happiness, the imagination presents to them the world as it should be, or as they would like it to be. The ideals are the projections of unfilled desires, aspects of experience that have missed realization, profound phases of life that have been repressed by the hard world of fact. They are thus expressions of hopes, syntheses of what exceptional men conceive as good. These social ideals give us visions of a better society beyond the best that experience has yet encountered; they are invisible patterns, unpicturable pictures, of the better world, the reality that is to be; blue-prints of the Kingdom of God. Ideals transcend the existent situa-

¹ G. Santayana, *Winds of Doctrine*, p. 6.

tion or thing, and forecast and outline something more desirable, more worthy to be. They are something out yonder to be gone after; a prize to be sought; a victory to be won.

If the intellect is the supreme device to facilitate individual and social adjustment, and if the reason is the highest part of the intellect, then ideas and ideals deserve serious consideration, even from the most rigorous scientific point of view, because ideas and ideals are essentially the finest and highest products of intellect and reason, knowledge and science; they are the supreme adaptive mechanism of their respective eras. But ideals while intellectual creations, are at the same time suffused with feeling, and therefore their social efficacy is increased. They have become the indispensable instrument in bringing about any type of adaptation. While they are at times highly impracticable and full of illusions, they are nevertheless forces to be reckoned with.

2. IDEALS AND VALUES

Ideals are not dreams; they are really accumulations of values, qualitative judgments of the value of activities, institutions, ideas, groups, and persons; they represent something better. And, as Rufus M. Jones points out, when we think of a better we value, and when we value, we rise above the *is*, and aim at what *ought to be*; we introduce a new way of seeing and appraising the world; we discover significance and meaning now and not mere facts; we exhibit insight; we approve or disapprove.²

Men are capable of producing values; they do extend their world in ideal directions; they do realize that one type of life is better, that is, of more intrinsic worth than another, and that one way of acting will further life and promote the good better than another. They look before and after the forecast ends and goals of life which they feel to be good and which they wish to attain; they have the capacity to live by the vision of what is not yet in the world of facts. But all this is also a process of constructing ideals, for ideals are expressions of values; social ideals are the expressions of the highest social values.

3. IDEALS AS GOALS AND STANDARDS

These ideals, these blue-prints of the better world, tend to serve as objectives or goals as men reach out for the better, for they are the beacon lights as well as the blue-prints of the future. They serve

² Cf. M. Jones, *Fundamental Ends in Life*, pp. 126-127.

as bases of a more comprehensive social organization. However practiced or hard-headed men may be, they always work toward something; they prefer to steer a course, however crooked, rather than drift. After all, ideals are the only beacon lights of this sort that there are or ever have been.

Man has always utilized ideals as his standards also, for they have confronted him in thought and activity, not with that which is, but that which may be. Expressing the better, they have served as criteria by which actual conditions were judged. They provided norms by which his thought and action were measured. Plato, discussing this principle in a memorable passage, answers the contention that children should be taught things as they are, with a statement that they should be taught ideals, because if you teach them things as they are, they will have no measures of value. By means of ideals we have been able to ascertain the defectiveness, the abnormality, the perversion in existing institutions and conditions, and at the same time perfect standards to which conduct ought to approximate. "That which is always begs comparison with that which should be, and the discrepancy is obvious. A guiding star does not lose its value as a guide because it is never reached. The ideal is a guide as well as a goal. Therefore, while the actual may differ from the ideal, we know that the actual will not go far unless it has a high ideal set before it."³

The ideals have been working hypotheses, working standards, and this is essential to all purposive activity. The great discoveries, the reformations, the social revolutions, the declarations of independence, and the constitutions—all changes for the better—have been built on ideals.

It must not be forgotten, however, that not all ideals are sound or valuable. Many are the products and live in the minds of cranks, fanatics, and faddists, are unrealizable and noxious, and society with full justice ignores them. Among such are "back to nature," the cult of nakedness, "free love," vegetarianism, and many other "isms." The soundness of many ideals is evident to the intelligent and unprejudiced student of society; others again must stand the test of time. Our concern here is with those that have come down through the selective processes of the past and are rendering valuable social service, those recently conceived ones that are obviously good, and those which at present show no inherent absurdities or weaknesses. Where unsound ideals are followed the results will not be those here discussed. The

³ Hertzler, *op. cit.*, p. 277.

repudiation and elimination of such should be one of the tasks of every progressive.

4. IDEALS AS CONTROL FORCES

Plato, in his *Republic*, grasped the thought that man is controlled not only by what he sees and feels but by what he imagines as desirable. Ideals are such elements, mental patterns by which men control their own conduct. Man, being human and rational rather than mainly instinctive, is influenced by remote as well as immediate considerations. Due to the unique nature of ideals, they so grasp the minds of men and become part of their mental environment that for generations, and sometimes for centuries together, they direct the thoughts and purposes of the general mind; and they do so with a power so absolute that their presence is often not suspected, for they have insinuated themselves into the very dispositions of the men whom they control. They are newer and higher forms whereby men are controlled in harmony with the best of the future instead of the survivals of the past, which is what most social control elements are. An ideal such as the Kingdom of God, once understood, is as potent a means of controlling the average man as any doctrine of hell or eternal punishment. It is the ideals which man never fully attains that are the operative powers of his life and his most essential being. An aspiration, a hope, a vision is every bit as potent a control agency as a "Thou shalt not" or a fear.

5. THE PROCESS OF THE REALIZATION OF IDEALS

The acceptance of ideals is the ending of a long process. The idealist's thought has to go through a selective process first of all before it receives a place in social belief and usage. Very few ideals are immediately accepted. In fact, many, probably the majority, never receive currency. After the ideal has been launched, if it seems to have any possibilities at all, it is subjected to a critical discussion perhaps for generations and even centuries. This discussion is carried on by the thinking minority of the group, however, in the main, for the general run of men are usually hostile to any new idea. If the favorable judgments outweigh the unfavorable, it becomes part of the fabric of social thought, perhaps quite an unimportant part as far as the mass of the group are concerned.

If there is any good in an ideal it will show great vitality. For even though valuable ideals may be ridiculed and even rejected by the

masses, they do not wholly die. There is an enduring element about them which causes them to live on and on. When temporarily denied expression in the objective world, they become part of the stored-up intellectual material of society—stored in the memory of the élite or in their books and traditions. For ideals have this subtle quality which causes them, even though hidden from the many, to be esteemed and preserved by the few, the minority of thinking and scholarly men. In their possession they sleep for a season like hibernating animals, until conditions more favorable to their acceptance appear, but it is a fitful sleep.

In the meantime society is undergoing perpetual change; the existing institutions and other agencies of control are becoming inadequate, and the majority of men are beginning to search about for better means of meeting their needs. The thinking minority have not, however, been keeping their ideals hidden as in a safe-deposit box, but have been radiating them like a lighthouse distributing light. This has caused these ideals gradually to become part and parcel of the general thought of the time.

The stress and strain becomes acute; the accumulated stock of unused ideals is examined; the most suitable are accepted and put into practice, and may finally become an established institution. Thus the eventual adoption and carrying into effect comes with the unfolding of social needs. It is always the quest for relief which creates the demand for ideas and ideals, and is responsible for their being put into effect. But, of course, the recognition of the need may be speeded up.

All this may be an immensely time-consuming process taking centuries and even millenniums. It took twenty-two centuries for Plato's general eugenic ideal to be accepted by the élite, and still it has not been accepted by the rank and file. Jesus' moral and spiritual ideals were launched nineteen hundred years ago and, while they have been quite generally accepted as valuable, and many Western peoples do them lip service, the candid man must acknowledge that it will be centuries before Western life will be an externalization of them. On the other hand, there is a formidable array of ideals, once confidently thought illusions, the products of diseased brains, that after several generations or centuries have come into their own and are part of our life. Notable are universal suffrage; free, universal, and compulsory education; equality of the sexes; trial by jury; an unlicensed press; an independent judiciary; abolition of slavery; prohibition of the

manufacture and sale of intoxicating liquors; the reformatory treatment of offenders; freedom of religious worship; and the separation of church and state. History is a succession of realized ideals. The kind of civilization we are going to have in the next era is determined by the kinds of ideals prevailing in this one.

Therefore, who can say that ideals in general are fatuous—incapable of realization? After all, is it not a matter of the “fulness of time?” The visions and ideals laughed at and rejected by our ancestors, we point to with pride to-day. The new ideal is not necessarily absurd; it may have a place in the march of time. Is it so preposterous to offer ideals as agents of progress?

6. IDEALS AND PROGRESS

Philosophers and religious teachers have emphasized for ages that human progress depends upon ideas and ideals. To-day the weight which practical social reformers, moral and religious teachers, and educators have attached to social ideals, social standards, and social values shows itself to be justified both by history and recent practice, even though it is known that many other factors must enter into all practical efforts at social reconstruction. All the great and noble deeds of history which have made human life rich have been the outcome of the highest intent of true men to reach their ideals. Right ideals alone lead to the step ahead. No construction of a plan of social action, no scientific experiment, no progressive action of any sort can take place without at least a partially formed picture of what is to be; the ideal may not have definite outlines, but it embodies a conception of new combinations, something different, something better that is wanted.

So back of progress are conscious attempts to realize social ideals. The very capacity to progress rests upon being willing to trust to ideas and ideals—man’s highest intellectual products. There is no doubt that as the degree of individual development increases, and the group as a whole improves intellectually, ideals will acquire more definite shape and greater causative power. The revelation of what is, what can be, or what ought to be, renders possible, and even actually commences the modification of what is, the realization of what can be, or of what ought to be.⁴

⁴For an extensive discussion see Alfred Fouillée, *L'Evolutionisme des idées-forces*, Introduction.

When the individuals of a group are ruled largely by feeling, instinct, and circumstance, the successive modifications in social structure are determined by like factors. But as intelligence and will in the form of ideals come into play, the group rises above unconscious forces and becomes to that extent self-determining—determined by its own ideals which it postulates as ends, rather than by physical or chance elements. Society develops according to the nature of the factors that motivate or affect its individuals. If these individuals progress through consciously chosen means to definite ends, so must the society develop in the same manner.

Ideals are a potent factor in encouraging the progressive attitude among a people. They help to loosen the dead hand of the past, they liberate the individual from the idolatry of the familiar, from inveterate prejudice and provincialism and narrowness of spirit, and encourage that fearless groping and searching out after something better. In his thought, the individual under their influence develops a free mind, obtains a perspective, transcends the limits of the actual, and desires right social change, experimentation, and amelioration.

They are also effective as agents of progress because most men are beings that need a cause to work for, something to look up to, something to be loyal to, and if they have such a cause they will enthusiastically support it and strive in its behalf. It is merely a question of giving them the right, idealized cause. Thus ideals are not merely patterns of a world ahead; they are also efficient causes. By virtue of their emotional appeal they enlist the enthusiasm and the efforts of men, and through that become multipliers of their powers, and point the way to the best use of these powers. There is a potency about ideals that prompts men to make them real.

7. THE CHANGEABLENESS OF IDEALS

No ideals are perfect, or absolute, or final. No idealist is sufficiently intelligent or all-seeing to draw up ideals that are forever good. Our existing ideals are merely the best of the moment. All history and all experience confirms the observation that existing ideals merely mark a stage from which the further achieving of ideals becomes possible. New ideals always take the place of old. As soon as society has caught up with those of one era, or sometimes even before, the élite will have constructed another set, still farther ahead. If this was not true, ideals would outlive their original setting and purpose and become an

obstacle, for that which ceases to advance cannot long serve to encourage growth.

It is due to this changeableness of ideals that they constantly lead men onward and upward. They are a succession of goals that constantly recede, leading and wooing men on to progress.

8. THE VICISSITUDES OF IDEALS

There are different reasons why even the best ideals have to bide their time for acceptance. In the first place, every one can see that a large part of the ideals in currency at a given time are no good because they are the absurd products of cranks and fools, and invite society in an impossible direction. Even those ideals which at conception show every possibility of being excellent, suffer from being lumped with the nonsensical ones by the people at large. While the social sciences are doing much to enable us to determine fatuous ideals, the general public is not yet in a position to discriminate carefully. In the second place, even the best ideals are at first rough-hewn, and to a degree angular and unassimilable. They must first be dressed down and polished; whimsicalities, extravagances, and eccentricities must be removed. They must be squared with fact and reality. Another difficulty that constructive ideals experience is the fact that the general level of idealism of the rank and file is so far behind that of the exceptional man. It is a peculiarity of practically all ideals that they frequently, in fact, usually, are so far ahead of the thought level of their time that they are not comprehended, or are thought to be impracticable. Hence they are repudiated by a matter-of-fact world. People in general must be led up to the ideal by circumstance or by education before they properly appreciate it. In the fourth place, governing classes find that ideals may suggest changes that would impair their status. Hence they attempt to discountenance or weaken them by all the many and effective means at their disposal. Finally, in many cases the ideal seems to be so good, so much in advance of this sordid and imperfect world, as many people see it, that they despair and think it impossible of attainment. Thus the vicissitudes are a combination of external and subjective factors, though the latter predominate.

9. THE ADVISABILITY OF NOT PITCHING THE PRESENT STATEMENT OF IDEALS TOO HIGH

The reason so many excellent ideals have disappeared, or never been realized, or required so much time to get themselves realized is

that they have been pitched too high. If ideals are to be used for progressive purposes within a reasonable period of time, they must be rooted in reality, they must start with things as they are. At present the value of an ideal depends, in great part at least, upon its chances of acceptance and application.

If the ideals are posited by idealists who have had a limited social experience, a deficient scientific background, and an unrestrained and over-luxuriant imagination, the ideals are too far removed from the actual, too much of another world, an unreal and unrealizable world, and they lose their significance for social practice; they have little or no social directive force. There is too much of a chasm to bridge between that which is and that which is conceived of as desirable, and the mind of the average man cannot make the jump.⁵ "The ideas that you expect to disseminate and use as the basis of your reform may not be too far removed from the current thought of the time, nor may the discrepancy between what you want and what is be too great."⁶ The idealist dare not ignore nor misread the present; he should not lead either a morally or a socially isolated life which confines itself only to the future. He is most effective in progress if he takes a part in the struggles and efforts of his own period. For he wants his ideals to be more than Sunday consolation—not sentimental, impossible, and sterile in character. The ideal must take into consideration the immediately practicable; the idealist must start with what he finds and build up from that. The changes proposed must be continuous with the social processes that have brought society thus far on its way. It must be remembered that humanity can never transcend the conditions of its existence. Thus the ideal that is the most effective is the one that is the easiest for the common man to grasp, the one that leads humanity to take its next progressive step, not its tenth. Our idealism must be tempered by opportunism.

Finally, rational progressives must be willing to abandon or modify ideals that have been demonstrated to be wanting in the qualities that capture the imagination, convince the intellect, or are obviously unfitted for the use to which they were intended.

We are not, however, in a position as yet to determine how high an ideal can be pitched and still be effective. That depends upon our ability as program builders. It is also quite possible that as our knowl-

⁵V. S. Yarros, "Social Ideals and Human Nature," *Open Court*, Vol. 36, 586-593.

⁶Hertzler, *op. cit.*, p. 306.

edge becomes greater and our scientific method better, we may, in time, have ideals that will grip the imagination of at least the majority almost immediately and cause forces to be set in motion to bring about their early attainment.

IO. THE IMPORTANCE OF A PROGRAM

Not only is the ability to build a working and immediately applicable program around an ideal a test of its practicability and usability, but it also is a means of realizing the ideal and making it a progressive factor. To be successful a reform movement must have both an ideal and a program; i.e., a goal, a set of proposals, and a method of procedure for the present and the immediate future. "Social ideals are not self-executory, and sighing, longing, preaching and scolding will not bring us a step nearer to our ideal goal." The program constitutes the step toward the ideal. It prevents men from forgetting the ideal and losing it. But, as in the case of the ideal, here also we must be willing to revise, reconstruct, and even discard portions or all of a program if it does not work properly. No progressive agent is sacred in itself; it is only the results it achieves in the great cause that make it worthy of note.

It is possible that as the social sciences give us more of all the necessary kinds of data concerning social forces, social laws, social processes, and social agencies, we will be capable of building programs that will enable us to bring into realization ideals that are now thought to be pitched too high, and hence unrealizable. So far we have so little experience in making programs and have so little skill that we cannot say; we are still groping about. But it is conceivable as we become better social scientists we will be able to realize continually higher and more remote ideals by constructing better and better programs, and hence accelerate progress more and more. Some of the greatest ideals ever given to the world and generally thought of as being realizable, are still fighting for recognition, due to the fact that men have not yet discovered the right kind of program or reform movement to put them into effect. The ideals of Jesus are perhaps the most outstanding example.

QUESTIONS AND PROBLEMS

1. What is the relation of exceptional men to ideals?
2. Paul Carus said (*The Ethical Problem*, p. 19): "An ideal is an idea to be realized." Expand on the relationship between ideas and ideals.

3. Those whose minds are closed to ideas and ideals have been called the "already dead." What is meant?
4. Why are ideals ridiculed?
5. Are ideals that seem to be unrealizable worthless?
6. Name what you consider to be the ten most important contributions that the Utopians made to contemporary civilization. (See Hertzler, *History of Utopian Thought*, pp. 279-300.)

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CHAPTER XIII

THE AGENTS OF PROGRESS: PUBLIC OPINION

I. WHAT IS PUBLIC OPINION?

NO treatment of the agents of progress is complete without an examination of public opinion, for here is a force of unfathomed potency in controlling and influencing people, a force that has done things of a stupendous nature and that is capable of doing almost anything that a social group needs to have done. While we are thinking of public opinion, not so much as a phenomenon in social psychology as an agent in social progress, yet it is necessary for us to analyze it briefly as to nature, content, formation, manifestation, and guidance.

We usually think of public opinion in connection with political processes, particularly the voting function, but it is a much bigger factor than this; it is that which underlies governments and all other effective instruments of control, including law, moral codes, and religion; it is that which gives sanction and power to social institutions; it is that, in the last analysis, which shapes our attitudes and our wants; it is behind every popular conception, every popular movement; it is the force of forces among the social phenomena of present-day groups.

By public opinion is meant the convictions, the more or less definitely formulated and stable mass of ideas, beliefs, or judgments which are operative. Usually they are held by most of the group, though this is not necessary, as we will presently see. Public opinion is a general like-mindedness, or consensus, a prevailing social attitude which rests upon a certain coördination and organization of individual opinions on topics of general significance and interest. It implies no absolute agreement or uniformity, but rather the organization of the opinions and judgments of individuals, the coöperative product of communication and reciprocal influence. As such it represents the average or general level of what men believe and how they feel upon a given subject within a given social unit; it is a harmonious trend concerning that which engages the public attention. Just as individuals form opinions and judgments regarding the various things that come to their attention, so masses of men come to some collective and more or less conscious opinion on

matters of group significance. They express this public opinion by a vote, or a demonstration of praise or blame, by an ignoring or ostracizing, or a following of contemporaries. While public opinion cannot exist apart from the individual minds that hold it, yet each individual acts toward public opinion as if it were something apart and above him, an autocrat whose fiat must be obeyed. It is a force that only the strongest minded person can stand out against. Hence it rules most persons with a powerful and imperious hand, and is one of the chief agents of control and influence.

2. THE CONTENT AND FORMATION OF PUBLIC OPINION

While public opinion may arrive at fairly rational conclusions, sober reasoning is by no means the exclusive factor in its formation. It is the result of intersocial stimulation; of the action and reaction of the thoughts, feelings, wishes, prejudices, and determinations of the individuals in the group. But this is not a free and unobstructed process. The thinking and feeling of people is centered around images, stereotypes, primary prepossessions and prejudices, or "the pictures in our heads" as Walter Lippmann calls them. Every stimulus that comes to us finds us already more or less biased. We bend our thinking and our experiences to fit these stereotypes, or we unconsciously select the facts and statements that fit into them, and thus tend to confirm us in our own beliefs. Hence public opinion is only to a small extent a matter of judgment based on ripe consideration.¹

The means whereby this intersocial stimulation occurs are various. It may grow spontaneously, or it may be designedly created and stimulated; it may be disseminated by private conversation between neighbors, friends, and associates in the home, or factory, or office, or on the street; it may be developed by chance talks here and there with men whom people believe, in some instances, to be better informed than themselves, but who actually often have used only the same sources of information as themselves; or by public speakers in the lecture room or pulpit or "on the air;" it may be shaped in the conference especially organized for that purpose; it may be propagated through the drama or movie, or by literature in songs or novels, in pamphlets and books,

¹ "It is probably not too much to say that not 25 per cent of our adult population have deliberately made up an opinion on a public question after anything like a reasonably full and fair study of the facts in the case." J. W. Jenks, "The Guidance of Public Opinion," *American Journal of Sociology*, Vol. 1, p. 160.

but particularly by periodicals and newspapers. In fact, the press is to-day thought to be the most important means of disseminating public opinion. Thus, as Professor Jenks says: "Public opinion . . . seems to be a mixture of sense and nonsense, of sentiment, of prejudice, of more or less clearly defined feelings coming from influences of various kinds that have been brought to bear upon the citizens, these influences perhaps being mostly those of sentiment rather than those acting upon the judgment."² It is a matter of arguments, appeals, proposals, and suggestions.

In whatever way public opinion does take shape, it is to-day the product of the influence of the more alert and active members of the group who, in some cases at least, deliberately impress their own beliefs or ideas upon the passive and uncommitted mass of individuals. It is thus a matter of individuals or purposeful groups working through the various opinion-shaping agencies.

3. PUBLIC OPINION NOT NECESSARILY MAJORITY OPINION

It is not mere numbers of individuals who hold to a certain opinion which alone determines its power and effectiveness. It is not a matter of majority or a unanimity, but of the social weight that can be or is thrown behind a social activity or idea. Authority, or intensity of belief or feeling, or strategic situation may give a minority, even a very decided minority, dominating power.³ It is, however, necessary that while the majority may not be enthusiastic about the forceful minority opinion, they feel nevertheless bound by conviction to accept it. Thus in public opinion when we speak of the opinion of a majority we mean, not the numerical, but the effective majority. The power of public opinion is like the force of a striking body which depends even more upon its velocity than upon its weight or mass.

4. THE PART OF SUGGESTION IN PUBLIC OPINION

A very important part in the formation and spread of public opinion is played by that subtle force that we call suggestion. By suggestion we mean the process whereby an idea or mode of action is presented to the mind and accepted more or less, usually less, critically; it is the indirect appeal which steals in upon a person and influences him without his realizing the source from which it comes.⁴ It is largely a process of

²J. W. Jenks, *op. cit.*, p. 160.

³A. L. Lowell, *Public Opinion and Popular Government*, pp. 13-14.

⁴E. R. Groves, *Social Problems and Education*, p. 372.

a mechanical nature. The greater the volume, the longer the duration, the higher the source, the more organized the suggestive agents, the greater is the likelihood of the acceptance of a suggestion. "The power of suggestion has its root in a tendency of people to economize their efforts and follow the line of least resistance."⁵ Hence it is easier to act upon suggestion than upon thought, and any idea that comes to the focus of our attention is likely to govern our concepts and movements. All normal human beings, regardless of how virile and mature they may be, are suggestible at least to a degree, for all behavior is in response to images and ideas; the only differences being that the intrusion of ideas in the minds of some people is more unconscious than with others, and that the type and quality of some suggestions is less obvious than others. But in general, "One can no more resist the bombardment of suggestions from the press, from history, and from social contact than he can resist the influence of the weather on his skin."⁶

Due to such conditions it is easy for opinion to move uncritically from person to person. We, as individuals, are immersed in a sea of opinions of all kinds that are continually bearing upon us, and, even at best, we cannot prevent ourselves from absorbing a large number. So the method by which public opinion does become diffused is largely this process of suggestion. When we supplement this with the great sensitiveness of most people to group disapproval or approval we see how powerful a pressure is exerted by public opinion.

The fact of supreme importance is that it is the impressions and suggestions that people get that determine their ideas and their attitudes. Present-day conditions are largely a product of suggestion. What ideas rule within a group and whether it is this idea or that which sets off the sanctions, or the loyalties, or any other behavior of the group, is determined very largely by the agencies of suggestion. By controlling the range and character of the ideas presented, virtual control of the responses of the group is ordinarily affected. Hence suggestion is one of the foremost agents in use among those who deliberately seek to form or distort opinion. These agencies deliberately and consciously practice the power of collective and repeated suggestion in order to make its effect cumulative and resistless. Their object, of course, is to reduce the independence and critical faculty of individuals, and lower them all to a common level in which all that is destructive and personal is lost or submerged, and they are the mere pawns or blind proponents of the

⁵ A. D. Weeks, *The Control of the Social Mind*, p. 206.

⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 208.

manipulating forces. This is easiest along the lines in which the group has been habituated to respond suggestively, or in times of crisis when emotion runs high and the mass is most impressionable.

5. PROPAGANDA AND PUBLIC OPINION

The deliberate use of suggestion on a large scale by any party or parties to disseminate interested information and opinion in order to influence public opinion artificially is known as propaganda. No propaganda is disinterested, for special interest is of the essence of the word. As Groves points out, of all processes of suggestion, it is the most subtle, for it permeates the general public by the use of indirect methods, thus hiding its purposes and usually concealing those who are manipulating it.⁷ The recent war gave us one of the finest demonstrations of the use of propaganda that the world has ever seen. Our own Mr. Creel tells us that paper bullets won the war. It has been discovered by individuals, by associations, and organizations of all kinds, and by governments, that herein they have an instrument that enables them to go far in ruling the destinies of human affairs. "The tremendous forces of propaganda are now common property. They are available for the unscrupulous and the destructive as well as for the constructive and the moral."⁸ It has indeed become a world force of marked significance and potency. "It may be true that it is love that makes the world go round; it is certainly propaganda that governs the speed and direction of its whirlings."⁹ There is thus a great social danger in it, as there always is where there is a possibility of great power being centered in irresponsible hands. It will always be a social menace.

Propaganda is called "capitalized prejudice" by Dodge. It is effective because it rests on deep-seated emotional premises or upon those long standing beliefs that the individual has acquired through the influence of his psychic environment. It is careful to arouse no antipathies, but suggests those things which are felt to be good because they are familiar or have their rootage in certain great self-preservative, social, national, or racial tendencies. "Apparently any group of ideas with emotional valence may become the basis for propaganda." What it dare not frankly assert it insinuates or presents by other indirect methods.

⁷ Groves, *op. cit.*, p. 374.

⁸ From R. Dodge, "The Psychology of Propaganda," *Religious Education*, Vol. 15, 1920, pp. 241-252.

⁹ R. J. R. G. Wreford, "Propaganda, Evil and Good," *Nineteenth Century*, Vol. 93, p. 514. See the entire article pp. 514-524.

It is thus inherently tricky. In fact it usually utilizes subterranean methods. It may sometimes be useful, and it may even be good, but it is not open and above board, and is therefore in principle emphatically undesirable.

Propaganda is by no means educational. It in no way conforms to those requirements that we have noted as desirable in effective progressive efforts, nor is it harmonious with the general philosophy of progress. It attempts to gain its ends by rapid coercion, instead of that slower modelling which considers both the nature of the material and its welfare. It avoids intelligent discussion, argument, and demonstration; it lacks confidence in intelligent building processes. Instead it works through feeling and hypnosis, or other methods that undermine reasoning and judgment. Furthermore, it cares nothing about its effect upon the believer; it is essentially selfish and unsocial. It will never take the place of education.

The outstanding media of propaganda to-day are the church, the movie, the radio, the stage, and the press, with the press by all odds the most powerful now, though the radio may possibly be its successor. Advertising, though a form of propaganda, is not so dangerous, inasmuch as everybody recognizes it as such.

6. THE CHARACTERISTICS OF PUBLIC OPINION TO-DAY

It is very difficult at present to find any evidence for the proverbial wisdom and inerrancy of popular opinion. From the character of its origins and the diverse influences that shape it, public opinion is not consistent. It includes beliefs and attitudes that cannot logically be harmonized. Its frown and favor alike are fretful and capricious and seldom betray discrimination or judgment. It is unstable, highly suggestible, and gullible, and accepts anything new, startling, spectacular, or pathological. In so far as it is a force, it is partisan, spasmodic, simple minded, and external. It is erratic and untrustworthy, embracing one thing to-day, another thing to-morrow; subject to the most amazing vagaries. In times of crisis it reveals clearly its incapacity to serve as a moral power, since resentment and other emotional traits characterize it, rather than calm judgment. It is not well informed, nor is it continuously interested or creative or executive. "We must assume that a public is inexpert in its curiosity, intermittent, that it discerns only gross distinctions, is slow to be aroused and quickly diverted, that, since it acts by aligning itself, it personalizes whatever it considers, and is

interested only when events have been melodramatized as a conflict.”¹⁰ In other words, no frank inquiry into the manner in which public opinion operates will lend support to such glorifications of it as are implied in describing it as the “social conscience” of the community, “vox dei” and the like. Yet it is a powerful social force that must be dealt with, and used for constructive purposes wherever possible lest it be used for destructive ends.

7. CONDITIONS NECESSARY FOR THE FORMATION OF SOUND PUBLIC OPINION

The formation of a sound, rational public opinion requires a *socially homogeneous people*, that is, a people having a more or less similar cultural, economic, and political background.¹¹ If a people do not have this, they lack the means of ready communication and the background for easy understanding of ideas. Then they can only develop a public opinion on the basis of feeling and emotion which all men have in common in spite of differences of culture or race or nationality. But public opinion based upon such elements has little in it that is valuable. It encourages opinion that is largely made up of prejudice and sentiment, and means that it is easily led in almost any direction if these primitive elements of human nature can be appealed to. Our polyglot United States offers abundant evidence of the above facts. Much of the intolerance, arrogance, bigotry, prejudice, and misunderstanding that obstruct the way to sound social thinking and sound policies is the result of social isolation of different kinds.

On the other hand, if the population has developed a considerable homogeneity, the formation of public opinion can be placed on a more rational basis. It is then a population capable of common aims and aspirations; it is more likely to have a ready interchange of ideas, and is more likely to be free from divisive prejudices that prevent mutual understanding and sympathy.

The development of a sound public opinion requires a *considerable body of people competent to form an opinion*. In a democracy it is every man's business to contribute to the formation and maintenance

¹⁰ W. Lippmann, *The Phantom Public* (copyright 1925), p. 65. Reprinted by permission of The Macmillan Company.

¹¹ “The prime necessity is that all elements in a population should be capable of common aims and aspirations, should have a common stock of political traditions, should be open to a ready interchange of ideas, and should be free from inherited prejudices that prevent mutual understanding and sympathy.” A. J. Todd, *Theories of Social Progress*, pp. 368-369.

of a sound public opinion. It is one of the primary obligations of every citizen to be intelligent with respect to common concerns and to speak out about them, not only when he agrees, but particularly when he disagrees. If this were practiced, much of the weakness and perverseness of public opinion would be done away with. As it now stands its characteristics are largely to be blamed upon all of us. To bring about this competent citizenship is needed a schooled, informed, thinking public, a public having character and intelligence, particularly a public with developed social intelligence. This must come with education and training.¹² This should begin as early as possible and be pursued as long as possible, and include not only the proper information and appreciation of the truth, but also emphasis on character building in the things which make a child an honest, truth-telling, courageous, social-spirited, and self-denying person, for the mature citizen of the future must have command of his own spirit, and the willingness to do the things he dislikes. In other words, the best public opinion is likely to appear, not among those who are the unthinking pawns of their own emotions, or desires, or prejudices, but those rational beings, who, because they are capable of self-denial and self-control, can put first things first.

Social skepticism and active research are necessary. A society which faithfully follows the ruts, or which dumbly submits its minds to its officials or its mobs will not have a valuable or reliable opinion. It needs to challenge and weigh everything. When we have no speculation and theorizing, no proposing of remedies and posing of queries, no challenging of tradition, and reviewing of customs, no trite accusations, society risks progressive deterioration; it assumes an increasing dead weight of apathy.

A selected group of individuals is needed with the energy, the courage, and the probity which will command a hearing from people in general to lead in the formation of public opinion. For public opinion is organized from centers and subcenters of men of influence. This is Ross's "ascendancy of the wise." Public opinion itself is not a conserving or creating force; it cannot direct society to any clearly conceived ends. It does not know in most crises what specifically is the truth or justice of the case, nor does it rouse itself normally at the existence of evil. It does not deal with the substance of its problems, or make technical decisions, or impose moral precepts.¹³ It merely passes judgment and then aligns its force on one side or the other. Public opinion is a reserve

¹² The question of education will be discussed more fully in the next chapter.

¹³ Lippmann, *op. cit.*, pp. 65, 67.

of force which comes into action during a crisis in public affairs. These other highly significant duties fall upon individuals or small dynamic groups.¹⁴ It is of vital importance that these men or small groups of men at these centers be wise enough and good enough to exercise this great social trust in a socially beneficial way. For they give substance to public opinion, present it with its choices, and consciously or unconsciously direct the choices that are made. To discover competent leaders of opinion should be one of the great endeavors of any group and it should develop all the agencies that make for this end.¹⁵

The bulk of the people must be in a position to determine of their own knowledge, or by weighing evidence, a substantial part of the facts required for a rational decision. For this free speech, free public criticism, a free press, and free discussion and free assemblage are absolutely necessary. As Walter Bagehot pointed out, the discovery and spread of truth is possible only through absolutely unlimited discussion. In the first amendment to our federal constitution we have a recognition of the importance of free public discussion as a factor in arriving at substantial social conclusions and policies.¹⁶ Not only is freedom of speech guaranteed to us as a right; it is also necessary in order to rationalize and stabilize public opinion. In the words of Bagehot, "It gives a premium to intelligence." It puts a premium on sound argument rather than unsound. It insures honesty of purpose and effort. It provides the opportunity for the coöperative working of the intelligence of the whole group in building up new social habits, ideals, and institutions. Through discussion the richest results of experience can be brought to bear on a given social situation, and there is the greatest chance of a wise and rational solution. Free discussion enables men to discover the truth by contest or argument. Or, as Justice Holmes said in a dissenting opinion, "The best test of the truth is the power of the thought to get itself accepted in the competition of the market." The

¹⁴ "The burden of carrying on the work of the world of inventing, creating, executing, or attempting justice, formulating laws and moral codes, of dealing with the technic and the substance, lies not upon public opinion and not upon government but on those who are responsibly concerned as agents in the affair." Lippmann, *op. cit.*, p. 75.

¹⁵ *Ibid.*, 67.

¹⁶ The amendment reads: "Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress of grievances." Walter Lippmann in his *Public Opinion* (p. 319), speaking of our Bill of Rights, says, "No one can possibly overestimate the practical value of these civil liberties, nor the importance of maintaining them. When they are in jeopardy, the human spirit is in jeopardy."

late Frank I. Cobb in commenting on this statement said, "That will always remain the best test of truth, and we cannot afford to tamper with it, however strong the immediate provocation may be, nor can we afford to suppress that competition." It also enables men to adopt the wisest course of action, and carry it out in the wisest way. As Professor Chaffee points out,¹⁷ free speech is more than a personal or individual interest; it is a great social interest and value; a fundamental social need that is never to be abridged as an individual interest or value, because its purpose is to discover and spread the truth. Of course, freedom of speech, press, and assemblage does not guarantee sound public opinion. Truth is not spontaneous and self-evident. But it does make possible the unobstructed sway of truth, and as Milton said in *Areopagitica*, "Who ever knew Truth put to the worse in a free and open encounter?" In the free competition of opinions the truth will always win if you allow the competition to extend over a sufficiently long time.

Freedom of speech and thought is the best way to forbid social institutions to dictate beliefs and standards; it is the best protection against the whims or desires of the powerful; it is the best preservative against the excesses of either radicalism or conservatism; it is the great searchlight which the group uses to illuminate its problems.

For the best public opinion is needed the broadest possible freedom of intercommunication, of interstimulation, and response. This demands the fullest development of all the mechanisms of free intercommunication, including both the abolition of all social barriers, and the improvement of all the mechanical aids. For only in this way does that desirable selection and gradual association and combination of ideas that we call the formation of public opinion occur.

In the last analysis freedom of discussion is a wonderful aid to social progress. Among those people where it has been free and untrammelled social development has been normal and uninterrupted.

There are many who would shackle the freedom of speech, press, and assemblage. These are mainly vested interests of one kind or another who profit by ignorance, or at least ignorance along certain lines which they are careful to maintain. Hence they take their stand against incisive and untrammelled political, economic, or religious utterance. But they do more; they acquire possession of governmental machinery and use it as a means of repression. By their denial of free speech they make public opinion a factory product. Needless to say such social repression of variations means stagnation, social inertia, and probably extermina-

¹⁷ Zachariah Chaffee, Jr., *Freedom of Speech*, p. 37.

tion, for in the long run social inbreeding brings degeneration and death. Such tactics of course encourage unrest and sooner or later result in social revolution.

If those who shackle free speech, press, and assemblage are not prompted by such motives, they are of the group who feel the very foundations of morality will fall if certain things are discussed. As such they have the viewpoint of the heresy hunters and hounders of scientists three centuries ago when social life was at low ebb. Anything unorthodox was dangerous. If a man said the earth went around the sun, he was not trusted anywhere. But it turned out that the orthodox were wrong in that case, as in most of their stands. How then can they be so sure they are right to-day? It is doubtless true that the very groups who advocate, or resort to, attempts to thwart or repress free speech, or press, or assemblage would be the most active and vociferous in their objections to any curtailment of their own efforts to preach or convert. This is because they are usually interested, not in a better and more rational public opinion, or in scientific objectivity, but in maintaining inherited creeds, dogmatisms, and special interests at any cost, even by intimidation. We are beginning to see to-day that the cause that ducks, slinks, or applies the gag ought to rest under suspicion. Conversely, a noble social cause is very likely to court publicity and discussion.

There are, of course, justifiable limits set by government to the degree of freedom of speech and press. Freedom along these lines does not mean license; it does not give a person the right to spread salacious or obscene ideas, or to ruthlessly destroy other valuable social products. In general, the group does not have difficulty in setting such limits.

An absence of the agents which now tend to corrupt or contaminate public opinion is needed. This is discussed in the ensuing sections.

8. THE NATURE OF THE INFLUENTIAL AGENTS OF PUBLIC OPINION

The nature and quality of the appeal made by the major agents in the formation of public opinion is a most important element for any one concerned with the quality of public opinion, or its possible use as an agent in progress. For here are influences that impinge on millions of minds. It is very difficult for any group, despite its production of wise men, to rise much higher than the general level of the mind-content of its people. Hence it is very important to know the quality of the stuff that is being poured into these minds by the writers of fiction, the moving

picture makers, the radio broadcasters, and the journalists and news reporters, these being the chief agents.

Books, particularly the fiction read by the general public, is an important force. Of course, the influence of literature in book form is not so widespread as the other agents to be discussed, but yet books touch their millions. The scholarly and scientific books, of course, are read by such a comparatively small portion of the population that their direct effect is small indeed. The real problem is the novel. There is no denying that much of our fiction in recent years has been a wallowing in filth, especially sex filth, under the pretense of giving us realism. The writers have regarded life and filth as synonymous terms. Now there is no objection to lifting the veil and openly acknowledging secret evils. A prudish passing by of a bad mess is both cowardly and silly. No one should be afraid to face the sinister side of life—to deal with its evil passions, ignoble emotions, its sins, big and little, with all their results, pleasant and unpleasant, with the shadows and squalors of life, and the nature and character of the people. But why abandon decency and embrace eroticism?

Art and literature can so grip a person's imagination that he goes and does likewise, or at least develops moods and attitudes and reactions which the book suggests, and the bad functions as surely as the good. The novelist and any other writer or artist has a great social responsibility in connection with the suggestive material that he places before the public.

An even more important influence is the motion picture film, for with its ten or fifteen million spectators daily in the United States alone, a good share of them young people, its publicity influence is greater than "best sellers," and in some cases equal to and perhaps even greater than newspapers. The easiest way of impressing or instructing the mind is by visual means, and in the whole experience of the race there has been no aid to visualization comparable to the movies, either in the accuracy of the image provided or in scope of influence. The motion-picture producers have been guilty of the same indiscretions that we have discussed in connection with the novelists. The code of ethics prevailing amongst those who supply the great bulk of these films will presently influence the code of those who, week by week, drink in the stories all over the earth; and we, the unconscious public, will reap the harvest sown by this seed. Through the movies the whole standards and ideals of a people can be changed. Through them can be spread foul-mindedness as easily as clean-mindedness, obscenities as well as de-

cencies. If we want to perpetuate fair play, orderliness, honesty, modesty, and humane attitudes, we can do it readily by this means. Apparently we have not yet realized the power of this instrument which science has placed in our hands for good or evil.¹⁸

The radio is another agent that has developed great potentialities in the formation of public opinion in recent years. It is already used extensively for advertising purposes, and in broadcasting speeches for informational or propagandist purposes, as well as providing entertainment for millions. So far, in the main, its tendency has been towards mediocrity, and its public, unable to react, becomes more and more bovinely receptive. The possibilities of its use as a propaganda agency for special and partisan interests are great. It is a factor with which the future will have to reckon and keep free and untainted at all costs.

9. THE NEWSPAPER AS AN AGENT

a. The Importance of the Newspaper. The most influential of all agents, however, is the newspaper. It is the agent *par excellence* in the formation of public opinion, and, in this connection, its ultimate social function and its first duty, as stated by Frank I. Cobb, the eminent late editor of the *New York World*, is "*to furnish the raw materials for it and the tools for its formation.*"¹⁹

Sixty years ago the American newspaper was quite different from the type we know to-day. It then was a publication which was intended to appeal to grown men only, and men of staid habits at that, for it made no pretense of providing light or easy reading. But as the result of the efforts of such men as James Gordon Bennett, Charles A. Dana, Joseph Pulitzer, and William Randolph Hearst, the newspaper has developed an appeal for everybody—mature thinking men, the rank and file, women of all classes, immigrants, and children. Consequently the circulation of newspapers has increased to such an extent that we are to-day a nation of newspaper readers and have the largest number of newspapers and the greatest circulation per unit of population of any people under the sun. The newspaper is now read by nearly the whole family among all classes.²⁰ In the past ten years the circulation of the daily newspapers of the United States has grown two and one-half times as

¹⁸ Arthur Weigall, "The Influence of the Kinematograph upon National Life," *Nineteenth Century*, Vol. 89, pp. 661-672.

¹⁹ "The Press and Public Opinion," *New Republic*, Vol. 21, p. 147. Italics mine.

²⁰ For an excellent discussion of the development of the newspaper see R. E. Park, "The Natural History of the Newspaper," *American Journal of Sociology*, Vol. 29, Nov., 1923, pp. 273-289.

fast as population as a whole.²¹ Its power is more decisive and irresistible than any other agency; consequently it overshadows them all in importance. With a few exceptions the same trends are noticeable among all the peoples affected by the Industrial Revolution. The influence of the lecture room, the pulpit, the public meeting, the pamphlet, the book, has faded into insignificance as compared with the newspaper as a factor in the formation of public opinion.

All of us to-day have come to be almost altogether dependent upon the newspaper for our knowledge of widely interesting events. As the organization of society has become more complex and far-reaching, the newspaper's importance in the acquisition and distribution of knowledge has inevitably increased. It has come to be for our society what sight and hearing are for the individual, and as such is one of the most indispensable factors in modern life. It is the one certain daily influence on the minds of the majority of the people. "It is the only serious book most people read. It is the only book they read every day."²²

A few are in a position to read journals of opinion, critical journals, scholarly journals, and so on, as supplements or correctives to their newspaper reading; but not the great mass of plain people, the people who render the decision on all questions in the last analysis. They are almost exclusively newspaper readers only, for that is all that they can afford, or all they have been taught or encouraged to read. For these masses the newspaper is their chief educational, informational, and recreational agency—their chief contact with the unseen environment; what it publishes they tend to believe as the gospel truth. Furthermore, they, like most of us, are willing to let others do their thinking for them; ready-made opinions appeal to them.

b. The Suggestive Power of the Newspaper. We are largely shaped by what comes to us in the form of suggestions. Reading is to-day one of the main sources of suggestions and reading affects the habits of thought, and habits of thought give rise to habits of action, and these two together are the essence of character. It has been wisely said, "Tell me what you read and I will tell you what you are." This is especially true of the non-intelligent and non-cultured reader. Thus the newspapers have a power to suggest to the people what they should think and do. Even those who do not take their opinions direct from the newspaper have their intellectual standards and their method of

²¹ W. P. Beazell, "Public Opinion and Social Progress," *National Conference of Social Workers*, 1923, p. 471.

²² W. Lippmann, *Liberty and the News*, p. 47.

reasoning influenced by it. The average person is tremendously affected by the newspaper. "If he is in the habit of reading that which is ugly, vulgar, and low, he himself will form habits that are ugly, vulgar and low. If a man's reading is confined to the nonsensical and the brutal, he ceases to be able to detect brutality and nonsense. If he reads nothing but what is ugly and tasteless he loses his sense of beauty and his taste. . ." ²³

When it is remembered that the great mass of readers are highly sensitized young people, and plain people whose minds are little disciplined, one realizes even more the potency of the press. When to this is added the fact that the newspapers use mass suggestion and constant reiteration, both multiplying the power of suggestion, it becomes even more obvious. By their persistent, never-ceasing, and powerful suggestion they work their will on their readers.

Thus the newspaper is a powerful director and moulder of public opinion—a powerful means of creating general attitudes of thought and feeling. It is a gigantic force in the community capable of doing almost anything with it—elevating its tastes and standards, its wants and desires, or dragging them in the dust. The newspapers are coming more and more to be the principal organs through which public tastes are formed and appeals to public intelligence made.

Herein also lies the opportunity of the newspapers, of becoming a powerful influence in the body politic for good. They could enormously accelerate our rate of national and individual progress toward a reign of equity and reason if they would. On the other hand, if they follow the course of least resistance or if they become the deliberate tools for manipulating the public in the interests of certain groups or classes, they can become agents of defilement and even retrogression. No other human institution has such potentialities for good or evil. ²⁴

c. General Condition of the Newspaper Press. ²⁵ There still are newspapers that seek to be inciters to intelligent opinion, that frankly and impartially present all the available facts in connection with public questions, that try to serve as culture media, that present news in a

²³ Rogers, *The American Newspaper*, University of Chicago Press, p. 112.

²⁴ Emerson thus describes some of the achievements of the *London Times*: "It adopted a poor-law system, and almost alone lifted it through. When Lord Brougham was in power it decided against him and pulled him down. It declared war against Ireland and conquered it. It adopted the League against the Corn Laws, and, when Cobden had begun to despair, it announced his triumph. It entered into each municipal, literary, and social question, almost with a controlling voice." From W. D. Foulke, "Public Opinion," *National Municipal Review*, Vol. 3, pp. 245-255.

²⁵ Cf. S. Bent, *Ballyhoo, the Voice of the Press*.

socially responsible manner, and in general seek to give their readers as complete and accurate a picture of their daily world as they can, but they are few and seem to be diminishing. There also are a large number of independent small city dailies, and village and country weeklies and biweeklies that are entirely neutral. They do very little that is notably upbuilding; but neither are they a particularly sinister influence.

There has been a tendency, however, for the newspapers with the largest circulations to allow their news disseminating function to disintegrate to the point where it borders on a public menace. William Allen White, himself an editor of prominence, described the present state well on the editorial page of his *Emporia Gazette*:

"Take a look at any first page—even the best of papers, and what do you find? Sex, crime and piffle. That's the whole of it. Apparently the newspaper reading public is composed of a lot of cheap, idle-minded morons. Serious questions are puzzling the world. Great events are stirring in a dozen centers of news. In America we are going into a new era. We are mapping out new courses of action in business, politics and religion. The world is full of big things, happening quite outside the newspapers, which either ignore the big things or misunderstand them. Instead, they smear sex, crime or piffle over the newspapers, and write inane editorials about nothing in particular. All because the people want this sort of daily pabulum. The newspapers are creating the demand, educating the morons, and then feeding them intellectual swill. Cheap, cheap, cheap! How long, O Lord, how long?"²⁰

The most influential portion of the press is essentially sensational, commercial, and partisan. It tends in the direction of stimulating a love of sensation and an interest in purely superficial and material things. The astonishing, the bizarre, the shocking, the non-essential is the preponderant suggestive influence. It is not to be inferred that such material gets the bulk of the space always, but it makes up a sufficiently large part of the content to make its suggestion potentially the most outstanding influence. The following are among the commonest faults of the contemporary newspaper when considered as a factor in the formation of public opinion.

(1) *Distortion, coloring, exaggeration, and suppression of news.* This seems to be done in a servile attempt to protect the private interests of persons controlling the paper, or advertisers using it, business associations or "business" in general, or the class represented by the paper or controlling it. The Pittsburgh papers, not wanting the steel strikers

²⁰ Quoted in the *Christian Century*, Sept. 3, 1925.

to win, gave a distorted account of the steel strike of 1919; the news syndicates, because of the nature of their control, felt justified in garbling and misrepresenting news about Russia. Again, the newspaper may err in exaggerating news. Any item of news that appears to favor the policy of the paper is seized upon, written up, and enlarged beyond its importance. Now, the personal equation of the writer cannot be eliminated, and, obviously, suppression of certain news is necessary, but there is so much distortion and suppression along certain lines where these are not socially necessary that one is forced to conclude that it is done as a matter of deliberate policy in order to withhold certain information from the public.

(2) *Propaganda*. Propaganda is the opposite of suppression; it is overemphasizing of facts. Dominant interests, political parties, nationalistic or imperialistic groups have always used or sought to use the press as a means of control.²⁷ The propaganda of the press is the most dangerous kind; it is the covert, unproclaiming type. The press is apparently impartial, and therefore not recognizable as propaganda. The newspaper stands before the community as a public teacher, and the first qualification of a public teacher is that he shall be sincere and disinterested.

(3) *Sensationalism, muck, and sports*. The effort is constantly made to-day among many of our papers to search out and emphasize those incidents and occurrences that can be sensationalized. Not many years ago one of the most prominent newspaper editors in this country in an address to members of his profession declared it to be his aim to produce such a paper that every reader on first sight every morning would involuntarily exclaim, "My God!"²⁸ Charles A. Dana once said, "News is anything that will make people talk." It is said of one of the most successful newspaper managers of St. Louis a generation ago that he was the man who best knew where hell was going to break out next, and had a reporter on the spot five minutes ahead of time.²⁹ To-day it is occasionally true that "when hell shows no signs of eruption, the successful newspaper manager sends a reporter to 'raise' it." News, according to this standard, is hell breaking loose. American and British journalism—perhaps not the majority, but certainly far too great a

²⁷ For example, the use of the press by Napoleon and Bismarck is a commonplace.

²⁸ See also R. E. Park, "The Natural History of the Newspaper," *American Journal of Sociology*, Vol. 29, p. 285.

²⁹ D. F. Wilcox, "The American Newspaper, A Study in Social Psychology," *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, Vol. 16, pp. 56-92.

portion of it—has to a distressing extent surrendered to this kind of an ideal. It has achieved a facility in playing up the sordid and startling aspects of our common life that has not been reached in any other field. Muck mongering has also come to be a huge vested interest. The result is a section of our press whose principal figures are persons of bad or questionable, or at least unwholesome repute, and whose influence is to suggestively focus the minds of people upon the cancerous and malodorous portions of society. Murders, thefts, suicides, accidents, debaucheries, divorces, night-clubs, escapades of notorious actors and actresses, prize-fighters, and so on receive more than their share of attention. Day after day, not consciously, perhaps, the press seems to be operating on the basis that a penetration to the lowest depths of our life, in order that the dregs may be displayed, is one of its chief functions. The kind of story that many a city editor to-day tries to develop further with investigation, surmise, interview, and illustration is a breach of social order, while the constructive event is finished in one day's telling. There seems to be an affinity between many of the newspapers and the unclean and morbid.

"A long time ago one of the deepest students of the human mind who ever lived stated that the road to communal decency lies through fixing the attention on 'Whatsoever things are true, whatsoever things are honorable, whatsoever things are just, whatsoever things are pure, whatsoever things are lovely, whatsoever things are of good report.' As Professor John Wright Buckham says, 'It is becoming increasingly the purpose of too many American newspapers to fix the attention of their readers on whatsoever things are foul, whatsoever things are criminal, whatsoever things are ugly, whatsoever things are of ill report, admonishing them that if there be any scandal and if there be any shame, they shall think on these things.'"³⁰

More and more the newspapers to-day tend to affect the morale of the community along the lines of its vices, rather than its virtues. Such have in fact become a medium for the persistent pandering to the primitive love of sensation. The public is being taught that the sordid, the insane, the unbalanced, the antisocial is the relish and chief end of life. By this never-ending process of suggesting the trivial and morbid, the public mind is becoming unable to distinguish the important from the insignificant, it becomes incapable of serious thought, and does not possess the ripe common sense which gives man stability and charm and the qualities necessary for intelligent and dynamic citizenship. The newspapers also devote large sections to sports. While this is not posi-

³⁰ Editorial. *Christian Century*, Feb. 25, 1925, pp. 274-275.

tively harmful, it concentrates attention on the superficial and unimportant and distracts attention from the real business of living.

(4) *Syndicated and standardized news and editorials.* The formation of free opinion in this country is further endangered by what has been called "canned journalism." Never before has so small a proportion of the contents of the daily been produced in its own office. Most of the state, national, and world news is provided for the individual newspapers by great news-gathering associations. To this must be added syndicated features, fillers, cartoons, comics, photographs, and special features. Even the local news is increasingly in large part identical in competing journals. In the larger cities, the local reporting staff is supplemented and increasingly superseded by a city news association which reports local happenings for simultaneous publications. In recent years even editorials have been syndicated, not only in the form of those written by some hired editorial writer for a chain of commonly owned papers, but those now turned out by editorial "canning factories," which provide any type of editorial for any kind of newspaper. The big danger in this latter form of canned editorial service is that it may be dishonest and manipulated, furnishing disingenuous propaganda in place of honest comment.

(5) *Concentration of ownership.* There is a general tendency toward local, sectional and even nation-wide combination of papers. There has been a trend for several decades toward the combination of scattered newspapers into a chain controlled by a single person or corporation, but in recent years competing local newspapers have been absorbed one by one by some single paper until many of our cities have only one or two dailies left. Here again the power of monopoly and manipulation is tremendous.

d. Outstanding Reasons for Various of These Conditions. (1) *The newspaper is a profit-making business.* The modern newspaper is strictly a business proposition. The first consideration of its owners is that it make money. If run in a certain way its operation is very lucrative. Hence the newspaper manager feels that his first duty is to make profits. Advertising is the most lucrative source of revenue, providing from 70 to 85 per cent of the average newspaper's income. The advertisers pay the highest rates to the papers with the largest circulation. Therefore the course of the newspaper publisher is obvious. In order to reach the largest possible number of readers, the newspaper's content is adjusted to the general level of information and intelligence, and that is not high, for about 70 per cent of the average newspaper's read-

ing public is frankly uneducated, being composed of those classes who a century ago did not and could not read newspapers, and who to-day cannot intelligently read newspapers like the *Christian Science Monitor* or the *Boston Transcript* or the *New York Times*. Thus the type and quality of the news has to be adjusted to the marginal reader, that is, the reader with just enough intelligence and literacy to be able to read the sheet. This accounts also for the widespread sensationalism, the elementary and inadequate presentation of serious national and international news, the frequent piffing and asinine editorials, and the various moronic "features." It is actually true that the best newspapers in America to-day from the point of view of sobriety, intelligence, and impartiality, with a few exceptions, have the smallest circulation, while the newspaper with the largest circulation (over 1,000,000 daily) is a moronic tabloid.

The profitableness of newspaper combinations, of course, arises out of the advantages of monopoly and the economies of large-scale production.

(2) *Many newspapers are consciously or unconsciously instruments of control in the hands of the large-propertyed classes.* The newspapers cannot live without the support of the propertyed classes, either as stockholders or advertisers. The men who own them are usually connected with other large interests or are sympathetic with them, and naturally want them protected; even the most remote contingencies must be prepared for. They are often stockholders and perhaps directors of railways and banks and vast industrial concerns doing a national and even international business. Since the propertyed classes have fixed policies and interests, the newspaper tends to become the voice of these classes or an instrument of control in their interests. Thus the actual fact is that the power of shaping public judgments and educating the masses is in the control of the people who have vast private and class interests at stake. In many newspapers this accounts both for what we see and what we do not see. These stockholders and directors are connected with corporations which are seriously affected by many public movements. For example, the public may demand certain reform measures that would disturb certain business interests involved; hence, news is omitted or perverted, and arguments are twisted so as to give the appearance of public spirit without its real presence. News is published, or suppressed, or modified according to the manner in which it suits the interests of the proprietors or their associates. The newspaper may actually build up a certain sort of public opinion favorable to the ends

or interests of those controlling them, as in the case of tariffs, presidential candidates, or in international affairs. It is true that in many cases the lurid accounts of crime and vice, the broadsides of sports, the columns of jazzy piffle, are presented to discourage thought, and draw attention away from economic, social or political questions, the discussion of which might intimidate the interests involved. Where this is impossible, as in some international situations, biased news is resorted to. Thus some newspapers at least are wilful agents of public bewilderment, obfuscation, and debasement.

e. The Newspaper and the Future. One of the difficulties that must be faced is that most newspaper readers do not want the truth bad enough to protest when they do not get it. We tend to want to read what we care about or know about, or what fits in with the preconceptions or "stereotypes," as Lippmann calls them, that have been developed in us. Furthermore, as noted above, the quality of the marginal readers must be improved. Thus, if the newspapers are to be agents of public opinion of high quality, we need among many other things, a rank and file having high literacy, superior interests, a sense of moral responsibility, a critical attitude, and an appreciation of honest information. Until this is done the present dominant type of newspaper will be able to work its way among us.

The future of the newspaper a generation hence is quite uncertain. Under any circumstances it will be widely changed. The motion picture combined with the radio is likely to make the dissemination of the news quite different from what it is to-day. It is quite possible that twenty-five years from now we will have news machines installed in our homes, as we now have the telephone, that will give us the news at regular intervals illustrated by pictures transmitted by wireless. Then, of course, we will have new problems.

IO. PUBLIC OPINION AND PROGRESS

In progress, as in any other social movement which requires social influence to support it, public opinion is crucially important. While it is not an initiating force, its function is to pass decisions, to render judgments, and then to exercise its irresistible power of approval or disapproval. It thus is a form of social control; it acts as a critic and a check upon those who contemplate action contrary to its will, and punishes those who violate its will. It is the force lying back of the power of all regulative institutions, whether political, economic, religious, do-

mestic, or ethical. Furthermore, public opinion, especially in highly dynamic and self-conscious societies like ours, is playing an increasing part in controlling all social adjustments. All changes in regulative or control institutions come as the result of the pressure of public opinion. It is the decisive element in bringing about new types of social activity and relationship. Equally significant is the fact that no attempt at directed change is fully successful until public opinion has assented to it. But when public opinion is clear on great social changes, its power is so formidable that men will tend voluntarily to devote their energies to such pursuits. Thus, whether in the maintenance of existing institutions, customs, and laws, or in their change to better forms, public opinion is the critical factor. Thus one of the most urgent needs among progressives is the knowledge and technique that will enable them to exercise that fine manipulation of human nature and the public mind that will give them impetus in the right direction. For this tremendous though intangible and invisible force, so competent to bring in the era of our dreams or to destroy us, must be harnessed to help and be curbed in its power for evil if progress is to occur. Pervading all humanity it is the ultimate motive power of all social forms and states, and the things we do to control it and direct it are the only ultimately effective things we can do to bring about progress. Public opinion and social progress move as one.

QUESTIONS AND PROBLEMS

1. What do we mean by public opinion?
2. Why is it significant in a study of progress?
3. Would you outlaw the use of propaganda if you could?
4. How many people attend movies in your town a week? What in general would you say was the effect of this?
5. Prof. Ross says (*Social Psychology*, p. 309): "It is coming to be recognized that there is nothing of concern to human beings which may not profitably be discussed in the right spirit by the right persons at the right time." Discuss.
6. Physics, chemistry, engineering, and within limits, biology, have been allowed freedom of thought, and great progress in the corresponding fields of material civilization has occurred. Would the same be true in the political, ethical, religious, and economic fields if they were permitted complete freedom of thought?
7. "The paper that desires and secures accurate reports, that sets down nothing in malice, that suppresses nothing which is unfavorable to *its* side and honestly publishes everything which is creditable to the *other* side, is notoriously the rare exception." Discuss.

8. Take two newspapers, one a "capitalist," and the other a "labor" journal, and compare their discussions of some pertinent public question. How do you account for the difference of attitude and emphasis?
9. "The broad secret of human progress is . . . contact or conflict of ideas, communication, the pitting of wit against wit." Discuss.
10. "Each of us tends to judge a newspaper, if we judge it at all, by its treatment of that part of the news in which we feel ourselves involved." Discuss the significance of this in connection with a truth-seeking newspaper.
11. "When printing took its place among the arts, the Dark Ages ended." Discuss.

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CHAPTER XIV

THE AGENTS OF PROGRESS: EDUCATION

I. EDUCATION AS A BASIS FOR THE OPERATION OF THE OTHER AGENTS OF PROGRESS

EDUCATION is absolutely essential to the successful operation of the various other agents discussed above. It is to-day the supreme means of developing the intellect, for it provides individuals with those stimuli which tend to elicit their maximum intellectual response. Knowledge is effective in progress only if it be widely diffused and properly imparted, for however scintillating a people's brilliant men may be, the group does not progress unless the products of these geniuses reach the many. Dense ignorance and moral stupidity of the masses is utterly incompatible with progress. The capacity to engage in science, advance it, and use its findings depends on education. Neither scientific research nor its practical applications can proceed very far if ignorance is general. Invention and discovery are more frequent and of superior quality among an intelligent and enlightened people. Education stimulates intellectual curiosity and powers of comprehension, insight, and correlation. The popular distribution of knowledge is a means of accelerating the development of a supply of exceptional men. A vital and effective education demonstrates and even creates new wants, new ideals, and new ideas, and these are among the most important of the stimuli necessary in the production of genius. Owing to inadequate educational facilities, using "education" in its broad sense, there are to-day millions of fine minds quite destitute of the valuable stimuli provided by the social heritage that are always necessary for the discovery and encouragement of genius. Ideals, those blue-prints of progress, flourish only among the educated, and are respected and used only by them. Public opinion will not serve as a worthy and effective agent unless it is informed, rational, and previsional, and this is only the case where a people have been subjected to a profound and rigid educational discipline.

None of these agents will operate efficiently without a popular distribution of knowledge and the concomitant mental alertness and flexi-

bility. For if you do not have this, a social inertia develops which acts as a resistant and neutralizing force in their proper functioning. That man is susceptible to and changeable by educational methods is quite obvious when the chapter on the shaping of human nature is recalled.

2. EDUCATION AS THE MASTER AGENT OF PROGRESS

Not only is education basic to the operation of all other progress agents, but it is itself the master technique of progress. All great social reformers from Plato down to the present time have seen in it the chief instrument of social betterment, the great weapon in the fight for reform and progress. Human experience also substantiates this contention. The change already achieved by education is a valuable object lesson. An examination of history shows all cultural evolution to have been essentially a learning process. Civilization itself is mainly the result of a continuous educational process in which experience is accumulated in the social group, this experience taking the form of knowledge, standards, values, industrial, artistic, and other achievements, continually being produced, transmitted, and diffused. History also shows that the immediate cause of periods of moral and intellectual breakdown in human society has been the failure of the educative process. Since the dawn of the telic idea some fifty years ago men have everywhere come to appreciate even more the indispensable nature of education in all progressive effort. For progress is now recognized as the outcome of a conscious and systematic attempt to utilize all the opportunities the group affords, and education is just this conscious and definite attempt to select and teach the best to the members, especially the immature members, of the social group. Social progress is definitely determined by educational forces. The task is not so much one for the agitator, the social reformer, or even the statesman, as it is a task for the educator. The reforms that we wish to introduce into the life of the nation can be best effected by embodying them in our system of education. Von Humboldt said: "Whatever we wish to see introduced into the life of a nation must first be introduced into its schools." Ross, writing in the same strain, puts it thus: "School education is in our day a mighty engine of progress."¹ Dewey somewhere has called the school a fundamental means of social progress and reform. Scientific education, working on youthful, plastic minds, can mold men almost at the will of those who guide it. Consequently, it is to-day the chosen

¹ *Social Psychology*, p. 231.

instrument of a progressive community in its efforts for reform, and is our main reliance for social progress in the future.

The man largely responsible for the emphasis upon education as a progress agent was Lester F. Ward, who, as we have previously noted, also contributed the conception of telic progress. He demonstrated conclusively that education is the initial and the main reliance for progress, and no other writer has approximated in emphasis and thoroughness his treatment of its sociological importance.²

Education is such an effective method or agent of progress due to the fact that human nature is so flexible and plastic, that man's infancy is long, that during this time the youth is open to all manner of influences and that the pressures that are brought to bear on human beings are so powerful in shaping attitudes, beliefs, and even will-acts. Education consists essentially of taking advantage of these characteristics of human nature and human beings. It is more than the dissemination of information and the provision of mental tools to the new generation by the previous generation, even though it is in this very transmission of valuable acquired elements of the past from one generation to another that a wonderful opportunity for improvement presents itself. It is also more than the unfolding of individual capacities and powers through the instrumentalities offered by the group. It is really the process of furnishing the patterns of future social behavior, of controlling the ways of thinking and the ways of acting and the formation of habit and character; it has as its purpose the cultivation and manipulation of opinions, ideals, ideas, attitudes, standards, values, insight; it is society's artificial means of controlling all the life expressions of its members so that their social actions may be controlled and they may be fit to participate efficiently in the social life of the group.

Progress is determined in the last analysis by the mental adjustment of individuals to the social life, that is, by the social attitudes which men maintain toward one another and toward the future, for if the individual has a right attitude toward society all other social problems will tend to take care of themselves. Now, inasmuch as heredity furnishes little more than human powers and capacities, these elements are obviously the result of environment. If these desirable social attitudes are to be developed, it must be done through a properly controlled environment, and education, furnishing as it does such an environment during the plastic period of life, is patently the most subtle and effective type

² See Ward, *Dynamic Sociology*, Vol. I, pp. 21-22, 26, Chs. X-XIV; *Applied Sociology*; *Pure Sociology*, pp. 573-575.

of shaping and controlling influence that can be imagined. It is the most effective adjustment agency at man's disposal.³ It is obvious though that even the most advanced peoples have barely begun to use education in this sense as an instrument of social progress.

3. THE PROGRESSIVE FUNCTION OF EDUCATION

The education promoting progress can be outlined only in its more essential and general characteristics and requirements. The details of the working program and the actual curriculum must be worked out by socially minded educational experts and checked by careful experimentation and observation. In an educational scheme which is to serve as the basis for enduring social progress, the following general requirements are important.

a. Provide an Education That Will Actually "Lead Out." The original meaning of the word *education* is a leading out, a process of bringing into actuality something which is already latent in the individual. But obviously this principle of education is one which has been almost forgotten, for with our emphasis on universality of education, on quantity of people educated, our aim has not been to lead out, but to press in, or "cram," as we aptly term it. Consequently, the surface mind has been filled with a great array of often valueless facts, thus making it increasingly difficult for the powers of the inner mind to be actualized. Our students have a buzzing confusion of half-truths on every phase of life, but they have no method or experience for finding great truths for themselves or for taking their place in the great scheme of things.⁴

Our present educational system tends, in the main, to hold the students to the customary, the existent, and the commonplace. It makes them merely participants with the present generation. In fact, it is often so full of dogmas, precedent, authority, and a thousand lesser cramping influences which retard progress, that it actually encourages reactionism. Instead it should, if it is really to "lead out," launch them from the shoulders of the present generation, passing on to them that which society has inherited, or wrought, or considers most contributory to its loftiest ideals, not as an end in itself or as a highest good, but as a point of departure in a new process of discovery and achievement.

³ For an excellent discussion of education as a progress agent see the following writings of Prof. C. A. Ellwood: *Sociology and Modern Social Problems*, pp. 371-387; *Psychology of Human Society*, pp. 445-448; "The Educational Theory of Social Progress," *Scientific Monthly*, Nov., 1917, Vol. 5, pp. 439-450.

⁴ Cf. G. H. Bonner, "Progress," *Nineteenth Century*, Vol. 97, p. 13.

If this is to occur, education must become more and more a process of self-realization; it must devote itself less to the proximate and secondary ends of life—making a living and so on—and place more emphasis upon the great primary end of *making a life*, of living better and fuller. All the multiple qualities and capacities of the unique individual, and every one is unique, must be elicited and developed, for only in this way can growth beyond the type be provided for. As never before, the students need that stimulus and emancipation that will give them freedom of mind, initiative, and intelligent and conscious adaptability, and will actually draw them out.

The old pedagogical idea of set lessons to be studied and memorized must be done away with; *all* passive or receptive methods need to give way to those that are active and constructive. The potential usefulness that has been lost to the world by the uninspiring educational grind to which students in both our primary and secondary schools have been subjected is incalculable. People must be taught to think for themselves and to develop themselves, and such thoughtful and alert minds can only be brought about by establishing habits of thought and alertness.

The educational system must provide the means of stimulating and nourishing the whole man; it should provide for the satisfaction of his creative and coöperative impulses, his intellectual and esthetic cravings, and his moral and social tendencies, so that he will be one who can participate to the limit of his capacities in the total activities of civilized life. It should liberalize and liberate the mind. It should be of such a nature that the individual wants to leave self-satisfied mediocrity behind and venture into the veiled beyond for the greater truth. When such an educational system occurs, a social life which is plastic, adaptable, and progressive will be practically assured.

b. Instil a Progressive Philosophy of Life. To counteract the fatalism, laxity, and discouragement of the group, the educational system must emphasize the idea of progress. A careful inventory must be made, not of the ideals the community or the present educational system talks about, but the ideas they take for granted—the ideas that live in their conscious purposes and really decide the kind of living they produce. For these current ideas and interests appear in the children's minds as inquiries, prejudices, and budding enthusiasms. They go far to shape their whole outlook on life. If these are contrary to progressive aims, they must be fought tooth and nail in the schools.

If the child comes into contact with a "laissez-faire," "I should worry," "Let the devil take the hindmost" conception of life, it must

be countered with a socialized viewpoint and a spiritualized enthusiasm; social responsibility and social service must become the ruling idea. The young folks must be trained to will to serve, to dedicate themselves to the common weal, and—a task by no means easy now—to believe they can serve their fellow men.

Such an education cannot lay exclusive emphasis upon individualistic achievement—individual initiative and success—for its own sake, but upon social service and social success. And we now see that in co-operating with his fellows in a constructive and altruistic way the individual is not subtracting from his valuable personal qualities or goods, but is simply transforming individual into collective achievement, which is the basis of a good life and the essence of social progress.

Hence children should be taught what they may find out by themselves eventually, namely, that the life of active social usefulness is the only life worth living. Particularly to be condemned is the education which produces the loafer, and parasite of society, and the man who has no other than selfish ends or interests in life. This new education should leave with us a hope that we as men and women count for something in the world's progress, and that every social deed has its ultimate social effect.

Highly necessary also in the progressive life is an acquaintance with those great human values, a knowledge of which is indispensable to the solution of present-day problems. These values must be so taught that they are not merely assimilated intellectually, but that they have a sure place in the affections of the masses of men and are appreciated for their own sake.

Another important factor is the development of a telic will. One of the most pernicious doctrines current to-day is that which maintains that man is merely a helpless unit played with by immense forces which it is beyond him to understand and control. This belief is a widespread heresy, and it spells helplessness and fatalism. To-day it is probably true that our pupils are prevented from obtaining either a clear understanding of the dynamic present or a real vision of a social future, hence they are the easy victims of this fatalistic philosophy. What is needed is an application of the ideals developed and the knowledge obtained to the vitalization of the purposes of life. Our schools can and should send forth their pupils strong in the faith that it is in their hands to make history on a greater or lesser scale.

Furthermore, since the school is the means whereby the older generation transmits its experience to the younger, it must be alert to

detect and do all that lies in its power to prevent that older generation from fastening its ancient feuds, its prejudices, its errors of judgment, and its moral shortcomings on the children growing up to take its place. Of course, not all of the past is bad, and there should be an adequate instruction in its good elements, but the future should not be neglected. In fact the children should rather be emancipated from the past and encouraged to think of the future. And yet, school and college have tended to turn their attention backward, and concentrate their interests in the past.

Finally, the children must be given the faith that underlies the courage of all reformers and pioneers—the belief, however expressed, that ideals are not impossibilities, but laws of the universe, laws the disobedience or neglect of which must be paid for, principles whose reasonableness must ultimately dawn on everyone who can be brought to summon up the intellectual courage and honesty to face them.

c. Diffuse More Widely the Social Heritage. A little knowledge is a dangerous thing. At the present time, as Patrick points out,⁵ the world has just enough knowledge to endanger it, not enough to save it. Ignorant people are ready dupes for the extremist. They will believe anything. Every plausible theory sweeps them off their feet. Half educated people do not know enough to realize how little they know, hence they tend to inflict their uncouth and “half-baked” ideas and explanations and schemes upon the world, adding to the confusion and often causing serious mischief. In a dynamic, progressive society, therefore, ignorance or half-knowledge is a distinct handicap both to the individual and his society. It means incapacity, aimlessness, and often viciousness.

In such a complex and highly organized society as ours the only sure foundation of right action is a sufficient amount of accurate knowledge and culture for everyone. The larger and more usable the individual's body of knowledge, the saner his wants, the more substantial his attitudes, and more fruitful his activities.

In this knowledge must be included a careful foundation of scientific theory and its applications, a knowledge of social forces and their use and abuse, a knowledge of civic and racial responsibilities, the simpler principles of hygiene, sanitation, and dietetics, at least a general cultural knowledge, and many other quite obvious elements; in brief, it must include intelligent contact with the entire social heritage.

The problem that confronts us is one of ignorance among men, and

⁵ *Psychology of Social Reconstruction*, p. 225.

not an undeveloped state of the arts and sciences. We have enough knowledge to make over the world and man, but it is in such few hands that we cannot nearly realize its potentialities. The people in general need to know. Defective health conditions exist not because scientists know so little, but because the public knows so little. Epidemics spread not because doctors do not know how to handle them, but because the people do not, or perhaps because they do not even know that the doctors know how. The chief discrepancy between the possible and the existing is largely ignorance. The universal possession of adequate intelligence and culture and of the extant knowledge is the only safe guide.

The average person needs that grasp of things that gives him a broad social perspective and a sense of control over his own and his group's destiny. The best guarantee of this is the right sort of an educational system; one that universally and thoroughly diffuses an adequate fund of valuable knowledge, and one that provides the necessary cautions, attitudes, and methods of thought. If the citizenry know and think they can weigh opinions, evaluate proposals, and arrive at intelligent conclusions, they can lay hold of the problems of the present competently and confidently.

It is not sufficient that knowledge be held by the few; it must become a common possession. Society must systematize and enlarge its knowledge facilities, and insist that every person be given the opportunity and the encouragement, in fact as well as in theory, to get a vigorous grasp of this knowledge. For progress depends not on the aristocratic learning of the few, but upon a wide popular distribution of knowledge. Distributive scholarship is as important as productive scholarship. And no one must make the mistake of thinking that knowledge, culture, inventions, discoveries, and the like, are self-distributive. This diffusion requires effort and organization to overcome the social inertia which tends to resist the distribution of knowledge.

For this is required a reorganized system of universal elementary and secondary education that will put the entire social capital in the possession of every citizen, as far as he is mentally capable of receiving it. A modernized high school education is the minimum essential that can be tolerated to-day. Furthermore, for all those mentally competent, the best of college, university, and technical education should be available. To students in the humblest circumstances these should be offered with free tuition and opportunity for earning living expenses. Certainly no one should be excluded or subjected to heavy handicaps because of

poverty. All people must be well educated to the greatest possible extent, otherwise progress is impossible.

d. Produce a Better Selection and Utilization of Special Ability.

Another one of the important functions of education is to discover the aptitudes of the nation's children. "Education," as Ruskin once said, "is not the equalizer but the discerner of men." This work of discernment, however, is not an easy task; it requires for its accomplishment (1) an elementary school curriculum which is sufficiently wide to enable teachers and principals to search out the varied abilities of children, (2) teachers with the intelligence and sympathy to fit them for this delicate task, and (3) an educational ladder that shall provide for the development of special faculties once they are discovered. Any educational system, if it is to be progressive, is obligated to awaken the sleeping desires, faculties, and potencies of individuals, to deliberately draw out their minds and set them to working. Progress to-day surely suffers from the fact, quite obvious to every intelligent person, that many persons of fourth-rate ability are engaged in work which is really beyond their powers, while there are other people of sound second-class abilities whose lot is to do fourth-class work. It would add incalculably to social progress if a more discerning educational system diminished the number of such misfits, and brought out of the rough the latent genius. For this a more careful discrimination between the type and quality of individual minds is necessary, and a specialized training suited thereto provided for all, regardless of social position; for we know to-day that different types of mind demand different types of education.

Especially is this true in view of the great need of leaders. A truly progressive society must be produced by leaders, and these leaders must be people of ability, with an adequate information of social facts and social forces, and a scientific training for the special achievement they are capable of rendering. The superior society and the superior man are correlatives, and the educational system must do its crucial part in enabling the former to be correlated with the latter.

If this is to occur, we must realize our responsibility toward the children of superior ability. Our educational system has bestowed far more of its attention on deficient children than on the superior, in fact, the superior children have not even received any special recognition or opportunity. We have thought that they would take care of themselves, and have left it to chance. But to do this is to create conditions which are unfavorable to the proper unfolding of their abilities. The superior child needs the most careful direction to prevent the appearance of

eccentricities, or development along lines detrimental to social welfare or any other miscarriage of superior abilities.⁶

But the educational system that can give full play to ability must be sufficiently varied to sound out every individual; the various notes of civilization must be struck in the hearing of every youth, that he may best find his particular interest and bent. "The greatest tragedy of life is the blank silence of the souls whom fate has never struck and made them ring."

e. Provide a Balanced Curriculum. An education which is to contribute to progress must maintain a careful balance among the different arts and sciences. Too great an emphasis on the physical sciences or the control of physical nature, while it may lead to great progress in material ways, will not favor progress in social and moral ways. If natural science is taught to the exclusion of other subjects, it unduly narrows the individual. The only knowledge for him is scientific knowledge, the only proof the proof of the laboratory, the only limitation the limitation of experiment. It often results in a lack of judgment on public questions, a crudeness of thought expression, a lack of appreciation for art, culture, literature, or religion and things spiritual. Too much emphasis upon history and the classics, instead of developing a profound reverence for and appreciation of the thought and occurrences of the past and serving as a stimulus to further endeavor in the future, may serve as a soporific or opiate which deadens all sense of responsibility for the future. What is needed is a curriculum that will produce that wide culture, that social sympathy and understanding, that mental elasticity and adaptiveness, that makes the individual an intelligent, appreciative, and constructive citizen of the universe.⁷

The curriculum that is provided must be selected with the social as well as the individual end in view. Our schools to-day are inclined to lay too much emphasis upon the knowledge and training which make for individual success, and which in later life will enable the individual to earn a living. Or they are engaged in producing brilliant and arrogant creatures who consider themselves as ends in themselves, but who, from the social point of view, are merely ornate sepulchers. What is needed is the imparting of that knowledge which will make the individual the best citizen for a coöperative society where all are assisting in the progressive task.

f. Teach the Social Subjects. We need more emphasis on the social

⁶ I. King, *Education for Social Efficiency*, p. 298.

⁷ Cf. J. H. Robinson, *The New History*, pp. 265-266.

subjects, and the balance and the judgments and the outlook they offer; the education of the individual for proficiency in his human relations must be at the very core of the educational process. The teaching of the social sciences, especially sociology, in schools and colleges, supplemented by the popularizing of social teachings through the novel, the magazine, and the "features" in newspapers, has already resulted in the development of a public opinion in some quarters which is at least tolerant of social reforms and social movements, and of sociological interpretations of history and current happenings. This social education, made more intense and reiterated through press and platform, would more and more enable persons constructively to devise policies of social betterment.

Education, in order to become an effective instrument for social progress, must seek more and more to bring about an awakening and a rationalizing of the social consciousness. Progress comes only through self-knowledge. As Ellwood points out, "Our universities should make more provision for research along social lines; and our colleges and secondary schools should give more instruction in the social sciences. We cannot have intelligent, social service on the part of our citizens without their possessing social knowledge; and indeed they will lack even rational motive for such service without such knowledge. Social progress, then obviously depends upon the perfecting and diffusion of scientific knowledge of society."⁸

The citizen, and therefore the student, needs a positive and constructive attitude toward the institutions and agencies by which social order is maintained and social life is carried on, particularly toward government, the family, religion, and the community.

g. Develop Mental Alertness and Flexibility. The education that contributes most to progress will be that which teaches those ideas that arouse children and youths from dogmatic slumber, as Kant put it, and inspires in them a desire to engage in the everlasting search for the Holy Grail of science and idealism. The good education strives to give a mental slant that will prepare for constant changes of individual and social adjustment. It is conducted in such a fashion as to stimulate the original tendencies of the child, and is not satisfied merely to reproduce the existent. In doing this education is performing one of its greatest social services, for in so doing it permits the trained person to have a sympathetic but discriminating attitude toward social habits and a basis for

* "The Educational Theory of Social Progress," *Scientific Monthly*, Vol. 5, p. 449.

adjustment.⁹ Furthermore, if the individual is to have the power of serving society he must be aroused to the need of perpetually awaking himself to an ever-widening conception of his responsibilities and a progressive criticism of his own social behavior. He must learn to change himself when intelligence shows him that it is necessary. He must learn to reach out after the better always. Instead of credulity, the object should be to stimulate constructive doubt, the love of mental adventure, the sense of worlds to conquer by enterprise and boldness in thought. One of the primary objects of education is to emancipate, to free from superstition, from the tyranny of worn out notions, and from the prejudices which enslave the judgment, and to develop powers of discrimination and perspective, a logic of inquiry, a posture of reflection.

Another basic educational requirement along this line is the development of initiative. "A progressive society," says King, "must have a good proportion of individuals who are capable of large initiative, who shape conditions to suit their purposes rather than merely suit their purposes to conditions."¹⁰ People need to have qualities of eagerness, of zest for reaching out after the unattained, of desire for experiment, of perseverance, in brief, of initiative. All the educational agents need to be directed to this end. After these have been elicited, they must be wisely directed and dominated by ideals of social responsibility and social service. Needless to say, instruction in initiative, though so essential both to individual success and also a fundamental condition of human progress, is still pretty much of an ideal.

h. Undertake to Train Character. We have taught everything else in our schools better than the art of all arts, namely, how to live together in society. We now see that if education is to make its greatest contribution to progress it must include character training, a task which the home and the various religious agencies are less and less capable of handling. As Snedden points out, as society becomes more complex and develops higher standards of individual and social well-being, it must depend upon its specialized educational agencies to carry on the functions formerly performed incidentally or informally through life itself apart from the school.¹¹ The formation of great principles of self-discipline and control, habits of order and industry, a conception of social responsibility, a feeling of obligation to do something, to produce

⁹ E. R. Groves, *Personality and Social Adjustment*, pp. 60-61.

¹⁰ For an expansion of this thought and that which follows in this paragraph see I. King, *Social Agents of Education*, pp. 225-228.

¹¹ D. Snedden, *Sociological Determination of Objectives in Education*, p. 267.

something in the world, and great spiritual ideals are basic to-day if education is to be of any great assistance. For it is something more than a training school for making a living, acquiring knowledge or disciplining minds.

Education is tending to-day to become more and more intellectual, and this is admirable. But an educational system which tends unduly to develop the intellectual faculties while leaving the moral nature largely unguided, instead of creating habits of self-control, may have the contrary effect, for if moral qualities are lacking the person will not benefit himself nor others by the knowledge imparted to him; which in that case might serve only to make him the cleverer knave. It is equally true that no amount of mere information or facts can constitute progressive education. It is dangerous to send forth boys and girls alert in mind and full of facts, but loose in character. History furnishes warnings enough as to the dangers inherent in the over-intellectualization of the aims of education. We now see that we have made a great mistake in counting men as having a liberal education, even though the world of knowledge was known to them, and their intellects were polished and brilliant, who remained narrow, unsocial, exclusive, selfish, and even immoral.

Furthermore, the need for spiritual activity and calm control in man grows in proportion to the magnitude of the victories which he achieves over the forces of Nature. These victories always make for a new arrogance which tends to have highly unfortunate social results. Therefore, if education is not to make for moral disaster while it is making for advance in skill, in knowledge, in intellect, and in science, it must also provide for the development of character and soul.

The fact cannot be overemphasized, however, that moral qualities cannot be implanted by mere precept and praise of them, or even by direct instruction in character as a separate study or topic. Character cannot be taught by cataloging and counting and describing the virtues. It must be fostered by right discipline and habitual practice from childhood onwards, so that the proper habits become a second nature and their exercise natural and unconscious, their breach a shock and a remorse. This comes only with regular daily discipline in well-doing. Character is something that grows; it is not taught.

Therefore the only real character training that counts is that which actually functions in the life of the individual; it is only that which produces a dynamic, virile, and socially disciplined personality. What is thus needed is actual practice during school days in the type of activi-

ties which general social welfare will demand of the pupil in coming years. The indirect method is best. It is through living in and taking part in the organized life of the home and the school that the child's character is gradually formed. Virtue is not so much a thing to be learned as to be acquired by practice—habits woven into the principles of the individual's nature.¹²

Athletics, participation in the activities of various school organizations, cultural activities, self-government, the socialized recitation, the project method, in fact, the whole school program in its entirety should be utilized to produce independence of thought and judgment, perseverance, self-denial, poise, background, moral strength, intellectual honesty, self-reliance, sense of responsibility, appreciation of ideals, an over-mastering enthusiasm for humanity, and the various other elements that go to make up character. Above all though, it is the duty of the teacher *not* to accept "an inexact observation, a slipshod remembrance, a careless statement, or a distorted truth." If he does he will corrupt a child's character no less than his intelligence. This simply emphasizes the importance of having teachers with the very best brains and the highest moral character obtainable.

4. THE TEACHER AND PROGRESS¹³

In bringing into existence such an educational program we cannot put our faith in plan and organization and machinery alone. Important above all else are well-trained and consecrated teachers with personality, idealism, and inborn ability. This not only is, but always must be, a fundamental fact. Professor E. D. Starbuck has said: "The future of humanity, the destiny of nations, the direction of human progress are in the hands not so much of makers of laws or captains of industry as of teachers who are shaping the citizenry of the world."¹⁴ The people who want their children worked up into the best possible product, and who are convinced that education is a necessary and a wise means for doing this well, if they are alert and consistent, demand and provide a corps of the best possible teachers. For they will realize that teachers are the most essential servants of society and that without good teachers all else is worthless or worse. The quality of the teacher decidedly affects to-morrow.

¹² E. D. Starbuck, "Fundamentals of Character Training," *Proceedings, National Education Association*, 1924.

¹³ See Keith and Bagley, *The Nation and the Schools*, pp. 208-239; L. D. Coffman, *The Social Composition of the Teaching Population*.

¹⁴ *Proceedings, National Education Association*, 1924, p. 165.

Even the most superficial examination produces evidence that is none too assuring. The great bulk of the teachers are inadequately prepared.¹⁵ Those going into teaching are not the better, more alert and intelligent young women in many cases. In fact, the general quality of the new recruits is deteriorating, as most teachers' training-schools will admit. There is some truth in the statement of George Bernard Shaw made a few years ago when he said, "He who can does, he who can't teaches." This means that many teachers do not have the ability, the cultural background, the inspiring personality, the vision, or the social attitudes that best fit them for their work.

Standardization also is a factor. As the numbers entering the training-schools has increased there has been a tendency to lump the students and make the training more and more mechanical. In the school system the teacher is shackled by programs and courses of study, by a vast and intricate machinery of administration and supervision, that takes away all originality and independence, discounts initiative, curtails ambition, and represses enthusiasm. This also has tended to select out the type of teacher that would fit into such a regime.

What is equally significant is the fact that most of the teachers when they start do not look upon themselves as permanent members of the teaching body. The records show that their average length of service is four years for the women, seven for the men. To both sexes, in fact, but particularly for the women, teaching is an interlude between school and something else—marriage for the women, and a more remunerative profession for the men.¹⁶

It is also true that the different training institutions have not been doing their work as well as they should. They have been emphasizing the mechanics of teaching rather than the spirit and subject-matter necessary to make a teacher a community force.

Lack of inducements to teach has discouraged the superior person from entering the teaching profession.¹⁷ Remuneration of teachers is a

¹⁵ Out of the 600,000 teachers in the United States in 1920, 30,000 had not had schooling beyond the eighth grade; 150,000 (including the 30,000) had not had more than two years of high school; about 480,000 had not had beyond two years of college; and only about 120,000 (20%) had the equivalent of more than two years of college. Equally disturbing are the age and experience data. One-fourth of these teachers were under 21 years; 150,000 teachers had not taught two years; 300,000 had taught less than four years. Keith and Bagley, *op. cit.*, pp. 219-222.

¹⁶ I am indebted for the content of these last two paragraphs to H. M. Kallen, "The American Public School," *New Republic*, Mar. 25, 1925, p. 119.

¹⁷ Consider the lot of 200,000 teachers in one-teacher and one-room rural schools. "Long winters in isolated, sparsely settled districts without hope even of congenial companionship; at best but half-welcome lodger in a home where

vital thing, for it means comfortable existence, cultural opportunities and contentment. If the community wants people with ability and vision, capable of transmitting a spiritual tradition and a progressive hope, it must be willing to pay more. We utter a lot of prattle about the significance of our teachers and then pay them less than we pay our auto mechanics. Most people will not accept genteel poverty when much more lucrative alternatives are at hand. This does not mean that salaries of teachers should be on the same plane with those of bank cashiers, or advertising specialists; if the salary was so high there would be a danger that the compensation would loom up as more important than the professional element, which is essentially the exercising of powers beneficial to mankind. Nor should the salary ever balance the value of the work that is done. The attention of a member of a profession should be fixed on outgo, not income. But the members of the teaching profession must live; and if they are to do their best work, they must live rather well; they must be protected against want, anxiety, and neglect. That is all that is asked for.

The status or standing of the profession in the community is another outstanding element. The incumbents of the teaching profession, because of its crucial importance, ought to be looked up to and honored. They ought to feel the tremendous sustaining power of a high public expectation and respect upon them. Needless to say, this is not generally true.

5. EDUCATIONAL ECONOMICS

In spite of the crucial importance of education, we are niggardly beyond expression in our expenditures for it as compared with other things. A people who spend twenty-two times as much for luxuries in general and twice as much for tobacco as for education, or whose federal budget allows 85 per cent of its expenditures for war and less than 2 per cent for research and every form of federal educational endeavor, has not yet learned its educational economics. We must wake up to the fact that there are only bare necessities and little or nothing of real comforts (for in many rural districts the 'better families' utterly refuse to 'board the teacher'); late night hours of preparation for tomorrow's onerous task; longer day hours of that task of patient effort with all the way from a handful to a houseful of pupils scattered, quite commonly throughout the eight grades; shabby little box-shack of a schoolhouse, set down in a piece of abandoned land, with outside toilets innocent of sanitation or seclusion; classrooms cross-lighted from blindless windows; unjacketed stove in the center of the room, ranged round with a confusion of rickety, unadjustable desks. Exaggeration? An hour's drive from metropolitan centers will discover such conditions throughout this boastful America." (Author unknown.) How can we expect talented, trained, and inspired young women to enter such holes of hopelessness with a sense of consecration and service?

fact that in this country of amazing wealth and amazing maladjustments it is no longer sufficient to set aside a mere pittance for the most important constructive task the group is performing.

As never before it is necessary to look upon expenditures for education as an investment for the public good—an investment in national stability and progress. It is necessary to pay teachers better, for a modern nation cannot afford the waste of poorly paid teachers. The home cannot be depended upon any more for certain forms of training, such as the teaching of morals, citizenship, health, industry, thrift, and obedience to law. We also have to teach vocation, and preparation for making a living, as the result of the decline of apprenticeship and the increasing mechanizing of industry. Culture appreciation must also be taught in the schools. We need to be freer in our expenditures for those who are capable and want to pursue their education beyond the minimum requirements of the law and are financially unable to do so. Youthful intellects dare not be stunted even though poor. All these tasks and a host of others must be fully met and paid for. Taking it all in all, a people get more in the way of real success, spiritual enrichment of life, permanent satisfaction, and progress if they spend their money for education than if they spend it in any other way.

6. THE MISTAKEN CRY OF "LEARN TO EARN"

From the point of view of progress the marked utilitarian tendencies in modern education are sinister. They obscure the real purposes and ends and make for a growing materialism. Everywhere there is the cry of specialization. Specialization in what? In knowledge and technique that will make for quick economic success. Every day attempts are made to crowd into the curriculum knowledge and methods that serve a strictly utilitarian purpose. Since religion, poetry, philosophy, some of the social sciences, and arts do not help in the scramble for prosperity, they must go. They are non-essentials, luxuries. But this strict attention to business is a hideous misconception of the function of education, and it postulates ends in life which can receive no rational approval. As long as self-advancement and commercial success is postulated as the be-all and end-all of education, so long will the nation be kept waiting for a cultural and spiritualized generation, and so long will it wait for progress; for progress is not made of economic prosperity or wealthy individuals. Culture, i. e., acquaintance with the best that has been known or said, and progress, i. e., enhancement of universal human good, are

words for which a wholly business-like and hustling world has little use. Such a conception forgets that education is not mainly a high road to self-advancement, but aims at the development of every side of the individual's nature in order that he may make his maximum contribution to life.

One of the stiffest educational fights ahead is to recapture the liberal education ideal. The specialist with his cult of the immediate and the useful must be put into his proper place. Else our educational system, instead of saving our generation and succeeding generations from a materialization and vulgarization of life, will become the chief party to it. Certainly education which recognizes only the law of competitive efficiency and has as its sole aim material advantage can contribute little to any progress save that which consists of purely material achievements. When education serves Mammon it ceases to produce individuals who are trained in the Platonic ideals of the Good, the Beautiful, and the True, or a society that is interested in the good life.¹⁸

7. EDUCATION FOR LEISURE IN AN INDUSTRIAL AGE

Another educational problem produced by the present industrial age is the conservation or wise use of the leisure time of the people regardless of class. For it is only by such a conservation that we can really get a truly educated people, and only through an educated people can we hope to have any of the conditions basic in progress. To-day, the knowledge and observation of any intelligent person unreservedly points to the fact that leisure time is being either wasted or worse than wasted by the average individual. And this is true in spite of the fact which Lester F. Ward and others have pointed out that leisure must be regarded as both the means and opportunity for education, especially that of adults.¹⁹

Our people have not been taught properly to use their leisure. Young men in this age of automatic machinery work short hours, have high pay, and much leisure on their hands, all highly desirable. This is accompanied by few responsibilities and at the same time high buying power. They have not, however, been brought up to a mental and moral and cultural level that approximates the economic level upon which they set foot immediately after leaving school. Their spare time and surplus cash goes into pursuits which do little to promote progress. Sensual and sensuous satisfaction are mainly the objects of their search for diversion.

See also H. G. James, "The Doom of the Arts College," *New Republic*, June 15, 1927.

See L. F. Ward, *Applied Sociology*, pp. 242-243.

This usually means some sort of mischief or vice, ranging all the way from very mild forms to serious breaches of the moral code, which have a decidedly harmful social effect. Our problem, as Arthur Pound well points out,²⁰ is to avoid machine-made barbarians. Because leisure has broadened out to include the majority, we must cultivate gentlemen and gentlewomen capable of properly utilizing and enjoying it *en masse*. The youth of to-day must be taught how to use their free hours and their excess earnings, not only so that they may not corrupt their youth and vitiate their maturity, but so that society itself may endure and even prosper. All must be fitted for leisure, else it will become a liability and a retrogressive factor.

Various elements are needed in this education. First of all training in self-restraint is basic, if the temptations of high wages or high salaries are to be resisted when the individual is relieved from the restraints imposed by the shop, or the daily professional or business task. He must also be taught and disciplined to subjugate the assertive ego to the demands of social well-being as manifested in the legal and ethical codes. Necessary also is a human and spiritual interest in the present, an understanding of the past, and a sympathy with the future, in order to give meaning to life and inspiration to leisure. History, literature, the sciences, natural and social, art, and music do this for most people if properly taught. All the spontaneous interests of a fine type must be appealed to and developed. Reading should be so taught that the student will want to employ some of his leisure time in adding to his knowledge and increasing his enjoyment by recourse to the riches of literature. The social sciences, if properly taught during the formative period of childhood and youth, will tend to make social responsibilities the leisure-time consideration of adults. The schools also can stimulate musical and artistic appreciation, love of high class recreation and amusement, especially useful and wholesome play and physical exercise, and cultivate tastes which furnish the basis for the suitable and profitable employment and the real enjoyment of future leisure. If they do not there will be a perceptible lowering of our moral and cultural tone, and progress will not only cease, but will become impossible.

8. EDUCATIONAL FREEDOM

Freedom of thought and freedom of teaching are recognized everywhere by liberal-minded people as a necessary condition to real educa-

²⁰ *The Iron Man in Industry*, Chap. X. Cf. also W. D. Ross, "The Right Use of Leisure as an Objective of Education," *Educational Review*, Vol. 66, pp. 71-74.

tion and real progress. But there are so many people who do not want this, who want teachers "safe" from their point of view, teachers who will say what they are told to say by powerful vested interests, who will not seriously investigate certain seamy sides of the established order, who will accept without questioning present standards, beliefs, ethics, and methods—that they actually seek to debar the fearless truth-seeker from schools and colleges lest he challenge that which is. But such a "safe" staff of teachers does not discover the truth, nor does it contribute much directly through its own efforts and ideas, or indirectly through its students to progress.

"Education has proved, and probably no one would now deny, that knowledge can advance, or at least can advance most rapidly, only by means of an unfettered search for truth on the part of those who devote their lives to seeking it in their respective fields, and by complete freedom in imparting to their pupils the truth that they have found. This has become an axiom in higher education, in spite of the fact that a searcher may discover error instead of truth, and be misled, and mislead others, thereby. We believe that if enough light is let in, the real relations of things will soon be seen, and they can be seen in no other way."²¹

9. THE DEMAND FOR A UNIFORM NATION-WIDE SYSTEM

Some of America's most perplexing problems center around the fact that our states and even our localities have different educational requirements, standards, and capacities to serve their required educational function. The time has come when we must insist upon uniform minima. The question has been asked, "Can we permit boys and girls of rare gifts, not to mention average boys and girls, just because they happen to have been born on the outskirts of the country to have only the outskirts of an education?"²² Illiteracy in Tennessee or Alabama does not remain a local problem, but due to population mobility and widespread intercourse and intercommunication becomes a national menace. Due to these factors children taught in Lincoln live their adult lives in Chicago; while Boston educates for Los Angeles, and Corn Center for New York City. To train children for residence in a particular city or district is absurd to-day. We must prepare pupils for general, not local, welfare.

²¹ President A. L. Lowell in his report on freedom of speech to the Harvard Corporation. Quoted by Z. Chaffee, Jr., *Freedom of Speech*, Harcourt, Brace & Co., p. 368.

²² J. Swain, "The Nation and the Crisis in its Schools," *Educational Review*, Vol. 56, p. 383.

What this means is that education is a national matter and there must be a nation-wide coördination of our schools. The child is to-day of concern to a wider region than the place in which he is born; and the wealth, or general intelligence, or foresight, or sense of responsibility of his community is no measure of the promise of its human material. The nation must seize the initiative and lead the way. Either directly, or through the states, it must subsidize and stimulate the struggling or backward communities and set up high standards for them. This does not mean that the people of this locality or that should or would lose their control over the teaching of their own children. It simply means that the nation must set up national minima so that no section of the country suffers from the carelessness, laxity, or penuriousness of any other section.

IO. THE AGENTS OF PROGRESS: A CONCLUSION

These agents of progress that we have discussed—intellect and knowledge, science, invention and discovery, exceptional men, ideals, public opinion, and education—are not the superficial, or obvious, or concrete social agents, not the applied mechanics of progress, but the real forces which in combination are the backbone, the causal factors, of all the applied processes. They are the agents behind the institutions of one kind or another—behind the church, the family, the school, industry, and organized charity and correction, that are the participants in the progress program. We have discussed, as it were, the great outstanding raw materials of progress.

The fact must be impressed on the reader, however, that these agents are not guarantees of progress; they are merely machinery, potentialities, instruments to be employed by a variety of groups for a variety of uses. They all have their bad uses as well as good. Their success as progress agents depends on the use to which they are put. Manipulated by certain groups, they become the means whereby the race may be prostituted to the basest ends, or means whereby it destroys itself; manipulated by other groups they become the means whereby man is elevated to the heights of which occasional great and good men dream.

Man is free always to make either a good or a bad use of any of the powers he acquires. Intelligence, for example, can be put to base uses as well as to noble and progressive purposes. Knowledge of the bad can be accumulated and perpetuated as well as knowledge of the good. Science may be devoted to the manufacture of death-dealing

devices capable, if not too much obstructed, of wiping out an entire civilization in a single summer morning, or it may be devoted to the increase of man's food supply, or the elimination of the diseases and weaknesses of the human frame, or the production of a great eugenic race, or the conquest or control of nature for humanitarian purposes. Not even a genius is automatically and in the nature of things assisting progress; the genius may be full of egotism, self-love, irritability, jealousy, coldness of heart; he may be quite immoral, even obscene; consequently he may be incapable of the discipline necessary to produce useful works. If public opinion is controlled by certain unscrupulous agencies, an entire nation may be led astray by trumped up hates, prejudices, and perverted attitudes, or it may be made pure, hopeful, and upward looking, and be prompted by the highest ideals of brotherhood.

Education may be manipulated by powerful but perverted groups and become a means of repression and exploitation, instead of a great inspired process of human levitation, the knowledge which it diffuses may be as readily manipulated by the socially unscrupulous as those motivated by the highest ethical principles. The way in which these agents are used is entirely in the hands of the present and the future, and eternal vigilance and persistent effort on the part of the ethically-minded progressives are the only guarantee that they will be properly used.

Another fact of significance is that these various agents must work together. There is no particular institution or portion of society which is alone responsible for progress, or that is capable by itself of effecting progress. The agents must all reach out together and mutually support and contribute to each other if there is to be genuine progress.

QUESTIONS AND PROBLEMS

1. Why is education the key agency in social progress?
2. What should be the main purposes of education for progress?
3. Who shall determine the specific content of any educational program?
4. Draw up a junior high school curriculum that you would approve of as a preparation for a progressive life.
5. Discuss education as an agent of social control.
6. Read E. C. Moore, "Educational Reconstruction," *International Journal of Ethics*, Vol. 29, pp. 350-363. What effect did the educational system of Germany have in shaping the people? What significance does this have for our study?
7. Read H. G. Wells, *The Salvaging of Civilization*, pp. 141-166. What do you think of his ideas?

8. What is the function of education in a democracy? (See W. E. Weyl, *The New Democracy*, pp. 326-330; D. S. Hill, "The Psychology of Democracy in Public Education," *Science Monthly*, Vol. 8, pp. 442-455.)
9. In what way is education a cure for social discontent? (See H. W. Household, "Education, the Cure for the Social Discontent," *Hibbert Journal*, Vol. 20, pp. 158-164.)
10. Mr. H. G. Wells has said, "It has always been a race between education and catastrophe." What did he mean?
11. When Mr. Bernard Shaw calls some teachers "amateur popes," what does he mean? Do such teachers have any progressive influence? Why?
12. Have the changes in education usually been initiated by the teachers or forced upon them from without?
13. What is the significance of the fact that education is always for to-morrow?
14. Would a greater coördination of all educational agencies of society be desirable?
15. Will we soon need to think of education as a unified world endeavor?

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CHAPTER XV

THE ENVIRONMENTAL ASPECTS OF PROGRESS

I. THE RELATION OF ENVIRONMENT TO PROGRESS

IF, as we have contended, progress is essentially a task in social control for the sake of enabling man to live fuller and better, it must, to be successful, include a fairly comprehensive study of social causation, that is, a scientific analysis and evaluation of the factors which condition and determine the collective life of man. Any complete causal explanation of human society must take cognizance of the biological, psychological, and environmental conditions and determinants. In this present study the psychological factors were partially dealt with in Chapter VIII, the more significant biological factors will be dealt with in the next chapter, while the environment as an influence force was also touched upon in Chapter VIII and will be treated more extensively in this present chapter.

Our purpose is to attempt to determine in what ways environment serves both as a stimulus and obstacle to progress. Inasmuch as it is that which surrounds us from the moment of conception and has its effects upon every phase and element of our nature, the movement of a people up or down turns to a considerable extent upon the conditions surrounding it at any given time. Here are the stimuli and conditioning factors which cause human capacities to develop or etiolate. Here also is the arena in which men act and in which progress occurs. Hence we are trying to get at the environmental factors that determine human physical traits, health, energy and vigor, occupation, psychic characters and qualities, attitudes, culture, behavior, and institutional forms; and the general *ensemble* of environmental conditions that make possible or encourage progress, or that break down man and cause him and his group to deteriorate, or that make him satisfied and inert. Here also are some of the highly complex forces that produce processes of change, and that force new adjustments; hence these must be studied to ascertain their principles of operation and the nature of the forces producing them.

This is, however, a difficult task, for the analytical examination of

environment is a comparatively recent study; in fact, it has just begun to make its appearance in the field of the social sciences. Consequently there is no science of human ecology which is comparable in precision of observation or in method of analysis with the comparatively recent, but much more firmly established, sciences of plant and animal ecology. There is, however, a rapidly increasing interest in the subject expressing itself in much substantial research.

This research encounters various difficulties due to the great degree of abstraction which is necessary in order to perceive the functioning of the environmental controls, the inadequate technique, and a most confusing variability among the various factors involved. But, in the main, we can say with some assurance that this is a wholesome and stimulating set of environmental conditions and that that is not.

At this moment, while there are few comprehensive and thoroughly scientific studies to depend upon, hosts of studies are available which touch upon the field of human ecology in one or another of its varied aspects. Inasmuch as we must base our present analysis at least indirectly on these, we shall avoid dogmatic statements or dubious evidence, and confine ourselves to that which among the majority of thinkers on the subject is generally accepted.

2. THE CONCEPT "ENVIRONMENT" AS ANALYZED BY BERNARD

In order that the social scientist, who invariably is also a progressive, may have a clear notion of the objective factors which affect human and social activity, there is great need for rendering the concept of environment definite and for analyzing it into its constituent parts. Professor L. L. Bernard, who has done pioneer work in environmental classification, classifies them logically in such a way as to emphasize their causal relationships to human and social behavior; that is, he classifies them as types of environmental pressure.¹ His classification, much abridged, follows.

a. Physical Environments. Here he places the *cosmic* influences, including such factors as the sun's heat, the moon's attraction, electric disturbances, the relationship of the sun and other cosmic bodies upon the earth; the *physico-geographic*, including altitude and such contour and surface configurations as mountains, coast lines, valleys, rivers, and

¹ See "A Classification of Environments," *American Journal of Sociology*, Vol. 31, pp. 322-326; "Environment as a Social Factor," *Publications of the American Sociological Society*, Vol. 16, pp. 90-103; *Introduction to Social Psychology*, pp. 75-76.

mountain passes; *soil*, especially in relation to the supply and distribution of plant foods, particularly nitrogen, potassium, and phosphorus; *climate*, including especially temperature, humidity, and the succession of the seasons; the *inorganic resources*, especially the minerals and metals—such as the natural fuels, coal, petroleum, and natural gas—the structural materials, iron, copper, tin, zinc, lead, and the rarer industrial metals; *natural agencies*, especially falling water, winds, tides, and sun's rays; and *natural mechanical processes*, such as combustion, radiation, and gravity.

b. Biological or Organic Environment. Here fall the various micro-organisms, such as bacteria, bacilli, and amoebæ; the various parasites and insect pests; the larger plants which constitute the forests which provide materials for shelter, clothing, medicines, and foods; the larger animals which form the herds, flocks, packs, and schools, providing food, shelter, and clothing; natural biological processes, such as reproduction, growth, decomposition, assimilation, excretion, and circulation.

c. Social Environments. These are derived and fall into three groups: (1) the *physico-social*, the inventions of one sort or another that are the product of man's reaction upon the physical environments, such as transportation and communication agents, houses and buildings, cities, heating and cooling apparatus, chemical compounds, machinery and implements; (2) the *bio-social*, domesticated plants and animals used for any human purpose; (3) the *psycho-social*, the objectified and wholly or partly standardized behavior processes, such as customs, traditions, conventions, beliefs, mores, folkways, fads, fashions, crazes, attitudes, and the stored psychic symbols, such as books and periodicals, pictures, statuary, musical compositions, archeological and ethnological collections, inscriptions, codes, moving pictures, phonograph records, and language—all stored data acting as stimuli to social and individual behavior.

d. Composite or Institutionalized Derivative Control Environments. These are products of the other environments in the form of institutions. They are of a general nature, such as the economic, political, racial, esthetic, ethical, religious, and educational institutions, and the more specific ones, such as American, Jewish, Scandinavian, southern, democratic, Catholic, conservative, and masculine.

For the purposes of our treatment, these different classifications can be reduced to two: the *physical environment*, including the sum of natural phenomena now exhibited and the phenomena of preceding ages still

in effect, whether of a physical or biological nature; and the *social environment*, including all social products, whether of a physical, organic, psychological, or institutional nature.

3. THE PHYSICAL ENVIRONMENT AS A CONDITIONER OF PROGRESS

At any given time it is evident that the amount and character of progress in a society is limited and conditioned at least to some extent by physical nature. This does not mean that one need take a stand with the geographical determinists who make geography the sole cause of social change. It simply means that the impartial observer is facing facts. He sees that environmental conditions rarely work directly and mechanically upon human beings or human groups, but that they are significant in an indirect way as they change biological conditions, habits, instinctive tendencies, feelings, and ideas. This they do (1) through their power to exert a selective influence, (2) their efficiency as modifying or habituating stimuli, (3) their ability to act as a stimulating influence, and (4) the fact that they have furnished the framework within which the processes of biological and social evolution have taken place. It would be hard to deny, for example, the selective influence of the physical environment, operating over relatively long periods of time, in fixing in a stock certain inherent traits or social characteristics that are favored by that environment. It would be equally hard to deny the large part which favorable physical conditions have played in the development of human civilization, by stimulating human behavior.

The physical environment is not, however, the absolute determiner that people have occasionally thought it to be, nor is in it any sense the sole or even the decisive factor in social progress. If it were, as Ellwood points out,² geographical conditions should make progressive societies out of animal groups. Furthermore, as he also shows, social progress does not always take place when physical conditions are favorable, nor have the most favorable conditions of physical environment prevented retrogression of societies in the past. Greece and Rome, for example, fell though there was no appreciable modification of physical environment. Cultures are often radically changed without marked changes in the physical conditions. While there is some correlation between habitat in the form of climate, geography, soil, and diet, and the specific characteristics of humanity, such as physique, temperament, institutions, occupations, and ideas, it is in no sense the sole arbiter of that people's char-

² *Psychology of Human Society*, pp. 429-430.

acter or destiny. When a complete picture of the shaping forces is desired, various other elements, particularly the biological heredity of the moment, the so-called social heritage, and man's brain power, must be introduced. But physical environment is a powerful factor nevertheless, and must be considered by those interested in social progress. Anyone must grant that given two individuals of exactly the same stock, if they develop in different environments they will vary more or less in form and in quality of function. Similarly the sum total of the social activities and institutions of groups will vary more or less; in fact, will undergo constant change as the result of natural conditions such as climate, geographical position, fauna, and flora.

Human life has a geographical basis; its character and quality does depend vitally on the natural physical environment. Any theoretical study of progress must recognize the part which physical nature plays in the affairs of men.

The effects of climate, particularly climatic change, are not difficult to observe. We all know through experience the effects of temperature, humidity, the seasons, and the weather upon our physical and mental condition and upon human activity generally. Certainly any climatic conditions which stimulate the energies of man, such as are found in parts of Europe and North America, are factors in social progress. Huntington's studies are particularly significant along this line.³ Dexter has called particular attention to the effects of weather.⁴ A tropical or an arctic climate means low general efficiency in the main for all human beings. Extremes of heat or cold reduce efficiency, both physical and mental; extreme aridity or extreme humidity has a debilitating effect; human efficiency increases with weather changes from day to day, as compared with a climate with the same seasonal average but imperceptible variations. Huntington even contends that wherever civilization has risen to a high level, the climate appears to have possessed the qualities which to-day are most stimulating. Certain pathological conditions, social and individual, such as crimes, both against person and property, delinquency, poverty, suicide, insanity, and nervous instability, seem to be affected by climate also.⁵ Climatic conditions have their more or less

³ See his *Civilization and Climate*, *Climate Factors as Illustrated in Arid America*, and *The Pulse of Asia*.

⁴ *Weather Influences*. See also A. Leffingwell, *Influence of the Seasons upon Conduct*.

⁵ See M. Parmelee, *Criminology*, pp. 43-53; J. L. Gillin, *Criminology and Penology*, pp. 81-87; C. Lombroso, *Crime, Its Causes and Remedies*, pp. 5-19; J. L. Gillin, *Poverty and Dependency*, pp. 52-53; G. Aschaffenburg, *Crime and Its Repression*, pp. 15-30; A. J. Todd, *Theories of Social Progress*, pp. 158-159.

direct effect upon health in that they affect the life, development, and virulence of the microorganisms which are the specific cause of disease, and they may strengthen or weaken the individual's power of resistance against the attacks of these organisms.⁶ Certainly human energy and, to an extent, honesty, morality, strength of will, and health are affected by climate, if not entirely dependent on it. The more roundabout effects of climate, such as the relationship between rainfall, temperature, humidity, season, and man's biological resources in the form of crops and live stock are also highly significant in any study of social progress, in that they provide a type of physical means essential to man's full life.

There is pretty general agreement that a good climate for a progressive existence for most people most of the time is one which has frequent moderate weather changes; fairly marked annual and diurnal variations in temperature; a reasonable amount of cold during at least part of the year; a refreshing variety of sunshine and cloudiness, and sufficient rainfall to provide enough moisture for the growth of crops. Such a climate is an intermediate one. It is neither invariably hot nor permanently cold. It is neither monotonously arid and cloudless, nor always dull and rainy. It is between all extremes. It is conducive to the development of sturdy men and women, physically strong and mentally alert.

The configuration of the land, its topography and contour, may also play a considerable rôle. Man's location on islands, in back country, in mountainous districts, in river valleys, along seas or oceans, on fertile plains, or deserts, goes far in determining the nature of his activities and the degree of his culture. Natural barriers in the form of mountains, deserts, forests, or swamps, may protect him from hostile migrating hordes, but they may also isolate him and hinder that intercommunication which is one of the first conditions of progress. Isolation almost universally leads to biological and social inbreeding, to conservatism, clannishness, narrowness, superstition, inelasticity, in brief, to stagnation. On the other hand, location on rivers, seacoasts with good harbors, on broad plains—all natural routes of travel—promotes rapid social progress, through the intercommunication and mingling of peoples thus made possible, the selection and cross-fertilization of ideas, inventions, and cultures, and the exchange of material commodities that is promoted. Accessibility and contact are among the prime prerequisites

⁶R. D. Ward, "Climate and Health, with Special Reference to the United States," *Scientific Monthly*, Vol. 12, pp. 355-378.

of progress; they make possible the meeting of societies and their products, and the consequent beneficial selection and mutual enrichment which invariably comes. Never have we realized as now the importance of contact in the progress of a people, or the part of isolation in producing stagnation and repetition.⁷

Equally significant are the soil and its resources in the form of minerals and metals, as well as abundant biological resources in the form of forests, grains, vegetables, and various food and draught animals. These satisfy some of man's material wants. They also provide wealth, and without wealth there can be no surplus of goods or leisure, both of which are necessary if individuals and groups are to realize their highest potentialities. It must be granted, however, that wealth in itself is no guarantee of progress; it depends upon the type of social organization that uses it. Soil fertility and the other great natural resources only give an opportunity for progress to occur.

These different factors of the physical environment combined have certain other effects. They partially determine the major economic activities of a people, such as occupation and industry, and as Hayes says,⁸ "Whatever determines the way in which a people get their living, largely determines the way in which they live, so that the geographic conditions which prescribe their economic activities thereby indirectly determine to a very large extent all the other departments of their social life." In this latter connection are mentioned forms of government, domestic organizations, intellectual interests, esthetic and recreational tastes and original religious creeds.

These factors also interact in influencing the location and size of human aggregates, both of which are important from the point of view of progress. Considerable aggregations of human beings can only occur where the conditions of climate, soil, food, and topography are favorable. As Ellwood points out,⁹ dense human populations have from earliest times characterized fertile river valleys, indented seacoasts, and, in general, localities where natural resources were abundant. If such conditions do not exist groups are scattered. A food supply sufficiently abundant permits the growth of considerable groups, and this is one

⁷ Until the recent penetration of our Appalachian region by highways our "mountain whites" were an excellent illustration of isolation. Shut in by the surrounding mountains, they isolated themselves from the culture about them and the most primitive conditions prevailed. In fact, they have been referred to as our "contemporary ancestors." For an intimate account of their life see E. A. Ross, "Pocketed Americans," *New Republic*, Jan. 9 and 23, 1924.

⁸ *Introduction to the Study of Sociology*, p. 31.

⁹ *Op. cit.*, p. 163.

of the conditions of the culture and the development of groups. The least that can be said is that these complementary physical conditions of climate, natural resources, and accessibility must exist if the progress that comes from sizable human aggregations is to occur.

Though less significant for progress, mention might be made of the more or less direct relationship between the different elements of the physical environment as a selective influence and stature, physique, head form, development of organs and muscles, pigmentation of skin, eyes, and hair, hair texture and structure, and various lesser regional physical adaptations in man. Notable are the investigations of Gould and Baxter among the descendants of Europeans in the armies of the Civil War showing a marked increase in stature, the series of experiments carried on by Professor Boas in which he measured the skulls of immigrants and their children and found that a common head form seemed to be developed by American environmental conditions, or the data collected in China (at Tsing Hua College) showing distinct differences in prevailing head form among boys from different Chinese provinces.

Idea-systems the world over show the influence of physical environment. Ethical codes, for example, are local both in origin and jurisdiction, and, to an extent, have to deal with that conduct which produces the necessary adjustments of individuals to each other in daily affairs. Originally, of course, ethical codes were directly concerned with the survival of the members of the group, and this process had as its dominant conditioning factor the physical environment. Ethical codes still reflect occupations, major methods of obtaining subsistence, forms of property, types of domestic organization, and vicissitudes arising from seasons, all of which may be more or less determined by local environmental conditions.¹⁰ Morality and ethical systems and ideas everywhere depend on the customs and institutions of any people, and these are in great part created by the reaction to a given environment; in fact, they are only excellent in proportion as they are adapted to a particular environment.

Religion and religious forms and institutions are to a certain extent influenced by physical environment.¹¹ Primitive religion was partially an attempt to explain local natural phenomena, to entreat the deity or deities to assist processes of reproduction and growth, to effect an

¹⁰ See E. C. Hayes, *op. cit.*, pp. 34-35; F. Thomas, *Environmental Basis of Society*, p. 12.

¹¹ Hayes, *op. cit.*, pp. 35-36.

adjustment to the awesome and inexplicable. Many of the religious conceptions of later men reflect physical environment also. Everyone is familiar with Peschel's theory of the influence of the physical environment on the origin and development of the great religions, especially his explanation of the rise of monotheism, and everyone will grant that something can be said for his contention. Notable also are the conceptions of Valhalla, the warm place of future reward and bliss with its sensuous satisfactions of the north-dwelling Teuton, or the happy hunting grounds, well-stocked with game, of the half-starved, hunting and fishing Indian, the religious festivals of thanksgiving at the close of harvest and in the spring at the end of a long winter, the religious ritual that develops around customs of practical value, such as the care of the milk with religious ritual among the Todas, or the planting dances of some of the American Indians. Religion everywhere reflects the fundamental expedients of the life process, which are undeniably bound up intimately with the physical world. Even the religion of the civilized man of the Western hemisphere shows vast economic influence.

Finally, the physical environment plays its part in shaping the psychological characteristics of both individuals and groups. In view of the close functional correlation between man's bodily state and his mental activity, and since, as has been mentioned above, there is a close relation between man's physical condition and the physical environment, man's thinking, feeling, willing, and many of his other behavior expressions are to a large degree affected by climate, food, altitude, and configuration, as well as the more striking natural phenomena, such as earthquakes, tornadoes, and floods. Similarly the social environment is not the result of the independent working of native tendencies of the members of the group, but of these tendencies as determined by climate and other geographical conditions, such as land and waterways, timber, minerals, and agricultural resources. The physical environment through its effect on composition, numbers, and activities operates indirectly to shape the social interstimulation. Furthermore, through the generally accepted effects of such environmental phenomena as weather, it also influences social-psychic reactions through individual reactions.¹² That its influence as a condition of human activity and as a progress factor is great, is undeniable. While not the absolute conditioner of human activity that many have maintained it is, it must always be reckoned with.

¹² Cf. F. Thomas, *Environmental Basis of Society*, pp. 6-7.

4. THE SOCIAL ENVIRONMENT AS CONDITIONER ¹³

A far more potent force than the physical environment in governing and shaping the behavior and activity of individuals is the social environment, the great significance of which has been only recently realized. The problem of environmental influences has long been complicated, and its solution obstructed, by the fact that the psychic and social environments are much more complex and hence more difficult to understand and control than the physical. This is partly due to the fact that the influence of the psycho-social environmental pressures is primarily and directly upon the mental organization, both conscious and unconscious, of the organism, and consequently its responses come silently and imperceptibly and are not usually visible. Then, too, we had not until recently, and still have not satisfactorily, determined the nature of the social processes themselves as bases for environmental study. Only during the last decade and a half or less have the social techniques developed sufficiently to enable the social scientist to collect analytical and positive data. The analysis of social processes to date has, however, already thrown up many important facts as to the correlations between psycho-social environmental pressures and the acquisition of mental, moral, and social traits of individuals and the form and functions of social organizations, the technique by which the neural organization responds with action and idea patterns to the pressure of environment, and also such data as that of the psychoanalysts, Freudians, and behaviorists. It has also encouraged the analysis of instinct, the study of the physiology, neurology, psychology, and sociology of habit formation, and the analysis of the mechanics of the various types of imitation. This has thrown much light on the way in which human nature is formed, and the nature of that dominant shaping force, the social environment.

The social environment is a variable complex composed of innumerable elements, most of which are transmissions from the past, though in recent years new elements are being rapidly introduced. It consists of all the psychic products of the associated activities of men in actual process, or hypothecated in fiction or theory, and resident in the con-

¹³ This section is the complement of Chapter VIII in which is treated at length the nature of human nature, its plasticity, and modification, and the effective factors in its reshaping, the nature of instinct as a progress factor, self as a shaped product, and the group environment as a modelling force. See especially the latter section.

sciousness or subconsciousness of the members of the group. Concretely it consists of the traditions, the myths and folk tales, the superstitions, the various religious, esthetic, moral, and political beliefs, all the knowledge, the creeds, constitutions, and statutes, all printed matter; in fact, all carriers of social ideas, values, standards, usages, and habits. In addition to those must be mentioned the institutionalized phases of social life, such as the economic, political, racial, esthetic, religious, ethical, and educational institutions in all their various forms. It includes, in brief, all those multitudinous objectified psychic processes that cause mental stimulation, and which in our civilization function as control objects in the organization and direction of contemporary human nature.¹⁴

The medium through which this psychical communication occurs, both from individual to individual, and generation to generation, is language in the widest sense of the word, including writing, printing, and every means for the transmission of thought. These combined constitute what Ellwood calls the "web of intercommunication."¹⁵

These elements composing the psycho-social medium or environment, and bringing their influence to bear upon individuals through the schools, libraries, museums, churches, legislatures, courts, newspapers, books and journals, the daily talk and random interchange of opinions, and the direct but silent contacts where suggestion-imitation is the only agent of transmission, form a very important part of the environment for the individual; so important, in fact, that they largely determine this behavior and go to shape most of what we call his self.

This is due to the fact that physical environment is static and relatively unchangeable and its effects are largely biological, while social life is dynamic and active, and affects every individual in a most intimate and penetrating fashion, as it makes him human. The stimuli of the social environment impinge upon the child from birth and give him certain definite modes of behavior, certain definite social attitudes, certain combinations of social patterns and mental images through suggestion of all kinds at first, and later through definite institutionalized pressures. The man of to-day lives in an artificial environment of images and ideals which is not less real to him than the physical environment, and far more powerful as it affects him individually. Here lies one of the variables of primary importance to any one concerned with progress.

¹⁴ Cf. L. L. Bernard, "Environment as a Social Factor," *Publications of the American Sociological Society*, Vol. 16, pp. 94-95; "A Classification of Environments," *American Journal of Sociology*, Vol. 31, p. 326.

¹⁵ *Psychology of Human Society*, pp. 62, 171.

Here you have the forces that take the potentialities of man and build them into a human being.

The moral conduct of the individual, as John Dewey points out,¹⁶ is also largely a matter of social environment. Moral judgments and moral responsibility are wrought in us by the social environment. They arise not because we are conscious that we *ought* to take into account the effect of our acts upon the welfare of others, but because our conduct is socially conditioned, whether we perceive the fact or not. Connections with our fellows furnish the field and the instrumentalities within which our conduct occurs. The objects aimed at and the rewards sought by the individual are what they are because of social admiration, prestige, competition, and power. Both his course of action and the disapproval he is subject to are facts within society. Conduct is a question of better or worse in social affairs.

Herein lie the overwhelming and generally the immediate pressures upon the character-forming and behavior-forming process. Herein lie the forces that make the individual this or that within the limits of his original nature. Of course no two individuals react exactly alike to environmental stimuli; occasionally they will react in diametrically opposite ways.¹⁷ In the main, though, the natures of most people are fairly pliable and take somewhat similar shapes under similar pressures. The progress problem then is to construct a social environment that will take physical and mental aptitudes and create out of them a progressing social order.

5. THE SOCIAL ENVIRONMENT AS AN ELICITING OR REPRESSING FORCE

Apart from the social environment the individual would never realize the self that he has in him; he would never "know himself;" he would never become acquainted with his own needs and capacities. His existence would be vegetative, merely a satisfaction of physiological needs. It is the social environment that draws out of him, in the main, whatever comes out of him; it provides the stimuli and opportunities; it establishes the demands upon him and supplies the fields of action that bring his innate abilities into play. The wider and richer the social relationships into which an individual enters, the more fully are his powers evoked, and the more fully is he brought to recognize the possibilities latent in them. "It is from seeing noble architecture and hearing har-

¹⁶ *Human Nature and Conduct*, pp. 10, 15, 316-318.

¹⁷ I. Edman, *Human Traits*, pp. 206-208.

monious music that the individual learns to know to what his own constructive and rhythmic tendencies, otherwise blind and inchoate, may come. It is from achievement in industrial, national, and family life that he is initiated into perception of his own energy, loyalty, and affection."¹⁸

A fact of even greater significance is that

"Social conditions not only evoke what is latent, and bring to conscious recognition what is blind, but they select, encourage, and confirm certain tendencies at the expense of others. They enable the individual to discriminate the better and the more among his tendencies and achievements. There is no limit in the power of society to awaken and strengthen the habit of discrimination, of choice after comparison, in its individual members. A small social group with fixed habits, a clan, a gang, a narrow sect, a dogmatic party, will restrict the formation of critical powers. . . . But an individual who *really* becomes a member of modern society, with its multiple occupations, its easy intercourse, its free mobility, its rich resources of art and science, will have only too many opportunities for reflective judgment and personal valuation and preference. *The very habits of individual moral initiative, of personal criticism of the existent order and of private projection of a better order, to which moral individualists point as proofs of the purely 'inner' nature of morality, are themselves effects of a variable and complex social order.*"¹⁹

The social environment also provides the repressions that affect the individual's activity. A society whose arrangements are such that the innate potential impulses of its people are being repressed rather than stimulated and satisfied is seriously impairing progress. Such a society at the very least produces boredom and ennui; usually it produces nervous strain and dissatisfaction; at its worst it produces an unrest that may accumulate until it produces widespread and most disastrous results in the form of crime, or even anarchy and revolution. A society that is making native endowments handicaps rather than assets, dead-weights rather than motive forces, is sowing dragons' teeth.

Of course, even if we tried, our attempts to control environment along such lines would of necessity be imperfect. That complete agreement between man's innate drives and the environment in which alone they can find satisfaction remains at best an ideal. But it is an ideal which indicates clearly one of the outstanding needs of control.

¹⁸ Dewey and Tufts, *Ethics*, Henry Holt & Co., pp. 433-434.

¹⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 434. Italics are those of the authors.

6. ENVIRONMENT AND ACHIEVEMENT

Progress is a matter of achievement along various lines ; and achievement seems to be partly a matter of environment. Lester F. Ward, on the basis of Odin's study, concludes that the proportionate amount of native ability is approximately the same for all classes, and even for all districts and races, the upper classes developing more men of achievement simply because of their superior opportunities. This is a strong statement to make, since the fact must be faced that selective processes are at work pushing the inferior into the lowest classes, and keeping them there. It is granted though by scientific men that, in general, given two people of approximately equal native ability, the one having the greater opportunity is most likely to become the greater achiever. The environment, for that is what opportunity is, furnishes the stimulus for achievement and determines the direction of its development. It determines the degree to which inherent characters shall be developed or perfected. Incidentally it may exert a selective influence in favor of the development of one trait over another. Thorndike²⁰ has pointed out that environment furnishes or withholds the physiological conditions for mental health and growth, it furnishes or withholds the adequate stimuli to arouse the full capacity of the brain, and it reinforces or eliminates activities that affect human efficiency. Herein lie the variables that determine the environment's ability to induce achievement. Environment may deplete energies and fatigue body and mind, or it may provide conditions most conducive to mental and physical health and exuberance. It may be so lacking in stimuli that latent abilities are never tapped and many persons drift through life on low tension, or it may provide such a variety that men are stimulated to their highest capacities. It may be of such a nature that only undesirable traits in the individual are elicited, or it may suppress or drain off the bad and stimulate those traits that are useful in present-day social organization. It may also stimulate many members, or it may stimulate only a few.

If environment is to be effective in achievement, it must be clean and energizing, it must be varied and offer a large number of powerful and diverse influences, especially of an educational and occupational nature, it must offer adequacy of life on the material side, and richness and

²⁰ *Educational Psychology, Briefer Course*, p. 394.

encouragement on the spiritual side. It cannot be unclean, narrow, mediocre, poor, or mean.²¹

7. THE CONTROL OF ENVIRONMENT

Any discussion of environment and progress unavoidably leads to the question of the control of environment. For since environment is a molding force for good or bad, for progress or regress, it must be controlled in the interests of progress.

Immediately, however, someone raises the question as to the ability of man to control that which shapes him. Let the reader refer to Chapters X and XI. Man, owing to his analytical and constructive powers, is the only species that can bend and shape environment to meet his needs. The very medium that draws him out and gives him materials, gives him the experience and the insight that enables him to control and transform it. This is especially true in the higher reaches of mental life. As E. Ray Lankester says, "It is his destiny to understand and to control it."²² This is not only true of the physical environment, but also of the psycho-social environment.

The limiting and determining aspects of environment, both physical and psycho-social, are becoming less significant as man's technique, both in the field of natural and social science, advances. Man is thus enabled to obtain desirable rather than undesirable social consequences from them as they come more and more under his control.

Whatever progress man makes in connection with the physical universe must come as the result of his own manipulation of it, for no progressive evolution need be expected in the physical universe itself.²³ There change is all a matter of great cycles. No single fact justifies the assumption that the universe is developing towards some riper, more complete form as its goal; determined processes follow regularly in immutable order; there is no place for development, and still less for progress. Nor do the geological and climatic processes of our own small planet promise any progress. They may in the course of cosmic events contribute to progress here and there, but there is no guarantee in the nature of their processes. And yet no one will gainsay that great and important changes have taken place in the conditions of our physical life.

²¹ Cf. F. A. Bushee, *Principles of Sociology*, pp. 377-384; L. F. Ward, *Applied Sociology*, pp. 147-221.

²² *Kingdom of Man*, p. 7.

²³ See e.g., W. R. Inge, *Idea of Progress*, pp. 11-12; M. Nordau, *Interpretation of History*, pp. 326-330.

These changes of a progressive nature are due to man, to his power of achievement.

Recent achievements in physical science demonstrate the ability of man more and more to control his physical environment. As he learns more about nature, he has progressive success in its control and utilization. Science has given him a refined and effective instrument.²⁴ To recount the technical modifications in draining swamps, irrigating deserts, conquering space by building roads, railways, canals, bridges, ships, and aircraft, in perfecting wireless and other forms of communication, erecting buildings, inventing cooling and heating devices, improving soils, crops, and livestock, eliminating parasites, pests, and diseases, safeguarding against natural forces, and converting them into power is to repeat daily commonplaces.²⁵

Though still relatively a tyro in his control of his social environment, man has been making remarkable progress in recent years. He is learning to control and modify his own nature by building up an artificial social environment. To-day he is analyzing the elements of human nature, their origin, function, and shaping, the nature of social processes and products, and is adapting for the new control uses already effective scientific techniques. Some of the best brains in the world are working on these problems to-day. What is more, man is gradually beginning to see that the conquests, not always socially and morally justifiable, in special fields, such as large-scale propaganda and advertising, are conclusive evidence of his power to work through his social environment and manipulate it for progressive purposes.

Major Leonard Darwin in his recent book says, "It is . . . reasonable to assume that any social progress now taking place is being promoted by such reforms and such changes as have recently been made; that is by environmental reform, using that phrase in a wide sense."²⁶ Similarly, if progress is to continue, our problem is that of modifying the factors which now influence future results. As John Dewey says, we need "that permanent reshaping of environment which is the substantial foundation of future security and progress. . . . The best we can accomplish for posterity is to transmit unimpaired and with some increment of meaning the environment that makes it possible to maintain habits of decent and refined life."²⁷ We know that to

²⁴ See Chapter X.

²⁵ For an excellent description see A. J. Todd, *Theories of Social Progress*, pp. 171-175.

²⁶ *Need for Eugenic Reform*, p. 61.

²⁷ *Human Nature and Conduct*, pp. 20, 21.

change the nature and character and will of others we have to alter the objective conditions that shape them or condition them.

The control of environment is a pertinent fact in progress, due to the fact that of the two agents in social regeneration, the environment is much more easily modified than is the racial stock, and improvement and control by means of it is much more rapid. Furthermore, those characteristics and qualities that can be transmitted by means of teaching or other environmental pressures or techniques can, if the desire is sufficient and the organization adequate, be spread over the whole world in a few generations at most. There are no impassable inherent biological or physical barriers to such transmission. Thus it would appear that the environment, especially the psycho-social environment, is the chief source from which new and valuable characteristics to be used in social improvement and social progress must come. Thus Bernard concludes,²⁸ "The method of social advance and of social control in the future will be determined by a close analytical study of the environment, and by the application of the principles discovered to the control of the social situation."

In fact, the man of to-day is bound to such a program as this, He has proceeded so far in his construction of an artificial environment that he cannot let go, or even stand still. For him capitulation can mean only chaos or death. His whole nature and life are adjusted to an artificial environment that he has made and must control. He has meddled in great affairs, and so far his efforts have been in the main successful; but he can only safeguard his destiny by continually gaining greater mastery over environment. "Nature's Insurgent Son" cannot turn back; he must forge ahead.²⁹

QUESTIONS AND PROBLEMS

1. Why is environment significant in a study of progress?
2. Clarify the concept "environment."
3. What is Huntington's general conclusion (*Civilization and Climate*) in (a) Chap. II on "Race or Place," and Chap. III on "White Man in the Tropics"? (b) Chap. IV on "The Effect of the Seasons"? (c) Chap. V on "The Effect of Humidity and Temperature"? (d) Chap. VI on "Work and Weather"?
4. What is Huntington's hypothesis with respect to the influence of climate on civilization? *Civilization and Climate*, pp. 4, 9, 9-10, Chaps. X, XIII.

²⁸ L. L. Bernard, *Instinct*, p. 24.

²⁹ Cf. E. Ray Lankester, *Kingdom of Man*, essay on "Nature's Insurgent Son," p. 31; W. C. Curtis, *Science and Human Affairs*, p. 293.

5. What are Dexter's conclusions upon the effects of weather on man? Are these conclusions of any significance in the consideration of progress? E. G. Dexter, *Weather Influences*, pp. 247-277.
6. What is the relation between criminality and climate, season and weather? M. Parmelee, *Criminology*, pp. 43-53.
7. Give illustrations from your general knowledge of history and geography of a definite influence of physical environment upon the following: crime, poverty, disease, retardation in political organization, coöperation, political independence, advance in arts and sciences, industrial activity.
8. There is a certain theory that maintains that the introduction of different racial elements into a north temperate environment will enrich, diversify, and broaden its culture. Must environmental conditions be taken into consideration?
9. Does the individual make his own social environment to any extent? Out of what does he make it?
10. Why can the white man sustain so much larger a population in North America than the Indian could with practically the same geographic and climatic conditions?
11. Does man become more or less subservient to nature with the progress of civilization?
12. What is the outlook with respect to man's conquest of nature? (J. Q. Dealey, *Sociology, Its Development and Application*, pp. 460-464; A. J. Todd, *Theories of Social Progress*, pp. 171-174.) Human nature?

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CHAPTER XVI

PROGRESS AND THE BIOLOGICAL NATURE AND QUALITY OF HUMAN BEINGS

I. SIGNIFICANCE FOR PROGRESS OF A BIOLOGICAL STUDY OF MAN

NO treatment of progress can go far without an examination of the biological elements of human beings. Good environment by itself is not sufficient; environment is merely a molding force. There must be good stock to mold. The individual as he appears on the human scene at birth is a product of biological forces. Organic variation, heredity, and selection have given the raw materials in the form of physical constitution, nervous organization, and intellectual capacity. These forces have set for him the scope and the limits of his character and achievement. They tell "how much" and, in a general way, "what" his capacities and possibilities are. On the other hand, the language he speaks, the attitudes he holds, the occupation he follows, the nationality he espouses, the degree to which his achievements are a fulfillment of his capacities, depend on the geographical and social environment in which he happens to be placed.

The environmental part of this dual set of forces that compose man has been dealt with in a general way above. The present chapter seeks to examine the nature of the human material, its present quality, and its relationship to the general study of progress.

Heredity fixes the potentiality of human development within rather narrowly defined limits. It is the result of the germ plasm, the agency by means of which the natural qualities of the parents are transmitted to their offspring, the physical link which binds succeeding generations to one another. The germ plasm is a substance, separate from the soma plasm, which forms the various organs of the body, but which is not a product of the body, although it is carried and nourished by the body. This germ plasm is handed on relatively unchanged from one generation to the next in a continuous stream and determines generations in advance the constitution of human beings, subject only to unique new combinations in the case of each individual as a result of

the mingling in turn of two hereditary lines and now rather well-understood processes of dominance, segregation, and successions of appearance and reappearance. Thus the chromosomes in the germ cells of the offspring so resemble those of the ancestors, that the offspring reproduces the same traits, if the stimulating conditions are similar. These inherited traits thus carried correspond to the seed; they are latent possibilities—innate characters that are brought out and developed by the environment. It must be emphasized, however, that inheritance does not consist in the transmission of actual qualities as we see them, but in the potentiality to develop those qualities under an appropriate stimulus. A given individual is a complex mosaic of many minute protoplasmic particles contributed by a long succession of ancestors, each of which is a determiner for certain potentialities of constitution or character.

In addition to these the individual has at birth certain congenital characteristics, elements, or modifications of his being, not inherent in the germ plasm, but acquired during the prenatal period. In the main though the individual's basic biological foundation consists of certain potential powers and traits inherited from his ancestors, together with certain individual variations, more or less pronounced. Thus the biological element is continuous; the quality tends to persist. A good biological line means physical vigor, mental competence, and achievement; a bad line means degeneracy, dependence—a drag upon society.

The biological nature is, of course, inadequate to explain social progress, because human groups have so much in their collective life which does not come to them in a biological way. But the biological constitution does furnish the potentialities of human and social progress; it provides the basis upon which this progress takes place. The biological type also acts selectively in determining what social ideas and institutions will work and how. Obviously this foundation material must be sound if a sound superstructure is to be raised. The progressive is no alchemist who can produce a progressive society from mediocrity or worse.

2. DEGENERACY AND PROGRESS

The term *degeneracy* as it is generally used implies any marked falling away, either morally, mentally, or physically, from the average condition of the nation or race. Thus in a contemporary civilized society the habitual criminals and the morally perverse, the mentally unstable and insane and epileptic, the physically weak and the ill-developed are

spoken of as degenerates. Both defective germ plasm and environment contribute to this condition. Inadequate or improper training and instruction during youth and adolescence, unsanitary surroundings, deprivation of suitable food and exercise, and general neglect or mismanagement during the early months and years of development will strain the best heredity and perhaps prevent a sufficient degree of development and produce degeneracy. Toxic agents also will reduce the innate potentiality of the germ-cell, and bring about a devitalization or impairment of the cell or certain of its energies, not only in the present, but future generations as well. Generally though, degeneracy is the expression of a germ variation, that is, it is due either to the perpetuation of a defect which has existed in certain strains or stocks for many generations, or it is due to the operation of certain natural processes of germinal variation, such as inbreeding and intensification of recessive traits, marriage into defective strains, and senility of the seed. These defective strains are then more liable to break down under the adverse or abnormal conditions of the environment. Degeneracy is a diminished developmental potentiality.¹

A people that desires to progress cannot afford to have even mild strains of degeneracy in its population, nor can it afford to allow degenerative conditions. In fact, due to the greater complexity of life, the increasing number of competing individuals, and the decline in material resources, the degree of mental and physical energy required to keep oneself under modern conditions above a certain minimum of achievement is greater than it has ever been before. It may even be true that greater capacity is required to reach a given degree of attainment than was ever needed before. The quality of a people is then a question of vast importance.²

3. THE QUALITATIVE TREND OF THE POPULATION ³

Where do we stand with respect to the present quality of population? What is the trend? There is much reason to think that the general population is becoming inferior in quality, and becoming inferior very fast.

¹ For an excellent discussion of degeneracy see A. F. Tredgold, "The Problem of Degeneracy," *Quarterly Review*, Vol. 228; pp. 31-50.

² Cf. F. Boas, "Report on an Anthropometric Investigation," *Journal of the American Statistical Association*, Vol. 18, pp. 195-196.

³ See particularly E. G. Conklin, "The Trend of Evolution," in *The Evolution of Man*, Yale Sigma Xi Lectures, 1921-2.

a. The Draft Showing. The results of the American army draft examinations present considerable startling evidence. The Report of the Provost Marshal General shows that the local examining boards rejected as unfit a little over 29 per cent of those examined. The medical corps of the cantonments rejected from 2 to 11 per cent of the men certified by the local boards. The total rejections were thus somewhere between 31 and 40 per cent, with 34 per cent as the approximate proportion. We are safe in saying that one man out of every three in our army draft was unfit. Of course a considerable number of these rejected men owed their impairment either to ignorance or neglect. Even with ample deductions for this, the proportion of rejections would be indicative of a condition most disturbing to the progressive. British military data show much the same state of affairs. One student of the Report of the Ministry of National Service says, "Out of every 9 men of military age in Great Britain between November 1917 and November 1918, three were really fit, two definitely infirm (but capable of improvement), three were incapable of strenuous physical exertion, and the remaining man was 'a chronic invalid' with a precarious hold on life."⁴

The intelligence tests given to 1,700,000 of this selected group of young men in the American army showed that 10 per cent had mentality not higher than that of the average ten-year-old child, and 75 per cent did not have sufficient innate mentality to finish a high school course with credit. When additional allowance is made for rejected inferiors—the obvious imbeciles and very feeble-minded—who did not even have the chance to come up for these examinations, due to their rejection before enlistment, one is forced to conclude that less than 20 per cent of our population is capable of understanding the facts necessary for a normally efficient life under modern democratic conditions.⁵

b. Types of Degeneracy. The best evidence obtainable shows an ever-increasing number of subnormal individuals, including the feeble-minded, insane, epileptics, and hereditary criminals, as well as an increasing proportion of the physically unfit, including the diseased, blind, deaf, and deformed. There are, for example, the countless numbers of feeble-minded men and women that are permitted by our social customs to broadcast their defective heredity. The statistics of poor relief, delinquency, insanity, and feeble-mindedness give some idea of

⁴Mary Scharlieb, "A Terrible Census," *Nineteenth Century*, Vol. 88, pp. 128-135.
⁵R. M. Yerkes, ed. "Psychological Examining in the United States Army," *Memoirs of the National Academy of Science*, 15, 1921.

their numbers. We know with certainty that mental deficiency of all degrees and of nearly every type is transmissible by heredity. If these persons of low mentality were a class off by themselves the harm caused would not be so great; but existing as they do in all classes of society, they interbreed, setting up strains and limitations of character and personality of every kind and in every direction. There is every reason for believing that the percentage of feeble-minded in the population is gradually increasing. Goddard estimated about fifteen years ago that 2 per cent of the children in the public schools are mentally defective to such an extent that they are a menace to society. It is also generally estimated that due to the fact that the mental defectives are bound by none of the restraints of intelligence in reproduction, and due to the greater prominence of their instinctive drives, they are increasing at twice the rate of the general population. This is furthered by the ignorance or carelessness of the American population in refusing to pay for the means to keep segregated more than on the average of 10 per cent of those feeble-minded who carry that defect definitely as a transmissible trait. The only way the tide of mental defectives can be held in check is by systematically preventing their procreation. So far we have done very little as compared with what we ought to be doing.

These mentally defective classes furnish a large percentage of our delinquents, dependents, and criminals, who cause enormous social as well as biological costs. We cannot yet think of the absolute improvement of the human race; we must face the more pressing question as to whether or not civilized society is facing the possibility of an actual decline through its failure to prevent itself being constantly infected by the poison of feeble-mindedness.

Epilepsy is another taint that is often hereditary. It utterly unfits those who have it for the duties of life. Insanity, also more and more discovered by careful researches to be an hereditary tendency, is on the increase everywhere. And everywhere men are equally inattentive to the danger of its spread.

It would also appear that vital efficiency and physical efficiency are lessening. The draft examinations, the numerous reports and statements on national vitality, the thousands of physically defective school children are evidence that needs must be considered. To be sure, athletics, physical education, medicine and sanitation have made great advances, but there is no satisfactory evidence that the effects of these are inherited.

Among the lower classes the effectives of all races are drawn to the great industrial and commercial centers where their vigor is exploited in the main for purposes of monetary advancement. There is also a danger that our sedentary manner of living, our increase of wealth, ease, and luxury will result in physical degeneracy. As yet we have devoted very little thought to racial conservation, and the effort exerted for the cause has been still less.

c. Tinkering with Evolution. Other trends that affect human quality must be noted. In the early stages of the human species' career nature's selection worked almost unhampered; only the healthier and stronger members of the community were able to survive and leave progeny. But with the advent of civilization milder conditions have ensued, the battle for life has become less fierce, and the standard of those fit to survive under the new mitigated circumstances has been gradually lowered. Furthermore, during the most recent stages of evolution man has developed the power of changing some of the conditions of his evolution. He particularly has succeeded in keeping people alive and enabled them to reach maturity and reproduction who would have died under ruder conditions. The struggle for existence has thus been to a large extent suspended. This has largely been done under the sway of a fervent altruism and a beautiful philanthropy; but it has been done without any adequate knowledge of the mechanism of evolution and any thought as to the future. Modern charity and philanthropy, medical and sanitary science, benevolent government, and Christian compassion, though the highest achievements of human endeavor, have inadvertently interacted to make evolution work backwards in some cases and promote the survival of the unfit—the subnormals, the weak, the defectives, and the ineffectives of all kinds. Some good may be gained by keeping such types alive, for some of them may be geniuses, but in general this must have a deleterious influence on the general distribution of vitality. Certainly neither altruism nor justice requires that such persons be permitted to propagate their kind. The humane ideal demands nothing more than kindly treatment of these individuals. The social worker, the sanitary engineer, the doctor, the political reformer, the Christian who saves such lives has a very definite and binding obligation placed upon him by all future generations to keep the people of these classes from reproducing their kind. If they do not, their efforts are of very limited social value. As it is, however, practically no restrictions of any kind are placed upon the reproduction of these people, and since they increase at a much more

rapid rate than the more competent classes, the social situation becomes more complicated and the quality of the population deteriorates. Our social conditions and social philosophy not only permit, but actually seem to encourage the deterioration of the population.⁶

Professor Irving Fisher points to other dysgenic effects of this evolutionary change when he says,

"Civilization has thrown the daily life of the individual out of balance, so that not one person in a hundred lives what might be called a biologic life. He is insufficiently exposed to the air, he eats too fast and often too much. In America he eats far too much protein and far too little bulk. His food is far too soft. It is usually lacking in vitamins. His evacuations are too infrequent, his posture is usually abnormal and unhealthful. His activities are too one-sided. His mind is too excited, worried and hurried. Worst of all, he is the unconscious victim of many physical poisons and infections. The examinations of the Life Extension Institute show some physical imperfections in practically every person examined. And the average man is blissfully unconscious of the damage he thus does himself, cumulatively, day after day and year after year. Yet this damage keeps on like a creeping fire under the leaves in the woods."⁷

d. War as a Dysgenic Force. Modern war also serves as an agency of mis-selection. In olden times war tended to purify and grade up the human stock by eliminating weak races, but to-day war takes the biologically best. The last war damaged the potential fatherhood of the race by destroying over 7,000,000 young men, medically selected for fighting, but thereby prevented from breeding. Much of the best male germ plasm in Europe has thus been lost. Even though the casualties in modern battle are more or less indiscriminate, the soldiers themselves represent a selected group, for those who go to war are usually the young, the strong, the capable, while the weak, the incompetent, and the degenerate are left behind as unfit for military service. And these become the parents of the next generation, while for every man killed in battle a fit woman who would have been his mate is deprived of children. So the germ plasm that war destroys or prevents from coming to fruition is of the best. War actually offers a bonus to the perpetuation of unfitness.

e. The Survival Differential. Another serious situation is found in the survival differential that exists between the ill-endowed as to nature and nurture and the well-endowed. The degenerate, the feeble-

⁶ Herbert Spencer once wrote, "Fostering the good-for-nothing at the expense of the good is an extreme cruelty. It is a deliberate storing up of miseries for future generations. There is no greater curse to posterity than that of bequeathing them an increasing population of imbeciles."

⁷ "Impending Problems of Eugenics," *Scientific Monthly*, Vol. 13, p. 220.

mind, the shiftless and drunken, the very poor, the chronically dependent, and even the lower occupational groups are generally exceedingly prolific; while there seems to be a tendency to gradual self-extinction among the classes that are biologically and socially the best. The birth-rate of the abler and more capable stocks is decreasing relatively to that of the mentally and physically feeble stocks, and the reduction in the size of families has begun at the wrong end of the social scale. Furthermore, while the death-rate is still higher among the less capable stocks than among the more capable, due to public and semi-public health agencies it is falling rapidly. Nowhere among civilized peoples is the death-rate high enough to greatly reduce the significance of the general birth differential. Hence the survival differential of the less capable over the more capable stocks is appalling in its significance. We are told that the lowest sixth of the population of England produce one-half of the rising generation,⁸ and that in this country the lowest one-fourth produce approximately half of the next generation. It may be parenthetically stated that the fact is unquestioned that shiftlessness, low mental caliber, stupidity, and incompetency are more common in these lower classes than in the population in general. Of course, not all of these lower classes are of this type; some of good hereditary qualities are there through misfortune, such as death, accident, the tragedies of war, illegitimacy, unemployment, or disaster, and will in time pull up out of these classes. But most of them are there as a result of a process of selection in which innate characters have played an important part.

The result of this survival differential that must be anticipated is that the naturally well-endowed will, as time goes on, take a smaller and smaller part in the production of the coming generations, with a tendency to progressive racial deterioration as an inevitable consequence. Major Leonard Darwin says,⁹ "I can find no facts which refute the theoretical conclusion that the inborn qualities of civilized communities are deteriorating, a process which must inevitably lead in time to an all around downward movement."

A further fact of significance is that the lower class population elements not only are much more numerous, but breed very much faster than the better grades. G. Stanley Hall says that "infra-men breed a hundred times as fast as really eugenic super-men." This is partly due to the fact that these sub-men marry much earlier than the

⁸ G. S. Hall, "The Message of the Zeitgeist," *Scientific Monthly*, Vol. 13, p. 110.

⁹ "The Field of Eugenic Reform," *Scientific Monthly*, Vol. 13, p. 393.

better types. Galton has shown that on the average people who marry at twenty-two will leave twice as many descendants at the end of a century as those who marry at thirty-three and in a few generations they will actually possess the earth.

The differential fecundity of different occupational groups as shown by the 1920 census is conclusive evidence of the tendencies discussed.¹⁰ The tabulations show that the wives of men in the least skilled occupations not only have had decidedly more children born to them than the wives of more highly skilled and better educated men, but the number of surviving children in the lower occupational groups is markedly greater than the number in the higher occupations. A Scotch investigator¹¹ whom Hart refers to points out that the same general situation exists in Scotland. Hart concludes that "In both America and Scotland the better educated and more successful occupational groups have decidedly fewer children born. Laborers' families in both countries have from 50 to 100 per cent more children than the families of professional men (except clergymen and mine owners). In 1924 was published the English *Report on Fertility of Marriage* based on the 1911 Census. This also bears out the fact that the population is recruited from the lower occupational groups—the least successful and socially lowest elements. The following table compiled from this *Report* shows the effective fertility of the different social classes:

EFFECTIVE FERTILITY OF ENGLISH SOCIAL CLASSES

<i>Social Class</i>	<i>Number of males enu- merated in Census re- port</i>	<i>Total children surviving at Census date, born to couples included within the class</i>	<i>Effective fertility</i>
I. Upper and middle classes..	1,305,580	1,253,643	.96
II. Skilled workmen	2,664,169	3,977,351	1.49
III. Intermediate	2,018,427	2,851,233	1.41
IV. Unskilled workmen	1,831,778	2,763,322	1.51
V. Textile workers	440,848	501,059	1.13
VI. Miners	900,317	1,466,000	1.63
VII. Agricultural workers	617,784	905,278	1.47

¹⁰ See Hornell Hart, "Occupational Differential Fecundity," *Scientific Monthly*, Vol. 19, pp. 527-532; W. S. Thompson, "Population Facts and their Interpretation," *Journal of the American Statistical Association*, Vol. 18, pp. 583-584.

¹¹ J. C. Dunlop, "The Fertility of Marriage in Scotland," *Journal of the Royal Statistical Society*, 1914, Vol. 77, pp. 259-288.

There is no adequate information available as yet as to the mental ability of these different occupational classes, but in the cities of Columbus, Ohio, Bloomington, Indiana, and Madison, Wisconsin, psychologists from the state universities located there made comparative ability tests of the children of men of different occupational levels. In each of these three studies, as Hart summarizes them, the children of professional men average by far the highest in mental test ability, the children of business men next highest, skilled workmen's children next, and the children of unskilled laborers lower than any of the above three occupational groups. The general conclusion would be that the occupational groups with higher standards of living and smaller families do produce children with higher mental test ability.

What this means is that the classes with the innate ability and opportunity to become successful, the highly educated classes, the professional classes, and the more successful business classes are reproducing at much lower rates and with longer intervals between generations than are the unskilled, ignorant, and poverty-stricken classes. And the desirable characteristics responsible for the success of these upper classes are transmitted from parents to children through social and biological heredity. It follows then, as Hart points out, "that average intelligence and average racial desirability in general, in so far as they are racially hereditary, will have a strong *tendency* to decline and in so far as they are *biologically* hereditary will *be bound* to decline from generation to generation until the dysgenic differential fecundity of these classes is altered. Put in other words, he says, "the conclusion derived from the above premises is that the rapidity of human reproduction is inversely correlated with the quality of the germ plasm, and inversely correlated with the quality of the culture of the individuals reproducing, and that this inverse correlation means progressive deterioration of the race." The tendency of the inferior classes to propagate themselves at such a great rate is both biologically and socially a calamity.¹² Here then is another curious reversal of evolutionary processes due to civilization. Those who succeed leave relatively few offspring, while the failures, the mentally subnormal, and the improvident who are restrained by no considerations of prudence, culture, or economy, national or private, perpetuate their kind in large numbers. So long as the preponderance of numbers belongs to these classes, the race stands in very serious danger of deterioration.

¹² See also W. S. Thompson, "Standards of Living as they Affect the Growth of Competing Population Groups," *Scientific Monthly*, Vol. 17, p. 64.

We seem to have been engaging in a sort of biological joy-ride. We have kept our unfit alive by medicine, surgery, sanitation, and charity; periodically we have been sending our more fit away to be killed in war; and then on top of it have permitted our unfit to reproduce several times as fast as the fit. It is difficult to conceive of greater stupidity and carelessness.¹³

f. Immigration. Immigration has also doubtless played its part in reducing the relative number of the superior stocks in America. The immigrants of the last forty years have been mainly from the South and East of Europe, people with a very low standard of living and a markedly different culture. The effect has been to force the older, and perhaps socially and culturally more desirable stocks, to maintain a higher standard of living, a phenomenon which invariably occurs when different standards of living come into competition. This has had the other invariable effect of reducing the reproductive rate of those forced into the higher standard of living. Of course this is only a temporary situation, because later generations of immigrant stock accept or seek to achieve the higher standard. Another fact may be involved. Though we have no reliable biological data, it is possible that this recent immigration is not as good a stock as the pioneer breed that first peopled this country and established its institutions. The recent immigrants have been mostly overflow people from over-populated countries—not the dregs to be sure, but those of the lower classes who were forced out—"the beaten people from beaten lands," as Ross puts it. Now if the polyglot assortment of nationalities fed into the melting-pot are physically, mentally, and morally, as well as economically below par, then there can be no hope of producing anything but an inferior race. That they are bad we are not certain; but if we are going to dilute our biological and social stock at all with outsiders it should be with the best, if we are to avoid deterioration.¹⁴

g. Congenital Weaknesses. There are also bad congenital conditions and other influences producing bad variations that tone down the quality of the population. We still permit the employment of women and children at occupations that unavoidably destroy vigor, increase disease susceptibility, produce malformations and displacements, bring about sterility, and conduce to ignorance and stupidity. With the unnatural indoor life which most of us live, the fast pace and nervous

¹³ See R. Pearl, *The Biology of Population Growth*, pp. 158-177.

¹⁴ See especially E. B. Reuter, *Population Problems*, pp. 285-302 and E. A. Ross, *Standing Room Only?* Ch. XXVII, XXVIII.

tension, the lack of exercise or the other extreme of over-exertion, the artificial living conditions, the increasing drift of people to the cities, the increasing use of various poisons, mal-feeding on one hand, and over-feeding on the other, and the numerous "prosperity" diseases, it can hardly be expected that the germ plasm of the race will escape being affected. We seem to forget that the piper must be paid.

It would seem that the forces that make for human and social degeneration were never so many, so active, or so ominous as now. "As far as we can judge from the facts at our disposal," says Major Darwin, of Great Britain, "the nation as a whole is slowly and steadily deteriorating as regards its average inborn qualities."¹⁵ The same is true elsewhere.

4. EUGENICS AS A PROGRESS AGENT

a. Importance of Biological Control. A vast amount of effort and resources are being spent to-day on material and social betterment. We have vigorously devoted ourselves to the improvement of the external world, and the amelioration of surrounding conditions. We have sought to better the conditions of the people so as to make their lives easier, happier, and enlightened. But there has been very little attempt on a sufficient scale to prevent the multiplication of the defective, the weakly, or of those liable to congenital disease, nor have we troubled ourselves much about the right of our children and our children's children to be well born. Until the breed is improved, human betterment will be only of the temporary variety; that is, only for the existing crop of social derelicts. Social alleviation is now an endless process of bailing out the boat without stopping the leaks. No amount of improvement or modification of the individual during his lifetime can become an inheritable part of the race in the biological sense. The effects of various kinds of social betterment and human uplift cannot be transmitted by inheritance and therefore can have no permanent influence upon the ultimate composition of the race. In the long run civilization and progress depend on the hereditary qualities of the race. As Major Darwin puts it, "To pass on superior germinal constitutions as a legacy to the coming generations is the only way in which permanent benefits to posterity can certainly be secured."¹⁶ This the eugenicist chiefly, among reformers, has recognized. Of course, such improvements effected in the life time of the individual may enrich

¹⁵ *Op. cit.*, p. 327.

¹⁶ *The Need for Eugenic Reform*, p. 72.

the social heritage, but that is only a partial factor in progress. The source of human supply is the fulcrum under which the lever of human uplift must be applied. Cold genetic calculation must be given a prominent place if we are really to cope with racial deterioration.

b. The Nature of Eugenics. The new science that concerns itself with such endeavors was called eugenics by its founder, Sir Francis Galton. It is the science which aims, through the actual utilization of the principles of evolution, at the practical control of human heredity, and aspires to "race regeneration." Galton himself defined it as "the science which deals with all influences that improve the inborn qualities of a race." It seeks the improvement of the inherited traits, the germ plasm, of mankind. It expects to do this by exercising some collective control over the reproductive process. As Galton said, eugenics must be "the study of agencies under social control which may improve or impair the racial qualities of future generations, either physically or mentally." It is evident that eugenics can do nothing to improve the human breed without controlling generally the institution of human marriage and sex relations in society. Practically the problem at this moment is simply that of securing wise matings and preventing unwise ones from the biological and psychological standpoint—essentially a problem in social control.

The basic task is the application of biological laws through the diffusion of knowledge, popularization of ideals, and the employment of institutional and other feasible agencies of social control. It is auto-evolution, human selection in place of the now more or less defunct natural selection. It comes of the realization that if we know enough and develop a right technique, defects in man can be bred out, as breeders exterminate bad points in plants and animals. It is exerting influence in favor of the development of good traits and the elimination of bad ones. It is conscious selection—biological and social telesis. It wants not large populations necessarily, but good ones, for human progress consists in producing a finer and finer breed of men and women. Even the marginal groups must have a sufficiently high level to be safe. All progress and all mental and moral character of the individual must be built on certain qualities and capacities of the hereditary elements of the germ plasm. In conclusion, in the words of Galton, "The aim of Eugenics is . . . to bring as many influences as can be reasonably employed to cause the useful classes in the community to contribute more than their present proportion to the next generation; and further, we might add, to cause the useless, vicious

classes to contribute to the next generation less than their present proportion." As we have noted, our future fate lies largely in our own hands. Man has rebelled against Nature and departed from her, and he can never return to his former state. Furthermore, we of the twentieth century are learning that the principle of laissez-faire is as pernicious in the matter of marriage and reproduction as it is in economics and politics. Consequently we see that if the race is to be improved, man must thoroughly investigate the laws of breeding and heredity and proceed to apply a control to human multiplication based upon certain and indisputable knowledge. Certainly it would seem to be advisable for human beings to at least be as concerned about their own propagation as they are that of their livestock. Eugenics is one of the agents in the determination of this aspect of our fate. It is conceivable that an enlightened society, possessing a knowledge of the principles of its own evolution, and mindful of the welfare of future generations, may accomplish much in the direction of eugenic progress.

c. Cautions. Fortunately in the last few decades genetic and psychological science have made sufficient advance so that we have some faint inkling of what is actually desirable and possible if the race is to be "stepped-up" biologically, and how it is to be done. Within the last half generation or so we have come to know what it is that is inherited. We have also during the last quarter-century or so done a vast amount of statistical and experimental work on heredity that has tossed up some valuable facts. Psychology has also contributed to eugenics in devising tests of inborn intelligence, which are sufficiently and measurably accurate and are to a degree independent of education, wealth, race, and social position. This has enabled us to identify and trace dangerous and incurable defects. But the science is still too tentative, its findings still too inadequate and piecemeal, its program of action still too undeveloped to enable it to do much. For example, we have not yet accumulated the data regarding the registration of family traits. Moreover, we have not yet agreed what we should breed for.¹⁷ We would, if we could, probably breed according to the demand of the time, and so perpetuate the time's eccentricities and inequalities, or we might permanently destroy many human capacities just because we could not now appreciate their value or discern them in the germ. Even though the need is great there is so much at stake that we must go slow.

¹⁷ Dean Inge asks, "Do we want a nation of beautiful and moderately efficient Greek gods, or do we want human mastiffs for policemen, human greyhounds for postmen, etc.?" *Outspoken Essays, Second Series*, p. 175.

To have discovered how to eradicate a few palpable defects and to strengthen a few desirable tendencies is doing much for the present. To quote Major Darwin again, "It is well to confess, or rather to assert, that whilst the laws of nature are being slowly and gradually ascertained, the ground over which we can advance without undue danger must remain greatly limited in certain directions, though it will undoubtedly keep widening out as our knowledge increases."¹⁸ We must be careful to move only when we have sufficient knowledge for the next step.

At present eugenics has a negative and a positive program; it seeks by various means to prevent the unfit, as now conceived, from becoming parents and it seeks by other agencies to encourage mating and reproduction of those capable of producing a high grade of progeny.

d. Negative Eugenics. Negative or restrictive eugenics is based on the assumption that certain degenerate human types are undesirable in society, that these are known in general, and that they should be prevented from procreating. Its immediate task is that of devising methods by which the lowering of racial quality can be arrested, or at least confined to its smallest limits. This must take the form of limitations upon the propagation of the unfit. Means at present advocated and partially carried into effect follow.

(1) *Stricter marriage laws.* Marriage laws insisting upon a thorough and reliable mental and physical examination, and making the granting of a license depend upon freedom from hereditary, neuropathic, or mental taints, from innate physical stigmata of degeneracy, and from transmissible disease will do some good. They must be honestly and rigorously enforced, and in order to avoid widespread evasion should be at least nation-wide in scope and uniformity. So far such marriage legislation has only been confined to a few of the more enlightened states, and due to the ease of evasion and the lack of understanding of its purpose on the part of the public, has not been very successful. The power of such legislation to stop the marriage of the diseased or to restrain the multiplication of degenerates has therefore not been very great. The general public still insist upon looking at marriage as a strictly private matter, but expect that the state will assume the obligation of caring for the unfortunate progeny—diseased, insane, epileptic, feeble-minded, physically inferior—of dysgenic marriages. Furthermore, marriage laws do not check the increase or procreation of the lower forms of degeneracy, for these mate more or less pro-

¹⁸ *Op. cit.*, p. 5.

miscuously without the marriage formality. These illegitimate matings may be actually promoted thereby, adding the stigma of illegitimacy to the burden of defectiveness. In spite of this, marriage laws are to be commended as useful educational measures. They set up desirable standards and help to mold public sentiment in favor of healthy marriage.

(2) *Birth-control*. Birth-control in some form is favored by most eugenicists, both because of its effectiveness and the fact that it is so economical of individual and social energy. This control of conception is now quite generally practiced among the upper classes everywhere from prudential considerations, or the more laudable motive of giving better advantages to a few children rather than mere maintenance to many. Actually, however, it is a dysgenic agent at present due to the fact that the sections of the population where its eugenic effects would be greatest do not use it, due to the fact that its practice requires a certain amount of intelligence and care which these cases are not abundantly supplied with, and also due to the misguided and foolish actions of a government which makes the distribution of birth-control information an illegal offense. This agent, so full of eugenic potentialities, needs to be socialized, the rank and file generally instructed as to its nature, and its use influenced by a social consciousness—a sense of racial obligation. Perhaps in time public opinion will crystallize into legislation making it possible to make the information easily available for the classes who need it most.

(3) *Sterilization*. This is also suggested as a means of coping with cases where individual and racial interests are opposed. It consists in making the degenerate individuals physiologically incapable of procreation. In the male the operation is a slight one called vasectomy, and consists of taking out a portion of the vas deferens, or sperm duct. The female operation, oöphorectomy or salpingotomy, is more serious, since it means removing a small portion of the Fallopian tubes. Where these operations are legalized they are usually made on the recommendation of a board composed of physicians, or of physicians and responsible authorities. This operation obviates the necessity of physical restraint on the part of the defective, does not interfere with personal liberty, and yet insures infertility. It does not, however, prevent sexual intercourse or the spread of venereal disease. Sterilization, of course, is the most effective measure that can be applied, but most people think it too drastic to be applied on a large scale, and if it is applied on a small scale it does not eradicate the evil inheritance. Furthermore, we

do not yet know enough about the transmission and segregation of hereditary qualities to be sure that, except in most extreme cases, we are doing more good than harm. We could however probably safely and justifiably practice this means of curtailing degeneracy on a much larger scale than we do.

(4) *Segregation*. The method most generally agreed upon in all discussions of the subject is that of segregating the insane, epileptic, feeble-minded, degenerate criminals and paupers, and the seriously diseased, in properly equipped institutions where due regard is had for opportunities for employment, self-support, and proper care. This is not only good from the eugenic point of view, but is the most reasonable, efficient, and humane method of caring for a large proportion of these unfortunates. But it is very expensive, and up to this moment the people generally have been unwilling to tax themselves to the extent of institutionally segregating more than about 10 per cent of those who ought to be withdrawn from free social circulation. There are, for example, hundreds of thousands of feeble-minded now at large and breeding in the United States whose guardians are anxious to have them cared for in institutions, but there is no place. All the institutions of this kind are overcrowded and have long waiting lists. If we were only willing to bear the burden of the institutionalization of these classes for one short generation, most of them, short-lived as they are, would die off, and much of the problem would be solved. The isolation and segregation of the mentally deficient and goitrous Cretins of Aosta in 1890, for example, resulted in their almost complete disappearance by 1910, thereby removing from the earth one of the most frightful breeds of degenerates known to recent history. In the course of a few generations, or at most a few centuries, the whole eugenic tone of the population could be immeasurably raised. Of course here, too, only the obviously unfit should be isolated at first; but ability to make proper distinctions would increase very rapidly.

All of these agents would do much to reduce the reproduction of the unfit. None of them will work as they should to be fully efficient unless the public is educated as to their purpose, importance, and nature. This education must include also the inculcation of a sense of responsibility for the hereditary qualities of future generations.

e. **Positive Eugenics**. It is as important that the right people should be born as that the wrong people should not be born. Positive or constructive eugenics seeks to promote the propagation of the better biological elements of the race. It aims to secure by various means

the marriage and mating of those individuals capable of producing high-grade progeny. It is based on the assumption that certain human types are desirable in society, and that, within limits, these types are known. At present, however, these eugenically fit classes do not provide their share of the population. Galton thought they should do more than this when he said, "The aim of eugenics is to bring as many influences as can be reasonably employed, to cause the useful classes in the community to contribute *more* than their proportion to the next generation." The positive eugenic program is in a much more amorphous condition than that of negative eugenics. This may be due to the fact that positive measures cannot be as direct as negative measures. They must consist mainly of education and the building of social values and ideals, and these results can only be obtained by means of the more intangible social control forces. A brief discussion of some of the more prominent positive agents follows.

(1) *Modify the standard of living.*¹⁹ The general assumption underlying any discussion of the relation of the standard of living to positive eugenics is that classes with a high standard are more inclined to represent superior stocks, and, in addition, have the advantage of a favorable environment. This, in the main, is true. Their achievement is fairly reliable evidence. A standard of living that is too high is not a virtue from the biological point of view. It is almost universally true that the reproductive rate of classes is inversely proportional to their standard of living. If a class is to do its biological duty as the social need demands, their standard of living should not be so complicated and elaborate that no allowance can be made for the raising of a fair sized family. A socially desirable standard does not need to be a luxurious one, as many people in this materialistic age seem to think. A lower standard involving less strain, much more comfort, and more abiding and valuable satisfactions, could easily include one more child.

(2) *Change class sentiment.* The reason for the low birth-rate among the upper classes is not solely nor even primarily economic, however. It is to a considerable extent a matter of class sentiment. As the result of rather tense and sordid competition between the upper classes having high standards, and vast masses, mainly recent and culturally diverse immigrant arrivals, large families have come to savor of the slums, and the idea has become more or less common that to be prolific is to be gross. A considerable restriction of immigration is

¹⁹ See e.g., W. S. Thompson, "Standards of Living as they Affect the Growth of Competing Population Groups," *Scientific Monthly*, Vol. 17, pp. 57-65.

likely to show some gratifying results soon in eliminating some of the factors contributing to this attitude. In addition, as Thompson points out,²⁰ child labor laws, compulsory education laws, minimum wage laws, factory acts, workmen's compensation and employers' liability laws, labor union rules of various kinds, and various other wholesome but not excessive restrictions, make it possible for the lower classes to maintain standards of living which they could not achieve until recently when competition was entirely unrestricted. But a different sentiment must be created, and since it deals with a subject full of detonating possibilities, it cannot be done by exhortation or crude appeal. The most refined and subtle agencies available must be used. The general class standards must be revised so that they favor a fine type of family life. The superior obligations of superior people to contribute to the next generation children of superior quality and training must be emphasized. Success in life must involve the raising of at least enough children to replace the couple under present conditions. Standards, ideas, customs, and habits which interfere with this should be banned by the class. An opinion should be created that applauds a fine family like an act of heroism, an act that is beneficial to the group. Of course, there are enormous obstacles to the effective erection of such an ideal, but if it is not done the classes and nations that have these high but perverted standards will perish from the earth in a few generations.

(3) *Eugenic education.*²¹ Education is eugenically valuable as a means of affording the development of a "eugenic conscience," which is now quite generally lacking. We still fall in love and marry haphazardly, permitting propinquity, sentimentality, social and economic considerations, or crude passion to rule our acts. What is needed is to induce each oncoming generation to make a more reasonable selection of marriage mates; to fall in love intelligently and conscientiously. Here and there to-day one finds rare spirits carrying some hereditary blight who refuse to marry. This encourages one to hope that the spread of eugenic education will cause more and more people of all classes to take eugenic obligations into consideration when they marry. We can so educate ourselves to higher and higher mating ideals that not physical beauty or attraction or prowess alone, not intellectual ability or common intellectual interest, nor moral character alone, shall

²⁰ *Op. cit.*, p. 65.

²¹ See especially I. Fisher, "Impending Problems of Eugenics," *Scientific Monthly*, Vol. 13, pp. 230-231.

seem sufficient, but that our standards for our mate and ourselves include hereditary cleanliness and high quality, and wholesomeness, physically, intellectually, and morally, and that this be so ingrained that one deficient in any of these respects shall be recognized as undesirable in marriage. In fact the ideal should be so strongly developed that marriage with an unhealthy and dysgenic person would be looked upon with the same aversion and repulsion as an incestuous or bigamous union. When that time comes the steady pressure of this high ideal of what constitutes attractiveness in marriage will secure steady progress.

For all this we need moral education along the lines of sex, heredity, sex morality, marriage, and the social nature and importance of the family. Our educational processes should also include those forms of inculcation that make the fact widely and deeply felt that it is both immoral and unpatriotic to marry or procreate if unfit, and if fit, to unduly limit the size of the family. Failure is certain, however, if the problem is not attacked with religious zeal. The future depends upon it.

These ideals will not form so quickly, however. There are barriers to be overcome before they have ready currency. In fact it almost seems an impossible task to educate a whole people to such a sense of duty to their race. Yet it is the best and perhaps the only way in the end. Generations and even centuries may be necessary. We need not be discouraged by the long weary way, but rather inspired by the vision. Our present problem is to set people on this way of progress.

(4) *Economic agents.* Various economic agents have been suggested as a means of encouraging reproduction among the better elements of the population. Galton, e. g., proposed to give prizes or endowments for the marriage of persons of high character, both physical, mental, and moral, to be determined by some form of inquiry or examination. This would perhaps not do much harm, but it certainly would do very little good. Its range of action would be extremely limited, and so far as it induced any couples to marry each other for the pecuniary reward, it would be absolutely immoral in its nature, and probably result in no perceptible improvement of the race.

The best that can be hoped for along this line at the present is a little alleviation of the financial handicap that now hinders the more promising but poor couples from rearing or even starting a family. It is likely that if household cares could be materially lightened and cheapened among the more impecunious intellectual classes, larger families would appear. Household labor-saving appliances, improved foods, further coöperation and division of labor may do this. Among

these classes one is safe in saying that the care of children is preferred to household drudgery and skimping. Increased taxation of the unmarried and childless is sometimes suggested, but this would have indifferent success. The most useful specific device so far proposed or utilized is the "family wage" or "family allowance system," important applications of which have already been made in Australia and virtually every country of continental Europe, the essential principle of which is that the minimum wage should vary according to the size and needs of the family, of course, equitably administered both from the point of view of the payer and payee.²²

(5) *Abolition of certain forms of celibacy.* Our present social arrangements create types of celibacy that while they do not prohibit children altogether prevent them during the best and most productive years of life. For example, to require that teachers be unmarried not only hastens the day when there will be no naturally gifted teachers, but cheats society of a considerable number of desirable progeny. The general feeling that a professional career for women and children are antithetical is also anti-social in its effects. The prolonged preparation necessary for the professions to-day, and the economic hardship incidental thereto means that the professional man can rarely marry much before thirty. This reduces the size of his family very considerably. Religious orders also still mean the wastage of a well selected and high quality germ plasm. Now, however, that the working of the hereditary factor is becoming better understood, more intelligent counsels will doubtless prevail in the future, seeking to better conserve the preferred strains in the population and perhaps even multiply them.

In conclusion, it may be said that eugenics is at present in an amorphous condition. It is quite true that our experiments in eugenics, both in its positive and negative forms, have at best been piecemeal and not very successful. In the main, while it presents no end which seems to be unattainable, it presents no beginning which seems to be feasible. Furthermore, the general run of folks do not know very much about it, and enormous difficulties stand in the way of any program so far conceived; public opinion must be aroused and informed, better knowledge of a genetic nature must be discovered, and heretofore undiscovered, or at least unused, social control agents for carrying eugenic programs into effect must be made available. Many decades must be passed in the bare effort to accustom men to the idea.

²² See P. H. Douglas, *Wages and the Family*; E. A. Ross, *Standing Room Only?* Ch. XXIII.

For long years the deliberate improvement of human breeds must be discussed and dreamed of before it can be done. For this, which is the most stupendous task man has ever attempted, will need all his intelligence and will, his endurance and foresight, his powers of social instruction and organization. It seems rather hopeless, but as Patrick says, "When we get ready to apply to the problem a fraction of the thought and care which we are now applying to the perfection of the automobile, then something will be done."

5. EUTHENICS

The selective devices of eugenics must be supplemented by environmental methods if they are to be rendered ultimately effective in peopling the earth with desirable types. In fact it is only through environmental control that eugenic control is possible. The thought and methods connected with these efforts toward controlling and improving environment compose the new science of eugenics. It has been defined as "The betterment of living conditions, through conscious endeavor, for the purpose of securing efficient human beings."²⁸ Its purpose is to provide opportunity for the fullest achievement of human potentialities, to give the germ plasm its maximum chance, and to secure the greatest efficiency under present conditions. The rose may grow in the desert, but not so well.

It is also true that eugenics, if carried into effect on as large a scale as possible, can do much to bring to fruition many latent elements of quality in the contemporary population; it may even remove the conditions that now cause congenital, natal, and postnatal causes of degeneracy. Certainly with good conditions of environment generally in effect we can have an immeasurably more efficient society than we now have. Even relatively mediocre stuff can be fairly good with maximum opportunity and stimulation. It is also true that many defects, especially mental defects, generally accepted in eugenic studies as of hereditary determination may readily be recognized as due to social conditions, rather than as expressing specific hereditary traits. In this connection Boas writes, "A weakling who is economically well situated is protected from many of the dangers that beset an individual of similar characteristics whose economic condition is not so favorable, and it must be admitted that criminality in families that may be mentally

²⁸ Ellen H. Richards, *Eugenics, the Science of Controllable Environment*, p. vii.

weak and which are at the same time struggling for the barest subsistence is at least as much determined by social conditions as by heredity. . . . We should be willing to admit that among the poor undernourished population, which is at the same time badly housed and suffers from other unfavorable conditions of life, congenital weakness may develop which lowers the resistance of the individual against all forms of delinquency." ²⁴ Similarly environmental conditions are capable of shaping this more or less plastic hereditary material on good lines. Therefore euthenic agents offer expedients in improving the quality of the population that no progressive can deny or treat lightly.

Euthenics is concerned with a vast mass of most complex variables. There are, for example, intimate relations between racial improvement and economic conditions. Certain economic conditions now oppress a very large proportion of the population. But good economic conditions afford conditions under which the operation of eugenic ideals would doubtless be more effective than now. A greater equality in the distribution of wealth would tend to bring about a greater equality in the birth-rate of different classes. The right environmental conditions can also prevent the waste of potential mental energy. If the environment is properly stimulating, it will direct the energies of men towards socially advantageous achievements. It is generally thought that if the masses are given a suitable opportunity to develop and use their brain capacity much unexpected achievement will come. The fact that the upper classes alone have had the opportunities is no insignificant reason for their contributions to progress. The environment may provide or withdraw the racial poisons, the germs and pests, that have such ability to exercise weal or woe among human beings.

Among the innumerable euthenic possibilities and activities of the present moment are the following: applied science in all its forms—its sanitary, hygienic, dietetic, and medical uses, its domestic applications, its use in all the various departments of engineering and industry; education in sex, culture, vocation, personal care and hygiene, homemaking and parenthood; laws which make for health and the prevention of disease, such as pure food and drug laws, quarantine laws, sanitary laws, factory and labor laws, as well as organizations and ideals directed to the same end; all that is done to prevent industrial disease, accidents, the employment of women and children under certain conditions; cheaper and more adequate food supplies; better hous-

²⁴ F. Boas, "Report on an Anthropometric Investigation," *Journal of the American Statistical Association*, Vol. 18, pp. 198-199.

ing; shifting the incidence of taxation to those best able to carry it; the regulation of corporations; safe and adequate water supply; cheaper hospitals, sanatoria, and medical and surgical service; better distribution of wealth and income; better distribution of population; provision of gymnasia, playgrounds, parks, and other opportunities for recreation; elimination of vice; more scientific and constructive social work; and hosts of others.²⁵

Both of these recognized ways of improving the quality of human beings must be used if there is to be progress; we need to breed up the quality of the germ plasm, and build up the quality of the environment in which all germ plasm potentialities are liable to come to fruition. In these modern man has double possibilities of controlling his destiny as a biological and social organism.

6. THE UNAVOIDABLE TASK

Conklin ²⁶ points out that for at least one hundred centuries there have been no notable improvements in the evolution of the human being. The limits of physical evolution have apparently been reached in the more perfect human specimens. Man's body among the best of us is as good as it can be, his brain is as large and as specialized and as efficient as it will be. All man can do is to bring the average up to the best. And yet civilization has been doing much to undermine the degree of attainment that has been reached. By means of various sorts of protection we have succeeded in keeping alive our feeble-minded and other mentally and nervously impaired types, who under more natural conditions starved, or were killed by enemies, or eaten by other species for whom they were prey. By sanitary and medical means we have succeeded in keeping alive many, both infant and adult, of weak constitutions, who in sterner times would never have lived to reproduce. Most of the degenerates which a primitive society kills off, civilization keeps alive, and it abolishes most of the agents that killed them. So far, however, civilization has not fulfilled its obligation of protecting society against its own weaknesses thus produced. And it cannot turn back to ruder methods; that would be unthinkable. Civilization must either cure its own sicknesses and weaknesses, and improve itself and its stock, or it will destroy itself. It must build up an ever stronger artificial structure to bolster up its decadent or decaying parts, or more humane and

²⁵ See the chart at the end of Mrs. Richards' book for a most extensive list.

²⁶ *The Direction of Evolution*, Chs. VI, VII.

efficient means of removing them. More and more is it forced into ceaseless auto-evolution. Man has created an environment that in turn has kept alive a motley population of various degrees of perfection. He is both a master and a bungler. He must become a master more and more. He cures contagious disease to-day, not by constructing constitutional resistance, but by erecting an outer barrier of protection against disease. He safeguards himself against poor human stock, not by breeding a better species, but by trying to discourage poor stock and by encouraging good stock. However, he must make sure that the outer barriers against disease never break down, and that the control of population quality never relaxes. If it does civilization will produce a shambles and then extinction. In fact, with the increasing complexity of life and the appalling increase of population everywhere, the problem of social or artificial control becomes even greater, and will continually do so.

How far can this pyramiding of sheer human control of nature go? Just how artificial can man make his life? We do not know. It is true that our knowledge of and control over nature are vastly greater than ever before, and the means of increasing and diffusing knowledge were never so good as now. Also at present our ingenuity for handling such problems seems to be improving at the same rate at least that the problems are increasing. At best, however, life will be more and more full of absolute requirements and obligations, and experiment and effort cannot be relaxed.

QUESTIONS AND PROBLEMS

1. (a) What is meant by heredity? (b) By Mendel's Law? (F. A. Bushee, *Principles of Sociology*, pp. 326-385; S. J. Holmes, *Trend of the Race*, pp. 11-26; F. S. Chapin, *Introduction to the Study of Social Evolution*, pp. 3-19; M. F. Guyer, *Being Well-Born*, Chaps. III-V, VIII.)
2. To what extent are feeble-mindedness and insanity inheritable? (Holmes, pp. 29-62; Guyer, Chap. VIII; Bushee, pp. 347-355.)
3. What is the possibility of the future development of man, i.e., the continuance of human physical and mental evolution? (E. G. Conklin, *The Direction of Human Evolution*, Chaps. VI-VII.)
4. "The higher races are using the resources of scientific knowledge to reduce the death rate of the inferior peoples and the birthrate of the superior." (S. H. Halford, *Population and Birth Control*, N. Y., 1917.) Explain.
5. Is it true that "Low standard men will drive out high standard men as bad money drives out good"?

6. Read H. H. Hibbs, Jr., "Infant Mortality and the Size of the Family," *Publications of the American Statistical Association*, 1914-15, Vol. 14, pp. 629-641. What inferences of significance to social progress do you draw?
7. Read Nellie S. Nearing, "Education and Fecundity," *Publications of the American Statistical Association*, 1914-15, Vol. 14, pp. 156-174. What inferences of significance to social progress do you draw?
8. What are the effects upon the quality of the population of concentration in cities?
9. In what ways do our ideas of romantic marriage interfere with the eugenic ideal?
10. How is the matter of public health related to the question of the quality of the population?
11. What in general are the eugenic and dysgenic effects of democracy and opportunity?
12. Do you favor an exchange of certificates of mental and physical health from a reputable physician on the part of a young man and woman when they become engaged?
13. Just what part does eugenics play in determining the quality of the population?
14. What do we mean by the "conservation of human resources?" What does it include? (C. E. Van Hise, *The Conservation of Natural Resources in the United States*, pp. 364-372; Ely, Hess, Leith, Carver, *The Foundations of National Prosperity*, pp. 275-336.)

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CHAPTER XVII

PROGRESS AND THE QUANTITY OF THE POPULATION

I. THE PROBLEM OF NUMBERS

AND God blessed them, and God said unto them, Be fruitful, and multiply, and replenish the earth, and subdue it."¹ From early times the duty of fecundity has been impressed upon people by the various agencies that shape public opinion until it has become thoroughly ingrained in the mind of the masses. It is quite possible that this was good in simpler and more primitive civilizations. With frontiers to push back and vast territories to subdue, many sons and daughters were necessary. But this injunction was quite unnecessary, for as Malthus puts it, "Throughout the animal and vegetable kingdoms Nature has scattered the seeds of life abroad with the most profuse and liberal hand." Nature, that master adapter to conditions, has given all the forms of life this intense reproductive impulse to "pull them through the tight places." Species inherit the impulse and capacity for greater reproduction than they need for continuance under ordinary circumstances, because they have had to get past the very worst conditions that they were likely to encounter if the species was to endure.² This tendency is merely Nature's way of establishing a margin of safety. Man shares this tendency with the other forms of life; he, too, has had a specific fecundity established for him hundreds of centuries ago that has insured him the power of surviving and expanding under the hardest conditions of primitive life, even the depredations of predatory animals, the natural holocausts, the famines, plagues, epidemics, and wars that have threatened to wipe out entire peoples.³ But almost everywhere for centuries this natural tendency has produced some of man's greatest problems, problems which until recently have seemed to be inevitable and almost insoluble. Less than two generations ago Huxley remarked, "The population question is the real riddle of the Sphinx,

¹ *Genesis* I. 28.

² E. A. Ross, *Principles of Sociology*, p. 32.

³ Cf. E. R. Reuter, *Population Problems*, pp. 109-131.

to which no political Oedipus has as yet found the answer. In view of the ravages of the terrible monster, over-multiplication, all other riddles sink into insignificance." ⁴ Jowett, at about the same time, said "Population is the most untamable force in the political and social world." ⁵

The most serious aspect of this problem is the one pointed out in such a memorable way by Thomas Robert Malthus,⁶ viz., "the constant tendency in all animate life to increase beyond the nourishment prepared for it," or, to confine the subject to man, the tendency of the human race to increase faster than it can increase its food supply, thus causing numbers to press painfully and disastrously upon resources, especially the means of subsistence. For nearly a century, due to rapidly expanding frontiers, the conquest of new agricultural lands, the ready exploitation of their virgin food resources, and at the same time an unparalleled improvement in methods of industrial production, the contentions of Malthus were, if not ridiculed, at least slighted. But now, for a quarter of a century, with most of the open spaces under cultivation and many of them beyond the point of diminishing returns, and at the same time a marked advance in medical science, sanitation, hygiene, and the control of natural phenomena all tending to reduce the death-rate, Malthus is "at par again," to use Professor Ross's apt phrase. Not all the inveterate optimists among the clergy or the economists can refute this irrevocable fact. The situation in brief is this: populations everywhere tend to increase continually, but the limits of the habitable globe remain fixed, the areas capable of producing food can be expanded only within rather narrow limits, and the means of subsistence are subject to the law of diminishing returns.

In the dynamics of population we have then one of the most insistent and important problems of social adjustment; a problem that is involved in every social change. We must face the question of balancing population against resources and conditions of efficiency; we cannot go on promiscuously filling the vacant corners of the earth without an eye for the future, and without any plan or desire for betterment. Sir W. H. Beveridge stated the case poignantly recently when he said, "The idea that mankind, while reducing indefinitely the risks to human life, can, without disaster, continue to exercise to the full a power of

⁴ "The Natural Inequalities of Men," *Collected Essays*, p. 328.

⁵ Int. to Plato's *Republic*, p. iv.

⁶ *Essay on the Principle of Population as it Affects the Future Improvement of Society*. 1798. Revised 1803.

reproduction adapted to the perils of savage or prehuman days, can control death by art and leave births to nature, is biologically absurd. The rapid cumulative increase following any practical application of this idea would within measurable time make civilization impossible in this or any other planet." ⁷ It is evident that we must place population policies on a rational and scientific basis.

2. THE TREND OF NUMBERS

Though our data on population increase in the past are neither complete nor altogether accurate, being partly in the nature of estimates, even if we allow for over-statement and give them a most conservative interpretation, they show a stupendous rate of increase.

Lavasseur estimated the population of Europe at the beginning of the eighteenth century at about 90 millions, and Voltaire at 107 millions. Süssmilch in 1741 placed the number at 150 millions, but about two decades later reduced it to 130 millions. Willcox ⁸ estimates the population of Europe at the middle of the 18th century to be about 127 millions. At the close of the Napoleonic Wars in 1815 Rossiter ⁹ estimates that the European population amounted to about 194,500,000, and if the people of European descent in America and elsewhere throughout the world were counted, it would amount to about 210 millions. According to Rossiter's figures the population of Europe, including the Balkan states, in 1860 was 293,000,000, and in 1910-15 amounted to 454,000,000, and according to the English registrar-general amounted to 465 millions in 1916. This is approximately at 51 per cent increase during the first half of this last century and 55 per cent during the second half. The combined population of Europe and people of European descent in the Americas, Asia, Africa, Australia, and elsewhere in 1915-16 is reliably estimated at 645 to 650 millions. Thus they more than trebled in a little over a century, and in two centuries increased to at least six times their numbers. The United States in 1790, the year of our first census, had a population of 3,930,000 in round numbers; in 1920 it had 105,711,000, an increase of nearly 2,700 per cent. For Europe and America together the gain from 1810-20 to 1860-70

⁷ "Population and Unemployment," *Scientific Monthly*, Vol. 17, p. 601.

⁸ "The Expansion of Europe in Population," *American Economic Review*, Vol. 5, pp. 741-742.

⁹ "The Adventure of Population Growth," *Journal of the American Statistical Association*, Vol. 8, pp. 561-562.

amounted to 63 per cent according to Rossiter, and from 1870 to 1920, 68 per cent. Rossiter points out that if the increase shown for the past century by Europe and the United States combined were to be maintained to the year 2020 the number of persons living then would reach the amazing total of 1,980,000,000.¹⁰

In 1830, according to the best estimates, the population of the world as a whole was about 850,000,000. Consequently, in 1800 it must have been considerably less than this. At present the world contains approximately 1,700,000,000 to 1,750,000,000 people.¹¹ This means that the world's increase was from 2 to perhaps 2½ times in this last century.¹² The annual world increase is estimated at 12 millions by East and 20 millions by Knibbs, the eminent Australian statistician. Roughly the population of the world increases by the population of France every two years. As Reuter¹³ points out, however, the rate of increase during the century was very unequal in the different grand divisions: in millions Europe increased from 200 to 465; Asia from 400 to 870; Africa from 100 to 140; and the Americas from 20 to 205. With the exception of Africa the rate of increase has been appalling.

Pearl shows that neither the most destructive war in all history, with its toll of nearly 11 million combatants, according to Bogart,¹⁴ nor the most serious epidemic since the Middle Ages, the influenza scourge, caused more than a momentary hesitation in the march of population growth. His figures show that these calamities were mere hurdles which temporarily slowed up, but did not seriously delay the rate of growth.¹⁵

Rather competent population specialists have attempted to give us some idea of future trends. Knibbs points out that with the present rate of increase in world population, if it were possible to maintain it, our great-grandchildren would see some 7,000 millions struggling for life, while in the year 3000 A. D. there would be the stupendous number of 34,000 million people. Reuter¹⁶ estimates that in 500 years, by the year 2400, the world would contain some thirteen and one-half billion

p. 568.

E. M. East, *Mankind at the Crossroads*, p. 67; I. Fisher, "Impending Problems of Eugenics," *Scientific Monthly*, Vol. 13, p. 221; G. R. Davies, "Population and Progress," *Scientific Monthly*, Vol. 19, p. 601.

¹⁰ East, *ibid.*, p. 66; R. Pearl, "The Population Problem," *Geographical Review*, Vol. 12, p. 637.

¹¹ E. B. Reuter, *Population Problems*, pp. 93-94.

¹² *Direct and Indirect Costs of the War*.

¹³ Cf. R. Pearl and F. C. Kelly, "Forecasting the Growth of Nations," *Harper's*, Vol. 142, pp. 711-713.

¹⁴ *Op. cit.*, p. 107.

people. But, as will be seen below, such populations are unthinkable, since there are distinct limits to population expansion. Alfred Marshall calculated that the population of the world will have reached its maximum of about 6,000,000,000 in about 200 years.¹⁷ Professor East gives a figure of 5,200 millions, a population which at the present rate of increase would be reached in just a little over a century.¹⁸ Professor Pearl, on the basis of his logistic curve, predicts 2,026 millions as the upper world population limit, which will be reached about 2100 A.D.¹⁹ While these estimates show no great unity, they do emphasize unmistakably the fact that the population of the world cannot go on increasing at anything like the rate of growth that has prevailed in the past more than a short time longer. What are the reasons?

3. THE RATIO OF THE BIRTH-RATE TO THE DEATH-RATE

The almost universal decline of the birth-rate is often pointed to as a factor offsetting the more sinister population tendencies. Viewed by itself such a conclusion is inevitable. But it cannot be viewed alone. It must always be balanced against the death-rate. When that is done we have quite a different situation.

a. The Birth-Rate. To be sure, the decline in the birth-rate, a movement which began in France before the Revolution, and which during the nineteenth century, especially during the last four decades, spread to practically all the countries of Western civilization, has been so marked as to constitute one of the great social phenomena of modern times.

It would be desirable to know the trend of the birth-rate for African and Asiatic peoples, but nothing more than guesses are available. For the Western world, however, and its descendants in Australia, fairly accurate figures are available. If, as may be possible, the decline is only in evidence among the White race, the problem is still more complicated and surcharged with difficulties.

An examination of the birth-rates of different countries in Europe and Australia during the last half century show a general, though by no means uniform, decline.

¹⁷ *Principles of Economics* (4th ed.), p. 257, footnote.

¹⁸ *Op. cit.*, p. 69.

¹⁹ *The Biology of Population Growth*, pp. 172-173; *Studies in Human Biology*, pp. 631-632.

BIRTH-RATE TRENDS

<i>Country</i>	<i>First Date</i>	<i>Rate</i>	<i>Last Date</i>	<i>Rate</i>	<i>Per cent Decline</i>
United States	1851-55	28.8	1921	24.3	15.6
France	1801-10	32.2			
	1871-80	25.6	1913	19.0	25.8
United Kingdom ...	1871-80	32.3	1921	22.5	30.3
Germany	1871-80	39.1	1913	27.5	29.6
Austria	1871-80	39.0	1920	22.4	42.5
Hungary	1871-76	42.8	1920	26.9	37.1
Italy	1871-80	36.9	1919	21.2	42.5
Spain	1861-70	37.8	1919	30.4	19.6
Russia (European) .	1867	50.3	1912-15	44.0	12.5
Denmark	1871-80	31.4	1920	25.4	19.1
Sweden	1871-80	30.5	1921	21.4	29.8
Norway	1871-80	31.0	1921	24.5	20.9
Belgium	1871-80	32.7	1920	21.5	34.2
Netherlands	1871-80	36.4	1921	20.8	35.1
Switzerland	1871-80	30.8	1921	20.8	32.4
New Zealand	1881-85	36.3	1922	23.2	36.0
Queensland	1881-85	36.5	1922	25.6	29.8
New So. Wales	1881-85	37.7	1922	25.7	31.8
So. Australia	1881-85	38.5	1922	23.7	38.4
Victoria	1881-85	30.8	1922	23.1	25.0

The causes of this birth decline are many and various, though by no means equally important. Among the more important, particularly with reference to the United States, the following are frequently mentioned.

(1) *Economic factors.* Economic conditions are probably the main causal factor, and the rising standard of living is probably the most significant among these. During the last century, with the assistance of extensive agricultural and industrial expansion as well as an unprecedented exploitation of natural resources, practically all classes among Western peoples acquired a higher standard of living. Now it has been noticed that when a community, or a class, or even a nation, has attained a decent standard of life and has maintained it for a time, it is extremely tenacious of that standard. It will not only resist its reduction, but struggle to raise it. Children are an obstacle in either case, and people tend to have fewer of them, rather than sacrifice their standard of living. Falling prices or rising money incomes tend to produce a higher standard of life instead of more children. During the eighties prices quite generally fell continuously and considerably. The same money incomes enabled people to buy more things without feeling

richer, and they thus became accustomed to living upon a scale which could only be maintained with smaller families. A higher standard of living usually also means later marriages, with a consequent falling off of progeny. Fecundity is limited for reasons connected with the family income, though restriction is by no means inversely proportional to the size of the bank account. In the main though, people believe that a given income yields more comforts, welfare, security, and other satisfactions if the numbers are small. In recent years there has been an increasing cost of living, a stimulated desire for luxury, and a general raising of the standard of comfort. All these have had further restrictive effects. Under conditions of democracy, such as now quite generally prevail in the Western world, there is a tendency for higher wants to percolate downwards and diffuse themselves among the lower classes with the same results noticeable among other classes.

(2) *Social democracy.* The fact just mentioned is merely part of a broader movement. Democracy in its broader sense implies political and social opportunity as well as nominal equality. Caste barriers are down. Education is not the exclusive privilege of any class. Such conditions provide a stimulus to ambition, and one finds in effect what Nitti called "social capillarity"—a straining to reach the higher rungs of the social ladder. The desire to improve the social position acts so powerfully that families are willing to make all kinds of sacrifices to attain this end. But men realize that, in the main, what the individual achieves and the standing he acquires depends on himself. Early marriage and children interfere with this ascent of the economic, cultural, and social ladder. The Frenchman, Arsène Dumont,²⁰ points out that to-day large families are only possible at those social levels where there is no progress and no expectation of progress, while small families become possible when the way has been opened, and there is hope of realizing natural aspirations toward betterment. Thoughtlessness and ambitionlessness conspire to produce large, and usually undesirable, families.

(3) *Social legislation.* Even among the lower classes, the birth-rate has been slightly diminished by different types of social legislation that have come during the last century. Child labor laws are a particularly good illustration. As long as children can be sent to work at an early age, they are an economic asset, and families are large. But when their labor is prohibited and they must be sent to school, they become an economic liability and the families become smaller. Karl Pearson found

²⁰ Referred to by East, *op. cit.*, p. 266.

this to be the major reason for family limitation among the English proletariat; Dumont comes to the same conclusion in France; and general observation shows more or less the same effects wherever such prohibition occurs.

(4) *Education and enlightenment.* The general spread of popular universal education during the last century has also played its part. It has induced a greater desire for leisure and culture. It has also tended to produce a more enlightened people, who desire to better themselves, who realize the part excessive progeny plays in preventing this, who are capable of understanding the significance of birth restriction and the means of effecting it, as well as producing a continually increasing group of people who see the general evils of large families and overpopulation. Among others one will find the idea of "Fewer and Better Children." Parents, seeing the necessity for a more expensive training to fit children to take part in the mental and industrial life of the nation, have fewer children so that they can give this to them. Parents have a more vivid realization of their responsibilities, and have higher ambitions for their children. Higher education particularly has also had the effect of causing later marriages, higher desires, and, especially among women, a tendency to celibacy.

(5) *Changing attitude toward women.* Some phases of the "woman's movement" also have tended to lessen the birth-rate in certain classes, at least of Western civilization. The older idea of the wife as a self-sacrificing, hard-working, child-bearing, child-tending animal, practically devoid of mental interests, who was the faithful servant implicitly obeying her husband, has ceased to exist in many circles. The industrial and other economic alternatives to matrimony or early matrimony seem to be the chief factors responsible for this change of attitude. Women now, to an extent at least, have a growing economic independence, which is accompanied by an enlarged liberty and the possibility for expression in life. This has meant an increasing control of their own lives, not only before marrying, but after as well. Consequently, the will of the woman is becoming more and more important in the family. This expresses itself with respect to child-bearing and the size of the family, both of which have come to be a matter of joint will and planning rather than the accidental expression of God's will—or more truthfully, the undesigned result of careless sex satisfaction.

(6) *Venereal disease.* That venereal diseases are a significant factor in producing sterility, either in men or women or both, is certain, but it is very doubtful whether they are a more important factor now than

formerly. The massing of populations and the readier facilities for transmission of these diseases may be causing them to spread, though we have no definite evidence of that fact. We are more certain, however, that never before in history have we been so competent to cope with their ravages.

(7) *Female sterility*.²¹ It is variously stated that certain influences upon modern women, such as education, intellectual pursuits, modern social life with its strain, the industrial employment of women, and the use of drugs and stimulants, produce sterility. This is undoubtedly true, especially in the case of the industrial employment of women with its strains and displacements. But that there is a general failing in physiological capacity to bear children is not supported by the evidence. In the main, other factors must explain the smaller family.

(8) *Urbanization*. The increasing urbanization of the population which in so many countries has occurred to such a remarkable extent during the past half-century is an important circumstance in bringing down the birth-rate. This trend, of course, correlates especially with the industrial and commercial changes of this past half-century. The ways in which city life affects fecundity are numerous. Children are an asset in the country; in cities they are a liability. In the country there is much work fitted to the strength of children, and, in the main, there is no objection to their doing this work. The work which is demanded of children in cities is physically and often morally unfitted for them, and compulsory school attendance laws and child labor laws specifically restrict or prohibit it. Facilities for rearing children are on the average much better in the country. The use of preventives and abortion are less prevalent in the country, partly due to the fewer contacts and other facilities for spreading such information. Celibacy is hard in the country; eminently desirable and enjoyable in the city. The search for pleasure, for social life, for culture is greater in the city. The emancipation of women seems to have proceeded farther in urban communities. There has also probably been a greater slackening of the Old Testament type of religious restraints in the city. Divorces are more frequent in the city. The cost of living is higher. In general, city life intensifies the action of most of the agencies that are responsible for the diminution of births. Cities having large numbers of immigrants will not show the above trends, however—at least for several generations.²²

(9) *Lower death-rate and greater expectation of life*. Another factor

²¹ This subject has been well treated by Reuter, *op. cit.*, pp. 164-166.

²² On this whole question see Holmes, *op. cit.*, pp. 152-164.

that does not reduce the number of births per given unit of women of reproductive age, but reduces the number of births per thousand of population is one that is to be discussed in the ensuing section. The fact that people are living longer, means that there are relatively fewer births per unit of population, even assuming the reproductiveness of the group to remain the same. This means a lower birth-rate.

(10) *Birth-control*. Greater than these various specific causes, and the one making most of them effective, is the deliberate and voluntary avoidance of child-bearing by the use of contraceptives. This is so important and has so many ramifications that it will be dealt with in a separate section.

b. The Death-Rate. While the decline in the birth-rate has been significant, the decline in the death-rate is even more marked and points to conclusions most portentous as far as the question of numbers is concerned. The following table gives the death-rates of the more important countries of Europe and Australia and of the United States, the rates as far as possible covering approximately the same periods as the table of birth-rates above.²⁸

DEATH-RATE TRENDS

<i>Country</i>	<i>First Date</i>	<i>Rate</i>	<i>Last Date</i>	<i>Rate</i>	<i>Decline</i>
United States	1900	17.0	1922	11.8	30.5
France	1871-80	24.3	1920	17.2	29.2
United Kingdom	1871-80	21.0	1922	12.5	40.4
Germany	1871-80	27.1	1922	14.9	45.0
Austria	1871-80	31.2	1920	19.0	39.1
Hungary	1871-80	40.1	1920	18.6	53.6
Italy	1871-80	29.7	1919	19.0	36.0
Spain	1870	30.9	1921	21.4	30.7
Russia	1890	35.8	1909	28.9	19.2
Denmark	1871-80	19.3	1920	12.9	32.7
Sweden	1871-80	18.4	1921	12.4	32.5
Norway	1881	17.0	1921	11.5	32.3
Belgium	1871-80	22.6	1920	13.5	40.3
Netherlands	1871-80	24.3	1921	11.1	54.1
Switzerland	1871-80	24.0	1921	12.7	47.0
New Zealand	1881-85	10.9	1922	8.8	19.2
Queensland	1881-85	19.1	1922	9.2	51.7
New So. Wales	1881-85	15.7	1922	8.9	43.3
So. Australia	1881-85	14.7	1922	9.1	38.3
Victoria	1881-85	14.7	1922	9.7	34.0

²⁸ This table and the preceding one were compiled from Gaudelier, *Les Lois de la Population*, The Report of the British National Birth Rate Commission, Census data, where available, and Mulhall, *Dictionary of Statistics*.

The causes of this declining death-rate are not difficult to find. Among the more important are the following:

(1) *Modern medical science.* Of primary importance is the remarkable advance of medical science in the last century. This has taken various forms. There are first the advances in general sanitation, such as better sewage disposal, more attention to water supply, purer foods and saner diet, greater consideration of personal hygiene, better housing, and better living conditions generally. There is the control of contagious and infectious diseases caused by parasitic plants and animals, such as bacteria, protozoa, and worms, resulting in the partial control of such diseases as hookworm, yellow fever (borne by the mosquito), bubonic plague (borne by the rat flea), and typhus fever (borne by the louse). There is also the use of serums and vaccines resulting in a marked decrease in the deaths from smallpox, diphtheria, tetanus, yellow fever, typhoid,²⁴ and others. The catastrophic plagues of the middle ages have almost disappeared. Important also is the prevention of infection by special hospital sanitary measures, isolation of suspects, quarantine, improved antiseptics, and scrupulous sterilization. Sepsis and gangrene have almost disappeared. The partial control of tuberculosis has materially reduced the death-rate. Modern surgery of the internal organs, the liver, appendix, spleen, intestines, bladder, kidneys, the brain, the heart, lungs, and large arteries also have saved untold lives.

(2) *Reduced infant mortality.* Newsholme, one-time British Registrar-General, has said, "Infant mortality is the most sensitive index we possess of social welfare and of sanitary administration. . ." Proper hygienic and sanitary science has had a notable effect in bringing more and more babies through their first year, the year of greatest susceptibility to bacteria. The higher degree of education of the modern mother has been the factor that made these other agencies possible, however. She gives the child better care, herself better care before the child's birth and after its birth, understands feeding principles, the importance of air and sunshine, and a thousand other things unknown to the mothers of a century ago. Deaths of infants have always constituted a very considerable proportion of the deaths of all ages, in the United States registration area running usually between 15 and 20 per cent, but in some countries, such as India and China, as high as 50 and 60 per cent. During the last half-century the infant mortality rate has been dropping

²⁴ In our World War Army there were 114 deaths from typhoid. At the Spanish American War there should have been 150,000 cases and 15,000 deaths. See East, *op. cit.*, p. 225.

in a marked way in the Western world, and in Japan of the Eastern hemisphere. From the 1881-5 to the 1906-10 period Austria showed a 20.4 per cent drop in the infant mortality rate, France, 24.6 per cent; England and Wales, 15.8 per cent; Holland, 31.5 per cent; Sweden, 32.8 per cent; Australia, 37.6 per cent, and this drop has continued, except for certain more or less temporary war interruptions. In twenty-seven leading states of the United States registration area in 1921 only 7.6 per cent of the children born died the first year, while in New Zealand in 1920 the per cent was only 5.0. Modern surgery, obstetrical science, and competent nursing have done much to reduce maternal mortality also.

(3) *Public safety measures.* In many countries and states hours and working conditions are regulated. Provisions are made for the proper care of the working class ill and injured; certain requirements with regard to health and safety of employees in industrial plants—proper safeguarding of machinery, lighting, ventilating, prohibition of poisonous or injurious dusts or vapors—are insisted upon; the abolition of unsanitary tenements, the enforcing of quarantine, and the inspection and protection of foods and water, are in effect. The tendency of such measures to reduce the death-rate is undeniable.

(4) *Improved economic conditions.* The better distribution of products and the general rise in the standard of living have had some effect, though it is not likely to continue indefinitely. In the main, the advances in medical science have been responsible for the diminished death-rate.

c. The Continued Accelerated Increase of Numbers. What effect does this rapidly falling death-rate have on the population problem? Aside from gains or losses through migration, the changes that occur in the number of inhabitants of any country depend upon the relative proportion of births and deaths. If we examine the ratios of births and deaths for different countries, we find that the figures offer little hope toward disposing of population difficulties. Our table shows a rapidly falling birth-rate—a fact which has scared our employers of cheap labor, our militarists, and some of our religionists—but the table on death-rates shows that the rates are falling at an even greater rate than the birth-rates in the case of almost every country. Now, even if there is a low birth-rate, actually a falling birth-rate, there can be a considerable increase of population if the death-rate is diminishing at an even greater rate. "What matters a falling birth-rate if the death-rate falls even more rapidly so that the net survivorship at any instant of time is

constantly getting higher?"²⁵ Notwithstanding the decline in the birth-rate, the natural increase of several countries is higher than it was a quarter of a century ago, and all are increasing at least at the old rate, owing to the fact that the birth-rate has not decreased so rapidly as the death-rate. In fact it may be tentatively asserted that the tremendous increase in the population of Europe and America during the last century and a half—a rate of growth vastly in excess of anything which had ever been known before—is attributable far more to a diminished death-rate than to any changes in the birth-rate. We are not being born faster, in fact not so fast as a few generations ago, but we are living decidedly longer; the infant mortality rates are dropping fast, as any table in any reputable study will show, and the expectation of life is increasing by leaps and bounds. The expectation of life from birth on for each new generation is greater than for the preceding one. Life is being prolonged, death is being postponed, not in the sense of increasing the natural term of existence, but in the sense of preventing death from taking a toll of premature victims. More and more are we living our full span of years. In Australia, which is somewhat typical, where they have an almost constant low birth-rate, but also a low and diminishing death-rate, and a remarkably great and increasing expectation of life at all stages, the rate of natural increase is as great as that of Rumania, where a very high birth-rate prevails, but where the other trends are not so noticeable. There still is a substantial excess of births over deaths, and in some countries an increasing one. And any system or form of activity which tends, no matter how slightly, to keep more people alive at a given moment that would otherwise not remain alive, must necessarily add to the total world population to be fed. With the possible exception of France, none of these countries are near a stationary population. The Malthusian devil has not yet been cast out.

Neither of these trends are evils; both, in fact, are evidences of progress. But as they are now juxtaposed they do not make for progress. As long as they produce an increase of population their tendencies are usually sinister. Of course, neither trend can continue indefinitely. There is no potent elixir nor Utopian life that will cheat death completely and forever. It is possible that germs can be almost eliminated, accidents made to disappear, and selective processes produce a race of near-perfect vigor and organic constitution; but here also there are diminishing returns as well as an irreducible minimum. While the birth-

²⁵ R. Pearl and M. H. Burger, "The Vital Index of the Population of England and Wales," *Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences*, Vol. 8, p. 76.

rate can fall to zero theoretically, there is very little likelihood of its fall continuing indefinitely. People who do not desire children form now, and will continue to form, a negligible fraction of the population. The parental urge, the love of children for their own sake, is much too strong. As East has it, “. . . there need be no morbid fears that people will suddenly cease to have children after millions of years of evolution based primarily on sexual reproduction.”²⁶ The situation that we must consciously work toward is, first, to try to determine which offers the greatest progressive possibilities—a very slight increase in numbers, a slightly decreasing population, or a stationary one—and, secondly, to then bring about by birth regulation mainly that balance of births and deaths that will produce this result. Certainly we cannot continue to drift aimlessly and optimistically along, trusting that “all’s well with the world.”

4. THE TREND OF RESOURCES

The final determiner of population, in the last analysis is resources. That the world’s various resources are capable of great and possibly heretofore unthought-of expansion is certain, but it is equally certain that the returns to human effort expended in satisfying human wants do not remain constant. The fundamental fact of ultimate diminishing returns and increasing costs must be faced. This eventually produces the strain between resources and population, for while there is an inherent power in human beings to multiply their numbers without limit, the power of the earth to increase its resources is limited. New processes of cultivation and manufacture, newly opened lands, new inventions capable of converting heretofore unused materials to human use, substitutions of one kind or another, newly devised improvements in distribution, may temporarily suspend the law of diminishing returns and enable an increased store of good to be secured without corresponding increase of cost, and the improved means of production may for a while keep pace with growing numbers, but eventually population by expanding into the new supply available brings its own check and the unavoidable process begins to operate. Thus, as numbers increase, the restrictions on numbers also increase.

Briefly, what increase of our resources seems to be possible? The preceding century is often pointed to as an illustration of what can be expected in the future. Here was a sudden and phenomenal growth of population accompanied by an almost universal improvement in the

²⁶ East, *op. cit.*, p. 282.

standard of living, and a somewhat general increase in popular welfare. Furthermore, during this period, in almost all the more advanced portions of the world, wealth and income were increasing faster than the population. European stock enjoyed increasing abundance for the average man; prosperity reigned; no shortage of production was in sight. This, the optimists believed, gave assurance of permanent progress. People laughed at the gloomy forebodings of the English curate.

But much of this advance was the result of an unusual combination of occurrences, some of which are incapable of repetition. First of all the phenomenal inventions in steam and iron made possible the improvements in transportation, which in turn encouraged the exploitation of new countries with virgin resources. Steam transportation on land and sea made accessible for European peoples the agricultural productivity of the American plains, of Canada, the Argentine, Siberia, Australia, South Africa, and other less important areas. Hundreds of millions of acres of excellent land were thus brought into cultivation by European settlers and their descendants. The new land for the most part was as productive as the best of Europe. Geographical expansion thus made unnecessary the descent to inferior lands, or the more intensive cultivation of existing arable lands, and there were no diminishing returns to labor. During this era scientific advance made possible the new scientific agriculture and the scientific means of extending the amount of arable lands. As Reuter says, "Scientific crop production increased the yield of each acre, on old or new lands, and agricultural machinery increased the product of each laborer on the land. The advance in science made it possible to adapt to new soils and climates food products formerly not grown there, and to develop the size, quality and productiveness of plants and animals previously known and used as food. Also, science evolved and modified and man accepted new varieties of food." ²⁷

Furthermore, the mechanical inventions and the use of steam and electricity in the driving of power machinery have made possible a rate of production previously impossible, and a degree of distribution hitherto not even imagined. Not only was food prepared in more assimilable forms, but mineral and vegetable resources were made available in huge quantities and universally distributed. As Raymond Pearl points out on the basis of a profound study, "While the population was increasing two and one-half times, the world's coal production and pig iron production increased from fifty to seventy times and by 1917 has increased nearly one hundred fold over the conditions of 1800. The

²⁷ *Op. cit.*, p. 100.

world's cotton production increased in the same period twenty fold; the world's commerce a little more than that; the world's shipping increased something like eight fold, while the railway mileage increased, in the period from 1830 to 1917, by roughly 3,000 fold, and the telegraph three hundred fold."²⁸

But what of the future? Pitkin,²⁹ on the basis of the army rations of the civilized world, has calculated the average annual increase in world population, now in effect, in terms of food and land. He shows that the average adult requires 1000 pounds of dry foodstuffs per year. This means that every year the farmers of the world must provide 23,000 million pounds more foodstuffs than they ever provided before. Since it requires from two to three acres to support a man, every season 40 million acres more capable of average yield must be prepared, planted, cultivated, and harvested than before, or else the land under cultivation must be farmed sufficiently intensively to provide the large additional store of food. Furthermore, competent students already call our attention to overpopulated conditions in many parts of the world, at least as far as natural resources are concerned. The United Kingdom, Germany, France, Italy, Belgium, Holland, Japan, Sweden, and Norway—saturated with population—are dependent on other parts of the world for a considerable portion of their food supply, though the latter two could be practically self-supporting if necessary. By means of manufactures or the exploitation of certain native resources, such as coal or iron, these countries carry on commerce with those parts of the world capable of providing them with food.³⁰ As their populations increase there is an increasing dependence upon foreign sources for food. As long as these foreign sources continue to export large surpluses of food and to import manufactured products, these countries can maintain their present populations. But some of the countries that have been providing them with food resources have reached the point of diminishing returns and are themselves beginning to import food, as well as to produce a considerable portion of their own manufactures. The notable falling off of grain exportations from the United States and the increasing importation of meats into the United States are a significant case in point, since the United States has been depended upon so largely to provide Europe's food in the preceding century. In the United States the exportation of foodstuffs is now overshadowed by the exportation of

²⁸ "The Population Problem," *Geographical Review*, 1922, Vol. 12, p. 639.

²⁹ *Must We Fight Japan?* Ch. 22.

³⁰ Cf. East, *op. cit.*, pp. 69-84.

manufactures and manufacturing materials, the proportion in 1921 being 260 per cent. The United States is thus more of a manufacturing rival of Europe than an agricultural support. If the regular natural tendencies occur, the same situation will eventually exist with respect to the Argentine, Australia, Canada, Russia, and the other lesser granaries of the world.

Furthermore, about every part of the earth that science to date can make habitable has been explored, appropriated, and is now being exploited. As G. Stanley Hall pointed out a few years ago, "All Africa is apportioned, and not only Australia but Madagascar, Borneo, New Guinea, and all the smallest of islands opened up so that there are not only no new continents but practically no new acres to be discovered. The great era of diffusion and tenancy is practically ended. Man has not only taken possession of every room but of every closet of his terrestrial habitation."³¹

Of course many possibilities of increasing the acreage of arable land in the world, of increasing the yield per acre, of improving types of food, and of substituting less wastefully for more wastefully produced foods can be mentioned. The amount of land in the world available for agricultural purposes may be vastly increased by irrigating deserts, draining swamps, reclaiming cut-over lands, and building up unimproved land, though this will require great expenditures of capital. Vast though inferior territories in Africa, Asia, both Americas, Australia, and the great archipelagoes of the Pacific and Atlantic oceans must be kept in mind. Ways will also doubtless be found of bringing the great tropical and subtropical areas, comprising perhaps half the fertile land of the world, under the control of man. In these areas and elsewhere may also be found plants and other elements heretofore not recognized as food possibilities. For example, beets were cattle food until their ability to produce sugar was discovered a generation ago; various tropical fruits, especially the banana, have only recently come to be food; the tomato, long suspected of being poisonous, is now a food staple; and the potato, unknown before the sixteenth century, and at the beginning of the eighteenth century regarded as only fit for swine and cattle, is to-day one of our chief foods, constituting the staple food of certain entire classes in some countries. The discoveries of new varieties of the grains and other food plants capable of maturing at higher altitudes, or in dryer regions, or extremely cold portions of the temperate regions, or in the subarctic regions may greatly extend the food supply also. For example,

³¹ "The Message of the Zeitgeist," *Scientific Monthly*, 1921, Vol. 13, pp. 107-108.

a hardy, quickly maturing wheat could be raised on millions of acres of the Canadian and Siberian prairies, increasing the wheat supply by hundreds of millions of bushels. Or consider the possibility of success in the experiments in wheat culture that are steadily going on along the indefinite western boundary from Northern Texas, through Western Kansas, Nebraska, the Dakotas, and Western Manitoba, Saskatchewan, and Alberta. Professor J. Russell Smith in his *The World's Food Resources* says, "Suppose a gain of but one hundred miles for the wheat-belt—1800 miles long. A yield of 12 bushels to the acre on nine-tenths of this every fourth year, gives 420 million bushels, more than enough to feed the United Kingdom, and most of the land still left for other crops." Or consider the possibilities that inhere in the discovery of grains or food plants that will grow in the vast semi-arid regions of Australia—areas nearly equivalent to the entire United States. The recent war demonstrated what can be done to increase productive areas; the British Empire and the United States together putting under wheat no less than 40 million more acres than in 1913. Not only can the wheat supply be vastly increased, but other grains in many respects as good as wheat could be used more than they are. Rye is practically equal to wheat in nutritive value, is much hardier, and will flourish on poor lands and in hilly districts. Now it has the reputation of being a low standard of living food. Barley has a wider climatic range than wheat, and as a rule a larger yield per acre, though it lacks certain food elements, notably gluten. Oats, becoming increasingly popular as a human food, not only yields larger crops than wheat, under the same conditions, but will thrive and ripen in colder and more elevated situations.²² There are also possibilities of substituting one type of food for another. We may in time swing over partly to reindeer venison, a considerable supply of which, it seems, could come from the arctic regions, in place of beef now raised on lands that would be more productive if they were in grains. The food supply could also be vastly increased by either directly conserving the grain now instead of producing meat—a wasteful process of food production—or in planting in grain the areas now used to graze cattle and other meat animals. Professor Smith emphasizes the immense food possibilities of sea life, such as small floating mollusks, especially the South Sea pteropod. In fact, the exploitation of the earth's waters for their organic products as a source of human food has hardly begun.

²² See R. Henry Rew, "The Prospect of a World Famine," *Nineteenth Century*, Vol. 88, pp. 256-266.

Man can also substitute more abundantly growing grains and vegetables. Indian corn, for example, has a much higher yield per acre than wheat, has great and balanced food value, and when it is properly prepared is equally tasty. The Second Birth Rate Commission in Great Britain in their report also suggested that a greater population could be supported off the soil if people were to eat potatoes instead of beef. Figures were quoted showing that on 100 acres it would be possible to support 420 people with potatoes, but only fifteen people if the land was producing grass for beef.

It is now a well-established fact that scientific agriculture is able to increase soil productivity beyond what could be seen a few decades ago. Soil preparation and fertilization is still in its infancy. We cannot conceive of the possibilities of converting what have been heretofore waste products or unused products into commercial fertilizers of high potency. We have no conception of the vast stores of resources of all kinds that may eventually be discovered. The undeveloped and unused or misused resources are vast beyond calculation as science increases its powers of utilization and control.

Large portions of arable land are still cultivated extensively. When intensive methods, including the new fertilizers, improved tools and machinery, improved methods of cultivation, and better seeds and live stock are used the yield per acre can be greatly increased, though at increasing cost. Hand labor, and woman and child labor can be used to reduce the horse labor and mechanical appliances in intensive agriculture if necessary. Increasing the food supply would also become much easier if we devoted to it the mental power, the energy, the capital, and the technical ingenuity that we now spend getting ready for wars and fighting them.

It is safe also to assume the unimpeded continuance of scientific discovery, particularly in synthetic chemistry and the several branches of biology.²² Certainly the possibilities of an increased food supply are numerous, and the world population is not confronted by an immediate famine if adequate transportation facilities can be maintained, and man's follies and perversities can be prevented from thwarting his productive and distributive activities. At any rate, the present generation can sleep soundly in their beds without being disturbed by the nightmare of starvation, or even that of a lower standard of living, for a time at least. Panic-stricken predictions are not yet in order.

²² W. E. Ritter, *War, Science and Civilization*, p. 24.

5. STRIKING THE BALANCE

There is plenty of time for inquiry before fecundity crowds us distressfully, but the general trend must be faced. When the situation is honestly and sanely viewed, certain facts stand out clearly. These facts are well summarized by Professor Reuter⁸⁴ when he calls attention to the following conclusions: population will have to be redistributed; the food supply will be increased at increasing expense; the new lands can be brought under cultivation only with an increasing capital and energy outlay; the more intensive agriculture will also demand increased labor and capital costs; the displacement of cheaper diets for the present more expensive ones will mean that men will not live so well; some sacrifice in human well-being will probably have to be made; and life will have to be simplified. Certainly one must feel some misgivings about the world's ability to indefinitely increase both its population and its average standard of living.

First of all there seem to be limits to the productivity of intensive agriculture. As Davies points out,⁸⁵ the recent increased agricultural production per laborer has resulted from the use of new and cheap lands. Science has not yet demonstrated that it can increase the yield per acre indefinitely. The United States with all its improved machinery produces little more than two-thirds of the average acre yield of Japan with its semi-medieval methods. Even Belgium, with the most intensive scientific agriculture in the world can barely double our record, and then she must needs use several times as much labor per acre. In the last analysis, intensive agriculture is a means of exploiting a limited reserve of soil fertility at a higher rate. It must be concluded that intensive agriculture cannot increase food proportionate to the recent rate of increase in population and still maintain the present standard of living. The inevitable tendency, as agriculture of necessity becomes more intensive, is to convert more and more of the population into food grubbers, who get smaller and smaller returns.

Nor is there any escaping the conclusion that the era of rapid and easy expansion is drawing to a close. The unpopulated areas of the temperate zones, the arctics, or the tropics are far less habitable than those now occupied, and can only be cultivated at greatly increased cost. The great bulk of the undeveloped lands of the temperate zone are

⁸⁴ *Op. cit.*, pp. 105-106.

⁸⁵ G. R. Davies, "Population and Progress," *Scientific Monthly*, Vol. 19, pp. 598-610, 606 ff.

seriously handicapped in one way or another. E. Dana Durand,³⁶ shows that there are vast regions which are entirely desert and only a small fraction of which can ever be reclaimed by irrigation. Other regions are too mountainous or rocky. Other vast areas, while capable of some agricultural use, are far inferior to the better parts of Europe and America, in that they suffer from partial aridity, cold, lack of drainage, poor soil, or unfavorable topography. In general, a given grade of labor and capital will produce less per unit with each further geographical extension, and more rigorous physical obstacles will be encountered.

The trend along this line in the United States is particularly noticeable as we have been forced to add new areas. The very fact that more and more people are taking up dry farming lands in the western United States indicates that real good land is no longer available. Durand also thinks that prices of farm products in the United States, reckoned in gold, are the highest ever known, and maintains that conditions in this country producing these high prices but foreshadow a world condition.³⁷

The tropics also offer great difficulties. While a considerable part of the tropical zone is desert, there are large areas which are fertile and capable of great agricultural production if certain obstacles can be overcome. But this latter is problematical. The White race could at least manage the agriculture but it has found the climate of the tropics an almost complete bar to permanent residence. The natives work no more than is absolutely necessary, unless they are forced by other men. It is conceivable that scientific progress along various lines and huge investments of capital may mitigate the heat, humidity, disease, and the various pests and enable the White race to live there in large numbers. But the prospects are not immediate and they will involve great expense. The arctic regions offer equally insuperable difficulties. Geographical expansion of agriculture anywhere is confronted by great difficulties that will constantly become more serious.

The very rapidity with which certain resources more or less fixed in supply, such as coal, iron, the other metals and minerals, gas, and the top soil, washed away after reckless deforestation, are being wasted is also portentous. Pearl shows,³⁸ however, that the very fiber of our social organization is bound up with the present huge consumption of such resources. But such an exploitation cannot go on indefinitely. And no amount of labor or capital investment can restore these. All that can

³⁶ "Some Problems of Population Growth," *Publications of the American Statistical Association*, 1916, Vol. 15, p. 131.

³⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 135.

³⁸ "The Population Problem," *Geographical Review*, 1922, Vol. 12, p. 640.

be done is to husband them intelligently. If not, society will have to do without some of them in a few generations if the present rate of consumption is maintained.

As these trends continue, unless the unforeseen and unheard of happens, the comfort and fullness of human life must of necessity be much less. Diminishing returns have already set in; further growth of population with the maintenance of present living standards is impossible; the cheapening of labor must inevitably come; life must be poorer and more strained.

Finally, there is a saturation point. Even on the rosiest hypothesis population cannot continue to increase without limit, and be fed. If the population of the world keeps on increasing each year, the time must come when there will be either no room, or no food for more. And after the lands now empty are full, and those now waste are reclaimed, we have nowhere else to turn; nor is it likely that inventions can go on at a geometrical progression as population increases and deteriorates. As Durand puts it,³⁹ "This process of building up population on the strength of resources somewhere else cannot go on forever. When enough nations have come to rely on the outside world for means of subsistence, there will be no outside world." We have found that henceforth we must not only conserve and laboriously cultivate; hereafter we must make and cannot expect to find our ways. More and more our fate is thrust into our own hands. Eventually a stationary population must result anyway; either it will be the stationary state resulting from a balance of the death-rate and resources and presided over by the law of natural selection, or it will be the more humane and happy state resulting from an enlightened restriction of births. Ultimately we have to face the alternative of controlling these matters for ourselves, or of letting nature control them for us. The problem of human well-being depends on the possibility of a general control of its numbers by society. Human foresight is not now at the helm. Will it be?

6. SOME SOCIAL ASPECTS OF POPULATION EXCESS

A rapidly increasing population has various pathological effects on society, and few, if any, good effects.

a. Material Welfare. If the birth-rate is uncontrolled it means that the economic resources of the society are being divided up among an increasing number of people, and in view of the tendency to diminishing

³⁹ *Op. cit.*, pp. 138-139.

returns, the rate of their increase is by no means proportional to the population increase. At the same time the masses are more easily controlled and there is a tendency for these resources to be concentrated in the hands of a few. Another fact observable is that when population surplus has become large, the lower classes are inevitably forced into poverty. In China and India and perhaps in Russia also, 90 per cent of the population are both living precariously, and are socially and economically submerged. If the birth-rate is uncontrolled the families are large, and the larger families are almost always poor. Poverty and a high birth-rate act and react upon one another. Hence the irresistible inference is that where the birth-rate is uncontrolled poverty will continue. With poverty comes vice and pestilence, unrest and inefficiency. Eventually the death-rate approximately balances the birth-rate and population becomes relatively stationary in number, at a level characterized by bare subsistence, threatening famine, low culture, animal-like stolidity, and no hope of progress. In general, our current economic reforms are unthinkable with a population increasing beyond a certain limit.

b. The Standard of Living. Increased population leads eventually and inevitably to a struggle for, first, luxuries and comforts, and, finally, the necessities of life, which is just another way of saying that if children are persistently brought into the world without prevision, the general standard of living will unavoidably be lowered. The standard of living, so far as it is not a result of exploitation, reflects an adjustment of numbers to the existing means of life. The good things of life of a material, social, and cultural nature that compose the most sought after phases of the standard of living can only be assured when there is no serious pressure of population on resources. An excess of human units puts the standard on a subsistence level.

A low standard of living is, of course, something to be strenuously avoided, since it almost always means a lack of attention to the arts, no inventions or discoveries, decreasing productivity of the population, a lack of ambition, and a life without zest and enthusiasm. Its influence is deadening.

c. Infant Mortality. For countries with large populations already short of elbow room high birth-rates are possible only on one condition, and that condition is that a high infantile death-rate shall keep pace with the high birth-rate. To-day, in the main, in the countries or classes with the greatest waste of infant life, it is the direct consequence of the reckless production of children. But why this massacre of inno-

cents? Why this wearing out of mothers? Why subject women to the anxieties of gestation, the risks of parturition, and the care of surplus children, who are born only to be buried? Why the useless suffering, and sorrow, and cost?

The more thoughtful classes and the more enlightened countries do not do it. Cox ⁴⁰ calls attention to the studies in England and Wales that show that the men whose profession compels them to think have only a small proportion of their children dying in infancy, while the men who support themselves mainly by manual labor of not a particularly skillful type produce a large number of children of whom a large proportion die before they are a year old. The experience of the Children's bureau in this country demonstrates also that the infant mortality rate is inversely proportional to the income grade of the father. The infant mortality rates of overcrowded countries like China and India, where the rates run as high as 750 and 800 per 1000 births, are further evidence. Is not prudence the wiser part?

d. National Vitality. Population excess, as human experience strikingly shows, leads to a lowered national vitality. Large numbers mean that people are poorly born and poorly raised. There is overcrowding and underfeeding. Sanitation becomes increasingly difficult, and diseases can only be held in check with difficulty. To keep the stock at a high vitality level becomes more and more of a strain; to actually improve the breed is well-nigh impossible. A bandy-legged, hollow-chested, narrow-shouldered race seems to come as a matter of course.

e. Social Morals and Ideals. Overcrowding tends to cheapen human beings. There is a weakening of restraints. Ideals, moral and otherwise, are lowered. This is due to the fact that human values and prevailing attitudes toward these values rest to a considerable extent upon the supply and worth of human beings. Your moral tone is low in overpopulated countries, your diplomats and militarists do not hesitate to slaughter men in great numbers, your labor is degraded, and your public social idealism is mediocre and worse. Life is hard, barren, cruel, empty. Passions alone have free sway.

f. Educational Standards. In overpopulated countries educational standards are low. In the main education is for the few, the élite. The masses must "scratch for a living." Life offers no stimulus to the acquisition of knowledge. The apathy of degradation prevails. Nor does a state whose population has been crowded to the subsistence level have the means of providing even the most meager educational opportunities.

⁴⁰ *The Problem of Population*, pp. 117-18.

Nor can children and young people be spared from the food struggle in order to be educated. A high degree of general culture and enlightenment demands leisure and plenty, and there must be a considerable margin between population and available resources if such conditions are to exist.

g. Status of Women. In overpopulated countries women are recognized as merely breeding machines and have a most restricted sphere of life, often resulting in what Bishop Potter called "the slaughter of women in the interest of bearing sixteen children." Nor can women whose time and energies are being devoted to gestation and care of children be much more. Woman as a human being with a soul, capable of culture, and social and intellectual participation does not exist. As the Kaiser recommended her sphere consists of *Kirche, Kinder, Küche, Kleider*.

As the birth-rate diminishes the status of woman tends to be elevated. She comes to be more appreciated by her husband as a comrade and companion. She is cherished for her own sake, and not merely as an object of passion and as a domestic drudge. Saved from much wasteful physiological functioning she is more comely and attractive physically. She has both time and energy for self-development and self-expression. Professional careers become possible, which, generally, are a clear addition to a civilization. Various forms of extra-family activities are made possible, thus making available the indispensable powers and insights which women alone are capable of contributing to social undertakings.

7. INTERNATIONAL ASPECTS OF POPULATION INCREASE

a. General Aspects. The problem of the growth of populations and its attendant problem of national expansion are not merely local nor even national in character; they are international problems of a most vital and crucial nature. They are inextricably and causally involved in such matters as international economic specialization, international trade, tariffs, foreign markets, hogging of colonies, aggressive commercialism, imperialism, militarism, and international hatreds and jealousies. The European countries, especially Italy, Germany, and Belgium, are a case in point. These are mostly overcrowded, some painfully so. They lack food and territory for expanding populations. For them the acquisition of colonies or foreign markets is a vital necessity, for colonies are places where surplus populations are dumped, where new resources are

worked up for home consumption, and where new markets to absorb home manufactures are developed. Foreign markets are necessary also as a means of disposing of surplus manufactures, but this is just another way of finding outside sources of food and other essentials, for the search for those to whom to sell is really the search for those from whom to buy. With the proceeds of the sale of their manufactures the industrial nations of Europe buy their food imports. The enormous increase in international trade in recent decades has been due to the necessity of exchanging manufactured products of highly populated countries for the raw products of less densely settled regions. The more any country is specialized in its economic functions, the more is it dependent upon colonies or international exchange, or both. The less industrial nations, being unable to export manufactures and import food, have only had the alternative of exporting their surplus numbers to less populous regions of the earth, though any advantages derived from this have been temporary. If these different means of relieving the situation cannot be fully met due to certain existing circumstances, various domestic difficulties arise—unemployment comes, the standard of living drops, recurring food scarcity occurs, and there is a danger of popular disorders and even of anarchistic uprisings; externally the situation takes the form of imperialism, colony-grabbing, militaristic tendencies, and occasionally war. These latter are not usually the result of degenerate greed or of nationalistic swagger either, but rather the result of an insistent demand for food on the part of an ever-growing population.

b. Emigration and Immigration. A significant aspect of population increase in a given country is emigration, or the migration of surplus population—i. e., as far as the local status of the arts and the local standard of living are concerned they are surplus—to lands of greater resources and opportunity. This is a hit-or-miss movement intended to produce an equilibrium between resources and peoples in the home country. Even if this relieved the situation at home, it would merely mean that in the end the problem of numbers had been shifted to some other people, though the overflow might temporarily be useful in the new country. But the situation at home is only temporarily relieved; emigration is by no means a remedy for over-population. The slightly easier conditions of life result in a lessened death-rate. The birth-rate also rises and remains high while migrants are leaving. The experience of the United Kingdom, Germany, Italy, Russia, Austria, and Japan is significant in this respect. Rarely is such a country better off with respect to numbers. The different European countries with the greatest

emigration show a regular rate of natural increase per decade regardless of the loss of migrants. Emigration also, as Wright points out,⁴¹ involves the withdrawal of a number of people from the community at a time of life when they are most active and efficient, leaving the young and the old to be provided for by others. It also throws upon a country, which is already feeling the strain of large numbers, the additional burden of breeding, perhaps at least partly educating, and raising to productive age human beings, and then exporting them free of charge—in fact, in some cases insisting that they be admitted elsewhere. Furthermore, it results in the overflow going to less settled regions elsewhere, where the rate of increase is usually stupendous; resources are more rapidly consumed, and competing industries may spring up.

Immigration is far from being an unmixed blessing in the countries to which the migrants flow. As has been noted, it is not doing a kindness to the country from which they came, since it really seems to stimulate births there. Actually, as Durand points out,⁴² wherever unrestricted admission of immigrants occurs it encourages and probably increases the rate of population growth in the world as a whole. Immigration everywhere tends to increase the racial, social, and psychological heterogeneity of peoples. This has certain advantages, but no one can deny that it makes life vastly more complex, makes the problem of assimilation a slow and difficult one, and continually complicates internal problems of all sorts, especially government, education, the question of classes, of culture levels, the solution of race problems, urban problems, and other problems of a like nature. Recent immigrants have mainly been, not a good middle-class lot, but from the lower classes—peoples just above the margin of minimum social intelligence and ability, and not, generally, a particularly valuable addition if their sojourn is to be permanent, unless, of course, merely “hands” or “gun-fodder” are desired. Coming into the new country with a lower standard of living and their old-country rate of increase, they breed at an outrageous rate, and threaten to inundate and even replace the usually superior pioneer stocks now observing prudence themselves. Furthermore, an unrestrained flood of immigrants, providing, as they do, a great supply of cheap labor, speed up the exploitation of natural resources to a wasteful and reckless rate, and simply hasten the time when the newer country shall itself become dependent on the outside world for its means of

⁴¹ *Population*, p. 146.

⁴² E. Dana Durand, “Some Problems of Population Growth,” *Publications of the American Statistical Association*, Vol. 15, p. 148.

subsistence, or be forced into a treadmill-like intensiveness of agriculture. At any rate, it very quickly reduces any overplus of unused resources clamoring for development.

In view of the general increase of population, it appears that any country that is trying to make some sort of an adjustment of births to resources which promises a fairly safe future must restrict immigration, else it will soon be filled up by huge numbers of overflow peoples from less intelligent or less advanced or more reckless countries elsewhere. Obversely, any policy of immigration restriction is partly a hint to overpopulated countries to tarry a moment and think about their national population policy.

c. **War.** It is undoubtedly true that most war and fighting all through history has been a ghastly demonstration of the Malthusian contention. They have as their underlying cause the ever-growing pressure of population upon subsistence. Of this fact the World War was an illustration on a gigantic scale. The increasing dependence of certain nations on outside sources of food and other necessities becomes a fertile-ground for the sowing of the seeds of international discord. Nations that are primarily devoted to manufactures and maintain their standard of living only by exporting these largely in exchange for food and raw materials, seek to secure for themselves exclusive sources of supply and exclusive markets. Every other equally situated nation in this tense and strenuous process is a competitor. Each nation looks with jealousy and fear upon the growth of the trade of another industrial nation with desired sources of supply. Anticipated as well as present pressure of population on subsistence is recognized. It is all but inevitable that this industrial and commercial struggle should foster bellicose attitudes, result in an international scramble for resources and colonies, and ultimately result in war. The United Kingdom, Germany, France, Italy, and Japan need only be mentioned to sustain these statements.⁴³

To-day there is practically no territory left that is not legally under the control of some nation or state, and that nation or state is perhaps already beginning to check the unlimited influx of overflow strangers. Its motive is simply to preserve its vacant or only partially used land for its own expansion. They do not want an increasing competition in their labor market that will bring down their wages and lower their standard of life. The United States and Australia are illustrations in point.

The aristocracies, the capitalists, jingoists, diplomats, and militarists are not alone responsible for war. In fact all of these together are not

⁴³ Harold Cox, *The Problem of Population*, Ch. III.

as instrumental as the simple peasant in the overcrowded regions of the world with his large and rapidly increasing family all demanding food regularly and in sufficient quantity. And when these simple peasants are faced by food shortage, they will kill their neighbors rather than starve themselves. This has followed in all stages of civilization, and is likely to occur in the future. In fact as populations increase and diminishing returns set in generally the difficulties of avoiding wars will grow immeasurably greater. And due to the tense rigor of this pressure wars will be even more horrible in the future than they have been in the past. Wholesale killing or maiming of men, women, and children, and the reckless, even studied, destruction of capital, will increase.

The very fear of war accentuates the evil. England, France, Germany, Japan, Italy, and the others, instead of limiting their families, are imploring their people to increase their military man-power by producing more children. The excuse is that each country must be prepared with a sufficient man-power to oppose that of the other countries. What an insane policy! They are trying to reduce the horrors of a dynamite explosion by producing more dynamite.

The chief solution of the war problem lies in a decline in the world's birth-rate. If this is not brought about, there are only two choices in the end; starvation and mutual destruction on the battlefield—both checks enumerated by Malthus. Cox points out that what is needed most of all is a League of Low Birth-Rate Nations, prepared to take joint action, if necessary, against any race that by its excessive fecundity threatens the peace of the world.⁴⁴ Of course, a reduction of the world's population will not necessarily prevent all wars; but it will remove the one special cause which, wherever operative, tends to produce war.

8. PROGRESS AND POPULATION

A certain population minimum is requisite for progress. Number and variety of social contacts are indispensable if there is to be that interstimulation that progress demands. Up to a certain point as the size of the group increases mental interstimulation becomes more rich, varied, and intense. The number and variety of ideas is increased, as are also the opportunities for the selection of valuable ideas. A certain population minimum is also necessary for the industrial and cultural division of labor that provides for leisure and sane comfort. These advantages do not increase in direct ratio with population increase,

⁴⁴ *Op. cit.*, p. 98.

however. As population increases a point is approached where the stimuli are so numerous that they blunt the sensibilities of the individual, or, due to the cultural and moral sag that comes with excessive populations, they depreciate in quality as stimulating agents.

In the main, social experience has demonstrated that a population increased beyond a certain minimum in numbers becomes a great obstacle to human progress. Huxley, in fact, was of the belief that overpopulation is the greatest obstacle to human progress. Population then begins to press upon resources, the question of diminishing returns in both agriculture and machine industry arises, lower standards of living, complicated problems of distribution, intensified competition between individuals and groups, and poverty, degeneracy, and unrest come about.

From the progressive point of view excessive population is waste and folly. It means that an unnecessary and positively harmful biological, economic, and social tax is being levied on the people. Among the women there is needlessly painful and wasteful expenditure of time and energies in bearing and nurturing surplus children, some of them perhaps destined to die prematurely. Investments are made in keeping alive and educating and nourishing people for whom there is no real need and very little room.

Invariably disease increases, or the struggle to prevent disease becomes increasingly tense. Surpluses disappear, living standards are beaten down to a subsistence level, and life becomes more and more a preoccupation with the animal necessities—sheer survival in a treadmill. The trend is toward poverty. Society becomes accustomed to suffering, loses its sense of responsibility for its conditions, is rapidly degraded, finds its general intelligence lowered and its efficiency diminished. Ignorance and misery flourish.

With the struggle for existence made more acute, the possibility of helpful coöperation among both the individuals and groups of mankind disappears; self-preservation is the first effort. The struggle for resources becomes international; jealousies, hatreds and intrigues arise, and war—disastrous, chaotic, wasteful—inevitably comes. The peace, the leisure, the sufficiency, the high level of aspiration and intelligence, the culture, that makes for the richness and fullness of life, have disappeared, save perhaps for a very few. Such is the prospect, according to the experience of history, if present trends continue.

Knowingly or unknowingly, recent generations have been making a huge gamble on the future discoveries and extensions instead of cutting their coat to fit the cloth on hand. Why continue this policy?

Has the race demonstrated that it improves indefinitely as its numbers saturate the earth, or as it succeeds in more successfully applying more labor and fertilizers to more areas for more stomach filling? Why should we be forced to think more and more seriously and continuously about food and resources and inventions, to scratch for them more diligently and frantically? Is life to be merely a process of finding new land, planting it, harvesting the crop, eating it, reproducing, and repeating the process endlessly? There are still those who do not want "man" written all over the countryside, who prefer open spaces here and there—even wilderness—and who would choose a life that permits the spirit to spread its wings. And who would say that this is not the way of progress? Then why give ourselves over to one of the cruelest despots in the world?

In this age a comparatively low general birth-rate is a necessary condition of progress. With a little foresight numbers can be kept down, and life can be lived as it should be—a life of sufficiency, of achievement, of opportunity, and full expression of human capacities. Then mankind can show a progressive improvement of body, mind, and soul. When strain can be avoided, why not do so? Certainly no thinking person wants life given to so many that it is a gift without value.

The way of progress in this respect seems to be quite clear now. Instead of a negative or indifferent attitude, we need a comprehensive and consistent international policy designed to control the number of the people, and a scientific technique for effecting this control. This will not come at once, but it will come eventually if we want it to. In the meantime the immediate and feasible task is to bring about a reasonable control of fecundity by means of contraception on an increasing scale wherever possible.

9. THE CONTEMPORARY SIGNIFICANCE OF BIRTH-CONTROL

Of all the contemporary factors affecting the quantity of the population, birth-control, or the voluntary restriction of the number of progeny by preventing conception, has the most direct bearing on the birth-rate and its selective possibilities. Since the trial of Charles Bradlaugh and Mrs. Annie Besant in England in 1877 for republishing Knowlton's *Fruits of Philosophy* served to give great publicity to the idea and aroused a vast curiosity, birth-control has come to be practiced almost universally by the upper classes everywhere in the Western world, and in some countries where legislation has not been hostile, as

Holland, among the lower classes as well. Among these classes it has been followed by a noticeable shrinkage in the size of families.

Birth-control enables people to exercise conscious control over members by permitting sexual gratification to occur without conception taking place. If people have sufficient knowledge of its technique they may deliberately choose the number of their offspring. Parenthood becomes voluntary; and children come because they are wanted. Human breeding is taken out of the jungle era. This makes population growth a phenomenon individually controlled rather than controlled by disease, poverty, and war. But birth-control becomes a social control agent only as its practice is encouraged by general knowledge and favorable group opinion.

One of the chief arguments against birth-control is that if it were universally practiced the consequence of separating sexual gratification from offspring might be that the desire for offspring would by itself be too weak for the perpetuation of the race. It is our contention that the desire for offspring may be very strong, nobody knowing precisely how strong it is. Certainly there seems to be no need of believing that the race will die out altogether. There will always be couples with strong parental tendencies, a deeply-implanted love of children, sympathy, the desire to cuddle and protect, as well as some intelligent people who will want children as a means of meeting their social responsibilities. Birth-control, as practiced by most of its adherents to-day, is not in any sense a revolt against all child-bearing.

Since birth-control leaves births to choice, it makes it possible for the unloving, the harsh, the cold, the selfish, the self-centered to have no children or few. It would thus seem that, in the main, the upper-class families who do have children want them, have the right spiritual attitude toward them, and before the birth of their children are reasonably sure that they can well provide for them. There is thus the possibility that birth-control will in a few generations select out as parents those most fit for that noble task.

When it is generally practiced, its effects seem to be exceptionally good. In Holland it has reduced infant mortality by making better intervals between successive children and by increasing their size and vigor. In addition must be mentioned a reduction of poverty, an increase in the per capita wealth of the people, increased efficiency, improved health and vitality of mothers, and superior health, care, and education of the children.

Where birth-control is practiced only by the upper classes, it, of

course, produces dysgenic results. But the very fact that it is practiced only by such classes is usually due to a silly bungling, a hypocritical morality, or selfish class control. As a result of this, the ignorant, the uninformed, the imprudent, the careless, are increasing at the natural rate, while the prudent, the intelligent, and the ambitious are increasing in a considerably smaller ratio. We know that any class, however small, if it is multiplying in geometrical ratio, tends in a few generations to supplant stationary classes. This tendency is not as bad as it seems, however, for the death-rate is usually great among the populous classes, while it is low among the upper classes. This, to a considerable degree, offsets the higher birth-rate. In addition to the differential death-rate there is the additional fact that the lowest portion of the rapidly reproducing classes, the positively unfit, are being increasingly institutionalized, and thus their breed is dying out. But in general, the effects are still bad.

There is no reason for thinking though that these present conditions will continue more than a few generations at most. Major Darwin⁴⁶ is of the conclusion that contraception has done its worst as a dysgenic agent by producing a differential birth-rate between classes. Birth-control methods are now percolating down, via the younger generation, among the artisan classes, thus lessening its evil consequences. With the advance of education and the general level of public intelligence, and the wider diffusion of culture standards, it will unavoidably spread farther and farther down, tending more and more to become a universal practice.

In view of social needs, which are the basis of ethical principles, it is absurd to say that it is unethical.⁴⁶ In many cases the choice must be made between birth-control and abortion, and here the policy is clear.⁴⁷ It seems that it is only a matter of short time before private practice and public opinion will force the repeal of the legislation sponsored by Anthony Comstock and his followers, which has served to check certain of the more open, decent, above-board, and scientific means of diffusing the information necessary to the intelligent practice of birth-control. As Professor Holmes says,⁴⁸ "To make ignorance the bulwark of morality has always broken down, and it might be better to make knowledge of the least injurious contraceptive methods the

⁴⁶ *Eugenic Reform*, p. 374.

⁴⁶ For a comprehensive treatment of this point see Harold Cox, *The Problem of Population*, Ch. VI, especially pp. 215-31.

⁴⁷ See East, *op. cit.*, pp. 262-263.

⁴⁸ *Trend of the Race*, pp. 178-179.

general property of all married couples rather than to keep it under the ban of legal prohibition." Only by making it possible for the right people to give this information can it be done in such a way as to neither lower moral standards nor injure aesthetic taste nor degrade the sex relationship.

Inevitably all classes will eventually be included. After the first effects of its misuse have worn off, it may then have very desirable effects, both from the qualitative and the quantitative point of view. It will be likely to give us our future generations from the more child-loving and altruistic persons of the population. It will also be likely to give us a more or less stationary population, and that is eminently desirable.

QUESTIONS AND PROBLEMS

1. Adam Smith in his *Wealth of Nations* (1776) said, "The most decisive mark of the prosperity of any country is the increase of the number of its inhabitants." What did he mean? How do you appraise the situation?
2. Discuss in detail the Malthusian theory of population (A. B. Wolfe, *Readings in Social Problems*, pp. 17-34; F. A. Bushee, *Principles of Sociology*, pp. 286-293; W. S. Thompson, *Population: A Study in Malthusianism*, Columbia Univ. Studies, Vol. 63, pp. 9-37.
3. Why has nature made it possible for each species to multiply so much more profusely than is seemingly necessary? Why do resources not increase in similar ratio?
4. What evidence do we have that Malthus's doctrine is still true in genera? E. M. East, *Mankind at the Crossroads*, pp. 64-109; W. S. Thompson, *Population: A Study in Malthusianism*, pp. 162-165; H. Wright, *Population*, pp. 119-140.
5. Account for the American pride in population growth. Evaluate it.
6. Missionaries bring medical science, sanitation, and various other Western means of reducing the death-rate of China, but give the people no information that will enable them to restrict the birth-rate. Discuss from the point of view of the population problem.
7. Are wilfully small families a sign of social degeneration? Why do they seem desirable?
8. Is birth-control a better means of limiting numbers than infanticide and abortion? Why?
9. What can be said of the effect of mothers' pensions or maternity subsidies upon population? (H. Cox, *The Problem of Population*, pp. 123-126.)
10. What is the effect of the falling birth-rate on the status of women?
11. How does the restriction of multiplication affect the social, economic, and political value of the individual? Is this desirable?

12. What forces of confusion are at work complicating the problem of population and progress?
13. Are we quite sure that we are making the average life more worth living as we make it longer?

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CHAPTER XVIII

THE POLITICAL AND LEGAL REQUISITES OF PROGRESS

I. THE FUNCTION OF THE MODERN STATE AND GOVERNMENT

THE nature of the state is of vital importance in any study of progress, for, since it fulfills indispensable social functions, it has within it the power of being one of the supreme agents of either progress or regress. The modern state is an institution, artificially designed, to promote the welfare of the greatest number of individuals in a given group along certain lines determined by those individuals. Activities of civilized communities are too complex and too manifold to be left to the spontaneous regulation of individuals, however intelligent and well-intentioned they may be. At the same time, certain uniformities of conduct must be established and observed, and certain public functions must be carried on. In these and various other respects society through the state sets up what it deems essential to its existence and well-being. It does for us what we cannot realize acting alone. In doing this it establishes an organic brotherhood of man due to the fact that each individual is dependent upon all others and all others are dependent upon him, and makes membership in this brotherhood compulsory.

Government is merely the agent, the organization, the machinery for putting into execution the will of the state; it is the network of activities of a "politically organized society." Among its functions are such as maintaining justice, liberty, domestic harmony and tranquility, providing for the general welfare in a multitude of ways, including protection from aggression from without. In the modern state, government has actually come to be considered not merely as an agency exercising repressive police functions, but also as a constructive social agency—a means of enabling the mass of men to realize social good on the largest possible scale. Since the prevailing form of political organization of the Western world has come to be democracy in some form, or is on the way to becoming democracy, an examination of democracy from the progressive point of view would seem to be a means of getting at the heart of the political problems of the present day.¹

¹ See A. J. Todd, *Theories of Social Progress*, pp. 336-351; H. J. Laski, *A Grammar of Politics*, pp. 15-43.

2. THE NATURE OF DEMOCRACY

Democracy in its *pure* form, as we conceive it to-day, is a very new thing in the world. It has, in fact, only begun; its history lies mainly before it. Its chief assets to-day, therefore, are not its achievements, though they are already most significant, but its ideals; not the level of its attainment, but the nature of its goal.

It is another product of that heaven that has been at work in the world during the last few centuries—the heaven that has produced such things as science, the social surplus, and internationalism, as well as the concept and ideals of progress. In both theory and ideal, democracy is running mate to the concept of progress as it has been caught above; as ideals they fuse into one. Realized democracy would be a most potent agent of progress.

Democracy is not merely a form of society or a form of social control, but is also a spiritual element. It is pregnant with the spirit of good-will, of comradeship, of simple justice. There is in it a denial of artificial ranking among men, a willingness to give all men their due, to let them rise, and be equally well off and equally able to take care of themselves. It encourages manly independence, self-respect, self-reliance, and self-help. It is a passionate desire for liberty and opportunity of self-expression, for self-development, and self-determination, for participation and achievement in the activities of the group. It is a consciousness of the worth of self, and urge to have this self come to fruition, and a realization that this fruition is most complete and valuable when it results in human service broadly conceived. It is a striving for adequacy of life for each and all.

As a form of society democracy consists of a group or groups held together by common ideals, common agreement, and common conviction and determination. Its unity rests upon the psychic basis of solidarity of understanding, mutual approval, a common sympathy, idealized sentiments, and fraternal feeling. In it there reigns a like-mindedness, which in its purest form, transcends the more or less artificial distinctions created by class, race, or cultural conditions, and encompasses the entire group. This sympathetic unity and rational like-mindedness expresses itself in free coöperation. Hence a real democracy is a society in which the binding force of external authority is at a minimum.

As a form of social control, democracy is one of the highest and noblest agents that man has ever devised. Here the control of function

is secured, not through custom and tradition, nor through coercive authority, but through the sympathetic understanding and the intelligent purpose and will of the whole population. It is mutual social control resting upon the claim of all the people to rule themselves—a common participation in all the important objective phases of the life of the group. Sovereignty is vested in the people whose interests are at stake, and these people coöperate in making their demands upon individuals and groups, and in enforcing them in the interest of group order, efficiency and progress. In essence it is a form of control in which the behavior of the group is determined by the untrammelled, intelligent opinion and will of every interested, mature member of the group. Hobhouse puts it well when he writes of it as a phase of social life which “founds the common good upon the common will, in forming which it bids every grown-up, intelligent person to take a part.”² It is in no sense an attempt to emancipate the individual from social control, but rather an attempt to reconcile the greatest possible freedom of the individual with the needs of objective social life. As such it is unique among the various political forms of social control in history. It attempts to carry out this reconciliation of liberty with objective social needs by appealing to the social intelligence and will of the individual. The individual is permitted, even encouraged, to exercise the greatest possible amount of freedom in the conducting of his own affairs compatible with the good of the whole, as well as to freely enter into the determination of group behavior. Democracy is not government at all in the old-fashioned, authoritarian sense, as Ellwood points out,³ but rather the free, collective control of the whole group over the conditions of its own existence. In theory it is not a discipline or regulation imposed by an individual or a class, but by the entire group through its chosen directors.

The *democratic state* is the means of carrying these democratic principles into effect. It is but the citizen and his fellows acting in coöperation for the highest common good. All members, irrespective of birth, or class, or station, share in ruling and serving. Its business is to provide the positive conditions under which a good and satisfying life is open to all alike. It should serve not merely to help its citizens enjoy existence and obtain health and comfort, but to promote their humanity, and enlarge their capacities and opportunities. It must afford

² *Liberalism*, p. 228.

³ “Making the World Safe for Democracy,” *Scientific Monthly*, Vol. 7, p. 517. The writer hereby acknowledges his indebtedness to Prof. C. A. Ellwood for some of the ideas expressed above.

them the chance to express their manhood, to enter into the heritage of the noblest traditions and ideals of mankind, and to win for themselves the high satisfactions of the life of good will.

However, the practice of democracy in any of the three respects briefly outlined falls far short of the theory. In fact, so far it has been a very imperfect attempt to approximate an ideal. This difficulty of accurate attainment rests partly upon a failure to understand accurately the essentials of democracy, but mainly upon an inability or unwillingness to carry them out.

3. THE ESSENTIALS OF EFFICIENT DEMOCRACY

a. A Population of High Quality. The very nature of a democracy forces it to risk its fate and its efficiency upon the ability of the rank and file of the citizenry to determine their own political destiny. Its success depends upon the possibility of this citizenry forming rational opinions, devising sound policies and executing these efficiently as a group. In fact, the quality of democracy cannot be much higher than the quality of its citizens, and its real success and advancement either as a form of society, or a form of government is dependent at last upon the development and enlightenment of the individual units of the population, and the social worth of their acts and sentiments. The intellectual level and the moral integrity of the state can never transcend the intellectual level and moral integrity of the rank and file of its citizens, for all its laws, bills of rights, constitutions, and programs are merely reflections of the degree to which the mass has attained these levels, and its concrete strivings are but human expressions to give them reality. It is obvious, therefore, that there should be among the citizens good innate mentality and extensive educational means for its development, comprehensive social and political information, moral sensitiveness, and integrity, and the various other essentials of good character, a high ideal of citizenship including especially a sense of social obligation and a sense of individual responsibility, and a general sanity of viewpoint.

b. Unimpaired Discussion. Since democracy is government of the people, by the people, and for the people, the most complete and adequate means of determining the expression of popular will must be utilized. This is simply another way of saying that public opinion is the force that lies back of the power of all democratic regulative institutions; and democratic society can be efficient and successful only

as it succeeds in making public opinion rational and powerful. A democracy must find a means of selecting among all the possible opinions which the group may develop, the most rational and soundest, and of basing group decision and group action thereon. Democracy, therefore, depends upon free thought, free public discussion, a free press, free assemblage, and free selection of public policies and public leaders. It was not by accident that the first amendment of our Constitution was enacted, but due to an almost immediate recognition of the vital need of such guarantees if our democracy was to endure and prosper. That rational like-mindedness which is both the basis and the motive power of a democracy is only possible through the free interchange of ideas and opinions, however diverse and apparently dangerous they may be. For a democracy is a consensus of *all* ideas and opinions, and *all* should be given play in the final decision. Thus there must be inner freedom of thought and judgment in the individual, freedom of intercommunication among individuals, and untrammelled expression of public opinion and will. These are the ultimate processes of mutual education and decision. As soon as freedom of thought and of public discussion are abridged the whole machinery of adjustment in a group will be hampered; it will be impossible to compare ideas, and to come to a rational judgment regarding group policies; stagnation, social inertia, inbreeding of ideas and prejudices, degeneration of thought and institutions occur. In other words, it is only through free discussion and the formation of a public opinion, untrammelled either by the prejudices and emotions of the whole group, or by the interests and power of some special class, that democracy can be a safe and efficient means of social control. Censorship, or any denial of free speech, press, and assemblage in a democracy is, according to the theory of democracy, actually class control or oligarchy. As such it sets in motion those processes that are the constant worries of class states and oligarchies, viz., unrest and revolution. Discussion brings about a sifting process whereby the weaknesses of "that which is" are determined; it is a safety valve for accumulating unrest, and assurance of social amity and continuity. Those who try to do away with this complete freedom of discussion on the ground that criticisms of existing conditions and discussions of possible changes are subversive of democracy, either do not understand the implications of democracy, or have no confidence in the ability of the people to exercise their constitutional rights. The failures of government have almost always been failures of free public opinion—mostly of public opinion that was ill-informed, that was denied the

facts, or that was misguided by self-constituted masters. The latter, too, will always remain one of the greatest menaces.

c. Equality of Opportunity. Our Declaration of Independence states, "We hold these truths to be self-evident, that all men are created equal, that they are endowed by their Creator with certain inalienable Rights, that among these are Life, Liberty and the pursuit of Happiness." Certain phrases of this have been grossly misinterpreted and given meanings that are far from the meanings of those who drew up this statement, and quite incompatible with the purposes of any democratic government. In the first place, the citizens of a democracy, or any other form of society, or government are not created equal. A democracy must be based on the fullest recognition of the inherent biological inequalities of capacity in men, and of the infinitely wide range of human tastes, capacities, and aptitudes. Furthermore, men inevitably become unequal through the circumstances of life. Social life involves coöperation, and coöperation implies a fundamental division of labor, and the division of labor makes men unequal with reference to the same capacity. Absolute equality does not and cannot exist in human society. Such dead-level equality, or egalitarianism, destroys the efficiency of social control, due to the fact that it prevents that coördination of the group in action, that necessary division in society of the economic, political, social and cultural tasks, which is necessary for efficient and full life.

What the founders of our democracy had in mind was an equality of rights and opportunities. Other declarations of the time carry the same intent. The French Declaration reads, "All men are born free and equal; not one of them has more right than another to make use of his natural or acquired faculties." The Virginia Declaration declares, "All men are by nature equally free, and have inherent rights, etc." Similarly, as Ross points out, the framers of the Declaration of Independence meant that "The doctrine that men are 'born free and equal' is not an assertion of natal equality in body or mind, but a rejection of the principle of inferior heredity status fixed by the act of some ancestor." ⁴

Infinite variety must not be confused with inequality. Properly speaking, democracy means an equal opportunity for all, in order that every one may be able to develop to the greatest extent his native capacities, and thus make his maximum, unique, contribution to the social wealth or culture of his group; it means free and equal oppor-

⁴ *Principles of Sociology*, pp. 373-374.

tunity on the part of all to earn a livelihood, to share according to capacity in the prosperity and the burdens of his group. It insists that all men must be treated as of potentially equal social worth, and be given equal opportunity to demonstrate their social worth. Political democracy means that every one is to count for one, and no one for more than one. Votes are counted, not weighed. The social goal of the democracy is the advancement and improvement of the people through a democratization of the advantages and opportunities of life; it is giving to each the same chances that I myself want. Walt Whitman once said, "As if it harm'd me, giving others the same chances and rights as myself—as if it were not indispensable to my own rights that others possess the same." Democracy is the best known condition for the fullest realization and utilization of the capacities of each individual; as such it becomes the best possible form of organized group life for men as a whole. It becomes increasingly indispensable in this modern world as men everywhere become enlightened and free.

Democracy insists that all participate in social control according to their social ability; but it does not object to such distinctions of class or position as are based upon individual merit and fitness; in fact, it feels that these are necessary for efficiency. What it does protest against are the artificial inequalities produced by artificial social distinctions.⁵

d. Legal Equality. If a democracy is to be effective and facile in its operation there must be an equality of legal restriction upon individual acts. Furthermore, if there is restriction of legal rights it must be certain that it is for the mutual welfare of all individuals. No man shall be prevented from doing what another under the same circumstances is permitted to do; no man should be punished for an act unless all other men are punished in kind and degree for the same act. With inequality, disintegrating forces are straightway set at work to destroy the organic relationship between man and man, which is requisite for a democracy's existence. If there is inequality of rights each individual ceases to be a personality having ends which all others

⁵ Cf. G. S. Hall, "Can the Masses Rule the World?" *Scientific Monthly*, Vol. 18, pp. 465-466; R. B. Perry, "What do we Mean by Democracy?" *International Journal of Ethics*, Vol. 28, pp. 451-459; I. W. Howerth, "Is there a Natural Law of Inequality?" *Scientific Monthly*, Vol. 19, pp. 502-511; W. E. Dodd, "The Struggle for Democracy in United States," *International Journal of Ethics*, Vol. 28, pp. 465-466; C. A. Ellwood, "Making the World Safe for Democracy," *Scientific Monthly*, Vol. 7, pp. 520-521; C. A. Ellwood, "Democracy and Social Conditions in the United States," *International Journal of Ethics*, Vol. 28, pp. 502-504.

are bound to respect, and becomes degraded to the position of mere means to some one else's ends.

e. Rational Humanitarianism. A democracy cannot carry on merely by means of these technical minima. Individual participation cannot be left purely on the basis of a calculating, individual benefit—a barter of social acts for mutual good. There must be a high-minded sympathy, and understanding, and good will among the members of the group. Hence the danger of too rapidly diluting a citizenry with elements too highly foreign and diverse racially or culturally.

4. THE OBSTACLES TO THE PROPER FUNCTIONING OF DEMOCRACY

In practice, democracy seems to be falling far short of the theories and principles underlying it. Let us examine some of the inherent weaknesses, obstacles, and perversions that impair its functioning, and that make it such an imperfect instrument and expression of political or any other kind of progress.

a. The Tendency to Mediocrity.⁹ The concept of equality underlying democracy has been woefully perverted in meaning and practice. The leveling process which originally was an uplifting force, now works more and more downward. In its recognition of all men and the granting of freedom and responsibility to them, the average man, the member of the rank and file between the small group at the top composed of genius and talent—those fitted by endowment and training for leadership—and the unskilled, illiterate, and the positively defective and criminal at the other extreme, has come because of his numbers to be the ruler in democracy, the shaper of his ideals, the selector of its policies, and the arbiter of its destinies. His characteristics are well summarized by Mecklin when he says:

"He is dominated by routine and tradition. His philosophy of life consists for the most part of conventional principles that are provided by pulpit, party, or counting-house. On the whole he is suspicious of ideas, especially if they be new; thinking is irksome and largely unnecessary since he finds that a judicious regard for what 'they say' will solve most of his problems. The political 'spellbinder' and the professional reformer, to whose interest it is to study his idiosyncracies, find that a skilful appeal to his prejudices or to his fixed ideas never fails to bring a favorable response. On the whole, he prefers orthodoxy to scholarship in his ministers, loyalty

⁹Cf. Emma M. Caillard, "The Danger of the Average Standard," *Contemporary Review*, Vol. 119, pp. 91-98; R. L. Gerard, "Civilization in Danger," *Hibbert Journal*, Vol. 6, pp. 729-742; J. M. Mecklin, *Introduction to Social Ethics*, pp. 3-21; D. S. Jordan, "Unrest and Progress," *Independent*, Vol. 73, p. 314.

to party rather than political wisdom in his statesmen, the preservation of the profitable *status quo* in his business rather than the sacrifices necessary for the social or economic betterment of the community.”¹

These average men who make up the bulk of democratic citizenry are only partly educated and their major interests are rarely those of the welfare of their group. They are intolerant of new ideas, because these disturb and unsettle, hence freedom of speech is only permitted along certain lines—usually those quite harmless to their major interests; they do not think, or else they do it so little that their powers of thought are little developed, hence the thinking they do is superficial, incompetent, and largely in terms of ready-made generalities; they do not want to be bothered about changes of the social order; they would sooner blunder along with the half-good than undergo the shock of a change for the better; they do not want to be bothered by politics any more than their major interests demand; they do not seek intelligent comprehension of governmental issues; they have a very limited sense of values, and those largely of a somewhat tawdry conventional nature; they do not want to appear too interested in real art, and beauty, and culture because that is “highbrow;” they have no perspective and do not care what will happen day after to-morrow. A self-satisfied stupidity reigns over all, and is jealously insisted upon. Deviation from the average, the statistical normal, is punished in one way or another.

The government cannot rise above the intellectual level of this mass. Back of all political institutions and activities lie always the essential status and character of the dominant population elements, their intelligence, traditions, prejudices, and aspirations. Thus one of the most mischievous features of our actual democracy to-day is the worship of commonness, vulgarity, mediocrity. Culture, politics, religion, idealism, and thought, are leveled down to the tastes and abilities of the mass.

This inevitably involves a narrowness of outlook in a democracy which at best cannot but be retarding to progress in all those directions most conducive to the general welfare. The rank and file with their bare understanding of what government means, mostly regard the power which they are told they possess as an instrument to procure, or even as a weapon to wrest for themselves advantages at the cost of anyone or anything not themselves. Rarely recognizing real leader-

¹ J. M. Mecklin, *Introduction to Social Ethics*, Harcourt, Brace & Co., pp. 8-9.

ship, the best man and measures are often rejected for those that are third best; while the boss whom they trust and exalt to power is one whom they deem represents their own mental and moral level, who vaunts himself as their "servant." They want their representatives to have education, mental attitudes and manners like their own. For this mass the thinkers, or the experts, or superior people generally, are "dangerous" persons, potential rebels, possible disturbers of the peace.⁸ Hence the more enlightened people in many countries are declaring that anyone who would obtain the suffrages of the majority has to appeal to ignorance, prejudice, and mediocrity. Elevated opinions, truly informed views, cannot appeal to the masses. One has deliberately to stoop to the average level of intelligence. To be much ahead of the electorate is fatal. In general this situation means demagoguery, the tyranny of the majority, dirty and disreputable politics, waste and incompetency. There is a modicum of truth in the statements of the Le Bon school of thought who think that democracy means "mobocracy" or "moronarchy."

Our most profound thinkers tell us, however, that the folksoul should not be distrusted. There is about the average man an unsophisticated sanity, an honesty and sympathy and loyalty, a humanness and common sense, a straightforward logic and reasoning, that produces great things—that has produced the literatures, philosophies, religions, and political policies of the world.⁹ It is possible that the average man has not yet adjusted himself to his new social and political condition. Another contributory factor is that the common people have had their views cunningly warped by propaganda, have been misled and jingoized by newspapers, doped by stump oratory, and kept in ignorance by various other devices. Our general education is also woefully defective, as we have noted. The correction of these conditions will go far to eliminate the tendency to mediocrity.

⁸ See E. Faguet, *The Cult of Incompetence*, p. 135; F. H. Giddings, "The Right to Achieve," *Unpartisan Review*, Vol. 12, p. 376.

⁹ "All the civilizations of the world, its cultures, its governments, institutions, literatures, science, states, churches and all kinds of organization—these . . . were made by great numbers of men acting together, often for a long period of time and over a wide extent of space. These have decayed or been destroyed over and over, and men have passed through trying periods of *débâcle* and relapse toward barbarism. But mansoul is unconquerable and impressible, and it has always sooner or later evolved other forms in all these domains. . . Men do not realize that the power to appreciate a great or good thing and the will to accept it are made warp and woof exactly of the same psychic stuff as is the power to create them, and differs from originality only in degree." G. S. Hall, "Can the Masses Rule the World?" *Scientific Monthly*, Vol. 18, p. 463.

b. Complexity of Life and Divergence of Interest. Democracy seems to be breaking down as practical government from the sheer weight of its extension in size and complexity. The scope, variety and complexity of the municipal, state, national, and international questions and issues, upon which the citizen is now called upon to pass, are increasing in almost geometrical ratio. Even the best read man finds himself constantly balked by insufficient knowledge and inadequate interpretation, and is mortified by his incompetence to deal with them. But he must confess his incapacity through sheer lack of time and ability to act intelligently and conscientiously.

Especially in America we also have to contend with the fact that we are a heterogeneous and in many respects poorly assimilated mass of diverse nationalities and even races, with differences of religion, language, social status, and political traditions, resulting in a multiplicity of cleavages, wide and varying prepossessions, and divided allegiances. We have also the participation of a considerable number of illiterates and inadequately schooled people who are easily swayed and controlled, vote without thinking or as they are told, and dilute the influence of the competent elements. Our exceedingly great expanse of territory with its diverse climatic and industrial conditions, has produced a variety of sectional interests that make political unity difficult. The more or less clear-cut cleavage between city and rural districts has further accentuated the political problem.

c. Politics and Politicians. Another bane of our democracy is politics and its accompanying politicians, both terms here being used in their narrower and more common meaning. Politics is that aberration in the general field of government which has to do with the machinery of government as an end in itself. The politicians, in the main, are the individuals who make their living by means of the machinery of government. They make much ado about the improvement of government and their service to the state, but their actual obligation is to their party and still oftener to themselves. The thing they are after in the last analysis is reelection and the control it gives them, the ability to profit by office holding. Both of these words, according to the experience of democracies, generally imply, to the candid at least, self-seeking, ambition, rivalry, intrigue, hoodwinking, spell-binding, destructiveness, perpetual conflict, disregard for the public weal, wastefulness, inefficiency, and public corruption. They pervert the functions of government and place the very opposite type of man in office than is needed. In a crisis they may produce disaster.

Everywhere in democracies politics and politicians are arousing a great disgust among certain minorities, and men are beginning to wonder how much longer they will last. There probably, however, will not be much change as long as we are as heterogeneous, ignorant, indifferent and self-satisfied as we now are, unless some heretofore unheard-of educational agent of inestimable potency can be perfected and put into effect by the ethically minded minorities.

d. Plutocracy. Especially in the last quarter century the forces of plutocracy have been corrupting and misdirecting democracy. Plutocracy is the aristocracy of wealth originating in commercial greed—a more or less fluctuating group of very wealthy men, loosely united, and their retainers—who through their wealth, prestige, and power have gained an enormous, if not preponderating influence over commerce, the various departments of government, and public opinion. Plutocracy's particular connection with our problem lies in its attempt to keep industry and business free from political interference or regulation. Consequently it has again and again cast its shadow directly athwart our proper political functioning as well as the political progress of our society.

To maintain its freedom from governmental interference, plutocracy has in one way or another gained possession of the strategic political positions—the positions which the democracy itself must gain before its regulation is entirely effective. The key to the situation lies in the control of the law, and the law in turn depends upon the legislatures and courts, and these in turn upon parties. Thus plutocracy has always sought the control of parties, through their leaders, of course, and in the main, as everyone knows, has been successful most of the time. The natural weapon used in this process has been the corruption of legislators, administrators, judges, parties and politicians. Plutocracy controls political conventions, it is influential in selecting candidates for office, it manipulates legislative bodies, it gets favorable interpretations of legislative enactments and constitutions, through its control of the courts. It does this by taking advantage of the complexities of modern governmental systems, the ignorance or indifference of the people, and by its widespread and almost complete control of public opinion, and its other elaborate machinery for the disqualification and frustration of opposition. It confounds voters and legislators; sets off one public body against another; confuses issues; grossly misinterprets meanings and consequences; and deliberately throws a cloud of dust over the whole legislative process; it entrenches itself in the intricacies and

convolutions of legal and judicial systems, and hides itself behind the most undemocratic features of governments and constitutions.¹⁰

5. DEMOCRACY AND PROGRESS

a. A Flexible Constitution. A most energetic propaganda has been conducted in recent years on behalf of Constitution-worship, and its champions appear to be eager to punish or even banish all dissenters and heretics. What are the merits of the case?

The legalist, of course, insists that the people have chosen as the foundation of their government a written constitution, which contains those ultimate principles which must find expression in true democracy. In the interest of freedom and justice we must accept implicitly this body of law and abide by it forever. The modern progressive, however, guided by the principle of evolution which he sees to be true in all departments of life and thought, must insist that government and law are themselves a matter of growth and development, that they spring from the life of the people; are, in fact, the people's expression of political adjustment. Neither laws nor constitutions can therefore be considered superior to the people whose needs called them forth, nor can they be forever best, for they are the result of a social process which is itself constantly accumulating new facts and new conditions.

The Constitution is one of the great achievements of all history, but criticism of it is not blasphemy. Men who think that the moral, economic, and political problems of to-day require either a revision of the modes of treating them or additional constitutional enabling power, as compared with the modes of the historical era of the French Revolution, are not necessarily fanatics or traitors.¹¹ Its claims upon the loyalty of the people extends just as far as it serves the needs of the people. "Time makes ancient good uncouth." There are no men who are good enough and wise enough to lay down a body of legal doctrine that is good for all time. Just as certainly as the past century has widened our vision of the physical world, it has also brought to light moral, economic, and political facts and problems unknown to the framers of the American constitution; problems, in fact, that no interpretation of the Constitution will adequately solve. It is possible also that new conceptions of social justice have been taking shape in the social conscience that differ fundamentally from those embodied in a fixed code.

¹⁰ See W. Weyl, *The New Democracy*, pp. 78-155.

¹¹ See especially F. J. Goodnow, *Social Reform and the Constitution*, N. Y. Macmillan, 1911.

Therefore when the need for the ways of acting provided for in a constitution has disappeared, or when the constitution makes no provision whatever for certain new contingencies, it not only becomes more or less useless, but it beclouds the moral and political horizon. In order that these various grave living issues may be met and adjudicated, a less inflexible constitution is needed.¹²

The Constitution is our political and legal fly-wheel. Hence we cannot permit it to shift off-center, but must keep it continually "trued-up." When the dislocations of life are as frequent and as rapid as they now are, facilities for doing this must be ready and effective.

b. Unavoidable Federalism. Progress in America necessitates an ever greater extension of federal power. It is not to be implied that state regulation is generally inferior or obstructive. There are, indeed, many fields where progressive social policy is best advanced by state regulations, but there are also a growing number of problems that can be handled properly only by the widest possible political control. Some modification of existing policy is needed.

The situations responsible for the states' rights doctrine have largely disappeared. Railways, the telephone, good roads, automobiles, widely circulated printed matter of all kinds, and the radio have caused sectional isolation to vanish. Population mobility is great. Sectional and provincial customs, traditions and amusements are either disappearing or becoming generally diffused. Occupations, professions, as well as all consumable goods—physical, emotional, intellectual—are nationally standardized. No American community, state, or section is self-sufficient or independent. Our interests and even our attitudes are coming to be nation-wide.

Similarly, our nation-wide problems must be handled in a nation-wide manner to insure nation-wide regulation and minima of attainment. The fullest realization of the potentialities of the largest number can occur in no other way. Industrial capitalism and power-driven machinery have given us interstate corporations, holding companies, mergers, vertical and horizontal monopolies, and interlocking directorates. Manufacturing, mining, transportation, and banking are now organized on a national scale.¹³ Public utilities, chain stores, and the distri-

¹² "The American constitution is a masterpiece of delicate equipoises and complicated mechanism suitable for the original nation, but is becoming full of difficulties and dangers now that hordes, for whom it was not intended, have changed the character of the nation." James Bryce, *The American Commonwealth*, p. 290.

¹³ As early as 1907 Roosevelt in his message to Congress said: "The states have shown that they have not the ability to curb the power of syndicated wealth."

bution of milk and baked goods are interstate. State governments are quite incapable of regulating any of these properly; all they can do is pester them. The near future will also present a host of problems such as the need of national unemployment insurance and exchanges, the equitable regulation of labor conditions, the control of divorce and marriage, the inauguration of eugenic regulation, the provision of adequate uniform education, the control of the motion picture industry and radio broadcasting, and the supervision of trunk highways, which can only be handled effectively in a national way. The trend toward federalism is unmistakable and unavoidable. Modern events inevitably expand the areas in which well-being must be uniform.

c. The Growing Indispensability of the Responsible Expert Official. In a pure democracy every place is in theory open to everyone. This is quite in conformity with the idea of equality; and in a perfect democracy composed of the best quality of citizens, and having a relatively simple organization of life, this theory might work out well. In our complex modern American society, however, efficient administration requires a great specialization of knowledge and a high degree of competency. But our best and most competent citizens, partly due to the bad reputation of politics and partly to the lack of dignity and adequate remuneration in public office, do not become candidates. Significant also is the fact that our office holders do not hold office due to fitness, nor do they go into it as a life-work. They are put in office by their party, the test of their ability being loyalty. They have authority delegated to them but no direct responsibility is fixed upon them. They have little to lose by their mistakes and usually little to gain by a wise and faithful performance of their duties. They may be swept out of office next election. The consequence is that our officials are often lazy, incompetent, and even too frequently irresponsible and dishonest. This obviously means that our democracy fails to function properly. Progress demands some remedy.

The way out seems to be to make certain modifications that make greater provisions for expert service, definitely fixed responsibility, and fixity of tenure during good service. To be sure we have made some of our offices non-political and have stressed competency—and these changes, incidentally, have been very satisfactory. But we need to go much farther. The tasks of our American democratic government in all its divisions and subdivisions are to-day so complex, so numerous, and so technical in nature, and their effects are such a long time in

developing that the average man is quite unfit to handle them. He is rapidly even becoming unfit to decide the more general issues connected with these tasks. We need in government scientific method, a uniform, consistent, long-time policy, patient and honest striving towards a definite and adequate goal, and well-trained, experienced experts, with long tenure of office, as officials in charge.

Of course our everyday political philosophy is opposed to the expert. He smacks of bureaucracy and high-browism. He is distrusted because it is felt that he is not in touch with the masses, and is too intelligent and skillful, and consequently too subtle and powerful. We also insist that every man has the right to share in public affairs, including the holding of office. But we have now come to the point where we must be reëducated; we must be educated to the viewpoint that it is not our responsibility to try to solve complex problems for ourselves, though any training we could acquire would not be amiss, but to employ specialists to solve these problems for us. To do this is the immediate task. It is merely good sense.

For his own and his community's salvation the average man must make his peace with the expert.¹⁴ Public welfare insistently demands him.

The people are often irrational and unscientific; they usually think in concrete, immediate, and personal terms; and they are guided by feeling rather than reason. But these are the very weaknesses that produce our problems. The expert is singularly free from these faults. Consequently, to avoid these, the best experts available must be put in every position of authority; we must place entire responsibility for their work upon them, leave them in office until they are called to a higher position, or until replaced by better men, and finally pay them enough so that they will stay.

In so doing we are not, in the last analysis, going contrary to basic democratic principles. Democracy actually requires only that the *ultimate* authority rest directly with the people. Actually a government with experts in authority, each assuming full responsibility for his work, and subject to the ultimate authority of the people represents the highest democratic ideal.¹⁵

¹⁴ "Whether popular government will endure or not depends upon its success in solving its problems, and among these none is more insistent than the question of its capacity both to use and control the expert." A. L. Lowell, *Public Opinion and Popular Government*, p. 303.

¹⁵ Cf. E. G. Conklin, *The Direction of Human Evolution*, pp. 116-122. Consult also A. L. Lowell, *Public Opinion and Popular Government*, Chs. 16-19.

6. DEMOCRACY AND THE FUTURE

Dean Inge has written that "An impartial consideration of the various forms of State which have appeared in human history, and of the various theories and ideals which thinkers have evolved in the course of their attempts to devise a perfect scheme of government must lead the student to one conclusion: *Good government is the hardest of all problems, and it has never yet been solved.*"¹⁶ Certainly democracy is not a perfect form, nor is it the final form, in spite of the American habit of assuming that it is the last word in political organization. Government is a function of social evolution, and each stage of evolution in time produces its own best functions. Democracy is still stupid, wasteful, turbulent, blunt, shortsighted, unjust, bombastic. But these various weaknesses may be due to its newness. It is just beginning to realize its strength and to enjoy the freedom and privilege and power that go with it, but it has not yet fully realized the obligations that also accompany it. The old shackles are gone; it has not yet developed its own restraints fully; and in the first flush of youth and power, it is quite naturally a little vulgar and flamboyant, a little common and unrestrained. Democracy is not effete or decadent, but rather immature, unstable, undergraduate. It is also quite possible that its great success and its great extent bring out its defects in glaring prominence. For undoubtedly with all its imperfections it is the best type of government to date, viewing the matter from all the necessary angles. Though it fails, as everyone knows, and fails ignominiously in each of these regards, never before in any broad nation was government so wise, so considerate and humane, so fair, so intelligent, so just to all. Modern democracies are more vigilant, more appreciative of the blessings of liberty, opportunity, and legal equality than any previous governments. The number of citizens who consciously and intelligently favor democratic principles is probably greater than it ever was before, both absolutely and relatively.

Democracy's real constructive capacities have not been fully sounded. Furthermore, the rank and file of the peoples that have tried democracy have not generally been of sufficiently high quality to carry it into effect in its true form, nor is society as a whole sufficiently enlightened to be quite ready for democratic political institutions. It is also true that during this period of its childhood the world has grown so fast

¹⁶ Italics mine.

and has become so complex and the problems that government has been called upon to solve and the services that it was asked to render have multiplied at such a stupendous rate that any form of government would have been swamped. Furthermore, during this time the risks of bad government have been greater, and due to the greater interdependence of life, the damage which general ignorance and selfishness bring have been more widespread, though not as acute in effect. It is only fair to admit that when viewed in the broad, democracy's success has been phenomenal. The hope is that this will continue; that it be purged of its obvious weaknesses, and conform itself to the spirit and needs of the new age.

In time democracy, as all else, will come under the sway of the new social spirit. The laissez-faire spirit and policies and the predatory or at least acquisitive individualism that runs through it to-day will disappear, and in its place there will be a workable social ethics and an individual sense of social responsibility. In place of a jealous sense of private property there will be current a conception of the trusteeship of wealth. Inalienable rights will not be negatively and individualistically interpreted, but extended and given social interpretation. Men will act, not in terms of the insistent and powerful and egoistic impulses, or the hard logic of legal precedent, but rather according to the still more basic principles of social justice and human welfare. The only democracy that will work in the future is a socialized democracy, which conceives of society as a whole and not as a more or less adventitious assemblage of myriads of individuals,¹⁷ and which acts, not as a matter of fulfilling the minimum political and legal requirements, but from a feeling of community of interests based upon common ideals. For until democracy is a glorious universal ideal it will not be an efficient social state.

7. LEGAL ASPECTS

a. The Law and Progress. Below all fine civilizations and social progress lies the firm foundation of law, for it has been the method used through the ages whereby men have crystallized their modes of right living. It is the sum of the general principles of social conduct as found in the moral code of a people which have been made definite, standard, and punishable because they are necessary to the achievement of the social purpose,¹⁸ or, to use Kracht's idea, law is nothing

¹⁷ Cf. Weyl, *op. cit.*, p. 162.

¹⁸ See H. J. Laski, Introduction to Duguit, *Law in the Modern State*, p. xvii.

but the product of the automatic reaction of the social will to what the social intelligence regards as good, expressed and enforced by that specialized portion of society called government.¹⁹

The definite statement of the essentials of public conduct found in law is necessary, as Plato long ago pointed out in the ninth book of the *Laws*, for two reasons: first, because our individual minds are not adequate in themselves for the recognition of what is best for social life; second, because, even when such recognition is attained, our individual wills are not always able or willing to pursue the best. We need law to precipitate or crystallize the good, and to definitely keep our attention on this common good, and not let our private interests thwart it.

The function of law, in the last analysis, is to establish that social order and security necessary for fullest individual self-expression consistent with the general free individual action of all men. As such it is imposed both on private and public persons, lest they serve as agents of physical harm, or insecurity, or of inequality or frustration, lest they deny the inalienable human rights and opportunities, lest they obstruct necessary social processes or institutions. In essence this means that the function of law is to establish a firm and stable social system, and so order human conduct and adjust social relations that justice obtains. If it is developed and administered in a manner consistent with its function it is undeniably both a necessary condition and an efficient agent of progress.

In a democracy the law in theory represents the intelligent and self-directive will of the people—the “legislative will”—and is used to mold and control men in the interests of the welfare of the general mass. Its ultimate sanction is based upon a loyal acceptance of its mandates, due to a reasoned and intelligent appreciation of the principles upon which it is based. It is the expression of the tested moral convictions of the masses of more or less intelligent men and women. It is the means whereby individuals and institutions are bent to the common will.

Law in a democracy should reflect the growth of experience and intelligence of the people. Hence it should be as flexible as possible, and still fulfill its function in establishing and maintaining social order, continually responsive to the needs and best interests of the democratic group. It should be a live, changing and adjustable instrument satis-

¹⁹ *International Journal of Ethics*, Vol. 27, p. 476. See also Duguit, *op. cit.*, p. 43; R. Pound, *An Introduction to the Philosophy of Law*, p. 99.

fying the requirements of ever-changing society; its precepts should be continually overhauled and refitted to the new conditions. And yet it changes tardily, much more tardily than social stability requires.²⁰ Involved are the influence of the legalist who conceives of law as having inherent and ultimate moral and political sanction—a merit independent of what men think or do. Law for him is not invalidated by the altered opinions of men or by changes of an economic, social, or political nature. This type of mind is characterized by a comparative inflexibility, a certain blindness to the changing social and economic order, and exaggerated and stubborn veneration for ancient principles of law, established under conditions which no longer apply, and an impatience with the cruder strivings of the raw democratic spirit.

There is also the dependence upon precedent in the determination of decisions. This means that the new situation, however unique, must be adjusted according to past, sometimes very remote, constructions. Of course, while the court has great freedom in the use of precedent, the characteristic attitudes and logic of precedent use predominate. Legal thought has not adequately kept in touch with the progress of the scientific mode of thought now permeating various fields. If it had it would see that the arbitrary element in the law, or in certain provinces of it, should be eliminated and the best knowledge regardless of source be used as far as possible. As it is, contemporary legal systems make very little provision for the modification or supplementing of the law by modern science. In many cases it is folly to base decisions on previous decisions made when no technical knowledge was available. The independence of the law—its “cloistered preconceptions”—are over-emphasized. It needs to depend more on the contributions of the ethicist, the economist, the sociologist, the psychologist, the criminologist, the political scientist, and the physiologist. So far it has recognized these only in the witness chair. More and more must these be consulted in judicial creation and interpretation, destruction or substitution of law, and particularly in direct law-making by legislature. Tested facts must be respected.

There are several other factors of a general nature that affect the efficacy of law in modern democracies. The judge through his function of judicial interpretation can so construe the written law and select the principles and cases he will follow, that he can almost build a legal foundation for the decision he deems right in the case at bar. There are so many principles and precedents running in different directions

²⁰ See Pollock, *Essays in the Law*, p. 203.

that a judge can generally find some principle, precedent, or construction to justify in legal form the conclusion he has arrived at on the facts. This means that the integrity and personal attitudes, the general education and information, and the sense of personal responsibility of the judges have great significance, and that the personnel of the judiciary is of incalculable importance; in fact, here is one of the keys to justice.

Significant also is the nature of democratic legislatures. They tend to be made up of more or less untrained men with inadequate political equipment. Their deliberations are often quite unscientific, centering around party doctrines, the "pork barrel," "log rolling," or other petty details, rather than around an inquiry into the various factors which demand regulation, the possibilities and means of satisfying these demands, and the probable consequences of the action to be taken. Consequently they pass a multitude of laws, many of them dead letters from the beginning, and others gross misapplications that will prove instruments of evil in the hands of the unprincipled. This militates against all law in the public mind.

It would also seem that in a democracy law should become more and more positive. The relation of the law and a vital social conscience is not sufficiently appreciated. Law is the arena in which the spheres of individual and communal development are molded and remolded and given definition. From being negative, prohibitive, and individual, it needs to become positive, permissive, social, and creative. In thus holding up social ideals, law will continue to develop in the minds of men a social consciousness that each is a living and vital part of the social whole, with duties as well as rights.

From the point of view of successful tactics, proposed laws in order to serve as progress agents, should not be very far in advance of the people. Ordinarily there should be a distinct majority, if only of influence, in favor of a law; otherwise it cannot be enforced, and unenforced laws lessen the respect for *all* law and lead to lawlessness. Not until a predominating section of the community will support a law should it become effective, because only in this way can there be that intelligent appreciation which is the backbone of obedience to law in a self-conscious democracy. In the last analysis, therefore, law can only be improved by improving the individuals that compose the group; for law, like other social institutions, is the product of individual thought and feelings. When this is done, the new institutions bring the lingering minority of mankind into harmony with the new

advance, and mold the natures of all into more perfect fitness for further progress.

b. The Legal Profession and Progress. It has been jocosely remarked that our American government is "a government of the lawyers, by the lawyers and for the lawyers." There is an element of truth in this, but like most statements of its kind, it is an exaggeration. The dominance of the lawyer in government, however, is natural and inevitable. The training and social practice of lawyers generally is then of signal importance in any study of progress from the political viewpoint, for they make up the bulk of the administrators, and are numerous among the lawmakers, as well as composing the entire personnel of the courts.

The lawyers, in the nature of things, are a privileged body of men, with very definite responsibilities for the maintenance of certain institutions of public welfare. There is a feeling, however, on the part of a large and respectable group of laymen that these public professional obligations are not being met as they should be.

There has been a tendency for the bar to align themselves with the commercial interests and throw their influence to the support of these interests even though they sometimes were highly predatory in character and their acts were a gross violation of public interests. The bar has permitted most flagrant and illegal restrictions of rights established by our own and other bills of rights, especially freedom of speech and press. It has permitted the gross violation of power by judges and of the legal department of our federal government. It has taken no definite stand in the important question as to whether the lawyer's first duty lies in the administration of implicit justice, or whether it is to his client. The indictment is particularly strong in the last case. Behind the screen of the lawyer's "sacred duty" to his client skulk the familiar practices that have made a daily mockery of justice—the attempt to gain the acquittal of the client at any cost, even of perjury, trumped-up defenses, such as "moral insanity," intimidation or "fixing" of future witnesses, delay tactics, and attempted bargaining with public prosecutors. Such things have caused the professional criminal to look upon the law as an aid rather than an enemy, and the honest layman to suspect and even dislike lawyers. Bar associations so far have been pursuing the easier course of ignoring such situations.

This general state of affairs is doubtless due to several factors. The work of the contemporary lawyer is so specialized and he is so much engrossed with the details of his practice, whether it be mainly

criminal or civil, and the satisfaction of his clients, that he sees the law as a practical convenience rather than as the reflection of the effort of a whole society to order its affairs and unfold its life. He has come to be a retainer of corporations and a manipulator of legal processes for individuals rather than an instrumentality in the administration of justice, that is, one whose acts are the fulfillment of the oath to which he swore when admitted to the bar. There are still too many legal practitioners "to whom the law is a rag bag from which they pick out the piece and the color that they want."

Another factor involved, particularly with respect to America, is inadequacy and diversity of the training among lawyers, and the laxity of the standards of admission to the bar in some states. Wehle points out ²¹ that largely because of the low standards of admission only about 8,000 out of approximately 30,000 students studying law some ten years ago were in the university law schools. This means that a considerable proportion of the new generation of lawyers are totally blind, ethically and intellectually, to the deep significance of the profession they have entered. Their interests are purely selfish and acquisitive. Those trained in the law schools do not have a perfectly socialized training, however. To be sure they have a superior ethical background and undoubtedly a firmer technical preparation, but they have the disadvantage of having been given a precedent-following point of view, which is not conducive to an intelligent handling of many important questions. They are fitted for the administration of what has been established, of operating the machinery as it has been operated. But they are not trained in the solution of new problems; they do not see the law as a body of evolving experiments in social order, and the lawyer as a social servant playing the chief rôle in this process. A training procedure is needed that will combine social with professional education; that will tend to turn out lawyers who will practice their profession in a spirit of scientific curiosity, men who will seek to know as much as they can about the social results of their professional work. The legal fraternity is confronted with the task of infusing into their profession a high conception of ethical practice, a thoroughgoing and inviolable adherence to the fundamental principles of public justice, and an element of responsiveness to the evolution of thought under changing conditions. It must do this to fulfill its proper function as a tool of justice.

²¹ L. B. Wehle, "Social Justice and Legal Education," *American Law Review*, Jan.-Feb., 1917.

8. THE INTERNATIONAL DEMOCRATIC TREND

We have had international relations of a sort for hundreds of years, but most of them have been of the type that resulted mainly in treaties between military rivals or alliances establishing a balance of power. During the last century, however, with the increasing intercourse between peoples, there has been a great extension of international relations of quite a different sort. Matters of common interest, not strictly political in their nature at all, have prompted these relations. Some sixty or seventy different agreements dealing with such international subjects as postage, telegraphs, navigation, railways, copyrights, insurance, sanitation, fisheries, prisons, the slave trade, the liquor traffic, and the traffic in women have been effected.

This trend has been vastly accelerated and has broadened out into almost all departments of life during the last quarter-century. The world is now rapidly coming to be one. The nations have common interests and thoughts. Their welfare and careers are inextricably intermingled. Instead of being probable assailants, as was once the case, they are actual and inevitable partners in a common work.

Economically, commercially, and financially, the nations are mutually dependent. International specialization has been carried to the point where no nation is self-sufficing and where all nations are of necessity engaged in a great coöperative process of production. International commerce, though harassed by tariffs, is an aid of first importance in this process. Capital to-day flows freely from country to country; investment and banking are internationalized. Studies of business cycles are revealing that the forces that govern prosperity and the trend of prices are world-wide rather than national in scope. The very workers of all countries are participating in international labor movements, and are establishing "internationals," because their interests are coming to be one. Every nation is to-day virtually a state in an internation as far as economic affairs are concerned.

As a result of the marked development of the means of transportation all the world is just around the corner, and with the increase and improvement of the means of communication all the world has become a whispering gallery. A world acquaintanceship, a world opinion, and a world culture are consequently in process. Religions, even the newer ones, are becoming international. Literature, music, and art are not confined to geographical or political boundaries, but have a

universal currency. Cultures are becoming interfused and united in a great freemasonry. Science, both in its pure and applied forms—especially in the field of medicine—is perhaps the finest expression of the new unified world. The discovery effected in a laboratory anywhere to-day is known and used throughout the world to-morrow. Philosophy also, we are seeing, is not conditioned by space, and is making its appeal across all vertical divisions. Health and sanitary efforts of necessity have become international in nature. The very essence of education demands that it be world-wide in interest and scope. Foreign travel with its contacts of various kinds, immigration as it pours the peoples of various countries through each other, the motion picture with its universal language, the international press associations, and various other activities, are indirectly pushing forward the process of world interstimulation. Mental and social as well as geographical distances are shrinking. Knowledge of all kinds is becoming international; and as this has occurred the nations have achieved a closer insight into each other's problems, prejudices have broken down, and at the same time their interests have been knit together. Our social patterns of life are coming to be more and more common to all peoples; we are becoming psychically one. A world civilization is at hand.

A cosmopolitan sentiment is developing as the result of the expanded sympathies that have come with the close acquaintance, and coöperation. A small but increasing number of persons are attaining world attitudes. Here and there are individuals who are asserting a world sense of ethical responsibility.

All this cannot occur, however, without affecting life in its political aspects. Human civilization is slowly moving toward a world political institution. To any one who deals in realities it is already clear that the nations have passed from the era of independence to that of interdependence. Modern states by the very nature of their activities are bound inextricably to every other state. Their salvation depends upon their ability to find some means of mutual accomodation and coöperation. Enlightened self-interest bids them make their contacts with other peoples as mutually agreeable as possible. All nations, as nations, must live with their neighbors on increasingly intimate terms. And this interdependence is bound to increase, for all the factors that have produced it are more definitely directed to that end than ever before.

The question to-day is not one of continuing or severing these new international conditions, for they are essential, but of fostering,

safeguarding and regularizing them. The world life must be free and orderly and well preserved. The relations between nations must be regular and lawful. Hence it must take some organized form. An international, self-governing political unit must take its place alongside of the national units; it must represent them and bring them into definite relationship; it must have the power to enact the necessary legislation, to maintain the necessary machinery to carry on in a systematic and world-wide fashion the necessary international duties, and be given sufficient power to enforce these against the nation that would endanger the world situation. There must be an organization of interests, a conscious interrelation of benefits and obligations. While this world political organization would be superior in strength to the most powerful nations to-day, it would not abolish nations, for they would be the representative units. It would be a voluntary union of free, independent, self-contained, democratic nations. Nor would it destroy national loyalties, though it might reduce some of the more febrile ones. It would simply mean that a new, world-wide federal agent would be put in effect to administer the world's multitudinous mutual tasks, and a world community loyalty would appear maintaining and enriching national loyalties.

Nor would this imply any marked modification of democracy. It would simply expand its scope, increase its humanity, and produce a world consciousness. In the last analysis, the full flowering of democracy in any given nation is bound up with the triumph of internationalism, for only as we develop and maintain equality and right and freedom among nations is democracy safe. The present trend demands an enlarged democracy, a new humanity as well as power, a new enlightenment as well as organization, a higher life for all—a world-wide democracy in the form of the organization of the friendship of the world. To this goal the inhabited world seems to be slowly moving.²²

This new trend is quite in harmony with social and political progress as well, for as L. T. Hobhouse points out, progress lies in the direction of extending the "area of the common good" from narrow social groups where we have seen it exhibited to the broader social groups such as society and humanity. It means also a new *Weltanschauung*, as John Morley puts it,²³ one which fixes vision, molds judgment, inspires purpose, limits acts, according to a new scale. The potentialities of good

²² The writer believes that the League of Nations is a partial, but promising, fulfilment of the international political needs here discussed.

²³ *Politics and History*, pp. 34-35.

for the group and the possibilities of fulfilment of the individual enlarge in geometric ratio with this growing, ordered world.²⁴

QUESTIONS AND PROBLEMS

1. "The veneration in which the Constitution has so long been held has largely been due to our prosperity during the constitutional period." Discuss.
2. Is democracy with its mediocrity, ignorance, inefficiency, and corruption better than autocracy or oligarchy?
3. Why did the founders of American democracy distrust democracy to the extent of establishing the constitutional provision for the election of the president by an electoral college, the election of senators by state legislatures, and the appointment of judges by the executive? Does it still exist?
4. How far is government justified in attempting to shape the opinions of the citizenry in a democracy? Should it be a reflector or projector of opinion?
5. What would you say of the advisability (as suggested by Weeks, *Control of the Social Mind*, p. 114) of establishing a public roll of eligible voters in every precinct, and at the close of election day cross off the names of every citizen who voted, leaving only for the public gaze the names of those who did not vote?
6. What modifications of the concept of freedom must we have if our democracy is to progress? (Conklin *The Direction of Human Evolution*, pp. 112-126.)
7. Why must there be universal, free education in a democracy? (Todd, *Theories of Social Progress*, pp. 346-351, 377-378, 524.)
8. In your estimation do the initiative, referendum, and recall contribute to progress in democratic government? Why?
9. According to James Bryce (*Modern Democracies*, Vol. II, pp. 597-609), is democracy in its final form?
10. Why, according to Todd, have we not been able to look to law and to courts of justice for very serious contributions to social progress? Is this changing? (*Theories of Social Progress*, pp. 359-364.)
11. Shall existing laws always be obeyed? (D. Durant, *Problems of Conduct*, pp. 410-413.)
12. What are some of the different ways in which the democratic state should assist in social progress?
13. Is there a "tyranny of the majority" in democracies?

²⁴ The author recommends G. V. Kracht, "The Fundamental Issue Between Nationalism and Internationalism," *International Journal of Ethics*, Vol. 30, pp. 241-266; L. P. Jacks, "The International Mind," *Atlantic Monthly*, Mar., 1920; J. M. Mecklin, "The International Conscience," *International Journal of Ethics*, Vol. 29, pp. 284-293; J. E. Boodin, "The Unit of Civilization," *International Journal of Ethics*, Vol. 30, pp. 152-154; W. K. Wright, "Ethical Aspects of Internationalism," *International Journal of Ethics*, Vol. 28, pp. 347-359.

14. In what way is the carelessness and inertness of the mass of citizens an obstacle to American democracy? (See A. M. Schlesinger and E. M. Eriksson, "The Vanishing Voter," *New Republic*, Oct. 15, 1924; H. F. Gosnell, "The Voter Resigns," *New Republic*, Oct. 21, 1925; A. D. Weeks, *Control of the Social Mind*, Ch. VIII.)
15. Why should a progressive state seek to avoid standardization such as that expressed in a certain percentage of Americanism?
16. What type of patriotism is most compatible with a progressive state?

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CHAPTER XIX

THE ECONOMIC ASPECTS OF PROGRESS

I. THE ESSENTIAL FUNCTION OF ECONOMIC ACTIVITY

FROM the earliest days the sole function of economic activity has been to support individual human life. Its task has been to assure the means, mainly material, essential to the preservation of life. What man has eaten, worn, constructed for shelter, or provided as comforts, has been the result of his economic activity. Soon, very soon, economic activity became a means not only of supporting life, but also of elevating it. As men stimulated each other and learned to coöperate, economic processes were improved, and surplus and leisure developed, at least for a few. The possibility of life becoming fuller and freer came as the result of this. Economic activity was now for the purpose of providing the wants arising in connection with human development and well-being. Its only legitimate function to-day is the general provision of the things and services necessary for human and social adequacy. Any exertion of economic effort for purposes other than that is a sheer waste and dissipation of energy, whatever its solemn sanction by law or tradition, or its apparent pecuniary profitableness. This is the acid test by which every bit of economic effort must be identified: Does it make for human and social well-being? In this true sense economic effort is entirely in harmony with the aims of progress.

The essential purpose of this chapter is to examine the present economic system with the intention of determining to what extent it is fulfilling its essential function, and what its effects are upon the fulfilment of individual life and the realization of group well-being.

2. THE BASIC NATURE OF ECONOMIC ACHIEVEMENT FOR PROGRESS

The products of economic effort are the very basis of social progress, for progress comes by the multiplication of achievement, and achievement along all lines—physical, political, moral, spiritual, artistic—depends upon substantial and appropriate economic foundations. The amount of resources useful to man, the system of industry and

technology, the nature of the processes of production and distribution, the nature and amount of the surplus, and degree to which it is increasing, and the utilization and diffusion of this surplus, are the basic conditions of progress. If they are positive and adequate in nature at any given time they give man health, strength, and longevity, and make his life easier, providing more comfort and more leisure, and enable him to be physically more efficient and to escape from that pressure of want which hampers the development of his whole nature. For a society they mean the possibility of a certain degree of culture and civilization, and a certain rate and degree of development. No society can go far without them. Wealth, properly diffused, means enhanced opportunity and ability to secure still greater opportunity. Leisure and an income above the level of existence tends toward an enormous development of individuality and sociality—towards the securing of education, the acquisition of greater political rights, of stimulative contacts, of opportunities for coöperation, general enlightenment and freedom. And wealth means money, and, as Walter Weyl pointed out¹ "Money—though only a part—is necessary for education, sanitation, leisure, and the amenities of life; for schools, universities, libraries, research institutes, art galleries, hospitals, museums, theaters, conservatories, magazines, books, parks, improved houses, better factories, clothing, shelter, recreation, and the endowment and production of what is good and worth while. . . . The growth of two bales of cotton, or two bushels of wheat, where one grew before, may make the difference between a besotted, superstitious, and reactionary people and an intelligent, cultured and progressive people. . . . However spiritual a structure civilization is, it is nevertheless built upon wheat, pork, steel, money, wealth." A palpable nexus exists between resources, technological processes, earnings, and progress. Here you have the material factors necessary for the erection of any superstructure of progress. The economic system presents the platform upon which social progress occurs. As population increases and the necessary machinery of life grows in amount and complexity the dependence of progress upon economic conditions will become still greater. Life will rest more and more upon artificial factors, many of which are essentially economic in nature.

This does not mean, however, that right economic conditions will spontaneously produce or guarantee progress, nor must we make the

¹ *The New Democracy* (copyright by The Macmillan Company), pp. 202-203. Reprinted by permission.

common contemporary mistake of conceiving of economic prosperity and social progress as identical. The existing economic system merely furnishes certain conditions and certain stimuli to development in certain directions, without which progress would be impossible. Wealth is the indispensable preliminary means to living well—the basis or opportunity for progress, the first essential condition. But it is neither the substance nor cause of progress. It may, in fact, under the influence of perverted attitudes, have quite the opposite effect.²

3. THE MATERIALIZATION OF CONTEMPORARY LIFE

Our present civilization has made of production and economic goods, not the fitting means of satisfying reasonable and legitimate needs, but ends in themselves. Instead of devoting itself to the cultivation of the higher phases of life after men have been made sufficiently comfortable and given sufficient leisure, our civilization has concentrated attention upon monetary rewards and the forms of consumption that give conspicuous evidence of economic success. Along with the power to secure material advantages has come the multiplication and accentuation of the desire for them, and in the process our tastes and interests have been materialized.

This "pecuniary" culture is not peculiarly American, but is a phenomenon accompanying the present form of industry. It is bound up with the machine production and the competitive capitalistic business enterprise growing out of the Industrial Revolution. There is a tendency for all countries that pass through this revolution to have material values predominating in their life, and to posit material standards of progress. This Industrial Revolution has brought our civilization some of its greatest achievements, but it has also brought with it forces and influences that have debased it and made it mean. Modern industry is carried on with a huge capital investment, has a big overhead, engages in mass production, produces for and sells in an impersonal market, and has profits as its sole motive. To make this effective it engages in ubiquitous advertising, the essence of whose appeal is that you cannot be intelligent or progressive unless you purchase every new product on the market and display it, and whose maxim seems to be "Set your hearts on the things of this world." It is the continual bombardment of

² Cf. C. A. Ellwood, *Psychology of Human Society*, pp. 433-441; J. Q. Dealey, *Sociology, its Development and Application*, pp. 162-163, 173-175; W. Weyl, *The New Democracy*, pp. 202-203, 223.

our consciousness with these suggestions that doubtless causes the extraordinary and growing materialism of contemporary life.

The production side of life shows this materialization in an undue emphasis of the profit motive mentioned above. All the processes of production and distribution and all the secondary commercial processes directly or indirectly involved with these are aimed at the sole end of producing quick profits and amassing economic wealth. "Even the enterprises which are most indubitably making useful goods do so only so far as the operation is expected to serve the primary business end of making profits."⁸ From the business standpoint the useful goods produced or the helpful services rendered are merely by-products or else carefully devised means of assisting the process of earning dividends. In response to this powerful impulse producers make things of any kind, of high quality or low quality, humanly beneficial or deleterious, useful or useless, and offer services of any kind as long as they are profitable and can be offered without seriously running afoul of the law. The public at large has generally permitted and even justified this. Natural resources have been so recklessly wasted by the profit-seeking industries of this country as to seriously imperil its future. In fact our very capacity to produce has been threatened by this waste of natural resources and the accompanying and equally reckless and ruthless waste of human beings. In demanding large and quick profits industry has glutted the markets with goods, while at the same time depressing buying price, raising selling price, and reducing wages, thereby defeating itself and producing recurrent periods of depression. Sabotage in the form of restraint of trade on the one hand, and restriction of output on the other, have also been resorted to in order to insure profits. Every situation, constructive or destructive, is turned into an occasion for financial gain and every possible available agency is manipulated to this end.

On the consumption side this materialization has led to an emphasis on conspicuous display and a neglect of cultural values. Thanks to the repeated appeals and suggestions of nation-wide advertisers, most of us are above all things bent upon outstripping our neighbors in the invidious display of luxurious consumption. This has made a kind of universal prodigality obligatory among all classes, and has resulted in making life a sort of gross and vulgar orgy in which things, display, and rivalrous consumption have come to be the outstanding characteristics—an opulent but coarse barbarism. Evidences of wealth are sup-

⁸ W. C. Mitchell, *Business Cycles*, p. 24.

posed to be a sign of cleverness; income is inferred from expenditures; and social approval depends upon the appanages of riches. Life comes to be a matter of showy houses on exclusive streets, over-stuffed or antique furniture, expensive motor-cars, wives dressed like Sheba, sumptuous entertainments—things, show, and spending. Spiritual values, true culture, appreciation of real beauty, service of the good, true, and abiding cede to the shabby and tawdry display of dollar values. Money becomes the supposed touchstone of human happiness and human endeavor, even of human respect.

Permitting material pursuits and interests to dominate visits upon all classes of society the devitalizing and enervating effects of mere wealth—comforts, conveniences, luxury, display. But among the truths which history clearly shows is that materialism, regardless of how it is fostered, inevitably brutalizes the people, makes them low-minded, and leads to deterioration, degeneracy, and sometimes to extinction. It is necessary to get back to fundamentals and face the fact that the purpose of economic activity is not wholly utilitarian and extrinsic, but should provide an environment and the other agents favorable to the growth of the finer qualities of man.⁴

4. WEALTH WITHOUT WELL-BEING

Peter Kropotkin has said, "For the first time in the history of civilization mankind has reached a point where the means of satisfying its needs are in excess of the needs themselves." We are accumulating social surpluses of various kinds.⁵ One of the most prominent features of the past century has been the enormous and continuous growth of wealth. The variety and quantity of the objects manufactured, the economic goods of life, have increased with bewildering rapidity as machines have grown from small and crude affairs to huge, complicated, efficient mechanisms. The old world of deficit and pain has given way to the new world of surplus. We Americans particularly are to-day one of the most advanced nations in the world along economic lines; we have great wealth—the greatest per capita wealth the world has ever

⁴ Cf. G. Ferrero, *Ancient Rome and Modern America*, Pt. III; R. L. Finney, *Causes and Cures for the Social Unrest*, Ch. XIV; R. J. R. G. Wreford, "Are We Civilized?", *Nineteenth Century*, Vol. 95, pp. 471-472; H. F. Ward, "Is the Profit Motive an Economic Necessity?", *Christian Century*, June 28, 1922, pp. 810-813; R. G. Tugwell, "The Distortion of Economic Incentive," *International Journal of Ethics*, Vol. 34, pp. 272-282; T. Veblen, *Theory of the Leisure Class*, Chs. II-VII; M. C. Otto, *Things and Ideals*, Ch. II; E. A. Ross, *Principles of Sociology*, Ch. XXXVIII.

⁵ See especially the excellent work of N. L. Sims, *Society and its Surplus*.

known—labor and time-saving machinery in factory and home, highly efficient labor, a high degree of specialization of labor and technical processes, rapid transportation and extensive distribution of goods, and highly successful commercial and industrial management. This surplus is a phenomenon of transcendent importance in the world. It is a new factor in man's career. It makes possible the abolition of poverty, slavery, despotism, ignorance, fatalism, and abjection of the masses. It provides a "stake" for all the people, a livable life for all the populations. The early poverty of society unavoidably brought with it the denial of wealth and rights for the people as a whole. It was a serious obstacle.

Men have always contended that the greater the productive power of society and the fuller the equipment of life on its physical side, the more time there will be for leisure and culture, the more social and spiritual capital there will be to invest, and the broader will be the opportunities for conceiving and perfecting means of social advance. Wealth and economic efficiency should mean a greater fulfilling of the desires of men—the chances of wealth, recreation, leisure, and culture. Superiority in economic surplus and economic efficiency ought to mean superiority generally. To-day we have at our disposal, actually or potentially, the economic necessities for the best social state conceivable. Any nation that in a single year can add upwards of ten billions to its capital surplus, is ready to face an age of progress as far as its economic background is concerned. We have the economic elements necessary for Utopia.

But a mere increase in the means of multiplying economic goods and the actual increase in the quantity of the goods themselves is not progress unless these goods are transformed into actual general well-being. An impartial examination of the situation shows a grievous lack along this line. Our growth of wealth has not brought a corresponding increase in the well-being of the whole people. The benefits have not been so great or so well distributed as might naturally have been expected. We have not made adequate use of the vast possibilities of human welfare which our wealth has given us. Thoreau, seeing this situation only in its early stages, said, "Our inventions are improved means to an unimproved end." Ruskin later noted that "We are manufacturing everything except men."⁶ With power to fully supply necessities, comforts, and even some luxuries for all, and to allow ample leisure for intellectual pleasures and esthetic enjoyments, we have so mismanaged as to give un-

⁶ Cf. A. R. Wallace, *The Wonderful Century*, pp. 343-344, 378-379.

precedented luxury to a few; we have intensified the struggle for a living, increased our waste, and produced a serious unrest.⁷

This disequilibrium between the social surplus and social well-being is responsible for a sober and searching social analysis among the rank and file particularly, and also among the more socially minded of the other classes, because the social conscience dictates that social wealth should be devoted to social uses. More and more articulate and insistent becomes the demand that the increasing social wealth should provide a full life for all members of society. Human life is achieving a new dignity. Mankind are insisting now that it is possible, that there must be the provision of facilities by which the highest physical, intellectual, moral, and social capacities of all citizens, born and to be born, may best be secured.

5. THE REDISTRIBUTION OF WEALTH

One of the most complicated problems of a socio-economic nature that the progressive faces is the question of the redistribution of wealth. That it has been most inequitably distributed for some time, and is even more so at present, is generally known; the statistics are easily accessible, and often glibly quoted.⁸ The present distribution makes impossible any great social progress. Progress requires a generally diffused economic adequacy, coöperation, and peace. If the wealth of the group is disproportionately and perhaps unfairly distributed it means for most of the members of society inadequate opportunities, thwarted potentialities, general social disharmony, strife, and the menace of all manner of disruptive forces.

The concentration of wealth gives to a few tremendous power, and inasmuch as this wealth is usually administered and made dividend-producing through corporations, it means a greatly divided responsibility for its use, or a complete lack of identity between ownership and use. This means frequently a perilous grasp on public affairs, political corruption, and usually a lack of consideration for the social aspects of the

⁷ Cf. Hartley Withers, *Poverty and Waste*, pp. 1, 2; G. Ferrero, *Ancient Rome and Modern America*, p. 138.

⁸ See C. B. Spahr, *An Essay on the Present Distribution of Wealth in the U. S.* (1896); J. G. Brooks, *The Social Unrest* (1903); R. Hunter, *Poverty* (1904); F. H. Streighthoff, *The Standard of Living Among the Industrial People of America* (1911), and *The Distribution of Incomes in the U. S.* (1912); W. I. King, *The Wealth and Income of the People of the U. S.* (1915); C. A. Gilchrist, "Our National Prosperity: Distribution of Property and Income," *Scientific Monthly*, Vol. 3, 1916, pp. 361-376; Mitchell, Macauley, King and Knauth, *Income in the U. S., Its Amount and Distribution*, Vol. I, National Bureau of Economic Research.

use of wealth. Rarely does a well-developed ethical sense accompany and parallel a great fortune.

Another important circumstance in this connection is that great wealth ownership usually leads to further concentration of wealth. The rich are so rich that they can hardly help growing richer. Their income is so great that through sheer inability to consume it all, even though they be dissipated, lazy, imbecile, or spendthrift, it becomes part of their capital surplus. Automatically the multimillionaire gains more in a month than the average man earns in a lifetime. Economic life to-day seems to be a game in which the loser and the winner do not get the gains in proportion to their ability or effort, but the winner gets all the gain.

Nor does it seem that many of the huge fortunes have been earned in the sense that they are the result of real intellect, and that a social contribution was made that was proportional to the return received. Yet the only reliable test of the lawfulness of economic possessions is reasonable proof of having paid a just price for them. In some cases the fortune is only a lucky fluke; such luck as being on a certain spot or being there accidentally at the strategic moment instead of some one else; or it may be the result of merely being the owner of capital and permitting it to be used when the results would have accrued with the capital in the possession of any one else, or of society at large, or of having the capacity for unscrupulously seizing an opportunity. As has been said, "The qualities that allow a man to make a million of money have been much overrated. They are far from being always virtuous qualities; they are often only a more subtle form of the animal alertness which enables one dog to snatch a bone before the other can reach it." ⁹ The most useful quality in the amassing of wealth is the determination to consider personal and private interests before those of any one else. The prizes usually go to the ruthless and crude, rather than the scrupulous and sensitive.

Another fact is that much of the harm flowing from wealth concentration comes after the accumulators are dead. It is the accumulation of great masses of capital during the generations that is so dangerous to a community. The danger is increased if the capital passes into the hands of incapable or idle descendants. The original accumulator may have had some kind of ability, but the case for his descendants gets progressively less plausible. There is no ability test. For them their wealth

⁹ G. R. Stirling Taylor, "On Millionaires and War Profiteers," *Nineteenth Century*, Vol. 91, pp. 198-208.

is pure luck. This often produces an idle-rich class with plenty of money and none of that self-control which is learned in the school of industry. The inevitable result is waste of capital and degeneracy in one form or another.

There are certain broader effects of the problem that need to be considered. The concentration of wealth is bad because it distorts production from the socially important ends, through the curtailment of the purchasing power of the masses. This changes the direction which production must take. Wealth is usually purchasing power, and it is this which determines production. Consequently the things that the masses will require to be produced will not be produced as freely as they should be, while an exaggerated amount of productive power will be devoted to luxury goods and other productive wastes.¹⁰

Furthermore, maldistribution of wealth produces class alignment. A few own the social capital and all the others are dependent upon them for jobs and livelihood. Society is aligned according to the Haves and Have-nots. This tends to the creation of separate group interests. It breeds class hatred and social unrest, for the people feel, and often rightly so, that the chief causes of extreme maldistribution of wealth are social injustices. The working classes particularly feel that their material rewards are not proportioned according to their real contribution to production, nor to their actual importance in society. Something is the matter with the rules of the game. Feeling so, they seek for means by which the situation may be altered so as to secure a larger portion of society's product for themselves. This often makes them the prey of cranks, demagogues, and unscrupulous adventurers.

Wealth threatens also the equality of opportunity and the spirit of individuality and self-reliance, for it means not inequality of natural endowment, but inequality due to property. In countries bred upon the general ideas of democracy, not even political equality and a wide distribution of basic economic necessities will suffice to produce general contentment, if a few at the top are possessed of the social advantages of vast wealth. Few are satisfied as long as they see others, often through no qualities of their own, more satisfactorily situated economically, socially, and politically. This is especially significant if it interrupts the free movement of individuals from class to class. Inferior individuals in the upper classes are kept up by the possession of wealth and the social power going with it. Superior individuals in the lower classes, with the

¹⁰ Cf. C. A. Gilchrist, "Our National Prosperity: Distribution of Property and Income," *Scientific Monthly*, Vol. 3, p. 374.

ability to rise and make valuable contributions to society, are kept in positions of inferiority and obscurity by economic handicaps over which they have no control.

With the widening of the gap between the respective economic groups there comes also a dulling of the sense of fellowship and responsibility. Each group becomes preoccupied with itself and develops an astounding ignorance of the thoughts, aspirations, and modes of life of the other. This puts an excessive strain upon the democratic relation. It is easy to see how this develops into distrust, suspicion, then antagonism, resentment, and finally mutual plotting for the downfall of the other.

For the classes in poverty it means also mean and insanitary housing, poor foods, inadequate medical care, misery, anxiety, privation, suffering. Among the classes in wealth it means usually decay of body and mind. The history of all times and all peoples—Persia, Assyria, Rome, France—shows that wealth divorced from virtue has brought the fall of nations in its train.

The crying progressive need of the hour is some sort of redistribution of wealth. The costs—economic, social, political, psychical—of concentration cannot continue. In general, the marked inequality of wealth is prejudicial to common good and hastens the process of social disintegration.

A more equitable distribution of wealth is necessary to insure that balance, and rational sobriety, and tolerable simplicity which is necessary to the group health. A certain adequate minimum of wealth gives the possessor a much greater freedom of movement, and a wider sphere of action. It provides not only the possession of property, but encourages the acquisition of property by personal efforts. This is a gain because it lures on to the expenditure of energy, to the formation of new capital, new inventions and discoveries. It also means a greater social stability, since the propertied man is seldom an enemy of law and order, due to the fact that he has something to lose. It increases the number of the middle class, who have always been the bulwark of any stable and progressive society. Above all, it provides the leisure and the opportunity for health and vigor which are necessary to that increase of knowledge, that invention and idealism upon which progress depends.

The material means of progress must be more evenly accessible to all, for we know that unless they are there can be no approach to that equality of opportunity which alone can satisfy the demands of an advancing civilization. Society must consider the well-being of the

majority, not the few. We are beginning to realize that once we permit an individual to come into existence, the duty devolves upon us of giving him a fair chance of living an adequate life. Just how this is to occur is, however, a vastly complicated problem. All we know definitely is that it is vastly more important that all men should have enough than that some men should be rich.

Any plan of absolute equality independent of needs, services, general deserts, or industry, would be fatuous and unworkable. Americans have never worshipped a rigid equality of wealth, nor would they or any other people be able to maintain one. Inequalities which were measurable and fair would be permitted. Nor could a distribution of wealth be based upon equality of work done, or value of product, or time involved, or equality of effort. Nor could it be done accurately or fairly according to *needs*, for no one is competent to accurately estimate needs, and if one could, it could only be administered paternalistically. Nor can it be fixed according to genuine *social* merit—*real* service to society—for there is often no possible way of estimating in money terms the relative value of different kinds of work.¹¹ There is no conceivable basis on which to determine an equalizing process apart from indefinitely extended experiment, and this must be carried on by economists, sociologists, social workers, statisticians, hygienists, home economists, ethicists, and a host of others. All we can certainly say is that wealth and income should be so distributed that there will be a certain minimum that is high enough to keep at the "comfort level" the lowest type of family that we can socially afford to have.¹²

6. THE INCREASE OF WEALTH

While some feasible means of bringing about a more equitable redistribution of wealth will do much to increase the possibilities of human well-being, there is not at the present time enough wealth in the world to provide the scale of living for all that the greatest well-being demands. If there is to be continuous and sustained progress there must not only be greater wealth, but also an increasing rate of accumulation of wealth. Whether or not the rate of accumulation is increasing or decreasing may actually indicate social progress or decline. It is necessary,

¹¹ See A. K. Rogers, "The Principles of Distributive Justice," *International Journal of Ethics*, Vol. 28, pp. 143-158.

¹² For a discussion of this term see Tugwell, Munro and Stryker, *American Economic Life*, pp. 66-96. See also in connection with the above discussion P. H. Douglas, *Wages and the Family*, and A. K. Rogers, "A Method of Distributive Justice," *International Journal of Ethics*, Vol. 28, pp. 406-424.

therefore, to increase still further the wealth of the world. The methods discussed below are suggestive.¹³

a. The Reduction of Waste. The reduction of waste in its various forms is one means of increasing the surplus necessary for progress. Increasing the technical efficiency of industry, standardizing its materials, coördinating its various parts, and improving its morale, would reduce waste in the processes of production. The report of the Hoover committee of engineers concerning industrial waste in six of our largest industries shows a deficit running from 25 per cent to 75 per cent of general production below the best performance in each given industry.¹⁴ Any process that is not as efficient as we know how to make it is wasteful. The Hoover committee roughly apportioned 50 per cent of the responsibility for this waste to the owners and managers of industry, 25 per cent to the wage workers, and 25 per cent to outside contacts.¹⁵

There are also inexcusable wastes of distribution. Excessive multiplication of jobbing operations,¹⁶ inadequate or poorly arranged terminal facilities and bad routing, competing and parallel railways and steamship lines carrying half loads, duplication of sales operations and of deliveries, and reckless extension of retail credit are sheer waste.

The salvaging of material normally thrown away is another great field for waste reduction. Our waste heaps are caches of nitrogen, hydrogen, carbon, iron, oxygen, ammonia. Eventually we will develop a technique for recovering value from our dump heaps, and all our other material-using processes. Stuart Chase,¹⁷ among others, also makes out a very good case for appalling waste in much of our advertising. Competitive advertising, advertising to sell shoddy materials, advertising to get people to buy "gold bricks" or "fiction at five dollars a share," advertising that forces people to buy unnecessaries, would generally be recognized by intelligent people as waste. The manufacture of useless and harmful things is also waste of energy and resources that should be devoted to necessities. Unemployment, with its idle manpower, is another waste that is enormous but reducible. The Hoover committee found that workers were idle around 33 per cent of the year in the industries they studied. The business cycle with its intermittent

¹³ The significance of the world-wide practice of birth-control must also be kept in mind in this connection.

¹⁴ See *Waste in Industry* by the Committee on Elimination of Waste in Industry of the Federated American Engineering Societies, especially Ch. II. See also S. Chase, *The Tragedy of Waste*, Chs. I, IX, X.

¹⁵ *Op. cit.*, p. 9.

¹⁶ Cf. C. L. King, *Lower Living Costs in Cities*, p. 18.

¹⁷ *Op. cit.*, Ch. VII. The reader is urged to read this book.

overproduction and under-consumption, its speculation, its fluctuations, its inflation, and its idle, deteriorating men and plants is the cause of much sheer waste.

Fatigue, wherever it is found, means waste. The economic and social importance of industrial fatigue has only recently received serious attention. It means physical devastation and decrease in productive power and efficiency.¹⁸ It means greater susceptibility to disease, accident, and shortened life.

There is also the avoidable waste through sickness and premature death.¹⁹ Fortunately much attention is being devoted to this problem with a high degree of success. There is the waste in much of our poor relief,²⁰ the wastefulness in governmental expenditures,²¹ and the waste of time.²²

The dissipation of human energy in any form is waste. This is true whether it takes the form of unemployment mentioned above, the activities of parasitic women (and there are many such to-day), excessive leisure, crime, sloth, vice, the pursuit of whims, needless conflict with fellows, or in misdirected or ignorant effort. And if human energy is wasted the community is to that extent impoverished.²³

Exceedingly important also is the reckless and unconsidered waste of natural resources—land and soil, minerals, forests, animal life above ground and in the waters. Here are fundamental goods that are not replaceable to any great extent. The time has come for us to apply our intelligence to taking stock of the resources that the earth still holds and to develop methods of utilization that will protect the future of ourselves and our descendants.²⁴

There are also certain consumption wastes that should be noted. War with its destruction of man-power, both in combat and through disease and starvation, its destruction of agricultural lands, railways, homes, buildings, power plants and shipping, its misapplication of productive energy to the manufacture of destructive things, its disorgan-

¹⁸ I. Fisher, *Report on National Vitality*, pp. 40-48; G. S. Watkins, *Introduction to the Study of Labor Problems*, pp. 203-206; H. J. Spooner, *Wealth from Waste*, pp. 47-57; *Waste in Industry*, pp. 364-368.

¹⁹ I. Fisher, *op. cit.*, pp. 117-120; E. L. Fisk, *Health Building and Life Extension*.

²⁰ J. L. Gillin, *Poverty and Dependence* (1st ed.), pp. 112-114.

²¹ *Ibid.*, pp. 109-110.

²² H. J. Spooner, *Wealth from Waste*, pp. 23-33.

²³ See R. T. Ely, and others, *The Foundations of National Prosperity*, Pt. IV.

²⁴ Cf. G. Pinchot, *The Fight for Conservation*; C. R. Van Hise, *The Conservation of Natural Resources in the United States*; Ely, and others, *The Foundations of National Prosperity*, Pts. I-III; S. Chase, *The Tragedy of Waste*, Ch. XII; R. Arnold, "Oil: the Menaced Resource," *New Republic*, Apr. 8, 1925.

ization of trade and finance, its maladjustment of life in general, seems to be sheer waste.²⁵

The support of vice of all kinds, especially prostitution, drunkenness, and gambling, and the care and treatment of defectives of various kinds create social expenses that could be much reduced. In fact, we are now in a position to eliminate some of them.

The domestic economy of most households is carried on in a very inefficient and wasteful way. Most of this waste could be saved if a little scientific instruction were given to all housekeepers. Food habits are not economical. The wrong things, and they often are the most expensive things, are purchased. The proper balance between proteins, fats, starches, cellulose, fruit acids, and mineral salts is not maintained. Nourishment and health units are often neglected. Food is improperly prepared. The garbage can is kept too busy. There is also much waste in buying in small quantities, in "telephone" shopping, in buying gim-cracks and gew-gaws from house-to-house salesmen, in purchasing on the installment plan. Too much is frequently spent for rent or entertainment.

Objectionable as waste is the production and distribution of things which are positively harmful to the individual or the group, and things which are indulged in for purposes of sheer conspicuous and lavish display and self-indulgence. The manufacture of such materials usually divert productive agencies—materials, labor and plant—to employments less beneficial to the individual consumer or to society. This usually means that necessities become less plentiful and more expensive. This in turn may result in under-nutrition, deprivation, loss of industrial and social efficiency and even dependency for some. Finally luxury corrupts the morals of men; it vitiates them; the expense it requires inflames cupidity and mercenary greediness; virtue becomes ridiculous; soul and mind are debased. Over against this is the moral necessity of having all supplied before any enjoy luxury.²⁶

As waste is reduced, wealth will be augmented. If the wealth thus accumulated is properly used it will make possible such a world as men only dream of in rare moments. The very fact that we realize all the various types of inefficiency and waste hinted at above indicates that we have sufficient intellectual capacity now to meet the situation. Co-

■ See E. L. Bogart, *The Direct and Indirect Costs of the Great World War*.

■ T. N. Carver, *Principles of Political Economy*, pp. 472-476, 490-493; Hazel Kyrk, *A Theory of Consumption*, pp. 238-243; Hartley Withers, *Poverty and Waste*, pp. 15-40; H. R. Seager, *Principles of Economics*, pp. 79-83; T. Veblen, *Theory of the Leisure Class*, pp. 1-187.

operation, coördination, and efficiency and intelligent control can eliminate much of it in the near future.

b. Thrift, Saving, and Investment. Saving is merely the other side of the reduction of waste, for a thing may be said to be saved when it is prevented from going to waste. The formation of an adequate economic foundation for progress rests squarely upon saving and thrift, for progress depends upon capital, and capital can only be got through accumulation by saving, i. e., the saving of individuals, corporations, and other groups, and even nations. Increased wealth is always the difference between income and outgo. This balance properly invested means an addition to the economic power of a people.

By thrift is not meant mere accumulation or hoarding through miserliness and stinting, but merely avoiding prodigality and extravagance, excess and waste, and investing in a socially productive way the proceeds of this avoidance. To save money merely for the sake of saving is a pastime open to question on many grounds. Thrift is mainly sensible spending and intelligent and economical use of resources. As this is done more and more the margin between income and consumption becomes greater or the social satisfactions from the expenditure are markedly increased. It makes possible also that surplus which must exist if there is to be intelligent and deliberate spending, regardless of whether the spenders are individuals or groups.

The effects of thrift of a progressive nature are obvious. For the group as a whole it means a greater surplus, and a higher standard of living. This acts as a check on excessive fecundity. More important though is the fact that the physical and economic adequacy of the people has been added to. A richer and fuller life has been made possible; the opportunity for free endeavor, improved well-being, leisure, culture, and the realization of hopes has been expanded. For the individual who practices it, thrift makes for foresight, independence of action and spirit, self-control, self-direction, self-discipline, self-respect. It encourages the use of inherent power and the exercising of intelligence rather than impulse; it puts the individual on a higher plane of life; it gives freedom from material worry and care; it makes possible the ambition to command social esteem, power, and influence. In brief, it means opportunity, greater expression, fuller life, the essence of progress.²⁷

²⁷ Cf. M. W. Brown, *The Development of Thrift*, pp. 1-31; H. J. Spooner, *Wealth from Waste*, pp. 3-18; M. Parmelee, *Poverty and Social Progress*, pp. 321-330.

7. LEISURE AND PROGRESS

There are many great gains to be derived from an increase of wealth from the progressive point of view, but the greatest is probably the added possibility it offers of leisure. Of course, leisure like all other potential good things, may be perverted to antisocial and retrogressive ends. Furthermore, it is quite questionable whether the rank and file would use their leisure wisely if it was considerably increased at this moment.²⁸ Properly used, however, it makes possible a new civilization. The demand for leisure is really the demand for the results of leisure, the advantages and opportunities that enable men—all classes of men—to develop as normal human beings. Leisure is the fundamental prerequisite for proper physical development, for upbuilding recreation, for intellectual culture, for spiritual growth, for the unfolding and formation of character. Only this makes possible high converse, fellowship with the eternal and the sublime. It is a necessity for social intercourse, for the realization of normal family life, for the proper fulfilment of citizenship opportunities and duties, for participation in the great struggle for brotherhood and justice. If men are to climb to the heights of the possibilities they must have leisure; the whole superstructure of civilization depends upon a certain degree of it. Leisure properly invested means life, expanding life, new horizons, larger men, progressive groups.

Without leisure men become dull, and dullness is inconsistent with that largeness of outlook, that full and free exercise of all the faculties without which there cannot be fullness of life. Leisure is synonymous with freedom—freedom for men to devote themselves to the creative work that they are prompted to pursue by their individual tastes and aptitudes.²⁹

But this leisure and the opportunities that go with it must be widely diffused. Progress will only be partial if we have a leisure class, a Brahmin caste of culture with special privilege in leisure. A whole society with leisure and intelligence and training enough to use them wisely is needed—a great brotherhood of leisure where all the people share equally in all the opportunities of culture and development. No other condition is entirely tolerable to-day.

²⁸ Cf. G. T. W. Patrick, *The Psychology of Social Reconstruction*, pp. 109, 161-163.

²⁹ Cf. I. W. Howerth, "The Labor Problem from the Social Viewpoint," *International Journal of Ethics*, Vol. 31, p. 180.

8. WORK AND PROGRESS

Work is the expenditure of human energy; it is the human side of sufficiency, the human investment in social well-being. As such it is basic for progress. Leisure, for example, to be productive, must come of work. Systematic exertion is necessary both for providing the means and the capacity for enjoying leisure. Wealth, the material basis of progress, is made available and is increased only through work. As individuals, work is a condition of our existence. It makes us free human beings; it liberates us from the thralldom of nature. As members of society it is one of the fundamental social functions we perform in the interests of the whole. To work is to take part in the vital processes of society—to make its necessary physical goods, provide its culture objects, and render its various essential services. Thus work is a social duty; it is a fulfilling of social purposes; and he who does not work is a parasite living on those who do. The social good demands that all able-bodied members of society be employed at tasks suited to their powers and tastes—doing what they can do best. As such, work is not an end in itself, it is a necessary social function; it is doing the things that the all-around well-being of the group demands be done. But in carrying on this necessary function work can be made a magnificent means of expression, a joy.

There has been a general attitude against work because work and toil have been confused. "Labor, being first performed by women and then by conquered opponents made slaves, was despised by the early mind, and how, further, the ability not to work, involving power to make others work for you, soon became an ingrained principle of pride; further, how the leisure class, an aborted part of the body politic, has preserved these errors of the early mind and added heavily to them by the increment of tradition and long association."⁸⁰ Then, too, the ancients, like many moderns, looked upon work as a curse because it was mostly irksome toil and forced labor; there was little expression of self or exaltation of spirit about it. What this amounts to is that much early work was servile, humiliating, uninteresting, non-stimulating, and non-creative, leaving nothing but the mechanical muscular expenditure. Work came to be looked upon as an evil and idleness was the goal of exertion. Thus the odium of labor is largely conventional and artificial, arising from caste and the habitual performance of work in the past

⁸⁰ Charlotte P. Gilman, *Human Work*, p. 179.

by persons of a lower class, and the fact that drab, forced, muscular labor was alone looked upon as work. Work in reality, though, is quite a different thing.

Industrial managers and orthodox economists have assumed that the "economic motive" was the only reason why man works, i. e., that he works as a matter of self-preservation—in order that he may eat and be clothed and sheltered and have some of the good things of life. This attitude rests upon their famous postulate of the "economic man." There is no question that this is a motive in work and not an unimportant one either. But it is by no means the only important motive, nor the most important one, as a great mass of work attests. There is, for example, the delight which every healthy child gets out of spontaneous work, the zest and enthusiasm of the man who is happy in his work long after he has provided for every present and future financial contingency, the pathetic sight of the retired men who are moving heaven and earth to get something to do, the enjoyment the factory hand gets out of freely chosen tasks carried on at home after work hours. Furthermore, when the facts of history and psychology are reviewed, it becomes apparent that the world's work has not been kept going by fear of want or starvation, nor can any industrial order be kept going long by this.

The healthy, normal man must expend energy; he has a hatred of ennui and lethargy; he wants to be active and busy. In addition there is in him a powerful propensity to create and construct, the expression of which gives him intense satisfaction.⁸¹ He wants to get something done, to exercise his powers productively, to apply his physical and mental energy to an enjoyable task, to take pains, to somehow give expression to his constructive urges. When this propensity is linked up with the production of services and objects of use and beauty, we have real work. It is this element of free choice, enjoyment, and creativeness which differentiates work from toil and labor.

Work is the normal exercise of function, in the form of a natural expression of the individual powers, in the performance of a social task. Happy is the man who has found his work. He has found one of the great realities of human experience; he has found something that gives scope to his emotions, that engages his intelligence, interests, and will; something that provides him with the joy of action, the externalization of impulses and desires, the pleasure of creative effort, the expression of individuality, the ultimate satisfactions of life. For perfect fulfilment a man's work must be his life and his life his work.

⁸¹ See T. Veblen, *The Instinct of Workmanship*.

All through history there have been men who have found their work. There are many such men to-day. For them work is pleasure, not pain; it does not draw on their energy store, but rather augments it; they are stronger instead of weaker for this right exercise of powers. They are doing what they are particularly fitted to do. And rarely do they do this work for great monetary rewards. It is a significant fact that the few who have any choice in the matter of the work they do in life seldom choose a profession or occupation because its rewards are fat; they choose it for the opportunities of self-investment it gives. In any social organization that approached the ideal, all necessary labor would produce these happy effects upon the laborer; and that social organization would be rewarded by unheard of returns per individual, because, as has been often pointed out by our wise men, the way to get the most out of any normal person is to give him a chance to make the very most of himself. The highest social efficiency is the result of the most complete self-realization. Progress demands the freest work opportunities for everybody.

In the main, though, to-day, where interest is manifested in work it is due to a fortunate, though rare and fortuitous combination of circumstances which enables the job to fit the man. For the rank and file the free expression of the creative urge in work is thwarted. As the result of the Industrial Revolution the great bulk of our work, especially that in industry, has been made mechanical, uninteresting, monotonous, irksome, a matter of drudgery. The subdivision of labor and the mechanization of industry—so characteristic of modern industrialism—have robbed the worker of the creative opportunity possessed by the old-time craftsman. The worker has become a "hand," a mere cog in the industrial system; he has been connected up with and geared to a machine. He does not guide a machine any more, he follows it. He is subservient to it physically, the use of his intelligence while at work is sharply circumscribed by it, and the need of judgment has been largely eliminated. We have gone farther and have tried to regulate and standardize the workers' motions in attending to the machine. The worker's share in production has been stripped of its psychic interest; there is no spontaneity in it, no preference, no play, no natural incentive. There has come to be a joylessness, a mindlessness, a soullessness about it that has dulled, and stupefied, and paralyzed him. His creative interest has become useless, even an obstacle; that part of him has been left functionless and unsupported. He is not appreciated, he has no personal stake in the job; there is no recognition of personality. He is being used

to serve the ends of others. He has been dehumanized ; he feels himself in a sort of treadmill. The only interests he has left are his time, his money, and his class.

The effects of this are various. Much of the friction between capital and labor, and the general unrest of the laboring classes is the more or less unconscious expression of irritability due to the thwarting of self, the wrong work life, the unnatural sustained effort. This state that makes for unrest is especially aggravated when the industrial condition is accompanied by a democratic philosophy that stresses manhood and opportunity and freedom. The worker becomes either suspicious and pugnacious, or suspicious and sullen. His bad human and primal ugliness is evoked.

The unreliability, inefficiency, laziness, slackness, clock-watching, and promiscuous job-quitting are almost entirely the results of lack of interest in the job. A monotonous, empty, unstimulated life conduces also to religious zealotism, sexual over-indulgence and perversion, gambling, superstition, recklessness, and senseless crime. Prevention of expression means usually distorted personality. From the social point of view though the worst effect is the cultural loss—the narrowed life and interests, the fagging of the mind, the thwarted versatility and variety of human expression, the lost contributions.

What can be done about it? Certainly merely an increase of wages, a decrease of hours, or a share in the profits will not solve the problem. Nor can any amount of welfare work, social clubs, athletic teams, or "company spirit" satisfy the need. It is equally true that the machine cannot be eliminated from contemporary society. The population of this country could not be supported in its present state of comfort without this system of highly specialized industry and the mechanical equipment which it uses. Without it we would have to revert to a deficit economy. As far as possible the drudgery and the unpleasant tasks must be done by automatic machinery. The work of a mechanical nature from which man cannot be withdrawn should be so organized that the worker has short hours, frequent breaks in the day, and a variety of tasks to perform, each one of which challenges him and sounds out his various skills and interests. For even machine labor can be made interesting, agreeable, and attractive instead of irksome and repugnant. Necessary though unsatisfying work may also be made less disagreeable if some social appreciation of it is shown, if it is made honorable, and if its social significance—the fundamental and indispensable ends it serves—is emphasized, and if an interest in the common well-being can be awakened.

The day's work must be ennobled; it must be invested with a social and spiritual quality. To do this our thinkers, educators, legislators, and engineers must attempt to build a new set of attitudes toward work, and bring about an adjustment of the machine process to men, and reorganize industry and commerce from beginning to end so that a social economy results which enables workers to be men. For work must be in strict conformity with individual and social well-being.⁸²

9. THE NECESSITY OF INDUSTRIAL DEMOCRACY

A deep and dangerous unrest plays through our industrial life today. The causes of this are various. The Report of the Industrial Conference called by President Wilson March 6, 1920, enumerates many of these causes. It says,

"Among others they include the rise in the cost of living, unrestrained speculation, spectacular instances of excessive profits, excessive accumulation and misuse of wealth, inequality in readjustments of wage schedules, release of ideas and emotions by the war, social revolutionary theories imported from Europe, the belief that free speech is restricted, the intermittency of employment, fear of unemployment, excessive hours of work in certain industries, lack of adequate housing, unnecessarily high infant mortality in industrial centers, loss of personal contact in large industrial units and the culmination of a growing belief on the part of both employers and employees that a readjustment is necessary to a wholesome continuity of their united effort."

But the report then comes to a cause much more significant in the opinion of serious students when it says,

"There is, however, a feature of the present industrial unrest which differentiates it from that commonly existing before the war. It cannot be denied that unrest today is characterized more than ever before by purposes and desires which go beyond the mere demand for higher wages and shorter hours. Aspirations inherent in this form of restlessness are to a greater extent psychological and intangible. They are not for that reason any less significant. They reveal a desire on the part of workers to exert a larger and more organic influence upon the processes of industrial life. This im-

⁸² Charlotte P. Gilman, *Human Work*, pp. 13, 179-257; G. T. W. Patrick, *The Psychology of Social Reconstruction*, pp. 127-147; R. M. Binder, *Major Social Problems*, pp. 100-117, 288-90; Hartley Withers, *Poverty and Waste*, pp. 34-38; J. Calder, *Modern Industrial Relations, Policy and Practice*, pp. 29-37; I. W. Howerth, *Work and Life*; I. W. Howerth, "The Labor Problem from the Social Viewpoint," *International Journal of Ethics*, Vol. 31, pp. 168-182; J. K. Hart, "Why Men Work," *Survey*, Vol. 49, pp. 555-559, 600-601; Adolph Bregman, "Monotony and Industrial Unrest," *Survey*, Vol. 49, pp. 552-554, 607.

pulse is not to be discouraged but made helpful and coöperative. With comprehending and sympathetic appreciation it can be converted into a force working for a better spirit and understanding between labor and capital and for more effective coöperation."

The relationship between labor and capital at this moment is most precarious. It is characterized by sullen revolt on the one hand, and desperate nervous resistance upon the other. Such a situation is intolerable; it means the loss of much working time; it means bad will and mutual distrust; it means creeping paralysis and the possible threatening of the whole of our industrial life, and consequently our national life. This situation is probably due to the fact that this relationship rests upon attitudes and principles and conditions that make difficult a happy relation. Industry is organized on the basis of laissez-faire individualism. This results in the exploitation of the economically weak by the economically strong; it destroys equality of opportunity and even legal right. It means that both parties attempt to achieve arbitrary power, and when one party does achieve it, it usually means abuse. Capital has built up a strong corporate power with a "hire and fire" power over labor. Labor has countered with equally effective organization and hold-up tactics.

Important also is the insistence of business men and the business corporations that they be left free to manage business in their own way. This rests upon the dogma that ownership of the tools of production gives capital the exclusive right to control the industry and all its processes. Labor is not recognized as making any investment; it is a commodity having a price; it can "take it or leave it," be "hired and fired."

Employers have realized, though, that labor is indispensable, and that it must be contented and happy. But in attempting to retain their property and managerial control of industry, and at the same time gain the loyalty and efficiency of labor, they have taken a paternalistic attitude rather than a frankly democratic one. They have adopted wage increase schemes by piece rates, bonus or premium payments, profit-sharing, various forms of welfare work, most of which have tended to emphasize the dependence of the employee for his greatest welfare upon continuing in his present employment. These efforts have done little to solve the problem; in the main they have aggravated it.

This is mainly due to the fact that the workers now enjoy a considerable degree of education, as well as political democracy. The idea of democracy fires them, and they have been educated to look upon con-

ditions as being made by man. They do not see why there should be democracy in politics and autocracy in industry. Their freedom to vote and determine political policies is largely neutralized, they feel, by their industrial dependence. Hence their discontent. They feel that they are not really free as long as they are constantly in danger of becoming dependent for mere subsistence upon somebody and something else than their own exertion and conduct—as long as they are financially dependent upon the will of others. They chafe under the necessity of being merely unreflective units in the productive system. They know that they are an indispensable factor in production, and are frequently piously informed of the fact, but their human status is that of servility and inferiority. They refuse to be considered merely as wealth-producing machines. Therefore it is vain to expect labor to respond enthusiastically to the requirements of an intensified production as long as industry is organized on a basis of master and man. Robert Bruere summarized the matter very well in *The Survey* several years ago when he said,

“The status of the wage-workers in industry today is substantially identical with the political status of women before they were enfranchised. The more the workers are freed, or win freedom from financial handicap, the more acutely do they feel the spiritual handicap of their inferior industrial status. No amount of swagger about one man being as good as another, no amount of hokum about the nobility of labor will satisfy the soul of men as a substitute for industrial enfranchisement, any more than the persiflage of anachronistic chivalry satisfied the soul of unenfranchised women. This is a major cause of what is commonly called industrial unrest whose incidents are as demoralizing and socially destructive as those of poverty itself.”

The workers feel that there can be no reserved areas in a democratic social order. They are bound to have not only equal political rights, but equal social and economic rights.

Another factor in present unrest, though not as vital as those just discussed, is the strong but not always conscious craving for some responsibility in the task. Since the Industrial Revolution the only responsibility the worker has is to appear at the factory for a given number of hours and meet certain minimum requirements established by the foreman. He has no responsibility for the worth or the extent of the production. To-day the only group in industry holding some responsibility comprises almost entirely executives, from heads of organizations down to sub-foremen and straw bosses. But the workers crave work which places some responsibility on their shoulders and gives them a

sense of their own usefulness and importance. They want a larger measure of control and responsibility than is at present the case. Ultimately they want a share in the management, or in the ultimate control, or both. The granting of a certain amount of responsibility to the working man is both satisfying to him and generally profitable. It tends to elicit his active interest and full coöperation, and it encourages pride of workmanship, initiative, and inventiveness. These are gains for which we now have to pay a very high price. No system of labor relations that is arbitrary on one side has ever been highly productive. People working under the will of another are characterized by servility, dodging, falsifying, and malingering.

What this all amounts to is that so long as the workers do not get a voice in management and have some responsibility in the job, they will be restless and dissatisfied, and perhaps take an irresponsible and even unscrupulous attitude toward their work. History has examples enough to emphasize that if industrial matters are not arranged properly there is always the possibility of a workers' uprising. Moreover, the working classes now have the political power in their hands, though they are not yet altogether aware of it, and political power eventually gives economic power. We must decide between alternatives. Progress unmistakably points to directed evolutionary processes as the way out.

The democratization of industrial enterprise is one of the most important single steps now before us. The workers must have the inner satisfactions, the spiritual values, that come from the sense that they are free and masters of their own destinies. They will not be satisfied until some sort of a partnership is achieved with the propertied class. Human beings may be temporarily bribed, browbeaten, or hoodwinked into some sort of acquiescence to the present autocratic organization of industry, but the sweep of the human spirit as expressed in the democratic movement is not to be thwarted forever. They do not want to control the industries in which they are engaged either financially or commercially, but there is a widespread desire among them for a fuller share of control over the industrial conditions. They want a voice in management, especially as the labor function is conceived; they want self-determination and representation. They do not want to run the works, but merely to have a voice in connection with their own jobs—the nature of these jobs, the rules and the terms and the conditions under which the work is done. Only as this is granted does the wage-earner feel his essential dignity as a human being, as a citizen, and as an important factor in industrial enterprise. And only as this occurs will

that mutual confidence and coöperation between employer and employee come that allays suspicion, distrust, unrest, and strife. Only then will the well-being and prosperity of each appear as the product of their not identical but reciprocal interests.³³

IO. THE HUMAN COSTS OF INDUSTRY

Industry is to-day directly or indirectly responsible for great human costs that must be reduced if the great mass of wage-earners composing approximately 40 per cent of the population are to enjoy the requisite opportunities for progress.

The long day to-day with its fatigue and the inability to recuperate over night results in high accident rates, increased susceptibility to disease, high mortality rates, vice, the use of stimulants and narcotics, and a general—in fact, a progressive—depletion of vitality and vigor. Nor does the long day permit cultural advance, citizenship interests and activities, a substantial home life, or vitally necessary recreation. The shorter day is economically necessary because of the higher standard of living that it seems to automatically produce among the workers, the increased productivity in the plant that seems to accompany it in most types of production, and the steadier employment that usually follows it.

The child labor still permitted is a “wasting of America’s seed corn.” Not only does it produce the “family” wage instead of the responsible family head wage, but it produces blind alley jobs, and mature casuals and partly-employables. No people can afford the biological costs of child labor—the strains imposed in the critical years of adolescence, the deformity and stunting and devitalization, or the increased sickness, accident, and death-rate among working children; nor can they afford the mental and educational costs—the curtailed schooling, the relative illiteracy, the inadequate vocational preparation, the undeveloped mental and spiritual resources; nor the moral costs—the pauperization of parents, the evil temptations of shop and mill, the appalling juvenile delinquency of the working youth; nor can they afford the loss of the play opportunity and the other lost forms of normal and spontaneous self-expression.

³³ Cf. W. Weyl, *The New Democracy*, Ch. XVII; Report of the Industrial Conference called by the President March 6, 1920, *Survey*, March 27, 1920; H. R. Seager, “Needs of Industry vs. Demands of Organized Labor,” *Survey*, Jan. 3, 1920; R. W. Bruere, “The Main Business of Industry,” *Survey Graphic*, Vol. 50, pp. 133-135, 171.

Women are still employed in occupations for which they are not properly constituted by anatomy or nervous organization—occupations that cause strains and dislocations, impairment of the reproductive function, nervous disorders, and illness, or that force them to work with dangerous materials. Mothers are still permitted or even forced to work immediately preceding or following confinement, and are taken away from necessary home duties, especially the care of children. Women are exploited, grossly underpaid, and subjected to moral hazards.

Inadequate wages make impossible desirable conditions of housing, proper and sufficient food and clothing, efficient or sufficient medical and dental care, necessary periods of rest and recreation, or the cultural and educational opportunities that are supposed to be the right of every citizen.

Unemployment with its general wastes of stoppage and disorganization, the increased overhead of producers, and the curtailed buying power of consumers; the disastrous effect on workers' earnings, their buying power, and their standard of living; the increased deterioration, physical, mental, and moral of the unemployed worker; the overhanging specter of joblessness; the menacing effects upon the family of the worker, and the potent unrest which it breeds need to be eliminated.

The incidence of most of these costs to-day falls upon society as a whole, whereas it is properly chargeable to the industries involved. Most of these costs are not only reducible, but removable. We have the knowledge, the agents, and the wealth to abolish every one of them.

II. THE NECESSITY OF SOCIALIZING BUSINESS

The term *business* is here used in the broad sense of including manufacture, transportation, commerce in its various phases, and the allied branches of finance. Business is becoming more and more indispensable in the life of any civilized people. It makes practically all our goods and then brings them to us; it renders us a host of vital services; it takes us wherever we go; it employs millions of us. It is a social necessity in this involved and complicated and specialized life of to-day; we cannot get along without it. It has life and death power over every one of us. Due to this tremendous influence it has over us, and its great importance to us, it should be particularly sensitive as far as its social responsibilities and services are concerned.

Its social consciousness, however, is still largely only brought into

play to head off aroused public disapproval and adverse public action, and service is still largely an advertising feature, or a rendering of certain by no means gratuitous functions. There are several serious obstacles to the socialization of business. Business is still predominantly under the sway of the laissez-faire philosophy. This has made business success competitive and has encouraged the use of practices, some of which are predatory and reprehensible, and none of which are designed especially to benefit the public, unless their first gain is to the business man. Being a materialistic doctrine it has bred that materialism already discussed.

Furthermore, business has long since come to realize its own vital importance in the social economy. This, combined with its tendency to capitalize its own material desires, has led it to consider itself as an end in itself. This in turn has caused it to manipulate legislation, courts, and the agents of opinion in such a fashion as to make it a law unto itself as well.

These tendencies have been vastly aided by the fact that business is mainly organized according to the corporate form. The corporation in our present social economy is as indispensable as business; no other form of business organization could cope with contemporary conditions. But its very strong points are causes of ill. Through its one-share-one-vote principle it has permitted enormous power to be concentrated in a few hands. Through the same principle it has made possible a vastly divided responsibility and a high degree of impersonality. The impersonal character of the corporation tends to destroy any feeling of responsibility on the part of shareholders and officers alike, for the acts of the corporation. This combination of great power with lack of responsibility is always and everywhere a dangerous moral situation, for while the responsibility for unsocial or anti-social acts can with ease be placed upon the corporation, the real perpetrators are anonymous. Due to this anonymity corporations do things that the individual stockholders or the individual members of the board of directors would not think of. The fact that the corporation's relation to its employees is impersonal is also the source of many difficulties. Its magnitude and great power give it autocratic control over the lives of thousands of workers with their families, over the degree of risk, the menace to health, the pace of labor, the length of the working day, factory discipline, pay, housing, and other features of their existence—a control that is in this day an anachronism.

When to these facts of multiplied power and divided responsibility is added the further fact that the corporation is the most successful

money-making machine in the history of civilization, and that every shareholder insists upon the corporation serving this function to its fullest ability, one sees why it is guilty of the practices it commits. Every last shareholder wants dividends; he is far enough removed from the actual process of extracting them so that he is not much concerned how they are produced; the officers must get results, and having vested in them enormous power and being largely able to sidestep any responsibility for the methods employed, they do the thing that is most profitable in a pecuniary way. Consequently the acts of the corporation are often open to criticism on social, ethical, and even legal grounds.

It is obvious from the above that business should be socialized, that is, made more sensitive and responsible to the public will, and conducive to social rather than individual or corporate well-being. Such vast power cannot be vested in a socially irresponsible agent. Left to themselves, the forces of industrial society are capable of immense social damage. If business continues in its old predatory fashion civilization itself is in jeopardy. Regulation helps some, as the advantages of the restrictions upon the ancient rule of *caveat emptor* attest. But regulation merely erects certain minima, or it establishes rules for a game which is unsocial as it is now played. Progress demands deeper and more constructive action. Business needs new motives and policies that will give it self-discipline through the highest social motives. It needs a socialized conscience, a sense of social responsibility, a recognition that it is a means, perhaps the most essential of all, in a great social purpose. It must be subordinated to general human interests and welfare, not human interests and welfare to the selfish purposes of economic groups. This is a task which challenges our best minds.

12. THE ECONOMIC FUTURE

The nature and efficiency of the economic institutions of a people, the success of their activities in meeting basic needs, the general material status of all classes, the degree of justice demonstrated in the human and group relationships involved, the opportunity offered to men by economic life to experience the growth, the flowering out, and the satisfaction of contributing in interesting ways to the destiny of mankind, the extent to which a people can satisfy their wants by a huge and complicated process dominated by a certain economic philosophy without making an end of the process and the philosophy, are means of judging the progressive state of a people along economic lines. By any

such test or tests we are still woefully deficient. We do have inexcusable waste of all kinds and are singularly careless of our resources; we observe no ethically recognized principles of justice in distributing the proceeds of our industry; we do deny men opportunities and thwart their self-development; we are materialized, commercialized, self-seeking, superficial, and greedy; we have been and are misusing our wealth, making it our god instead of our servant; our motives in the main are ignoble and selfish; we have bred unrest, discontent, and suspicion instead of tranquility and trust. Along many lines matters are about as bad as they can be permitted to be.

We need changes, stupendous changes along some lines. We should not be proud of how much we produce, but of how much we get out of our resources, not of our millionaires, but of our millions having economic adequacy and all the opportunities that go with it. Rigorous discipline and regulation imposed by federal or international bodies need to be exercised in some departments until more ethical conditions come into existence. Service rather than selfish gain must be made the inspiring element in economic activity. General human interests and values must be recognized, and social, and not merely material, well-being must be advanced. Coöperation and democracy must dominate the human contacts. There must be a general infusion of socialized motives, as well as the grasping of a long-time and international perspective. Economic activities must be conducted as means to great human and social ends. Not only progress, but the endurance of our civilization, demands these things. Otherwise economic activity is a monster that consumes those who practice it.

The new economic era will come if we plan it and strenuously work for it, and continue to do both without losing courage and hope. But no hypocritical gesture nor any free play of economic forces will suffice; only far-reaching, honest, conscious effort that is in conformity with known and perhaps experimented good along a great variety of lines will be effective. Much valuable experimentation has already been done and many corrective and constructive policies are already being used; most of them, though, are still undiscovered.

QUESTIONS AND PROBLEMS

1. Why does maximum well-being not necessarily depend on increasing bank deposits, large amounts of crops and other farm products, greatest exports, more automobiles, increased manufactures, and greatest increase in construction?

2. Do material inventions and machinery necessarily mean well-being?
3. What is the assumed social value of private property? Do you agree?
4. Is capitalism in and of itself wrong? What are the evils of capitalism? What are the benefits? Would it be possible to have the benefits of capitalism without capitalists? (C. A. Ellwood, *The Social Problem*, pp. 152-170.)
5. Can any great progress be achieved with the corporation as the prevailing form of business organization?
6. What is the effect of monopoly on progress?
7. Does society owe anyone a living?
8. What, in your opinion, are some of the main issues involved in the redistribution of property? Of income?
9. Is there any relation between inequality of opportunity and inequality of wealth?
10. Someone has said: "Concentrated wealth in the hands of a few has permitted art to flourish. Civilization with its achievements and refinements is the product of inequitable distribution of wealth." Is this correct?
11. Is charity desirable as a redistributor of wealth?
12. (a) Will the state in the last analysis, due to the unequal capacity and administrative power of individuals, be forced in the interest of the general welfare to assume the responsibility of providing the advantages of wealth for all? (b) How is it doing it now, i. e., equalizing incomes and using the proceeds for public purposes? (C. A. Ellwood, *The Social Problem*, pp. 175-183.)
13. Should there be greater rationality in the use of private income? How improve individual choices?
14. Is thrift always beneficial to the individual and the group?
15. Should a certain amount of thrift be compulsory, i. e., in the form of various sorts of social insurance—unemployment, sickness, old age, and health?
16. To what extent should the aspiration for higher standards of living be looked upon with favor from the progressive point of view?
17. What degree of luxury is justifiable among a people?
18. Would the masses spontaneously use a suddenly augmented leisure for progressive purposes? What is necessary to insure the wise use of leisure? (G. T. W. Patrick, *The Psychology of Social Reconstruction*, pp. 109, 161-163.)
19. Someone has said that capital and labor are as much a part of each other as carpenters and their hammers, mankind and its boots. Discuss.
20. To what extent is collective bargaining a solution of the difficulties between labor and capital? What do you think of compulsory bargaining?
21. What can be done to reduce the drudgery and monotony of machine industry without losing its great advantages?
22. What effect does the joy of the work have upon the efficiency of the worker?
23. Will the workers be forced into politics to improve their status?

24. What can you say of the coöperative movement as a solution of some of our economic difficulties? (G. S. Watkins, *Introduction to Study of Labor Problems*, pp. 537-564.)
25. Discuss some of the social effects of the business cycle. (W. F. Ogburn and Dorothy S. Thomas, "The Influence of the Business Cycle on Certain Social Conditions," *Journal of the American Statistical Association*, Vol. 18, pp. 324-340.)
26. Why must there be a sincere devotion to the problems of agriculture if there is to be progress?
27. What are the best preventives of economic radicalism?
28. Is government intervention necessary in economic affairs?
29. To what extent are the professions being commercialized? Why is this a dangerous situation? See E. A. Ross, *Principles of Sociology*, Ch. XXXIX; J. M. Williams, *Principles of Social Psychology*, Ch. XV; R. H. Tawney, *Acquisitive Society*, Ch. VII.
30. Is a renewed emphasis upon agriculture necessary?
31. What can be said of the international trend of economic activity?

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CHAPTER XX

THE DOMESTIC AND SEXUAL ASPECTS OF PROGRESS

I. THE SIGNIFICANCE OF THE FAMILY IN CONTINUOUS PROGRESS

THE family is the portal through which we enter human life. From the biological point of view, the quality and the combinations of quality of those who found and produce families is of crucial significance in that it determines the human potentiality of all future generations. For each generation of potential parents is the custodian and manipulator of the quality of all future population.¹ From our present point of view the family is even more important as the portal through which we enter human society. Being one of the two basic primary groups, the family, in spite of its lessening influence, still plays a strategic rôle as a control agent, this term being used in its broader sense. It is in the family that the earliest and most plastic years are spent, the years before the more formal educational institutions ever affect the child, and during which the simpler and more fundamental behavior patterns are formed, where the basic attitudes toward self and associates are fixed, where the first and foremost personality-forming and self-expressing stimuli are radiated, and where the early disciplines that determine self-control and amenability to social control are exercised. It is here that human nature gets its first shaping. As Professor Ellwood points out,² it is also chiefly in the family that children learn to love, to be of service, to sacrifice for others, and to respect one another's rights—in brief, the virtues and controls needed for successful living together. It is from the windows of the family that the child first views the world of things, ideas, events, and ideals. It is in the family that the child has its first contact with standards of living, political ideals, cultural standards, religious life, the realm of beauty and spirit, and where its main impetus in developing and fixing any of these comes from. It is the basic shaping, disciplining, and stimulating agent of each generation. It is the group in which the most powerful character-forming influences are exerted—those which probably leave the most

¹ On these points see Chapter XVI.

² *Sociology and Modern Social Problems*, pp. 84-85.

abiding impress on the individual. It is the chief depository as well as the first purveyor of civilization. The family situation in one generation is thus bound to have a definite and profound influence upon the life of the next and all succeeding generations. Any pathological conditions existing, or any that affect the family in any marked way are exceedingly significant from the point of view of progress.

2. THE FAMILY AS A MEANS OF EXPRESSION

It is through the family that adult human beings achieve some of the most beautiful and abiding forms of self-expression, and that children achieve their fullest and most satisfactory life. The sex impulses of the individual, if illicitly satisfied, are often a devastating passion that comes to dust and ashes. In the legitimate and sanctioned satisfaction of the married relationship it is a refined ecstasy of delight that becomes more beautiful and noble through the years. It is in the relationship of happy and free marriage that both male and female have that normal sex life that means wholesomeness of attitudes, efficient and exuberant life, complete and sacrificial comradeship, and perfect understanding. But with the sex element denied free expression, or, what is equally bad, given perverted expression, marriage results in the condemning of one of the richest elements in personal experience, a limiting of activities, a smothering of interests of value, a nourishing of others to an unnatural state of development, and finally a warping of character.

Family life means for the mature individual a full life, mutual inspiration, incentive, and challenge to the achievement of personality, and to the attainment of a place in the world. For two adult individuals the home also offers an outlet for the greater part of their emotions, though not all, of course.

It is through the family that the mature individual is permitted the joys of biological and spiritual satisfaction that come with parenthood, the achievement of a type of immortality that consists of transmitting your flesh and blood, your spirit and hopes, your talent and force on through the generations. No man, no woman, can reach full adult spiritual stature without mating and natural fruition. It is one of the highest forms of self-expression. To voluntarily avoid it is to be a stagnant pool, not a quickening stream. To be denied it is a calamitous thwarting of life and a cutting off of the soul. Not to have it is to make life hollow, to make it a futile effort to fill it with worth while things. It would seem that life is not worth while for the mere living of it; to

have its full savor and power, its most complete fulfilment, it must be passed on. Children are a source of joy and satisfaction unappreciated by the childless, or those who turn their children over to hirelings. It is in the sacrifice for children, in nurturing them, and training and disciplining and leading them that expression and growth really comes.

It is also in the family that childhood gets its best and fullest expression. One need only call attention to the deficiencies of life and spirit in the career of the institutional child to substantiate this statement. It is in the family that the child has the adventures, the experiences, the social opportunities, the variety of contacts that make for wholesome life—full life in miniature.

Finally, the family is still the primary expression of citizenship. Through it individuals establish a social unit and make its characteristics a reflection of their ideas, aims, and ideals. It is the social form that the objectivation of two coördinated selves of opposite sex usually takes.

3. THE EMANCIPATION OF WOMEN

The emancipation of women, a change that has been going on for a century, is a movement that has had most profound effects upon the whole feminine sex, upon the relations between the sexes, upon the contemporary family, and upon economic and political life. As such it is a crucial factor in contemporary progress.

The movement emerges from a complex of historical factors. In the Western world the "rib" story of Genesis and the Pauline doctrine of the subservience of women, adopted by the early and medieval church, and at least implied in the doctrines of most of the Protestant sects, served to give a religious sanction to the dominance of men that was borne by the women with Christian resignation, but also with a silent protest that would become outspoken when the opportunity offered. Medieval chivalry, while it placed the upper-class woman on a pedestal and caused her to be protected and treated graciously, was actually a means of keeping her in subjection to a man's world, and limited her life and activities. The stunted and cramped life that it created for woman resulted also in an unrest that would break out with the first weakening of social restraints. Significant also were various legal restrictions, such as the common-law rule of *sub potestate viri* which gave the husband virtual control of the woman in person and in property.

The later eighteenth century and the nineteenth century produced a train of events that not only offered opportunities of release from

these restraints, but actually created conditions that changed the whole economic and political and social status of women. Chief among these changes was the Industrial Revolution. Destroying home industry, it took away much of woman's economic importance in the home. With its easily operated machinery it created a demand for the cheaper labor of women in the factory. Gradually it took one after another of woman's domestic tasks, such as brewing, baking, canning, weaving, sewing, clothing making, and laundering, out of the home and carried them on in the factory. Woman followed to do the work. The distributive and commercial processes that soon grew out of the new industry created a great variety of occupations that could be well handled by women. Many women became economically independent. In the last half-century, due to insufficient male income, the increased cost of living, rising standards of living, unrest as the result of domestic monotony, desire to avoid parasitism, and various other causes, a growing army of married women have also been employed outside of the home, though their relative number has fallen off slightly since 1910.

Universal education developing during the last century along with coeducation, and the higher education for women, notably demonstrated by the admission of women to men's colleges and the establishment of institutions of higher learning for women, stimulated the female mind, led to new occupations, and set in effect an intellectual leaven that would soon protest against subjection, legal discrimination, or inequality of social rights. The democratic movement also soon spread beyond political confines, and was applied to most of the relationships of life, including those between the sexes. The weakening of religious orthodoxy, the reduction of the Adam and Eve story to a creation myth, the modification of the canon law, the increasing rationalism, and the increased confidence in science caused the religious restraints upon the freedom and equality of women to be swept away. The combined effect of these was to give woman opportunities of economic independence, make her man's intellectual equal, give her aspirations for political, legal, and social equality, and make most of them real, and cause the traditions, customs, and conventions concerned with the relations of the sexes, the place of woman in the home, and the social conduct of the sexes, to be smashed right and left. Woman has been becoming emancipated, and has in large measure achieved a parity with man.

From the progressive point of view this is as it should be. The movement for the emancipation of women has left all the outlets for expression that family and home have always provided. In addition

women now have a host of opportunities of all kinds that permit them almost every kind of expression they are capable of. They have the right to form their own judgments, to select their own occupations, and to be responsible for their own actions. Many of them have become as much individualized as men. Their whole intellectual atmosphere is more free. Their life is more full of hope; there is more freedom in it, and consequently more chance and even danger; it has become more diversified and complex; fresh interests have arisen; vaster horizons have dawned to encourage growth and spirit. Women to-day have almost the same possibilities of reaching their full stature as intellectual, moral, and creative beings that men have. At no time, in recent history at least, have their opportunities for a full life, and a full contribution to life been greater. They have a chance to play a rôle, new, indispensable, solving, in the constructive future.

Any process of emancipation, however, is certain to cause disturbance, temporary maladjustment, even temporary disintegration. It frequently results in the relaxation of wholesome restraints, in misapplication of efforts, in perversion of interests, and various absurdities. It frequently necessitates a complete readjustment of some of the basic institutions, and the development of whole sets of new attitudes, standards, and even laws. This is especially true of the emancipation of women. The remainder of this section and the one following are devoted to a discussion of certain conditions growing out of this movement.

The libertarian movement among women, as most libertarian movements, has tended among some women at least to be a rather dismal affair. This has come as the result of a mistaken idea of freedom. Like slaves they have conceived of liberty as the ability to imitate their former masters and dominators. The male professions and callings have seemed higher and better, because they hitherto belonged to the dominant sex. Many freed women have thus tried to become like men, or at least do the things that men have done. This has consisted of taking over men's jobs wherever possible, entering various professions, for some of which women are well fitted, and of some they make a sorry failure, taking up men's sports, men's bad habits, and polite vices, there even being here and there those who advocate the assumption of men's double standard. In this it would seem that women were pursuing the wrong tack. Feminine freedom is not achieved by trying to do everything that men have done, but in developing a unique free life of their own—a full expression of feminine nature—more of spontaneous action and less

of obligation and imitation. The world needs the enrichment that would thus come from the full blossoming of feminism. It is the diversity of life that makes it rich and joyous and satisfying. We are now missing that. Instead we are having a more masculine world than ever before.*

There are a great mass of activities and callings that women should enter, and that the world needs her in, and there is a great sector of human life outside the home for which women are by nature fitted to care, but these have not all been discovered. The sexes are different in many ways. The fundamental biological division of labor and all that it includes in the way of marked differences in physical make-up, metabolism, emotion, nervous organization, and temperament stand in the way of any assumption of similar spheres in life. The activities of both sexes must be based on their characteristic functions. The method of repression does not work, nor will the attempt to force self into some unnatural position work. The disappointment in the new position of freedom, the irritability and irksomeness, the breakdown of temperament, and the nervous disorganization of many an emancipated woman bespeaks a thwarting of natural expressions, a straining to fit into places for which she is not fitted, a misplaced body and temperament coming as the result of the aping of men or an incomplete adjustment to a more suitable sphere.

Man and woman are mutually complementary, interdependent, and interacting. Life at its fullest must have this reciprocity in reproduction, in companionship, and in doing the world's work. If it does not it is falling short of its possibilities.⁴

4. CHANGING MARRIAGE

Marriage and the family seem to be as much affected by the social changes now going on as any other social institutions. Unless they make the necessary readjustments they will be unable to play their proper part in progress.

Indisputably there must be marriage, and it must be public, purposeful, and legal. A social state is not conceivable in the near future when the establishment of a family can be left to instinct, or to enlightened principle, or to any arrangement of convenience. The crucial social position of the family demands that its quality and stability be safe-

* Cf. G. T. W. Patrick, *The Psychology of Social Reconstruction*, pp. 94-95.

⁴ Cf. Isabel Leavenworth, "Virtue and Women," *Nation*, Vol. 119, pp. 42-4; Edwin Muir, "Women—Free for What?" *Nation*, Vol. 119, pp. 140-142; S. E. Jelliffe, "Woman and the old Immorality," *Forum*, Vol. 127, pp. 189-199.

guarded in every way compatible with freedom. At the same time the institution of marriage must change if necessary to give its members fuller life, and to better serve its social function.

Important among the factors causing a shift in the nature of marriage is the changing status of woman. She now has economic and social equality with man. Marriage as a vocation has to compete with profitable, pleasant, and freedom-giving occupations along various lines. This has not only given woman more control over marriage; it has caused marriage to cease to be the only acceptable calling for women. To-day women are not forced to marry for support, nor can they be forced to marry to gratify the whims or plans of parents, nor do they feel it necessary to humbly accept what a particular marriage offers them. This means that marriage must be worth while for the woman. It must offer her what she needs and desires if she is to be "willing" to go into it. Consequently women are demanding more of marriage than they did, and the integral satisfactions that they demand in marriage are more consciously expressed than ever before. Of necessity, therefore, as marriage has other relations to compete with its standards mount. In other words, the equality type of marriage has arrived. It must now, for an increasing number of people, be of such a nature that free and independent men and women can get the fullest amount of expression out of it, and put the highest kind of service into it. More and more people are thinking of marriage as a means of rounding out and enriching the lives of the contracting parties, and as a consummation of human affection. This means several things.

It means first that now as never before marriage must be based on real love if it is to be satisfying, successful, and enduring. There are very few married persons whose mental and moral dispositions or habits are in perfect accord, or who have a perfect community of aims, tastes, and sentiments. For most people, with the first clash of will, or judgment, or desire, a strain is produced, and unless love is strongly rooted and of genuine quality the union is in danger. This means that a spiritual essence is now demanded of marriage. Legal bonds have lost much of their binding force, and public opinion seemingly has none at all. Love must be aided by physical compatibility, complete mutual sexual satisfaction, an adequate supply of common sense, and the will to accommodate. But without mutual love there can be no real and lasting union.

Since marriage is not a forced condition or the fulfilment of an obligation, it must also be a true friendship and comradeship, a true sharing of joys and interests, a mutual appreciation of each other's

aspirations and efforts. This is quite possible even though the man and woman are engaged in quite different pursuits. It simply means that neither partner can live in a world of his or her own, and not share it with the other. It means also that there cannot be too great a spacing between the intellectual and cultural levels of the parties to-day.

Modern marriage must also be conducted on democratic principles. A woman who has enjoyed a democratic world outside of matrimony will not submit to excessive authority or subjection within it, nor are religion or social opinion capable of forcing her to do so. This means that marriage is a partnership of free wills to-day, and that family policies are a matter of mutual decision.

Furthermore, since marriage is for most men a luxury, it must be entered upon as a highly desirable spiritual, social, and moral relationship. There was a time when marriage was a decided economic advantage for both man and woman, and it still is among some farming peoples, but for most urban and even most village men it is an economic risk. Instead of it being a profitable division of labor in domestic industry, it means for most men a doubling of housekeeping costs, but not by any means a doubling of income, as a general rule. Hence the man with home burdens is at a disadvantage with competitors who do not have them, and must have domestic joys and satisfactions that compensate for the economic worries. As people are more and more marrying with their eyes open, these economic considerations come into play, debits and credits are reckoned, and a decision is made.

These new demands that social changes have made upon marriage make it a much more difficult problem for men and women to-day, and the possibilities of a given marriage being a success are not as great as they were in a more simple and authoritative age. The selection of a mate is becoming more and more a matter of experiment. The problem of the adjustment of personalities to each other grows more complicated continually. The individual of to-day is more of an individualist than his ancestor ever was and has a wider range of interests. This means many more points of possible incompatibility. But the successful marriages are probably on a higher plane than marriage has ever been before. Certainly the marriage relationship has never before offered such a play of emotion and feeling and intellect, or such a diversity of interests, or such a richness of comradeship between men and women.

But the bulk of the population do not as yet understand the full significance of the new marriage or the demands which it makes upon them. They are confused and groping, but at the same time eager for

information and show a surprising readiness to make necessary departures from traditional or even conventional ideas. The present strains and breakdowns and failures are unfortunate interim effects that must be expected. All changes are accompanied by costs.

As a means of social well-being several things must also be insisted upon. Marriage must continue to be a monogamous union. Free love, whether in the form of "emancipated" promiscuity or temporary liaisons, introduces chaos in sexual as in all other relations, and prevents the formation of stable and responsible basic institutions or the establishment of necessary salutary social control. Furthermore, monogamy is the only form of marriage that offers the type of married life that the present demands, with its exclusiveness and its interchange of intellectual, affective, moral, and social qualities among the parties.⁵ Finally, the members of a monogamous union should be faithful to each other, and their union should be good enough to be life-long.

5. THE CHANGING FAMILY

The family has felt the changing social conditions and has been modified by them. Like marriage, though, the family is here to stay and to serve. As Professor Todd says, "There need be no fear that even extreme democracy can destroy the fabric of family life or threaten in any way its essential stability or its finer values. Undoubtedly the family will continue to be modified and colored by social pressure." But, he continues, "The roots of the family strike so deep into the underlying strata of social history and social organization that to uproot it would mean the uprooting and destruction of every other recognized social institution. . . The outlook is for a world that still expects and needs family life as the normal portion of the great majority of the people."⁶

Nevertheless the present generation must face certain problems in connection with the organization and function of the family if it is to live through its present crisis without loss. A new equilibrium must be established and a new pattern of family life formed, adapted to the new situation. The family must work out new habits, new points of view, new ideals, adapted to the new complicated and shifting conditions.

The family came into existence as a result of the need of caring for human offspring. Its primary function was and still is to rear children in comfort and security, to furnish them with sound, joyous health and

⁵ See Ludwig Lewisohn, "On Love in Marriage," *Nation*, Vol. 119, pp. 464-465.

⁶ A. J. Todd, "The Family as a Factor in Social Evolution," *National Conference of Social Work*, 1922, pp. 13-21.

with behavior codes. The family still loses its real identity without children.⁷ Of course, few people in the past have married for the deliberate purpose of having children, but children usually appeared, and the family fulfilled its biological and social function.

In recent years, though, along with the emancipation of women and the advance in the practice of contraception there has appeared an increasing number of childless families. This necessitates a new type of family relationship with the most important binding element, the children, missing. Here are two people properly married, living together more or less happily, having sexual relations, and serving as a type of social unit, but not playing the part of the family unit in the usual sense of that term. Dr. M. M. Knight has invented the term "companionate" for this sex relationship.⁸ The only bond is the sex relation and the companionship; no other necessary social function is served. The question is, To what extent can society afford to have companionates? What effect do such unions have on the status of marriage? What effect do they have on the quality of the population? What effect do they have in producing parasitic wives? Can families be based on the pleasure basis alone, and still be permanent, or does such a relationship make for unstable sex relations? What effect does it have upon the social attitudes and social functioning of the parties involved?

Another problem which the family faces is to properly make its adjustment to the complex conditions of urban life which is the situation of the majority of the families of the Western world.⁹ The cost of living in cities, the limited housing facilities, and the actual prohibition of children in many apartment houses, the congestion, the relative discrimination against families with children in income tax legislation, tend to make children a luxury, and discourage the establishment of a real family. If there are children there are tremendous difficulties in properly raising them, and they become more and more institutionalized. Dr. Knight in the above-mentioned article points out that children are such a decided handicap in modern life that unless we lighten the responsibilities of parents, especially decreasing their economic disadvantages as compared with the childless married couples, the family will appear less and less frequently in its true form, until even civilization itself may be menaced.

⁷ See E. R. Groves, *Social Problems and Education*, pp. 140-141.

⁸ "The Companionate and the Family," *Journal of Social Hygiene*, May, 1924, pp. 257-267. See also B. B. Lindsay and W. Evans, *The Companionate Marriage*.

⁹ E. R. Mowrer, "City Life and Domestic Discord," *Survey Graphic*, Dec., 1926, pp. 298-9, or his book, *Family Disorganization*.

To adjust what might be called the "emancipated" family is another problem crying for solution. Most families to-day, due to the great mobility of people, the diversity of callings, and various other factors, develop by themselves apart from the control of the wider kinship group of grandparents, uncles, aunts, or cousins.¹⁰ This means that the modern family is quite independent of kin, and must and does work out its own salvation. This requires a rather high type of family founders, with either intelligence and adaptability, or special training. Needless to say, so far, much is to be desired along these lines. This emancipated situation also takes away a certain anchorage in the form of fixed standards which the family once had and makes it more or less susceptible to various movements and likely to exhibit a variety of patterns.

Another problem is that of the working wife and the working mother, whether she is seeking a "career" or of necessity piecing out the family income.¹¹ The family, in the main, has grown up around the husband and father as the bread winner, while the wife has had as her chief duties the management of the household and the great bulk of the moral responsibility of rearing the children. As we have seen, many of the housekeeping duties have evaporated from the home, and many of the child-rearing duties have been delegated or deliberately assumed by extra-family institutions, such as the school and the supervised playground. Thus many wives and mothers have a great deal of unemployed time on their hands; others are free to work if necessary. Nearly one-fourth of all employed women in the United States are married, and of these 53 per cent are mothers, and only 27 per cent are from homes without a male wage-earner. This means that the mothers of approximately three-quarters of a million homes, or approximately one home out of ten, are at least partially employed outside the home. This raises a series of questions: What effect does the working of childless wives have upon the possibility of their becoming mothers? Is the work done suitable for mothers? Does the training of the children suffer? Can a working wife or mother create a home? What risks does this change bring to wholesome home life? Are there any other ways of handling the situation where mothers are forced by economic necessity to work? Is there something the matter with the

¹⁰ See E. W. Burgess, "The Family as a Unity of Interacting Personalities," *The Family*, March, 1926.

¹¹ Nine per cent or 1,920,281 married women were gainfully employed in the U. S. in 1920. 6,426,515 single, widowed, divorced, and those of unknown status were in gainful occupations.

home or the relation of the woman to it that causes some women to want to work? Is the mother socially justified in working? Why are the standards changing to permit mothers to work?

A further change that must be met is that concomitant with the emancipation of women and the new democratic husband and wife relationship. In the past the family has pretty much reflected male desires and wife and children have been under the father's control and authority. But now man's complete dominance in the family is passing. Even though the father may consciously approve the idea of the perfectly democratic family, generations of family habits based upon male dominance bedevil his actions and attitudes. Where the husband resists the new idea, or the wife is militant in her assumption of domestic equality, there is continuous friction and unhappiness.

The adequate preparation of both young men and women for family status to-day is another serious difficulty. The function of the family in present-day social organization has changed to such an extent that old rules and attitudes are inadequate to prepare young people for it. Young women before they have acquired even a minimum home-making training in the paternal home go to work in factories or offices or in professional pursuits at tasks which very rarely give them any preparation at all for their later domestic duties. About all we do now is to give a smattering of domestic science in the public schools. Young men do not have even that minimum preparation. And romance, and even love, does not thrive on a chaotic or helplessly inefficient or uneconomical housekeeping. Nor is there any adequate sex preparation for marriage. This ignorance produces strains that are almost insurmountable at times.

6. CHANGING PARENTHOOD

The same forces that have produced changing marriage and the changing family are also causing marked changes in the nature of parenthood and creating serious problems in connection with the parent and child relationship.

Child welfare is probably the central problem of civilization and also of the family. The child is the center of the family, and parenthood is the chief family obligation. In the last analysis the recent changes have been hardest on the children.

In the first place, as Professor Groves points out,¹² parenthood is

¹² E. R. Groves, "Social Influence Affecting Home Life," *American Journal of Sociology*, Vol. 31, pp. 231-232.

more and more a matter of choice. Except among the lower classes we now have in general the condition of voluntary parenthood. Marriage does not mean potential child-bearing and child-rearing any more. This, of course, means that in many cases there is a selective process at work which chooses only those emotionally and temperamentally, and perhaps even biologically, best fitted for parenthood, but there is also the possibility that many who have excellent qualities of a transmissible nature, subordinate or even suppress their biological function in response to economic or social opportunity. Voluntary parenthood is not yet on a spiritually, socially, or biologically sound foundation.

Furthermore, the recent changes have conspired to take the children more and more out of the hands of their parents. This, of course, rests partly upon the eagerness of parents, with a host of alternative interests, opportunities, or obligations, to escape responsibilities, for parents are giving much or little to their children according to their sense of social values. But it is also due to the ease with which parental responsibility can be shifted and the eagerness of ambitious institutions, especially the school, to take over various parental functions. Now the school, at best, does this parental work poorly. So far it has not provided the human and emotional touch necessary for the proper raising of children. It is impersonal and institutional and does not individualize to any great extent. The consequence of these conditions is that "children who become emotional orphans, stranded between an abridged parenthood and an impersonal school, will carry through life a socially dangerous void."¹⁸

In this connection the first prerequisite would seem to be in some way to develop in parents a keener sense of social values and social responsibility, and to get them to realize that they are missing some of life's greatest opportunities. To miss the chance to direct the unfolding of the life of a human being, to miss the companionship of alert, eager, young creatures, to miss the participation in their dreams and their ideals, to miss their confidences and admiration, is to miss many sweets of life, and deliberately to avoid the challenges and problems that come is cowardice.

Another difficulty is to get a parenthood competent to serve its function in this new age. As Miriam Van Waters puts it, "Parents have refused to be educated. Intrusted with the task of rearing, sheltering, nourishing and guiding the most complex organism that life has produced they insist on relying upon tradition, whims, prejudices, and

¹⁸ Groves, *op. cit.*, p. 233.

obsolete religious sanctions.”¹⁴ Parents have refused to inform themselves of the new findings of science concerning child nature and child rearing, and have either made a sorry mess of their relation to their children or have let them drift and have devoted themselves to other pursuits. In many cases they have not even studied the art of bringing up children with the devotion they give to bridge or golf. The result is that children feel no tie to their parents; they may even have a sense of repugnance. Both discipline and respect decline. Children in many cases have not been getting the support and information and companionship they have been entitled to, or that they have craved. Parenthood undeniably requires wisdom and special training to-day.

Another weakness in many of the parent and child relationships has been the lack of respect among parents for the personality of the child. Parents have been inclined to play the part of the stern governor who inflicts his ideas and will on the child. The day is past when we can be content with a philosophy of family life which makes it one of the first responsibilities of parenthood to secure in the children the greatest measure of conformity with adult standards. Children, even though controlled, must be free to work out their own life and express themselves. One of our chief problems as parents and as educators is to develop a technique that can discern value and foster individuality in the child—to bring to flower child growth and harmonize its claims and needs with the social life of which it is a part. Parenthood requires infinite tact. Above all is required a type of parent and child association that stimulates and draws out as it safeguards and molds.

More than ever before successful parenthood requires consecration, intelligence, and serious application. “It [parenthood] must furnish an emotional background, a sense of warmth, security, and a guiding line that can withstand the confused definitions of modern life. This can come about only when adults understand themselves and before building a home conceive the home as the primary social group in a world full of interests, struggle, and great and splendid hazards.”¹⁵

7. DIVORCE, A SYMPTOM OF MALADJUSTMENT

The frequency of divorce is one of the most threatening social questions of our time. It is a problem that has been becoming more acute and disturbing decade after decade. To-day the United States leads

¹⁴ “What’s Wrong with the Home?” *New Republic*, Feb. 4, 1925, p. 279.

¹⁵ Miriam Van Waters, *op. cit.*, p. 280.

the world in proportionate number of divorces. In 1924 we had 152 divorces per 100,000 of population as against 1050 marriages; in other words, we had one divorce for every 6.9 marriages. Not only is the ratio of divorces to marriages large in this country, but the rate of divorce is constantly increasing. In fact, at present the rate is increasing two and a half to three times as fast as the population.

This situation has caused many people to cry out against divorce as a national evil, and to clamor for the great cure-all, stricter legislation. This evidences a gross misapprehension of the situation. The fact that we must face is that the high divorce rate is not caused by our divorce legislation, but rather is a symptom of the chaos and waste and error involved in the transition that we are now making in domestic and sexual relations. *We must distinguish between symptom and disease.* Anyone who characterizes a divorce law as "a statute undermining the very sub-structure of society" implies that nothing but coercion holds man and woman together. It must be kept in mind that no divorce law ever rent a harmonious and happy household, nor has the denial of release to the mismated ever "restored the purity of our homes." Holding people together who should never have been brought into the relationship, or who have discovered that marriage would be a torment, does not really conduce to a high family morality or to social well-being. Stricter divorce laws will not solve the problem. You can stop a wound from running by the use of an astringent, but you cannot keep it from festering. Healing occurs when the cause has been properly treated. Our American experience has been that liberal divorce laws do not raise the divorce rate to any appreciable extent, and stricter laws do not greatly check it. In other words, legislation seems not to affect it one way or the other.

If divorce is not permitted, even more dangerous evils appear, such as illegal separations, promiscuous relationships, and illegitimacy. Data show, for example, that in those countries where, for religious or legal reasons, divorce is forbidden or very difficult, the illegitimacy rate is exorbitant. The fact that this rate is the lowest in the United States of any of the Western nations is a partial compensation for our high divorce rate.

Divorce is merely another problem arising out of that complex of shifting factors that have caused changing marriage, the changing family, and the changing parent and child relationship. The domestic and sex relations cannot conform to ancient sacred formulas. They are in a process of flux. Instead of hurling anathemas, one must examine

the meaning of the processes producing them. Among the innumerable processes producing divorce must be mentioned the emancipated woman—the economic, social, political, and moral equal of man—a woman who feels that she need not suffer domestic subjugation, indignity, or incompatibility, and who, being economically independent, can make effective her protest by cutting loose and supporting herself. This she increasingly does.

The fact that for more than fifty years about two-thirds of the divorces in the United States have been granted to women indicates to an extent at least that their protest is most pointed and effective. The spirit of democracy among women, as among men, has produced an individualism, a lack of respect for old traditions, a fearlessness of social change, and a sense of freedom that will brook no subjection. There is also on the part of most women an insistence upon higher sex standards for men. The social inferiority of women made the double standard possible. When women are the equals of men they refuse to tolerate conduct under the guise of marriage duty which is repulsive to their moral sensibilities, or which intimidates their health or the welfare of their children. The women of the nation are beginning to realize also the dangers that are in store for them in case by chance they marry a man afflicted with one of the social diseases, for it is the women, in the last analysis, who bear the greatest burden in the way of serious effects. All of these factors, though not actually mentioned in the divorce plea, are important causes of divorce. Other causes follow: There is the inability of young women to make or run a home after years of industrial, commercial, or professional employment. There is also what might be called the lack of mental preparation. Perhaps if mothers concerned themselves a little less about their daughter's trousseau, and a little more about the daughter's ideals, attitudes, training, and general fitness for marriage, there would be fewer of them running back to their mothers after a short period of married life. There are also hasty, thoughtless marriages—the result of "leaping before looking"—made more possible in this freer age. In such cases the respective parties know almost nothing about each other's social standards and ideals, ethical convictions, religious beliefs, standards of culture, amusements, family customs, personal habits, sex attitudes, life aims, tastes, sentiments, mental dispositions, or physical and emotional nature. all of which vary with individuals, and are only revealed after a considerable period of close acquaintanceship. Too often hasty marriages are a matter merely of fleeting physical pas-

sion, or of a desire for adventure, that soon spends itself. The revelations after such marriages are often unfortunate. There is no deep spiritual love and understanding, no sincere and well-developed mutual admiration and interest to maintain the bond. Childless marriages, with the absence of the parental bond, also show a much greater likelihood of resulting in divorce. The fact that for the middle and upper classes marriage comes later in life, after habits, attitudes, and interests are rather rigid, makes successful adjustment more difficult. The precocious stimulation of sex consciousness, increasing financial worries in the modern family, the lack of understanding in sex matters, the weakening of the religious sanction of marriage, the transition in ethical concepts, the absence of public opprobrium, the cheapening of marriage and the magnifying of divorce in our plays, movies, novels, comic strips, and the press are further causes.¹⁶

The divorce problem is really a marriage problem. The requirements and risks of marriage are so great to-day, and most people are so poorly prepared for them, that mistakes must be expected. When people marry more intelligently, and circumspectly, and deliberately, when they are economically, morally, emotionally, and physically prepared for marriage, when they realize in advance what they must expect of marriage, what its duties and obligations and trials are, when they realize what their relationship to each other is to be, when they face in advance the possibility of uncongeniality, incompatibility, and repulsion, and their ability to make the sacrifices involved in living intimately with each other for life, there will be less divorce. What is needed is a new attitude between the sexes for our new age, a new sense of mutual, life-long devotion, a new basis for domestic partnership, a new conception of the social importance of marriage, and a new socialized sense of obligation to make it successful and permanent, as well as a clear sense of the spiritual nature of the marriage relationship. We need a higher ideal of marriage and more careful selection in marriage. It requires positive agencies—social, political, economic, religious, and educational—for promoting right marriages and making people want to stay married. As such it is a problem which requires the serious and conscientious thought and discussion of all thinking people, linked up with judicious action rather than the impassioned, bombastic,

¹⁶ For more extensive treatments of causes of divorce see J. P. Lichtenberger, *Divorce, a Study in Social Causation*, Vol. 35, No. 3, of Columbia Studies in History, Economics and Public Law (1909); C. A. Ellwood, *Sociology and Modern Social Problems*, pp. 148-166; Blackmar and Gillin, *Outlines of Sociology*, pp. 151-155.

and mainly uninformed utterances to which we are accustomed. Above all, the domestic institutions in general need to settle down.

While divorce is, in the main, a condition, probably temporary, growing out of the chaos and transition through which our domestic and sexual relations are now going, and while the readjustment must come largely through thought and painstaking and sincere experimental efforts and through education, there are some things that can be done immediately to modify the tendency toward divorce.

Some repression of the excessive publicity now given to divorce would doubtless reduce it somewhat. Publicity, contrary to newspaper editors and other apologists for the present daily press, does not serve as a deterrent, but actually dulls the mind to the seriousness of the case and makes imitation easy. To draw a picture of marriage, in press, movie, novel, comic strip, or on the stage, which is crass and vulgar, full of infidelity, failure, and putrescent "smart stuff," is to cheapen and deprave the most fundamental and beautiful human relationship and put it on the basis of sex or convenience merely. Furthermore, accounts of divorce should be stripped of their artificial prominence, the piquancy of their scandal, and the spurious sentiment of romance, and the situation portrayed only in its unadorned legality and associations of social disgrace. We must remember that it is the impressions and suggestions that people get that determine their ideas about things. The present impressions cheapen marriage, encourage infidelity, and increase divorce. Instead we should do everything possible to sanitize marriage and picture divorce as a matter of individual and social failure.

There are a great many people—parents, clergymen, teachers, editors and writers, public men—who could and should do more as part of their calling to preach higher marriage and family ideals, to disseminate information concerning the social and personal responsibilities involved in the marriage relation, and to create sentiment in favor of careful consideration of the physical and mental fitness of people for the high task of being the progenitors of the next generation. Working together, we must do what we can to make it customary for men and women to ask themselves seriously whether they are sure that they are fitted in every way to be happy with their prospective partner, whether the kind of life they intend living permits of successful mutual adaptation, or at least whether they are prepared to make the sacrifices involved in living intimately together for life.

Our clergymen especially could do much if they would. No clergy-

man as a man of God, and a protector of the purity and permanence of the homes of the nation, should marry any couple until he has informed himself adequately as to whether they are fit to marry—whether they are old enough, and sufficiently well-acquainted, whether they have faced the responsibilities and trials of a home, and whether they are diseased or incompetent. Above all, the high obligation of joining people in the “holy bonds of matrimony” should not be made a matter of competition and put on the quantitative basis in order to acquire the questionable notoriety of being a “marrying parson.” It is not the state of the couple at this moment that blesses him who joined them, but their relationship twenty years hence.

We also need more courts of domestic relations as an immediate expediency. Many divorces are due to the fact that there is no disinterested party which has authority to review those differences which have caused discord, and act as a mediator. Jealousy, hurt pride, a chance and fleeting infatuation with one of the other sex, accidental humiliation, family tiffs, interference of relatives and friends in quarrels, cause a temporary anger which magnifies the real situation. Frequently there is no real incompatibility. This is borne out by the fact that a surprisingly large number of divorced couples remarry. At such times all that is needed is wise counsel and kindly help, and a complete absence of inflammatory conditions.

8. THE PROGRESSIVE ATTITUDE TOWARDS SEX ¹⁷

a. The Importance of Sex. The fullest and best expression of self and the greatest social well-being insistently demands that much sincere thought be devoted to the fundamental questions of sex and sex relations. Of the various factors which enter into the development of human and social life few have been so much neglected and so seriously mismanaged as the question of sex, and this in spite of the fact that this powerful impulse has so much to do with the health, the sanity, and the welfare of the race. The whole of humanity is concerned in and vitally affected by the sexual aspect of life. We are now coming to see with increasing clearness that in this neglect and mismanagement more than in any other facts are to be found the essential causes of the prevailing sex problems of our social life—prostitution, sex perversion, illegitimacy, and other forms of sex delinquency, venereal disease, broken homes, and unhappy marriages.

¹⁷ See J. Q. Dealey, *Sociology, its Development and Application*, pp. 428-440.

Sex is a subject that demands ventilation. The older sex attitude kept people in ignorance of the facts of life which it is the right and duty of every individual to know. We need to break down the walls of ignorance and prudery which have hedged in the sex problem from the knowledge of parents and youth alike. We need to lift the entire subject of sex physiology and experience from the morbid and furtive region of curbed curiosity, sly allusion, and secretive experiment to the frank and unashamed recognition of its necessary and dignified character; and to do this it should be discussed with openness and candor. Traditional attitudes toward sex should not be continued unless they survive the honest appraisal of newer facts and judgments based upon those facts. All interested groups—parents, teachers, clergymen, ethicists, editors, doctors, social workers, and sociologists—must devote themselves to clarifying the problems here involved.

b. Sex and Expression. Sex is not merely a device for propagating the race. It is also a great creative force in human life which has marvellous capacity for upbuilding and enrichment. In its capacity for transformation it is the source of power underlying the creativeness of man. In the form of love, it must be frankly admitted, sex gives life its chief meaning. Though not willing to admit it, people have realized that it was this spiritual outgrowth of the contact of the sexes that made labor endurable, achievement easier, creativeness an urge. It has been the thing which has inspired all great achievers, mystical as well as earthy. It involves every human joy, all the thoughts and aspirations of mankind; it is the source of poetry, beauty, and life.

c. Sex Stimulation. Yet if overdone sex can be a source of vast evil—a perverting and blighting influence. It would seem just now that the stage, the movie, the novel, the magazine, and the daily press have conspired to produce this over-stimulation of sex, among both young and old, by magnifying it—especially on its physical side—out of all proportion to its real part in everyday life. These and other commercial agents have intensified consciousness of sex in our people, especially the young ones, and produced a sex interest and sexualization of life unparalleled in recent human experience. Instead of presenting sex in its true light, they have tended to give the impression that life is a sexual joy-ride, or at least a continual sex-prepossession, and this has produced an excessive morbidity and preoccupation by things sexual—almost a worship of sex.

d. Sex Morality. Sex as an impulse is notoriously unsteady. It needs to be canalized and supported by rather rigid rules. While it is

unquestionably true that the sex problem is at present complicated by its morbid commercial stimulation, it may also be that our sex morality is at fault. Much of it has held over from another age, and is quite unsuited to present-day conditions. The sex ethics of a patriarchal age, an age of female subjection, are not likely to apply in an age of equal rights, militant feminism, and female economic self-support. The rules and conventions of a formal and prudish, man-dominated age must be put to the test of value; they must be challenged in the interest of a more scientific and assured form of sexual behavior. By this we do not mean the advocacy of a wholly new creed of conduct, but only the elimination of the outgrown and the prudish and hypocritical elements.¹⁸ In our efforts at rectification we must guard against both prudes and over-sexed, capricious, or perverted apostles of sex freedom.

We need an honest search in the light of modern knowledge, modern thought, modern conditions, and modern relationships for new bases of self-control and social control that will at the same time hamper the individual the least in his free life and yet preserve our ideal of family life and social decency. The new tests must consider personality, full health and vigor, dignity, chastity, and the assets of the substantial family and wholesome childhood. Sex must be viewed as a normal part of healthy life, and as a tremendous inspirational factor, but at the same time, being probably the most powerful of instincts, it must be kept within leash, protected against perversion, and kept clean in the interests of its true biological and spiritual function in the family. The new ethics must permit only those sex relations as are proved advantageous both to individual well-being and the race, and these rules must conform to certain notions of good, decency, and honor that already have a tenure, however feeble, upon the public consciousness. There must be in them no trace of vulgarity, promiscuity, or hypocrisy. There must be in them a spirit which rules sex and uses sex instead of being driven by it, or giving in to it.

e. Sex Education. Any attempts at creating a higher and better sex morality are fruitless unless they are based on sound knowledge. Perhaps one of the reasons why there is so much mismanagement of sex to-day is due to the fact that it has been kept under cover so long; people have been so ignorant regarding it, or they have received it in such perverted form, and their life has been consequently complicated so much. Therefore the drive for sex education has the soundest

¹⁸ P. R. Lee, "Changes in Social Thought and Standards which Affect the Family," *National Conference of Social Work*, 1923, p. 293.

arguments behind it. It suggests the possibility of a saner and more wholesome outlook upon existence for the new generation. There are still those who object to sex education, but such must remember that it is not a question of whether or not there shall be sex education, but rather under what conditions it is to be offered. As Exner points out,¹⁰ "Sex education from earliest childhood is inevitable. The child lives in a sex environment and receives sex impressions from every hand. If the impressions which the child gets are not interpreted for him in terms of wholesomeness and high values, he will piece together an interpretation of his own, in most cases vulgarized and sensualized through the sources from which and the atmosphere in which his sex impressions have been received." Children do get sex knowledge sooner or later, and for most of them it comes sooner than we think. The question is, under what conditions do we want them to get it; shall it be the whispered and lewd appeasing of curiosity or the straightforward presentation of the most reliable information by the best person available? Is there any doubt as to the answer? There may be disagreements as to the form sex education is to take, but there can be no disagreement as to its desirability.

This education should include clear instruction as to sex practices with physiological and psychological reasons for the prescribed practice, instruction as to the anatomy and physiology of the reproductive organs, the significance of right diet, exercise, sleep, bathing, and clothing. There must also be a very distinct and effective introduction to the principles of mental hygiene. The children, or at latest the adolescents, should have clear instruction as to the relation between sex functions and the feelings, moods, phantasms, aberrations, and mind wanderings. They should have a knowledge of insanities and mental aberrations originating in repressions, or distortions, or misuses of the sex life. They should also have clear and frank information concerning the nature, transmission, and effects of venereal diseases.

But it should not consist merely of giving biological and physiological facts about sex, and warnings against misuse. It must reach deeper. As Exner emphasizes, it is a vital phase of character education as well. "We must touch the deep springs of life and these lie in the emotions and affections. Our task is to interpret the facts of life so as to motivate and inspire to wholesome attitudes, high ideals, right choices, sound habits, and social outlook." Here is a challenge of huge propor-

¹⁰ M. J. Exner, "The Sex Factor in Character Training," *National Conference of Social Work*, 1924, pp. 252-257.

tions that must be met. We cannot afford to suffer the effects of misinformation any longer.

9. VOLUNTARY PARENTHOOD

Birth-control, already discussed in another connection,²⁰ plays a very large part in our sex relations, and is a significant factor in parenthood and the quality and well-being of our families. At the very outset it must be admitted that the same prevention of conception limits the offspring of married and unmarried couples, as well as making immorality easier through taking away the fear of possible pregnancy. This, of course, is unfortunate. But even here, it must also be admitted that it reduces illegitimacy. And also when over against this is placed the pure gains of its legitimate use in the form of voluntary and selective parenthood, these other unfortunate uses are more than compensated for.

Voluntary parenthood is, after all, the highest form of parenthood. The employment of birth-control methods, in the first place, makes parenthood possible when the parents are ready for it. Mating is, after all, an experiment. Birth-control makes it possible for a man and a woman to discover whether or not they are well-mated before they assume the trials and joys of parenthood. An early pregnancy, with its concentrated interests and obligations, often prevents this experience, with the consequence that there often is a broken home later involving at least one child.

In the second place, birth-control permits a quality of childhood. It gives the child the birthright of being wanted and provided for. Wise parents, guiding nature, control the conception of the desired children so as to space them in the way best adjusted to their health and material well-being and the training and opportunity they have to give. Instead of making children the products of passion and lust, it gives them a status in life as highly desired and well-provided for entities, having recognized values in themselves. The child is entitled to careful nurture, an adequate cultural heritage, affection, and a happy and unified home. He cannot come to the full expression of his capacities with less than this.

In the third place, birth-control makes possible a certain quality of parenthood. By making parenthood voluntary it enables those couples who do not crave parenthood—who do not have the emotional and

²⁰ See Chapter XVII, sec. 9.

spiritual qualities that make for good parenthood—to avoid issue, while those who love children, and who have the yearning to guard and teach them—in brief, those who have the qualities necessary for normal and successful parenthood—have them to the extent that they can care for them. This means that parents more and more are able to carry out in a fine manner the spiritual side of reproduction. It means also a selected parentage and better progeny. It might mean in time the breeding out of those who do not wish to procreate their kind. At any rate, unwanted children and unwanting parents are reduced in number, and the problems they cause are diminished also.

Birth-control makes procreation more and more an act of will, mind, conscience, and education, as well as an act of body, as Eliot points out. This, as he also emphasizes, will in time mean that parents who are known to have the knowledge and means of birth-control may be justly held accountable for the care of their children, and public opinion will demand of them high quality. Voluntary parenthood, in the last analysis, means the procreation of human beings as the culmination of individual ideals and an adequate sense of social responsibility. A progressive state can hardly afford to have in it creatures who are not reproduced on these grounds.²¹

QUESTIONS AND PROBLEMS

1. Give an estimate as to the part of the family in the social progress of the past. (A. J. Todd, *Theories of Social Progress*, pp. 332-335.)
2. What are some of the effects of the Industrial Revolution on the home of to-day? (Blackmar and Gillin, pp. 126-128; E. A. Ross, *Changing America*, pp. 56-58; W. H. Hamilton, *Current Economic Problems*, pp. 62-66.)
3. What was the eighteenth century ideal of woman? Illustrate from literature.
4. In what respects should education for men and women be the same? In what respects might it be socially expedient for it to be different?
5. Shall married women earn outside the home?
6. What is the significance of the "parasitic wife" in the modern family problem? (E. R. Groves, *Social Problems and Education*, pp. 154-156.)
7. Shall the self-supporting woman without dependents, or the married woman who works by choice receive the same wage for the same work done by a man with family responsibilities?
8. What are some of the ways in which women are abusing the "new freedom?" (Anna G. Spencer, *The Family and its Members*, pp. 87-88.

²¹ The reader is especially commended to see T. D. Eliot, "The Creation of Souls," *International Journal of Ethics*, Vol. 29, pp. 202-209.

9. What is the effect of marriage upon the mortality rate of men and women? (G. I. Bliss, "The Influence of Marriage on the Death-rate of Men and Women," *Publications of the American Statistical Association*, 1914-15, Vol. 14, pp. 54-61.)
10. "Modern marriage offers the opportunity of many more points at which the interests of man and woman can be dovetailed and to that extent it offers the possibility of a richer, more permanent comradeship between them." Discuss.
11. What can you say of the effect of the present cynicism concerning marriage on the home?
12. "Town-planning experts say that the greed of real estate men in making home lots so small that children cannot be reared in comfort, or given adequate room to play in, is responsible for the weakened influence of the home." Discuss.
13. Outline the fundamental prerequisites of a healthful home. (Ira S. Wile, "The Healthful Home," *National Conference of Social Work*, 1922, pp. 210-214.)
14. "In every age the younger generation has been looked upon by its elders with grave misgivings." Why?
15. Summarize Lichtenberger's analysis of the causes of divorce. (*Divorce, a Study in Social Causation*, Columbia Studies in History, Economics and Public Law, Vol. 35, No. 3, pp. 151-200.)
16. As a partial solution of the divorce problem it has been advocated that we have fairly lax divorce laws but strict marriage laws. Discuss. (See especially, G. E. Howard, "Bad Marriage and Quick Divorce," *Journal of Applied Sociology*, Dec., 1921, Vol. 6, pp. 1-10.)
17. What would you think of the justice of punishing as a criminal offense the culpable transmission of venereal disease? Of its effectiveness in reducing venereal disease?
18. What is your attitude toward the legislation that prevents the dissemination in a legal and scientific way of birth-control information, and that prevents the establishment of birth-control clinics and motherhood clinics?
19. Should marriage be indissoluble?

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CHAPTER XXI

THE RACIAL ASPECTS OF PROGRESS

I. RACIAL CONTACTS AND RACIAL UNREST

WHILE there has always been relative mobility and contact among the races of men, the events of the last few centuries, especially the last three quarters of a century, have accelerated these processes in a manner unprecedented in history. Improved means of communication have brought peoples and their cultures into close contact with diverse peoples and cultures elsewhere; the improved means of transportation have made possible vast migrations of expanding peoples, and have brought these peoples into contact, and even poured them through each other. The industrial and commercial revolutions have produced growing and irresistible world-wide movements that are everywhere throwing peoples, or even fragments of peoples, with relatively fixed cultures into contact with one another, and even have necessitated a sort of coöperation. The racial world, as the political, economic, cultural, and religious world, is shrinking together. It is finding itself neighbor to itself in strange, almost magic, degree. These race contacts have produced problems that insistently demand settlement.

The changes in the social life of men that have been occurring while these race contacts were being produced have brought marked shifts in race relations and race attitudes. These changes have been such that the so-called "inferior" or "darker" races cannot be submerged or exploited hereafter, any more than Western women can be submerged. As the result of these various contacts, these races have acquired a knowledge of Western science in its various phases, and some of them have developed a high degree of proficiency in its use; they have been affected by Western education and educational methods, and some of them have instituted these among themselves on a considerable scale; they have absorbed the fundamentals of both social and political democracy; above all, they have awakened to their own place and significance in world affairs and have acquired a clear and accurate realization of their powers. They have travelled far and learned much.

These are facts that we must face. Things have occurred that cannot be undone. Races everywhere are being pressed against other races. The contacts are both direct and indirect, both personal and economic and political. It is impossible in this day for races to remain segregated or to escape contact with each other. It is going to be more and more impossible to dominate or exploit races; the new forces cannot be held in check, they have gone too far.

Probably the most serious outgrowth of these new contacts has been the development of world-wide racial antagonisms, taking, in the main, the form of an alignment of the colored races against the white race, though in Europe and America there are also inter-white antagonisms. In general it is a racial revolt involving a clash of color—the “rising tide of color,” as it has been called. The colored races are restless and are clamoring for self-determination in a world dominated by the white race. The American negro is seeking opportunity and a fuller recognition of his claims. Japan is insistent on maintaining her place as a first rank power. China, though torn by internal dissension, is becoming nationally conscious, and increasingly resents foreign domination or interference. India contains a seething mass of dissatisfied people demanding self-government. The Philippines are claiming independence. There is unrest in the Dutch East Indies and a ferment is at work in Africa, especially in Egypt and South Africa. Everywhere the position at present held by the white race is being challenged by the colored people—black, brown, and yellow. They insist that a situation which enables the white race to dominate 47,000,000 of the earth’s 53,000,000 square miles of habitable land and the greater portion of the colored races who compose about two-thirds of the world’s populations, is wrong. They are awake and refuse to submit to subjection; they resent discrimination; they want self-determination. The continuance of an insulting policy towards them may possibly join them some day in a vast league against Europe and America. This would destroy civilization—as Macaulay once put it, it “will sweep away all the rich heritage of so many ages of wisdom and glory. The danger is terrible. The time is short.”

But, on the other hand, as never before the races of mankind are to-day one great human family. They unavoidably come into contact; they are dependent on each other in a thousand ways; they have to live together. At the same time there exist these furious antagonisms that develop soreness and threaten upheaval, making race and its companion problem of war the two greatest problems confronting man-

kind as a whole. Force in the form of repression or suppression will not solve these. There can be no success by old methods. "The old order changeth, giving place to the new." A new standing-ground must be found that will assure an adjustment that is compatible with world peace and mutual world good; that is consistent with the fundamental principles of justice, equality of opportunity, self-determination, self-respect, and free self-expression. Progress imperatively demands this.

That there are innumerable obstacles is equally obvious. The race problem, as Professor Julius Drachsler pointed out, "is shot through with passion and bias, the spiritual remnants of the epoch of isolation; it suffers from a dangerous lack of tested facts; it is invested with dogmatic opinions; it is the victim of jugglery and confusion of terms."¹ It is the despair of the social sciences. What is insistently needed is calm reason, real knowledge, and clear-cut ideas.

What follows in this chapter is in no sense an attempt to offer a solution of the race problems; it is merely a brief examination of those problems, mainly from the theoretical point of view, as they affect the question of social progress.

2. THE NATURE OF RACE

We are still on the search for a tenable conception of race. Even the wisest minds are still only on the threshold of knowledge as to what is meant by it. The very specialists who undertake the difficult task of splitting humanity into ethnical groups are rarely united on the nature and the essential characteristics of the groupings. Almost every major question affecting our views on race is still a matter of high and vehement debate, as, for example, the questions as to how races originated, the character of racial differences, or the meaning of race distinctions in human history. These facts partly account for the difficulties in connection with the solution of the problems of the relation of race to race, and the ultimate destiny of the present races of mankind. Even the use of the word "race" implies a confusion of criteria. We speak, for example, of the "human" race, apparently distinguishing humans from animals; we speak of a "Caucasian" race, as apart from other ethnic stocks of mankind. It has also been pointed out that "To speak of the 'white' race is to assume that race is a matter

¹ "Racial Diversities and Social Progress," *National Conference of Social Work*, 1922, pp. 97-105.

of skin pigmentation; to refer to the 'Jewish' race is to differentiate race on a basis of religion; a 'Latin' race implies a linguistic criterion; and finally any reference to an 'Irish' race must mean a race characterized either by geographic position or, failing that, by temperament." ² And yet a working conception is necessary. In what follows we will try to draw up a consensus of opinion regarding the origin and constitution of races.

In general it can be said that human races are human varieties or subspecies based on differences caused by the changing influences of the milieu.³ A race is a group of individuals having a general similarity in bodily constitution and disposition, though there is the widest variation in these respects among the individuals of a given race. "The wide range of individual variations within every race does not, however, destroy the significance of the racial concept nor warrant the conclusion that the differences between races are negligible." ⁴ Such differences of body and mind of the races as exist are the result of specialization by selection under the peculiar conditions of life in different geographic areas. This has caused the hereditary elements to vary considerably in degree and perhaps in quality (from some given point of view), and has given to each original race its distinctive physical qualities, characteristics, its common mental powers, and its peculiar temperaments or dispositions. Thus, having developed in different geographical areas, they each present certain peculiar racial traits adapting each to the environment in which it was developed.⁵ A workable definition would then be that a race is a differentiated type or variety of people having in common certain physical and psychical characteristics, and a certain history, that cause them to be more or less distinctive.

To note racial characteristics and peculiarities one must observe large numbers of a race, rather than scattered individuals. It is only in this way that the confusion which results from wide and universal variability can be overcome. The race characteristics are really the average or typical or even modal characteristics of a race.⁶ A well-defined race shows variations around a central type. When taken to-

² E. A. Hooton, "Methods of Racial Analysis," *Science*, Vol. 63, pp. 75-81.

³ F. H. Hankins, *The Racial Basis of Civilization*, pp. 271, 291, 297; J. Finot, *Race Prejudice*, p. 317; J. Arthur Thompson, *What is Man?* pp. 166-168; J. M. Mecklin, *Democracy and Race Friction*, pp. 23-30; Spiller, *Papers on Inter-Racial Problems, Communicated to the First Universal Races Congress*, London, 1911, pp. 73, 78; C. A. Ellwood, *Sociology and Modern Social Problems*, pp. 246-248; E. G. Conklin, *Direction of Human Evolution*, pp. 31-33.

⁴ Hankins, *op. cit.*, p. 257.

⁵ Cf. Mecklin, *op. cit.*, pp. 23-24.

⁶ Cf. Hankins, *op. cit.*, p. 260.

gether these various traits of a race will mark off their possessors from other members of the human species. These traits will differ widely from race to race, and make it possible to distinguish among the races with respect to such qualities as climatic adjustment, resistance to diseases, such physical characteristics as prognathism, cephalic index, pigmentation, hair structure, stature, such psychic variations as instincts, impulses, emotions, and modes of response to stimuli as cause a race to be characterized as sanguine, phlegmatic, austere, sensuous, even differences of mental power and ability to achieve certain types of culture under certain conditions. Yet the diversities which exist among races are variable and pass into each other by insensible gradations. There is also much overlapping among races. Actually, as Hankins points out,⁷ when we define a race in terms of a series of traits we necessarily define a more or less idealized type. As irreducible categories, races only exist as fictions in our minds. At best we can only use the word in a general sense.

The races which now exist will range from a high degree of purity, that has been preserved through geographic isolation in islands, mountains, valleys, or desert oases, to extreme hybridity. Practically all races though, even in pre-history, have intermingled. Neither recent nor paleoanthropological evidence points to a perfectly pure race. Some one has said that it is as hard to find a pure race among men as it is easy to find a pure type of any other zoological species. Into every group has come some of the blood of other groups, until practically all groups are made up of rather complex mixtures. As J. Arthur Thomson puts it, "the genealogical tree divides at the top into numerous branches, and . . . these have interlaced."⁸ Thus while we have for general purposes the primary races, usually designated as white, yellow and black, we actually have innumerable sub-races and cross-breeds. Our human groupings are, in the main, ethnical agglomerations created by community of language, or that of economic, social, political, or religious interests.

These general facts unmistakably point, however, to another fact, conceded by all anthropologists and biologists, namely, that the races of man are all of but one species (*Homo sapiens*), and that they have arisen from a common pre-human stock.⁹ This common biological origin and unity is further attested by the fact that all so-called races

⁷ Hankins, *op. cit.*, p. 269.

⁸ *Op. cit.*, p. 168.

⁹ Cf. Conklin, *op. cit.*, p. 34.

are fertile to each other, and that blood transfusion—a basic test of biological difference—can occur between races. Furthermore, the different races of men are all affected alike by antitoxins. Thus beneath and above all the races is the one human race.

3. RACE PREJUDICE

Perhaps the most serious and the most overwhelmingly disturbing element in the race problem is the matter of race prejudice and its accompanying hatreds and assumptions of superiority.¹⁰ Race prejudice raises almost insurmountable barriers to racial peace, amity, and coöperation, and serves as a subtle poison that produces progressively harmful effects. It blinds the people of one race to the virtues of another and leads to an exaggeration of each other's faults. It creates misunderstandings and antipathies. It debars exact and equal justice. It limits opportunity. It lumps all individuals of a race, good and bad, intelligent and ignorant, efficient and inefficient, in one limited and frequently erroneous category. It produces ostracism and persecution. It becomes so deeply established that men cannot escape from its thrall, and even those who despise taboo have to respect it in self-defense.

Race prejudice is an attitude or set of attitudes that arise wherever diverse races, or even similar but competing races, are in contact. It verges on the psychosis in nature. While there appears to have been race prejudice all through history, evidence seems to show that it is not innate, it is not rooted in primitive, instinctive impulse, nor is it something which exists between all the individuals of different or prejudiced peoples. It is not present among children whose responses are spontaneous. All over the world children of a given race will joyously play with children of the despised race, showing no more manifestation of antagonism than marks the children of any one race. Furthermore, white children will be as fond of their brown ayah, yellow amah, or black mammy as of a white nurse; this will be true also after they have grown up. Race antipathies also melt before the personal relations of the sexes. Between all races there has been free intermarriage, or spontaneous or desired intercourse without marriage. Many peoples, the Latins, for example, admit of marriage between themselves and races of extreme color diversity. The very mingling of races and the great numbers of half-breeds everywhere are convincing evidence of

¹⁰ H. G. Wells has said: "It justifies and holds together more baseness, cruelty and abomination than any other sort of error in the world."

the sexual compatibility of diverse races. There have also always been close friendships between members of the same sex among forbidden races, even where custom frowned upon it. Race prejudice is also easily dissipated or converted into its opposite by association, or a slight modification of stimulus.

Race prejudice is a non-inherited element that seems invariably to grow out of the contacts of masses of different races—a social psychological pressure continuously acting upon all the members of the races concerned. It is a form of behavior that is developed wherever this particular social pattern of race antipathy prevails. The more pronounced the social pattern, the stronger emotionally it becomes. It is for this reason that as soon as children become susceptible to education and the pressure of social environment they acquire it; it is everywhere one of the most pervasive elements in child training. It is also for this reason that an adult moving to a district where a certain race prejudice exists, which he has not heretofore felt, will frequently acquire it. As Mecklin points out, race prejudice is unknown between members of widely divergent races who have been reared apart from their racial groups.¹¹ It is focalized group opinion that works its potent hypnosis by suggestion so continuously and imperiously that it becomes an automatic reaction which evokes almost the same intensity of feeling as a so-called instinctive reaction.

It originates in any one of a considerable number of causes and usually is a blending of several of these.¹² It doubtless goes back to that solidarity of feeling and action that was essential to the preservation of the primitive tribal group. Present in it is also the superficial and fluctuating antipathy aroused by striking and unfamiliar physical differences. A more important reason why these physical differences play any part, however, is that they are accompanied by diverse standards, traditions, mores, cultures, or social status which for one reason or another are disliked, and make assimilation difficult. Physical characteristics then become symbols of race and group antipathies of a lasting and serious nature. For example, the American white social mind associates with the black skin certain standards of living, moral ideals, or group habits which do not harmonize with those of the white group, while the Nordic group mind attaches stigma to any characteristic which it does not have, or thinks it does not have.

¹¹ *Democracy and Race Friction*, p. 3.

¹² For an excellent discussion see J. M. Mecklin, *Democracy and Race Friction*, pp. 123-156. The author here acknowledges his indebtedness to this treatment.

Still more important factors in the formation of race prejudices are the new economic competition, or the desire for political power, the spread of the culture, or the religious dominance of heretofore weaker or submerged peoples. As such, it is a defense-reaction against the competition of elements that threaten life, safety, culture, or dominance. A significant companion cause is the pressure by and the fear of inundation by a rapidly increasing race with a low standard of living and a highly different culture. The competing peoples are feared and consequently placed outside the circle of sympathy and feelings to which even the lowliest members of the same race are admitted.

Where the persistence of group values is threatened by amalgamation, group antipathies also interfere; for no group will permit the dissipation of its cultural identity or the cheapening of those things that make its future worth living for. A society wants a continuous racial type because that seems to assure a continuous and progressive civilization, since it is its bearer. A given group do have a culture—it may not be the best, but it is their own—the product of generations and centuries of growth and achievement, the final deposit of their best expressions and greatest realizations under the vicissitudes of life. Are they unjust in not wanting it diluted or even destroyed?

In brief, race prejudice is a more or less spontaneous and unreasoned reaction of the racial group against the racial competitor who threatens to contaminate the purity of its stock, or disturb its security or dominance, or jeopardize the integrity of its social heritage.

It is an exceptional race that can surmount race prejudices and prosper. The Jews alone of modern races have been able to mingle with other races and hold themselves to any considerable extent above ostracism, subjection, and persecution. This they have done by creating for themselves a type of social heritage, of industrial methods, literary, religious, and social traditions that developed personalities vigorous enough to insure survival amidst adverse social conditions.

4. SUPERIORITY AND INFERIORITY OF RACES

Another complicating race problem that usually either grows out of race prejudice or accompanies it is the assumption of superiority by some races, usually the dominant ones, and the imputation of inferiority by them to other races, usually, those subjugated or exploited, or those of different skin color. As a matter of fact each race always has and does now make the claim of superiority in its own behalf.

conception of human inequality, generalized into the sense of race or class superiority, appears to be universal. The ancient world was under this curse, as, for example, the distinction between Greeks and barbarians, and the modern world perpetuates it. At this moment it doubtless takes the form it does due to the fact that the dominated races are everywhere beginning to assert themselves, and the dominating groups are searching for moral support. This they find in the philosophy of survival of the fittest. Finding themselves in a dominating position they conclude that they are inherently superior,¹³ and deeming themselves greater than other races—especially those of other color—they have elevated into superior qualities all the traits which are peculiar to themselves. This, of course, is merely a convenient myth, for nothing proves that these vaunted traits are traits of real superiority. Such peoples are merely accepting and rationalizing their own preferences and prejudices. The conditions that produce dominance are fortuitous and changing; natural endowment is a rather secondary factor. At any given moment the power to dominate is a matter of chance location, chance timeliness of arrival or appearance, chance possession of organization, or accumulated wealth. Even the possession of a given culture, the agents of a particular civilization or standard of living, a certain prestige, or a social momentum acquired in history, are usually more or less matters of chance. Certainly it is very difficult to attribute them to any inherent racial characteristics, since these are the result of adjustment to milieu, and races have mixed until there are almost no even moderately pure strains. Furthermore, what appear to be physical and mental inferiorities of a given race in a given environment will often, as the result of even spontaneous selection, disappear. The proficiency of a given people at a given time in a given place may be due not to race but to relative conditions, not to blood but to surroundings. It is probably largely due to a combination of temporary adjustment to milieu and fortuitous circumstances. As Finot says, "The greater the field of observation becomes, the more we perceive that organic demarcations and differences are only passing traits, born with time and susceptible of disappearing under its influence."¹⁴

When we in our loose way speak of a race as inferior we mean that they cannot do the things we can do with our cultural background, and in our habitat, as well as we can. Actually what we must scientifically conclude is that the particular race has, as a race, developed its

¹³ H. A. Miller, *Races, Nations and Classes*, pp. 130-131.

¹⁴ Jean Finot, *Race Prejudice*, p. 314.

racial characteristics under conditions quite different than those now bearing on it. Its qualities, interests, and capacities are different because its physical and social setting prompted it to concentrate its attention on different things and activities; it produced a different set of reaction-patterns. It would be expected that its efficiency would be less and its reactions different than those who had developed under these or similar conditions. But if its adjustment is poor, can it be said to be inferior, or merely not yet adjusted to a given set of conditions? It is also occasionally true that a so-called inferior race, or even nationality, existing among another race or nationality has not yet enjoyed the education, opportunities, inspiration, or any of the other influences which would lift it to the level it was potentially capable of achieving under the given conditions. In fact, the dominant race, possessing every advantage of political, economic, and social position, may have deliberately withheld these, or done very little to encourage the development of the less exalted group. Finally, as Weatherly points out, the sum of cultural achievement up to any given time may not be an accurate index of racial capacity. Some groups move fast and wear themselves out; others move slowly and persistently and in time get the same results.¹⁵

5. RACIAL SELF-EXPRESSION

Like most of the other problems considered, the race problem is at bottom a problem of self-expression. The situation is essentially that of dominant and dominated races and peoples with the attendant psychological and cultural costs that flow from domination. Among races, as among classes and individuals, there is an intense desire, an ardent urge, to fulfill themselves, to achieve, and to attain a rational self-adequacy. Each race has, and ought to have, its own life and uniqueness. To-day the different races in widely varying degrees, but with one voice, ask that they be free to use the powers that are in them, and to control increasingly the current of their own lives. Sooner or later these inner impulses making for unfettered and normal self-expression must be met.

At the present moment, however, these urges among most of the dominated racial groups, both white and colored, are not permitted fulfilment. Of course these racial groups or classes of races that are uninformed and unaroused, due either to physical or social isolation,

¹⁵ U. G. Weatherly, "Race and Marriage," *American Journal of Sociology*, Vol. 15, Jan., 1910, p. 449.

are unaware of any repressions or suppressions. But the dominated races, classes, or individuals of dominated races that have been swept into the current of world events, that have become informed and observant, are very definitely aware of inferior status. It is reasonable to assume, in the light of world-processes now going on, that in the not remote future most races and segments of races will be so informed. Wherever there is a recognition of dominance there exists what might be called an "oppression psychosis," that is, a persistent and exaggerated state of consciousness which is characteristically produced under conditions where one group dominates another, either politically, economically, or culturally. It appears as the result of forced frustration of expressions and desires. As such it makes the oppressed group or individuals abnormally subjective and self-conscious; they become abnormally suspicious; and some of them may overcompensate their inferiority complex by being aggressive and self-assertive. All attention and energy is concentrated on attaining that which has been prohibited.

We have no way of ascertaining how many splendid minds among the prejudiced races and peoples have been warped into rebellious crookedness, self-indulgence, or apathy, nor are we able to estimate the degree of spiritual blight and dullness that has been caused, or the creative and cultural contributions that have been lost as the result of the racial curse. We have, by imputations of inferiority, deprived people at the very dawn of selfhood of a sense of personal worth or ability to give of themselves. Except for those of the very highest force of character, we have poisoned the very centers of growth. The progressive measure that seems to be advisable in this situation is simply to give the men of all races the best socially permissible chance to live and to rise and fall freely according to their individual desert, without artificial props or bars, or as Winston Churchill put it in 1921, "that there should be no barrier of race, color, or creed which should prevent any man by merit from reaching any station if he is fitted for it."

The world of intellectual life, of highest expression and creativeness, has in the main been the world of dominant peoples. It is and has been difficult for the other races and peoples to enter this. Since they could not get into it, and since their own world could not or did not offer any premiums, their expressions have been untapped or wasted. This has given us only one set of culture standards and one source of culture contributions. And thereby we are immeasurably

poor. For all races, white or dark, have their own special contributions to bring to the common treasure of mankind.

We are just beginning to see that many of the contacts of various races, including our contacts with our own foreign born, offer opportunities of appropriating cultural and spiritual values in unknown forms that will enrich our own and the world's civilization. Almost every race, because of the difference of its biological inheritance and its historical experience, can give something that can be got from no other source. The very differences may be a source of enrichment. As we realize these facts more and more we shall be slow to deny to any race the possibility of rendering its distinctive contribution to the growth and achievement of humanity as a whole. For modern life needs the best contributions that each individual or race can make.

This opportunity for cultural enrichment does not mean the aping of any other race or the loss of whatever cultural purity exists, for cultural standards are a social capital that must not be dissipated by surrendering any good thing. There should be a pride of race which causes each race to want to fulfil itself; it should follow the lines of its own natural capacities. As Weatherly puts it,¹⁶ "Preservation of distinct racial types means the saving of characteristic traits and capacities which are as stimulating and beneficent for the world community as are varied individual traits for smaller social units." Each race has a work to do in the world for itself and for all other races. Thus the existence of race gives richness and variety to the world's life.

But this richness is by no means assured, for there is a marked trend toward amalgamation the world over.¹⁷ The intermingling that has been going on since the beginning of man's history has been vastly accelerated through the reduction of geographical barriers by the recently developed means of transportation. Furthermore, the races are indefinitely fertile, and enactments and social edicts do not prevent the working of the forces of individual sex attraction.¹⁸ As Reuter points out, the farther amalgamation progresses, the more rapidly the process tends to go on. For good or ill an indefinite intermixture of races is irresistible. Progress insistently demands that every effort should be put forth to avoid the loss of valuable social and cultural elements

¹⁶ *Op. cit.*, p. 453.

¹⁷ Cf. R. Dixon, *The Racial History of Man*, p. 523; E. B. Reuter, *Population*, p. 278; J. Drachsler, *Democracy and Assimilation*, p. 160.

¹⁸ This is especially occurring in India, the United States, South America, and South Africa. In the United States, for example, it is thought by those in a position to judge that the mulattoes now outnumber the pure blacks.

that frequently accompanies such fusion. Moral, social and cultural values of the contributing stock on both sides should be conserved, and the fusion prevented from occurring among disharmonious and incompatible strains. The biological as well as the cultural issue should be safeguarded as much as possible. For example, it has been discovered that the culture forms of one ethnic unit may not only be unsuited to promote the progress of another, but may actually be inimical to such progress.¹⁹ Advanced modes of life for primitives may mean degeneration and ruin for both strains. In addition there is the inability to enter sympathetically into each other's inner life, and the consequent loss of good things, and the general sensualization of life.

6. PROGRESSIVE RACIAL POLICIES AND ATTITUDES

One of the greatest difficulties in the way of a solution of the race problem has been a lack of understanding and a very limited perspective. At present we do not have enough entirely adequate and reliable information about race to enable anyone or any group to act with certainty or finality. Progressives sincerely hope that this will more and more cease to be the case in the future, and they willingly and gladly apply themselves to mending the situation the world over by strenuously thinking and engaging in various researches. But in the last analysis at present, because of this situation, racial toleration is about the only entirely and universally workable plan. There are both races and civilizations that will not mingle and should not mingle at this stage; but to permit this situation to engender hatreds and prejudices is unnecessary and stupid folly. We should assume that intelligent attitude which causes us to see that hatred of the different is often a very primitive and petty attitude, and that differences need not divide, but may and often do actually enrich. In other words, we need a healthy racial atmosphere both within our country and in the world. Intolerance breeds mutual suspicion, dislike, antagonism, aloofness, separateness, misunderstanding, blindness, exaggeration, and fear, with the possibilities of conflict and war. The nation and peoples generally need to pass out into an ampler and freer world. They need to recognize the unity of the world, and the fact that a conscientious attitude of good will is the only justifiable attitude to maintain. As some one has put it, we can only "wipe out" our enemies by "wiping out" our enmities.

¹⁹ Weatherly, *op. cit.*, p. 452; Drachsler, *op. cit.*, p. 161.

In so far as we can be rational we should not allow any prejudice of race or color to injure our just and kindly and happy relations with our fellow-men, but, observing the injunction of Kant, should treat every person as an end, as we consider ourselves ends, and never treat anyone merely as a means to an end.²⁰ We should recall that race bias and race antagonism are not instinctive but are largely, if not wholly, socially conditioned; that is, antagonistic reactions of one race or ethnic group to another are the result largely of a certain type of training and social condition.²¹ As reasonable men we should adopt as a practical policy the attitude that race does not exist, that we should do our level best to act courteously to individuals of all races and pay them all the compliment of assuming that they are essentially similar in potentiality to us and our like.²² We should resolve to live as men among men and not permit anything human to be alien to us. Above all we need to avoid like the plague any policy of recrimination and discrimination.

We need to develop a sense of responsibility for basing race relations on justice, right, equality, and humanity. Now justice and equality may not involve equal attainment or even immediate political status, and humanity does not necessarily mean intermarriage. They do mean, however, equal justice to develop and exercise the faculties and rights of men and nations. As Article XXII of the League of Nations' Covenant puts it, "The well-being and development of peoples not yet able to stand by themselves forms a sacred trust of civilization."

Nor does this forbid cultural exclusion and deliberate prohibition of intermingling. If Western communities, for example, are insistent upon conserving their national existence and their distinctive institutions, and the composition of their own population, Orientals should admit this right. To want to maintain certain standards of life, institutions, a distinctive type of life, and integrity and continuance as a nation is a justifiable desire. But, in no case should Western peoples indulge in racial arrogance and discrimination, or do anything that is incompatible with the self-respect of the peoples of Asia, nor should they demand in Asia what they deny in the West. The endeavor should

²⁰ H. A. Miller, "The Myth of Superiority," *National Conference of Social Work*, 1923, p. 504; C. A. Ellwood, "Racial and Religious Intolerance," *National Conference of Social Work*, 1925, p. 24.

²¹ J. Drachsler, "Racial Diversities and Social Progress," *National Conference of Social Work*, 1922, p. 101. It should also be kept in mind that a normal human child can be socially "conditioned" into having attitudes that do not include racial antagonism.

²² Edward Sapir, "Let Race Alone," *Nation*, Vol. 120, p. 213.

be to arrive by mutual consent and reciprocity of action at an arrangement which is recognized as reasonable by both sides. Only in this way is fairness maintained and misunderstanding and resentment avoided. Each race should be free within limits to work out its own destiny.

Backward races should not be treated as cultural equals, but be prepared to live in a modern age and civilization. Inasmuch as they do not have experience to get along "on their own" they first need apprenticeship, discipline, and slowly ripening experience; they need to learn prudence and to develop constructive power. But in so doing they cannot be considered as menials, inferiors, and incompetents. The attitude should rather be one of social sympathy and coöperation and democracy. The matters here discussed are well summarized in a speech given in Tokyo by Marquis Okuma, former Japanese Prime Minister.

"It is clear that the principles of Benevolence and Equality, which are the basic elements of morality, can never harmonize with the attempt deliberately to differentiate mankind in superior and inferior races and accord discriminatory treatment. The highest principle is that which sustains the mutual existence of mankind by Benevolence and Equality based on Justice and Humanity. It should be remembered, however, that every righteous order has an expedient. Therefore, my insistence on the equal treatment of all mankind does not necessarily imply that all nations, irrespective of their present conditions, should be granted equal treatment. What I demand amounts to this: that the racial standard should be replaced by the standard of civilization. If one asks for equal treatment to a nation which finds it difficult to remove even extra-territoriality, he is asking for something impossible. A nation at this stage should be given material and moral aid to promote its civilization, and when it is sufficiently civilized to stand shoulder to shoulder with other Powers, then it should be granted equal treatment."

In general, where racial contacts occur the policy should be to so control social forces that both races or peoples will be able to share fully in the opportunities of the new life, and both be in a position to contribute their best to the new life.

Perhaps the most beneficent and wholesome aid of all in solving racial problems is participation in discussion and conference. In conference all are placed on a level of fraternity, prejudices soften, understanding is cultivated, mutual respect is engendered, and mutual education proceeds step by step. Thereby a right public opinion on racial questions is also developed. Interracial coöperation in action is also a possible welder of interests. After all, in most cases, it is only peoples that do not really know one another that hate one another.

In the last analysis, toleration, patient coöperation, and conference offer the most practicable possibilities at this moment. As far as possible these should terminate in definite machinery of control which commands the assent and the mutual support of all parties.

Eventually it is possible that a spiritual unity can be built up among the races—a human fellowship in which the estranging differences of race have been completely transcended, and we have that sort of camaraderie in all the departments of life that now prevails in art and science—and a loyalty in the great common purpose of effecting human ends rather than national or racial ends. That this goal is Utopian is unquestioned, but Utopias have become real.

QUESTIONS AND PROBLEMS

1. Does "consciousness of kind" play any part in race prejudice? (E. R. Groves, *Social Problems and Education*, p. 304.)
2. Distinguish between race and nation.
3. What is the significance of education in race understanding?
4. Are we ready to advocate racial amalgamation on a large scale? (See J. H. Oldham, *Christianity and the Race Problem*, pp. 147-170.)
5. What evidence is there of racial fusion? (See E. G. Conklin, "The Trend of Evolution" in *The Evolution of Man*, Yale Sigma Xi Lectures, 1921-2, pp. 174-177.)
6. It is a recognized fact that mixed marriages have a greater instability and a lower fecundity than marriages among a common stock. (See J. Drachsler, *Democracy and Assimilation*, pp. 156-157; U. G. Weatherly, "Race and Marriage," *American Journal of Sociology*, Jan., 1910, pp. 445-446.) How do you account for this?
7. What is the significance of sport in reducing racial antagonisms? (Basil Mathews, *The Class of Color*, pp. 110-111, 136-140.)
8. Discuss fully the significance of racial domination in a democracy, especially our American democracy. (See J. R. Commons, *Races and Immigrants in America*, pp. 1-21; J. M. Mecklin, *Democracy and Race Friction*, pp. 6-21; J. H. Oldham, *Christianity and the Race Problem*, pp. 176-196.)
9. What is the thesis of Allen T. Burns in "Immigration, the Matrix of American Democracy?" (See *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, Jan., 1921, Vol. 93, pp. 144-149.) Comment.
10. Can a policy of exclusion of any race or restriction of immigration be justified?
11. Why are American negroes more aggressive since the World War?
12. What are some of the causes of race riots? (See *Report of Chicago Commission on Race Relations*.)
13. How do you explain such a large amount of criminal tendency among the negroes?

14. Are Jim-Crowism and democracy compatible?
15. What are the outstanding phases of the Negro problem in American life? See E. R. Groves, *Social Problems and Education*, pp. 304-335; E. B. Reuter, *Population Problems*, pp. 267-284; E. B. Reuter, *The American Race Problem*; C. A. Ellwood, *Sociology and Modern Social Problems*, pp. 246-274; E. B. Reuter, *The Mulatto in the United States*, Chs. IV-XII; J. Dowd, *The Negro in American Life*, Pts. 7-8.

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CHAPTER XXII

THE RELATION OF REVOLUTION AND WAR TO PROGRESS

I. THE SIGNIFICANCE OF REVOLUTION AND WAR IN A STUDY OF PROGRESS

PROGRESS, as history demonstrates, is, in the great majority of cases, a process which rests upon continuity, order, regularity, and the avoidance of breaks, destruction, undue passion and violence. Revolution and war, being unavoidably characterized by these latter occurrences, are consequently, almost without exception, contrary to the fundamental principles of progress. And yet both have played a very important part in the life of peoples, and still do. Both interrupt or destroy progressive processes, or even inaugurate retrogressive processes which it takes generations and sometimes centuries to overcome. Any study of progress is incomplete without at least a brief examination of revolution and war as they affect social processes.

While revolutions are less likely to occur to-day than war, due to the increasing prevalence of democratic forms of control, they still are a grave and continuous possibility. Our democracy still is limited in its application, and consequently the forces that make for revolution are still active.

2. THE NATURE AND CAUSES OF REVOLUTION

Revolutions are social phenomena that arise out of the relationships between social classes or social strata. By revolution is usually meant the more or less violent upheaval of the existing order as the result of the oppressed and submerged class or classes rising up and overthrowing the class or classes that have dominated or exploited them. If successful, it results in the newly ascendant class or classes assuming social control in their own interest. It is a social process which, down to this moment, has occurred among the classes within a nation, though there is great likelihood that in the future, unless forestalled, revolutions will cut across national lines. In revolution there is a more or less rapid and more or less successful shifting of social

power, a rather radical displacement of the center of gravity of society; usually a more or less rapid transformation of the economic, political, and judicial superstructure of society, and a new social equilibrium in place of the old. There is a fundamental rearrangement of the relations subsisting between conflicting and even allied social groups. It is a recrystallization of society on new planes, a new combination of social elements.

Upon examination of the causes of revolution they are seen to be entirely natural social phenomena that are to be expected if certain combinations of conditions are permitted to exist. Any given revolution usually has a long history behind it—a history replete with various irritants that serve as cumulative causes leading to minor revolts, and finally, when the accumulated protest and revolutionary power are strong enough, and the proper combination of events occurs, the final dynamic rending of social bonds occurs and the people are in the midst of a revolution.

The immediate cause of revolution is thwarted self-expression and group expression, and hampered activity among masses of people; in brief, repression of normal human impulses.¹ This results in a constant, silent, and for the most part unconscious accumulation of inwrought tendencies. Given certain personal and social temperaments and a certain conjunction of circumstances and the accumulated force breaks its barriers and you have a social explosion.

This repression is mainly due to the Bourbonism of the Right. The ruling classes through their manipulation of the institutions of social control, in order to maintain the *status quo*, interfere with the mechanism of normal social adjustment. They do this either through shortsightedness or selfishness. Certain economic institutions and arrangements are insistently adhered to and enforced, and consequently do not change with the normal development of the times, and economic power is abused. Government is controlled in the interests of the ruling class; men are governed by self-constituted governors; representation is restricted or manipulated; law is not fairly created or fairly enforced; the rights of free speech, press, and assemblage are abridged or denied; grievances and needed reforms cannot be openly discussed. Religion is made to conform to the reigning theory of classes and the church becomes the chief instrument in enforcing it. Education, both as to quan-

¹ Cf. C. A. Ellwood, *Psychology of Human Society*, pp. 250-257; E. S. Bogardus, *Fundamentals of Social Psychology*, pp. 451-452, 454; P. Sorokin, *The Sociology of Revolution*, pp. 367-408; H. Barnes, "Revolution and Reaction," *Nineteenth Century*, Vol. 92, pp. 466-474.

tity and quality, is controlled for ulterior purposes. Public opinion is misinformed and the masses are misguided. As the particular class system develops the class or classes most favored by it become more arrogant and abusive of their privileges. Their hauteur, intolerance, and arbitrariness increases. The more firmly established their power, the more jealous they are of their prerogatives and the more disposed they are to exercise this power to the utmost. Coercion is resorted to more and more. After such a class arrangement has persisted for some time, the favored classes lose all sensitiveness for the condition of the oppressed and exploited classes. Born and reared under the protection of time-honored rights and social arrangements, they are entirely ignorant of the bases of these, and of their ephemeral and perverted character; they fancy themselves to be invested with them forever by some sort of divine right and do not realize that unavoidable change is causing accumulations that will destroy their power. For their own sakes they have made the group organization static, and, for many, oppressive.²

All this, however, means inflexible institutions, enforced status, exploitation and subserviency, denial of opportunity, and a general restraint upon normal evolutionary processes of social growth and adjustment, as well as a thwarting of human beings, and the accumulation of unrest. These repressed forces ferment and gather momentum until they burst their bonds, resulting in violence and chaos; and the more severe and prolonged the repression has been, the more destructive and terrible is the revolution. Usually at the same time that these revolutionary pressures are developing, changes in the psyche of the oppressed classes are going on; there is a crumbling of the religious doctrines which at first kept them resigned, there is a growing acquaintance with the lot of other peoples, new disruptive ideas are spreading among them, unity, strength and leadership are being developed, giving a sense of confidence. It is obvious from the above that revolutions are not and cannot be made by agitators, as is commonly stated. Revolutions are the result of the halting of social processes, that cannot be stopped if

²Ex-President Wilson in discussing the causes of the Russian Revolution stated: "What gave rise to the Russian Revolution? The answer can only be that it was the product of a whole social system. It was not in fact a sudden thing. It had been gathering head for several generations. It was due to the systematic denial to the great body of Russians of the rights and privileges which all normal men desire and must have if they are to be contented and within reach of happiness. The lives of the great mass of the Russian people contained no opportunities, but were hemmed in by barriers against which they were constantly flinging their spirits, only to fall back bruised and dispirited. Only the powerful were suffered to secure their rights or even to gain access to the means of material success." "The Road Away from Revolution," *Atlantic Monthly*, Vol. 132, p. 145.

social health is to be preserved, and the balking of human expression, and this cannot be done if unrest is to be averted.

3. THE COSTS OF REVOLUTION

It cannot be denied that social progress in the past has occasionally come through revolutions. Good has come in this manner, and, under the conditions of the past, in many cases, the necessary result could have come in no other way, for the agencies of orderly change were not available or not usable; hence revolution was the only resort in correcting an intolerable situation. But to-day the telicly minded social thinker notes appalling costs of all kinds which come with the good. In view of the fact that revolutions are becoming increasingly unnecessary due to the availability of agencies of redress, the costs become so great that revolutions appear as almost sheer loss; certainly they are too costly for any civilized people to tolerate. Sorokin, in writing of the good elements that have accrued from revolutions, states that they "are a drop in the ocean of disastrous effects."⁸

The costs of revolution are numerous and widespread, and the recovery takes a long, a very long, time. The cost of social explosions in wrecking mental stability and sanity as well as social attitudes is incomprehensible. They are the supreme destroyers of realistic thinking, because the excessive danger and the fearful overstimulation of passion unsettle disciplined thought and behavior. Fanatics of all kinds are bred. Periods of chaos follow in which there is an impairment of the agencies of control, especially a disastrous loss of respect for law and order with its train of countless other evils.

There are the intellectual and cultural costs. Revolution distracts from pure science and the pursuit of knowledge. It disintegrates idealism and culture. It brings, in many cases, the actual destruction of the choicest products of culture and intellectual achievement, simply because these were owned or sponsored by the hated dispossessed class. It works irreparable injuries to many of the finer traditions. It tends to be destructive of all the higher achievements of civilization among a people. Priceless things are swept away.

Economically, it reduces and destroys working power, it dissipates energies or directs them in socially useless or even harmful channels, it interrupts productive processes, destroys wealth, and reduces the wealth-producing capacities of a people; it disintegrates distributive

⁸ *Op. cit.*, p. 361. See also E. A. Ross, *Principles of Sociology*, pp. 552-554.

processes, destroys financial systems and credit, and interrupts or destroys international trade.

It produces stupendous moral and spiritual costs. It arouses mutual hate and suspicion, brutalizes sentiment and feeling, subverts good will, removes the moral restraints, destroys social and moral values, and causes a general reversion to a brutish state.

The clash of interests produces violence, and the violence combined with the confusion, excitement, and animal-like levels of behavior favors the formation of crowds and the rule of the mob with its unreflective, irresponsible, and unspeakably horrible activities. As such it releases qualities in human beings that should never be encouraged. The unseating of the fine disciplines and regularities of conduct that make us human leads to violence, and the employment of violence starts a process of rebarbarization which destroys all the fine attitudes and controls that have been built up by centuries of civilization.

At best the coercion that accompanies revolution can only suppress action for a time. Every act of coercion, with almost mechanical precision, produces an equivalent reaction. Unless this is stopped some way, it results in counter-revolution. To avoid this the revolutionary leaders must become dictators and despots; they must rule with a hand of iron, destroy opposition at any cost and by any means, centralize control, and order life in a highly absolutistic manner. Since their régime was born of violence and terrorism, they feel that its only security is in terror and frightfulness. They must put the fear of the revolution into the minds of the people, and this can only be done by killing. The populace must be cowed into loyalty. The revolutionary leaders, by force of circumstances, are forced to be blood-stained.⁴ This produces a new feeling of oppression and strain, it crushes initiative, it maintains fear, and produces a discoloration of self even among the freed classes.

Finally there is the tendency to slip back after the revolution. As a result of the moral debauch, the physical exhaustion, the chaos and anarchy, the absence of effective and freely functioning control devices, the destroyed conventions and traditions, the mistrust and antagonisms, the murder or banishment of leaders, the people have lost their energy, their enthusiasm, their constructive ability, and there is a going backwards until recuperative forces have been painfully and slowly developed and the civilization is again built up step by step.

⁴J. St. Loe Strachey, "The Mechanism of Revolution," *Nineteenth Century*, Vol. 88, pp. 585-586.

Revolution means a violent break, and it can only be produced by methods that are violent and precipitate. It disrupts the orderly process of continuity in history. It necessitates adaptations for which people as yet have no foundation. It throws out of order or sets back existing agencies, or destroys them altogether. It is a more or less blind and passionate groping for means of adjustment, not a utilization of existing forms and functions. It is not continuity but destruction, which is supposed to be a starting over, but which only rarely is such in any worthwhile sense. From the progressive point of view it is worse than worthless, because there are other better means of accomplishing its ends.

4. THE AVOIDANCE OF REVOLUTION BY A TELIC POLICY

Any examination of revolution shows the futility of resorting to it as a means of effecting progressive change. As someone has said, "Revolution is the kind of incendiarism against which the country ought to take out a good, safe and comprehensive policy." It is true that revolutions have swept away obstacles to progress, but they have never succeeded in effecting permanent progress except as they have been preceded or followed by telic processes. The social student therefore is beginning to think that, instead of waiting with folded hands while revolutions overtake him and then being forced to construct in mad haste, it would be wise to modify existing disharmonies, repressions, and maladjustments by telic means, secure the transformation peaceably and without shock, and avoid revolution altogether. He is sustained in this resolve by several developments of recent times. One of these is the "new" history which has given him much light concerning the antecedents and consequences of the revolutions of the past. These examinations have suggested both curative and preventive treatment. Psychology, social psychology, and sociology, with the assistance of economics, politics, and several of the other sciences, have been studying the various types of individual and social unrest, and have, in this connection, come to some fairly reliable conclusions as to the causes of revolutions, and have been able to recommend policies and techniques of avoidance. In other words, we are now intelligent enough to devise a steadier and more certain method of progress. Some of the suggestions that have been made are discussed below.

The avoidance of revolution is first of all a matter of understanding and knowledge—understanding of how anarchic mutations in human affairs come about, a realization of the mechanism of revolution, a

knowledge of human behavior under revolutionary stimuli. We must understand how social health and security can be maintained. When men know that they are able to take the precautions necessary to prevent revolutions, difficult as this may be. These causes, as we have indicated in a preceding section, are now fairly well known. Everything encourages the belief that we can cause the present social system, in all its forms, to pass into a higher phase by a gradual and rational willed process of transformation, instead of by violent upheaval. By studied effort we can bring about in good time desirable and socially feasible change and keep institutions adjusted to changing conditions.

The causes of revolution point to the fact that a high degree of flexibility must be maintained in our social organization. The means of communication must be free in functioning; group discussion and protest must be unobstructed; there must be free determination of group policy; fairness in class relations must exist, even if it hurts; and there should be no artificial restrictions upon opportunity.⁵

Somebody external to or apart from the distressed classes must take the initiative in avoiding explosion. Social students may do this, and certainly their counsels will be worth while, but, in the last analysis, it must come through the efforts of the dominant classes. And this in turn rests upon their intelligence, good sense, and social perspective. They may either alleviate or hasten the revolutionary forces. They need to be educated enough to see social processes at work, and then have the wisdom and the willingness and enough of the democratic spirit deliberately to change their own policies where necessary, and to render every aid to the other classes. For new ideas or needs of amelioration must be quickly incorporated into social institutions and laws must be accommodated without too much struggle or friction to the new public opinions. The ruling classes need to make concessions, to give ground, even to relinquish their influence over the system of social control if the needs of the group demand it. For the principles of democracy are now so generally diffused, widely understood, and increasingly effective in the thinking of people that no controlling class can expect to remain in absolute power indefinitely, regardless of its power or cleverness in control and manipulation.

There must also be an undeniably democratic organization of the group, along with a fraternal attitude of the classes toward one another. This relationship can only be maintained if efficient and impartial justice prevails. Ex-President Wilson well stated it when he said, "The

⁵ See Ellwood, *op. cit.*, p. 264.

nature of men and of organized society dictates the maintenance in every field of action of the highest and purest standards of justice and of right dealing; and it is essential to efficacious thinking in this critical matter that we should not entertain a narrow or technical conception of justice. By justice the lawyer generally means the prompt, fair and open application of impartial rules; but we call ours a Christian civilization, and a Christian conception of justice must be much higher. It must include sympathy and helpfulness and willingness to forego self-interest in order to promote the welfare, happiness, and contentment of others and of the community as a whole." ⁶

Everything that is done must be done, in the last analysis, through the majority. This alone will allay suspicion and provide an effective method of procedure. But this involves the participation of the proletariat, and this logically means that the people as a whole must be as highly educated and as well informed as possible. Safety is only assured through universal enlightenment. Ignorance is a halter which not only enables the masses to be led astray and manipulated, but it is also something with which they entangle and damage themselves. Give them information and teach them to think and they can weigh opinions; they can play their part in government and the determination of social problems. Then, if the social constitution can be improved, alter it, but alter it by the means which the law allows—means which are so arranged as to secure the free choice of the people. Any assistance which can be given the majority in finding a true expression of their desires is permissible, but here also the legitimate forces of argument and persuasion should be used.

It must also be remembered that whatever action is taken must be rather slow and considered—not sudden change. History shows that that advance is best which comes through the accumulation of little changes and those continuous slight improvements called reforms, effected at the logical moment. The socially better must be built up by raising the whole level of knowledge, of ideas, of values in a social group, and this is a gradual process. Only the survivals of long outgrown social elements can be quickly discarded. Large masses of people cannot be moved rapidly and at the same time safely. If steps are not to be retraced, the social structure must be built up slowly and with prepared and tested material. Thus the people as a whole need to be educated up to the new stage and fitted to intelligently and willingly participate in it. The only wise thing, therefore, is to ex-

⁶ *Op. cit.*, p. 146.

clude all leaps and bounds, all violent and arbitrary mutations of things, all social precipitation of any kind that is too sudden, and act with a minimum of shock to our delicate industrial, political, and social machinery.

Revolution on the other hand is sudden and violent, it is essentially destruction of both the fit and the unfit. But this emphasis on orderly change does not mean that we must resign ourselves to the advance that slowly comes about by the "trial and error" of spontaneous evolution. Rather it means the only revolution that is pure good, namely, "peaceful revolution"—through analysis, intelligent experimentation, systematic training, and wise and well-planned construction—one step at a time, but a step every time. This is essentially directed evolution, which is the essence of progress.

5. THE PROBLEM OF WAR

War is an equally significant pathological social phenomenon. Just as revolution is the conflict of classes within a nation, so war is the armed conflict between nations. It is the method nations have mainly resorted to in settling their disputes with each other, a method which includes continual preparedness, combat, violence, force, and the destruction, if possible, of the other nation or nations. That the problem of war is one of the most serious and intricate with which civilization is confronted is generally recognized. That it is a highly controversial subject is equally clear. That it has, through its powers of destruction, a great effect upon progress is no less true. In fact, it is possible for war to destroy all else that is good. It is necessary to keep clear of emotion, prejudice, and personal or group or class bias, and pursue the facts wherever they lead, and interpret their relation to our task rationally and soberly and logically.

6. WAR AS A PROGRESS FACTOR IN THE PAST

The more or less unsatisfactory and inadequate evidence from the past seems to indicate that the social and cultural results of war then were far more likely to be of a progressive nature, or at least indirectly contributory to progress than is now the case. War and the fear of war with its attack and aggression was and has been the first and greatest stimulus to coöperation, unity, and group solidarity. Men probably first coöperated to fight or defend themselves. Through war,

groups have always become better knit together, better organized, and more conscious of their collective life. War has evoked common interests of the most powerful nature. In the past groups were either forced to organize and fight to exist, or remain unorganized and become obliterated by an organized group. In this respect, it also aided in the creation of those common sentiments and desires which go to make up the folk life. Most students of the past bear witness to the consolidating effect of war as revealed in the sinking of private quarrels, subordination to leadership, larger patriotism, the firmly wrought cohesion, and the more intelligent and harmonious activity.

War in the past, directly or indirectly, has also tended to evoke and develop leadership. The stress, the crisis, the necessity of organization, and a hundred other exigencies call forth men with the qualities of leadership, and this not only among the men who lead the army, but also the statesmen and other civil leaders that the need calls forth. Exceptional men in a variety of lines have thus been produced whose many-sided, beneficent influence has extended beyond into the activities of subsequent ages and generations.

The nature of early war also tended to emphasize and draw out certain personal qualities among the men at large—indomitable courage, fortitude, bravery, strength of will, discipline, self-reliance, coöperation, self-sacrifice, and devotion—qualities fundamentally necessary if progress is to occur. These qualities and virtues have been raised to an ideal, become a priceless heritage, and their persistence has not been without great progressive influence.

Past war has played its part in maintaining the most wholesome mores and customs. Keller tells us,⁷ "Where group conflict has been persistent, the path of history is strewn with discarded codes. . . . If certain mores physically or numerically weaken a group, or impair its organization, rendering it ever so little inferior to other groups, this fact, which may remain long concealed under isolation, is revealed at once when conflict arises. Such revelation has been, in history, one of the characteristic functions of war." Thus those customs making for group efficiency, and for group welfare, which in the last analysis means individual welfare also, have survived through war.

Another notable result of past war has been the cross-fertilization of cultures coming through the contact and intermingling of conquerors and conquered. This has frequently resulted in a culture richer and

⁷ A. G. Keller, *Societal Evolution* (copyright 1915 by The Macmillan Company), p. 62. Reprinted by permission.

more diverse than either of the original ones. Lester F. Ward, writing in this connection, has said,⁸ "Progress results from the fusion of unlike elements. This is creative, because from it there results a third something which is neither the one nor the other but different from both and something new and superior to either. . . Ideas will cross-fertilize each other. It is not otherwise with human societies brought into contact." This, of course, varies. When a backward people come into contact with a highly cultured one, merely borrowing takes place, but when the peoples are nearly abreast in different lines of development, one fructifies the other and a higher culture results. A certain process of selection takes place by which poorer elements are rejected, and the best of the new culture adopted. Israel came to be what it was through its many borrowings, largely as a result of violent contacts. "Another great cross-fertilization occurred after Alexander's conquests and colonizations in Southwestern Asia and in Egypt had brought into closest contact the two great currents of ancient thought and culture."⁹ Lord Bryce emphasized the fact that Roman law owed much to the conjugation of diverse culture-elements as the result of Roman military undertakings.¹⁰ Much of the progress of past civilization can be traced directly to such forced culture contacts. They were a stimulating factor.

War has also been a stimulus to invention and discovery. It has aroused peoples from psychical lethargy; it has stimulated effort, both along mechanical and social lines; it has called forth genius, and everywhere, at all times, has goaded men on to new attainments. The fact that this has been under pressure does not detract from the value of the heritage.¹¹

It is also true that war has played some part in the selection of better races and in producing cross-breeds that were biologically superior. It has been one of the major contributing factors in the origin and development of the state and many of the forms of government and the rise of nations. It has given stimulus to the development of law, and has made other contributions, many of which are still with us. Of course, it is undeniable that these gains were accompanied by much loss, most of which cannot be estimated. As we face the present situation and the nature of modern war, we are struck with the fact

⁸ *Pure Sociology* (copyright 1905 by The Macmillan Company), p. 237. Reprinted by permission.

⁹ E. A. Ross, *Foundations of Sociology*, p. 237. See pp. 234-338.

¹⁰ *Studies in History and Jurisprudence*, Vol. II, pp. 250-251.

¹¹ See, e.g., W. G. Sumner, *War and Other Essays*, p. 30.

that war has almost ceased to be a progressive factor; in fact, has become perhaps the most retrogressive agent of modern times.

7. THE CAUSES OF MODERN WAR

Before modern war can be intelligently discussed as a factor in progress, at least a sketch of some of its more important causes is necessary. The urgent need is for a correct diagnosis, since without it our remedies are bound to prove either inadequate or futile. A most superficial examination shows that it is caused by a vast complex of factors. In this search we cannot rest content, however, with any mere assumption of psychological motives, such as hatred, bloodlust, or aggressive pugnacity. These motives merely operate as the result of other conditions, of an economic, social, and political nature.

Perhaps the basic cause to-day, as all through history, is the growth of population. This seems to be the causal force underlying many of the other causes, such as imperialism, national greed, desire for territorial expansion, attempts to control resources and obtain raw materials, colony-grabbing, and the various other expressions of national rapacity, as forced by growing national need. As Professor Ross has it, "The real enemy of the dove of peace is not the eagle of pride or the vulture of greed, but the stork." One of the most important phases of population increase as a factor in war is the economic. It is not to be denied that excessive patriotism, nationalism, national egotism, national fear, a stimulated military spirit, entangling alliances, professional patriots, diplomats, and militarists, and the armament makers are influential in producing war. But the economic factors provide the stage on which these operate and the dynamics through which they act.

National need has produced national acquisitiveness. Nations to-day, in order to exist and prosper, must maintain and increase their material power. This means the extension of territory, subjects, or wealth, or all three. These usually can only be obtained by taking them away from others. This results in various other activities. Notable are the various forms of international economic competition. As someone has said, "War is no longer the last argument of kings! It has become the final move in games of commercial speculation." No one would deny that fierce commercial rivalry has been a potent cause of war during the last three centuries. Nations need certain markets—preferably those they can monopolize. Colonies or subject territories provide this; they also provide raw materials and a cheap labor supply—in

brief, the power of exclusive exploitation. It is generally conceded that the European animosities and intrigues that developed into the World War were the result of a bitter rivalry for colonies, spheres of influence, raw materials, markets, trade routes, and fields for investment.¹² This is especially significant in view of the fact that the characteristic economic feature of all the great industrial nations is the rapid growth of productive power in excess of the purchasing power of their own citizens, with the result that either external markets must be found or production slowed down. Thus appear as alternatives either international commercial rivalry with its struggle for markets, shipping subsidies, trade treaties, and tariffs, or domestic chaos, unemployment, and unrest.

The necessity of such international economic activities leads to economic imperialism on the part of a nation—to the need of building up an economic empire if the nation is to be great and strong. This in turn results in a state subservient to the nation's economic aspirations; a state which invests its funds in armies and navies necessary to gain the desired economic end or maintain the desired economic status once attained. In fact, in recent history, armaments and militarism have increased in direct ratio with economic expansion.

Since such a condition is most precarious, nations seek to strengthen their position by alliances, treaties, and understandings, important both in carrying on offensive operations or in resisting aggression. Out of this comes the desire for balance of power and from this arises a never-ending series of crises that continually threaten and periodically disturb the peace of the world. As long as the economic rivalry of nations is predatory, unrestrained, and unregulated, clash of interests of a violent nature must be expected.¹³

8. IS WAR A PROGRESSIVE FACTOR IN THE PRESENT?

After having noted that war in the past has been a factor of some significance in progress, one is led to ask if war to-day makes for progress. The frank and unprejudiced reply must be that war to-day is a futile and suicidal method of settling disputes between nations. War, which was once essential and necessary for material and social

¹² Peace treaties, the one of Versailles, for example, show this also. Division of spoils and annexations that are clearly a cornering of economic resources are the subjects receiving the attention of the most astute abilities there assembled.

¹³ See also Chapter XVII, sec. 7.

progress, has lost this significance and has become the most dangerous enemy of civilization. In actual operation it is not constructive, but enormously destructive, it deadens and paralyzes, it piles up costs, and instead of settling disputes and appeasing the honor of nations, develops new disputes and desires for revenge. No one who believes in progress with its long-time social welfare can believe in war, for war destroys everything—wealth, men, morality, civilization. "War is like the shaking of the tree in the hurricane; everything falls down—fruit, good, bad and rotten—dead limbs and worms—all is stripped off—the social organism is shaken to its very foundation and rent asunder—all things are laid bare."¹⁴ War is not only abnormal but a social monstrosity—the greatest contemporary vampire of the human race. War as a means of settling international disputes has resolved itself into mutual slaughter and wholesale destruction of all that is good. As such it is colossal folly—the equivalent of fighting fire with gasoline. "War is the greatest self-inflicted evil from which man suffers."¹⁵

a. The Economic and Material Costs. In the first place, war does not rectify the economic conditions which caused it. It merely results in a re-allocation of territories and resources which soon results in new antagonisms and intrigues which perpetuate the vicious rivalry and mistrust. Even the victor's gains are illusory, for war piles up stupendous burdens of crushing debt that it takes both victors and vanquished generations and perhaps even centuries to retire. These economic burdens of war project themselves into the remote future. Professor Bullock in discussing the immense financial costs of war comments: "This fact you will do well to recall when next you propose to decide a dispute by the aid of gunpowder bought with borrowed money which your children's children will hardly repay."¹⁶ Let us not forget the words of Franklin: "Men do not pay for war in war time; the bill comes later."

The experience of Europe teaches that national debts would hardly be known, and taxation might be so moderate as to surpass belief, if it were not for war and the burdens which it entails. Our own financial history and our own financial condition leads to the same conclusion.¹⁷ Consider the sober and conservative words of the Hon. Andrew Mellon in his annual report as Secretary of the Treasury, given out

¹⁴ A. Macdonald, "Anthropology of Modern Civilized Man," *Open Court*, Vol. 34, p. 469.

¹⁵ H. Cox, *Problems of Population*, p. 92.

¹⁶ C. G. Bullock, "The Cost of War," *Atlantic Monthly*, Vol. 95, p. 2.

¹⁷ See, e.g., *Literary Digest*, Nov. 12, 1921, pp. 16-20.

at the end of 1925: "It is of interest to point out the proportion of government expenditures which are due to war. While it is not possible to segregate entirely all expenditures which might fall in this category . . . the expenditures which are directly or indirectly attributable to war and the national defense compose over eighty per cent of total federal expenditures. The amounts spent by this government in aid of agriculture and business, for science, education, better roads, and other constructive efforts are insignificant when compared with outlays due to war and national defense. This will be the inevitable situation as long as war is the method of settling international disputes. These facts should be faced squarely by those who clamor for reduced government expenditures and at the same time oppose the world's efforts to devise rational methods for dealing with international questions."

The more immediate economic costs must also be considered. War reduces the effective labor supply of a nation by totally destroying parts of it by killing men, and by impairing the efficiency of other parts by maiming and disease. It is thus a diminution of the human wealth producing capacity of the combatant nations, be they victors or vanquished. It is also the destroyer of property, whether through the production of destructive or non-productive instruments and materials of war, or through the ravages of war in invaded territory, resulting in destroyed forests, fields, crops, and engineering works—buildings, bridges, and railways—as well as the contents of buildings, often priceless and irreplaceable. It means the waste and depletion of natural resources. It also results in the demoralization of industry, the harassing of commerce, the dissipation of capital reserves, the destruction of credit systems, the disruption of the world's financial machinery, the dislocation of the habitual lines of international and even national trade, and the disappearance of economies fostered by international specialization of production.¹⁸

War involves a further reduction of wealth by the withdrawal from their productive activities of a large number of workers, not only during the actual fighting, but during the time spent in being trained to fight, as well as the unemployment during periods of reconstruction after the war.

b. The Biological Costs. It would seem that wars in former times acted to purify racial stocks by eliminating weak races, and selecting for survival those of superior physical strength, sagacity, and courage.

* See E. L. Bogart, *Direct and Indirect Costs of the Great World War*.

To-day war seems to have the very opposite effect, owing to the fact that modern war kills or maims the best young men of all the warring nations, and so, by destroying the most valuable germ plasm of the race, causes irreparable damage. Novicow has said, "The more vigorous and well-born a young man is, the more normally constituted, the greater his chance to be slain by musket or magazine, the rifled cannon, and other similar engines of civilization." It was a grim commonplace in the last war that the best men always "stopped a bullet." The real survivors of modern war are the C-3 men. The loss is not alone of these stalwarts in their teens and twenties and thirties. There is a never-ending phantom host of those who ought to have been but never shall be—the unborn sons of soldier fathers who gave up their biological heritage in the shambles of the human abattoir. This is a waste unreckoned and prodigal, a waste that can never be gathered up again. "The weaklings survive, the cowards escape, the physically unfit are not called, the morally uncourageous are left to breed after their kind for the next generation; but the strong, the daring, the willing,—they leave no breed behind."¹⁹ Consider the long lists of the finest young men who were cut off in this last war. What untold, incomprehensible, potential talents and contributions have been dissipated and lost forever.²⁰ Mention must also be made of the increased infant mortality rate that often accompanies war, the millions who die of diseases and epidemics, and the wholesale impairment of the quality of population as the result of protracted underfeeding.

c. The Political Costs. War depresses the individual and exalts the state, and the thing we call militarism makes its appearance. This militarism is not a delegation of powers but an assumption of them. It tends to take political power out of the hands of the many and places it in those of the powerful and influential few. And since their honor and interest and success lies in war, they seek to maintain the sentiments and institutions upon which it rests. Those who are responsible for men going into battle and those who participate in battles have no parity of rights or powers. War has always been one of the greatest enemies of democracy. Nothing is less implicit in militarism than the democratic ideal. In fact, it actually glorifies domination and servility. "Not only has militancy tended towards the rule of force

¹⁹ J. A. Macdonald, Quoted in *Review of Reviews*, Vol. 50, pp. 732-733.

²⁰ See L. Darwin, *The Need for Eugenic Reform*, pp. 499-504; D. S. Jordan, *The Human Harvest*; O. Seeck, *Geschichte des Untergangs der Antiken Welt*; A. G. Keller, *Societal Evolution*, pp. 171-172; J. A. Thomson, *What is Man?* p. 302.

and towards despotism in general, but even a defensive warfare . . . has more than once resulted in the subversion of democracy both in government and in society at large. . . War can never make the world 'safe for democracy.'" ²¹

d. The Intellectual and Cultural Costs. War, being an exaltation of physical strength and the principle of force, as against the love of truth and the pleasures of thought and knowledge, except in so far as the particular department of military science is concerned, cannot be deemed a cause of intellectual progress. True, researches for military purposes have incidentally led to discoveries of value in other fields, just as the practice of military surgery in the field has and is advancing surgical science in general. But, in the main, the effect has been to detract from pure science, and from the applications of science to general well-being, minds that might have made great and valuable contributions.

Military preoccupation and success must mean a loss of civilization. Bryce has said, "It is the races that know how to think rather than fight that contribute most to civilization." Again, "Progress is due chiefly to thought, which is more often hindered than helped by war." War leaves little or no time for non-military uses of thought and science, since all the constructive energies of a people are drained off into military operations. Particularly significant is the perversion of science from life-giving and life-improving endeavors to the perfecting of death-dealing devices. It is a melancholy fact that the greatest inventive achievements of man have had their greatest use in his own destruction.

War also interrupts the educational careers of many of the oncoming generation, retards or disorganizes wholesome educational processes, degrades minds by clever and unscrupulous propaganda and mob-mindedness and breeds ignorance. The emotion engendered and the confusion existing makes straight thinking difficult if not impossible.

War also brings a cultural decline. The choicest products of leisure and peace are relegated to the limbo of sentimentality. Militarism and materialism govern the time and energies of the people. The militarization of Germany following Bismarck's successful wars caused the treasures of German idealism, art, literature, and music, to be rifled in the victory. Business grew apace and imperial strength waxed

²¹ C. A. Ellwood, "Making the World Safe for Democracy," *Scientific Monthly*, Vol. 7, p. 511.

great, but the empire produced no successors to the German philosophers, humanists, musicians, and poets of a century ago.

War has also always been the destroyer of the choicest products of culture and intellectual achievement. It cannot be estimated what setbacks civilization has thereby suffered. Merely to allude to the destruction of the architecture, the sculpture, and other priceless art objects, the libraries, and other carriers of centuries of West European history is to suggest what is meant. Nor is any treasure in any spot of the world immune. Modern machines of destruction could even batter the pyramids and the Sphinx to shapeless heaps in a few hours; but in perceiving these desolate ruins we might have revealed to us another of the Sphinx's secrets.

e. The Moral and Spiritual Costs. War, to be sure, calls into play some of the noblest virtues. The courage and the sacrifice of those who fight, and the encouragement and coöperation of those who keep the home fires burning are splendid. But war inevitably plunges unnumbered millions of both combatants and non-combatants into a seething cauldron of mutual hate. This fierce and absorbing hatred, often mightily stimulated, is probably the chief of the furies which war is certain to unloose. Someone has said, "The deadliest, costliest war consists not so much in fighting and carnage, armaments and campaigns, as in losses by suspicion, envy and hatred." It leads to revenge and the desire for retaliation; it dries up the streams of good will; intolerance becomes a virtue. The voice of the spirit of international brotherhood is drowned in deeply-founded mutual recriminations and in diabolical chants of hatred. The virtues supposed to accrue from war are the merest by-products incidental to a process essentially vicious.

Then, too, war is certain to brutalize popular sentiments and feelings. "Kill," "destroy," and "punish" are the words on every tongue. It places the conception of might above that of right and creates a type of character in which the harsher and what one may call the barbaric virtues are exalted. The very horrors of war, and especially the barbarities committed upon prisoners and upon civil populations are brutalizing to all concerned.

There is also the vitiation of public and private morals, the abrogation of standards of conduct and social welfare, which have taken a long time and cost much to establish—a submerging of the very virtues through which the moral elevation of the world has been secured. Ideals are blighted and lowered. Justice is sacrificed to expediency.

Social reform and betterment movements are interrupted. Delinquency increases, the estimation of women declines, domestic instability grows, maintenance of order is more difficult, license and violence increase, and a general abandon and relaxation reigns. War breeds cupidity, cruelty, and deceit. It not only shatters men's bodies; it also blasts their souls. All this is most grave. As Edmund Burke once said: "War suspends the rules of moral obligation, and what is long suspended is in danger of being totally abrogated."

The effects of war upon spiritual values are equally disastrous. The brutal business of slaughter and destruction kills spirituality and destroys faith. Religion becomes subservient to militarism, and the churches proclaim a "moratorium in Christianity."

All the conceptions and values of self identified with progress are thwarted. Ideals of personal liberty are dimmed; personality is submerged, and the individual is automatized and standardized. "In the light of social evolution the obtrusion of militarism, even when associated with unavoidable necessity on the part of defendant parties, is a deplorable interruption of progress, of the temper out of which progress springs. Any laudable program of social integration or socialization must ever present the strongest possible contrast to militarism in point of recognition of individual worth and self-direction." ²²

f. The Next War. If the World War had lasted into 1919 military forces and methods more prodigious and destructive than any yet heard of would have been employed. Since then we have received some inkling of their nature and this has enabled us to anticipate the nature of the next war. It appears that the scientists are prepared to blot out civilization in a few months at the longest. The distinction between combatants and non-combatants which was one of the mitigations of war temporarily obtained by advancing civilization has now disappeared before advancing science. With the use of long-distance bombarding guns, submarines, the use of aircraft, the development of poison gas, the possible use of disease germs and death-dealing rays and wireless agencies of destruction, the immunity of the civilian has disappeared. Future wars will mean wholesale killing of all the population and wholesale destruction of all that is valuable. Whole peoples will be starved by blockades, their animals killed by diseases, their crops by blight. Cities will be destroyed by vast fleets of aircraft traveling 200 or more miles an hour, and carrying enormously destructive bombs, gases, and death-dealing liquids and germs; by tunneling

²² A. D. Weeks, *The Control of the Social Mind*, D. Appleton & Co., p. 227.

machines undermining them; by bombardments by guns shooting dozens of miles and hurling several tons of explosives with heretofore unheard of potency. Combatants will engage each other with machine guns that will kill men as surely as the Evil Eye, with water jets charged with death-carrying electric currents; with battleships and airships that will be floating fortresses; with wireless controlled tanks, torpedoes, airplanes; with phosphorus and other inflammable substances, with Lewisite or something even more deadly; and various other diabolically destructive devices that the imagination cannot even grasp. Of course, enemies will counter with equally effective devices and often succeed in neutralizing the offensive devices, but with such death-dealing capacity a delay of half an hour in countering an attack might conceivably result in the destruction of ten million people and the wastage of a strategic city or other area. Mankind are confronted with a choice which they must make very soon. On the one hand, they have means of destruction incalculable in their effects and wholesale and frightful in their character. On the other, they have the possibility of eliminating or tempering the causes of war and abolishing it as a method of settling international disputes.

g. Conclusion. With the advance of civilization the usefulness of war has declined. The forms of communication provide the agencies for the exchange of information and thought, and for culture contacts with the resulting mutual enrichment and internationalization of civilization. Transportation facilities of various kinds have drawn the world together into one family. The international division of labor, and international industry, commerce, and finance have made us all coöperators in a world economy. To-day the costs of war far outweigh any gains that are obtained by it. It is neither a logical, just, humane, nor profitable way to settle disputes. Civilization has contributed other less costly means of achieving what it once provided; at the same time it has provided the means whereby war can be eliminated from the human economy.

Nobody of sane mind will disagree with the proposition that war is a very terrible thing, and promises to be even more so; nor will any one disagree that if the human race desires to be considered a civilized institution, the organized killing of one's fellow-creatures must come to an end, for it is the potential destroyer of the human race. It has in it such possibilities of chaos, setback, and even destruction, that the straight-seeing and straight-thinking man shudders when he contemplates it.

9. THE AVOIDANCE OF WAR

No sane person can deny that the abolition of war is eminently desirable and absolutely necessary not only that progress may occur, but to maintain the degree of civilization that has been attained. The methods proposed are various. Here too, however, the telic policy offers the greatest possibilities of success.

Absolute pacifism does not effectively contribute to the ending of war. It is not thorough enough, nor sufficiently far-reaching, nor safe. Moreover, it is not yet certain that it is wrong to fight for the oppressed, for justice, or in defense of our country until other and better means are established. It is also true, as a trio of eminent thinkers have recently pointed out,²³ that the position of absolute pacifism causes the person to take the position of refusing to obey the laws of his country and become a law breaker, and if many do this a state of lawlessness will ensue. To organize an attitude against constitutional and statute law is the very antithesis of pacifism. The writers comment, "Even in so great a cause as the abolition of war we should have a care in invoking the methods of anarchy and treason, lest in doing so we unloose evils greater than those of war."

The method of directed evolution, that is, the elimination of causes, the processes of education and social reform, of creating moral visions, of careful and well-planned constructive effort, especially along the lines of a definite world organization, pursued with insistence, intelligence, and resourcefulness, are surer to reach the goal. To discourage war or prevent it, the part of wisdom does not seem to be to wholly incapacitate any single or any few nations for war, but to get rid of the cause of war, modify the attitudes that make for war, eliminate the agitation of propaganda for it, and create machinery for handling its supposed purposes. The process consists of putting intelligence and knowledge and coöperation where there is now prejudice and misconception. Just as spasmodic and sentimental hand-outs are the very worst social work, so this emotional and spasmodic pacifism with its demand for complete disarmament is the worst kind of peace work. Among the measures now discussed for the avoidance of war, those that follow seem to offer a considerable possibility of success, though they are in no sense final agents.

²³ E. Eubank, A. W. Taylor, R. E. Lewis, *Christian Century*, Sept. 17, 1925.

a. The Adjustment of the Economic Causes. Any really effective effort in the prevention of war involves the adoption of proper arrangements for the just distribution of territory and resources, the checking of industrial aggression, and the regulating of commercial rivalry. In our international business relations the law of the jungle still obtains. In this fact lie the seeds of war, and as long as we go on sowing dragons' teeth we must not be surprised at the punctual recurrence of the dragon's brood. If we would evade war the spirit of unbridled competition must be exorcised, and some sort of international control over international, industrial and commercial activities exercised. Some sort of a league of nations establishing international commerce commissions and trade commissions and enforcing international regulatory legislation would seem to be helpful. The last and most effective effort along this line would seem to be a League of Low Birth Rate Nations to take joint action against any race that by its too great fecundity threatens the peace of the world. But inasmuch as economic conditions and population cannot be perfectly controlled, and will consequently continue to be a cause of irritation, other aids are necessary.

b. Demilitarization. Excessive armaments are now an irritant that good policy demonstrates should be reduced. Not only do they impose a crushing financial burden upon a people and lead to the vicious circle of ever more extensive preparedness, but they directly conduce to war. More effective international agreements limiting armaments are necessary. The goal that thinking people have in mind is to reduce huge standing armies and enormous navies with their enormously expensive machines of destruction to the minimum of an efficiently equipped police force.

There needs to be deflation of military attitudes within the nations also. There is now so much uncalled for propaganda, sword-rattling, "chip-on-the-shoulder" posing and over-emphasis of militarized patriotism. This can only build up a state of mind which is closed to the realities of war and occupied with its superficial and emotional phases. But any clipping of the claws of the war monster is merely a palliative.

c. Outlawry and Law. What seems to be needed most is a definite world attitude toward the outlawry of war. For there will always be causes of war. Even if the whole complex of causes effective to-day were removed, there would be fresh causes to-morrow. Just as in our neighborly and community life there are innumerable causes for dispute continually arising, so this is true in the community of nations.

But in our neighborhoods we have outlawed force, violence, and the duel as legitimate or acceptable methods of settlement, and the great mass of us heed these principles of outlawry because they have been declared crimes. Similarly the nations need to declare war as a method of settling disputes a crime; the moral sentiment of the world must be brought to the point of condemning war as it condemns brawling and murder in communities.

Of course, war is still a matter of national honor. But a century ago dueling was demanded by an almost universal sense of personal honor. The dread of it was everywhere, yet no one dared to break with the "code of honor" lest the disgrace of cowardice should shadow the family name. But eventually the common conscience rebelled and dueling was outlawed, and to-day is almost unknown. The same is true of the ordeal, trial by battle, and piracy. Piracy is particularly significant. Here was an institution universally accepted and condoned under which successful sea-roving pirates were treated as heroes and benefactors on their return home with the spoils. To-day they would be hung, the reason being that the nations have made piracy an international crime, punishable by the law of nations anywhere the pirate is caught. The international slave-trade was outlawed also by action of nations. The anarchy of private or semi-private war against one's neighbors has given way to the public law of relations and property and contract by the route of outlawry. Nothing, war included, can withstand a universal sentiment when it dares to express itself in collective action.

Outlawry is a change in direction upon the part of the people and the nations. It is a right-about face. It is putting war under the ban of nations; it makes aggressive war an international crime. It eliminates the mock-heroic attached to war, and makes it definitely illegal and unholy; it reduces it from its present status of right, respectability, and honor to that of an outlaw. The right of defense of course remains, but that is no more war than striking back at a personal assailant is dueling.

Outlawry displaces war by law—not by arbitration, nor voluntary conference, nor military alliances, nor a league of political units working through diplomats, but by law, universally recognized as just and mandatory. This, of course, involves a considerable change in international law. Three-fourths of our existing international law has to do with the regulation of war. International law is thus practically a code of war; it is the international dueling code. What is necessary is

not merely a codification of international law, necessary and valuable as that is, but also an amplification that should include as its first article, in the words of Professor J. W. Garner, "a clear and emphatic declaration pronouncing aggressive war to be an international crime, declaring that aggressors shall not be entitled to the benefit and protection of the law of nations and laying down the principle that a state which goes to war without first submitting its grievance to judicial determination shall be considered as *prima facie* an aggressor" ²⁴

This law, established by the will of nations, will have to be embodied in a recognized international or world court, and other appropriate institutions or agencies through which the declaration of outlawry can be authoritatively and effectively enforced in practice—a court with full jurisdiction in which potential causes of war can be adjudicated between nations in accordance with the established international code of justice.

All this involves a process of enlightenment and education, for until nations are convinced that war should be outlawed there is no way of outlawing it. Along with any organization of nations to keep the peace must go a progressive education of public opinion. People must want outlawry bad enough to ask for it. At present such action is confined to a few. All the intellect and all the resources of every individual have to be enlisted in this cause so as to form an irresistible group stronger than the predatory forces that make for war.

d. A League of Nations. While a league of nations is no guarantee against war or even a very effective means of preventing it, it is possible through it to arrive at international agreements of various kinds, provide an international forum and clearing house, make possible a clearly expressed international majority opinion, produce a closer mutual relationship and understanding, make possible a process of constant adjustment of changing international relations, and effect more frequent and more effective international coöperation. Membership in such a league is becoming unavoidable; not only national expediency, but international well-being demand it.

QUESTIONS AND PROBLEMS

1. Armand Marrast, one of the framers of the Constitution of the Second Republic of France in 1848, has this as an argument: Revolutions are due to the repression of progress, and are the expression of triumph of a progress which has been achieved. Comment.

* "The Codification of War," *Christian Century*, Feb. 12, 1925.

2. What evidence is there that future revolutions may be international rather than occurring entirely within a nation?
3. Are certain forms of revolution justifiable and even desirable from the progressive point of view?
4. Are there more agencies available now for avoiding revolution than at the time of the French Revolution? Can we as a group be persuaded to use them?
5. General Grant once declared that there never was a war that could not have been avoided. Comment.
6. What can be said of the statement that human nature is so constituted that it makes war inevitable?
7. To what extent have the causes of war discussed in the text played a part in the wars in which the United States participated? What other causes were operative?
8. In what ways has advancing civilization robbed war of its power to contribute to progress?
9. Which is the surer cure of war: military disarmament or commercial disarmament?
10. Is national patriotism a scientific guide to national action under all circumstances?
11. Can a good patriot be a bad citizen?
12. Will there be a world patriotism?
13. Considering present world trends, could world peace be an intolerable situation from the progressive point of view?

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CHAPTER XXIII

THE ETHICAL REQUISITES OF PROGRESS

I. THE NATURE AND SIGNIFICANCE OF MORALITY

ALL progressive effort and thinking involve a conception of the right and the problems of right. This right is variously expressed as morality and ethics. Morality refers to actual conduct, while ethics is the systematic thinking, more or less critical, about conduct. The moral code of a people is the means whereby their social conduct is canalized. It is the result of the attempts to date to solve the group's problem of mutual adaptation and adjustment; it is that selected residue of age-long experience and reflection of the group and of its thinking élite upon social conduct that has produced the best results in general well-being and an orderly social life that is good and right. Hence right conduct is activity viewed from the standpoint of control, that is, it must contribute to social adjustment and social vitality; it signifies those conditions of social life which are essential to social maintenance and progress. In the last analysis, morality is a method of coöperation for the greatest good of the greatest number—a method of successfully living together; it is fulfilling those mutual duties which must be performed in the interest of an orderly society; it is establishing in the family, the neighborhood, the village, the city, the state, the nation, and the brotherhood of mankind those conditions which guard and secure human well-being; its object is "to live and to let live," and to help others to live; it seeks to produce the good and the full life. William James once said that the one unconditional commandment is "that we should seek incessantly, with fear and trembling, so to vote and act as to bring about the very largest total universe of good which we can see," and that the man who proposes to act morally will give his active approval to every experiment calculated to discover the means of arriving at this goal in the concrete issues of life. And this commandment is of the essence of morality.

2. PROGRESS AND THE CONTEMPORARY ETHICAL NEEDS

If there is to be progress, right conduct is indispensable. There can be no Good Society without it. Every approximation of progressive goals

demands an advance in the quality of the social relations, that is, an advance in morals. Every really epochal advance must have it or slip back. One of the basic tests of any civilization is the standard of ethics and the moral practice which the people have attained. In fact ethical conduct is so essentially a part of all normal social activities that it also furnishes a test for social progress. It is equally true that it is vain to hope for a reconstructed society if fundamental ethics be neglected or if the current ethics are perverted or out of date. Goodness facilitates progress; wickedness drives to retrogression, or else it means stagnation, which, compared with advance, is retrogression.¹ History shows that high morality is one of the chief constituents of civilization, and that without it, there is a swift decay.

One is led to ask, What is the quality of the contemporary, everyday ethics, and to what degree does it meet contemporary needs? An inventory is none too assuring. We need, as never before, those fundamental ethical principles and attitudes that, if obeyed, will establish the domestic, the industrial, the economic, the communal or civic, the international relations of the modern civilized world on an ethical basis adjusted to the complicated needs of the moment.

Viewing the present critically, it would seem that the moral development of civilized humanity has not kept pace with its purely intellectual or its scientific development. For while we give mental assent to the idea that service and coöperation should be the dominating, ethical principles, and while most of us recognize the existence of mutual responsibilities and mutual effects in conduct, actually we are still quite generally acting according to principles of ruthless individualism and the uncontrolled use of power. Individually, as groups, and as nations, we still permit and even professedly or tacitly glorify rules of life which include ruthless oppression of the masses, the gospel of brute force, of utter indifference to the fate of the weak or less well placed, the gospel of remorseless struggle and competition—personal, economic, international—the conception that makes selfishness a virtue and allows the spoils to the lucky ones, the regnant feeling that all is right that “you can get away with.” But we must frankly face the fact that the capacity of social forces to work good or evil has been greatly enlarged, and the life of every individual, as the result of the inexorable and much accelerated forces of social evolution, whether he will or no, has been

¹ “The scheme of things is so arranged in this particular world of ours that either righteousness must triumph or else the material and intellectual advance of man must cease.” H. F. Wyatt, “The Race: Death or Life!” *Nineteenth Century*, Vol. 88, p. 866.

more widely interlaced with the general welfare in the last half century than ever before. Consequently neither in the domain of economics, social life, nor politics can the negative freedom of the past with its "Let things be" furnish us with necessary guidance.

Those who would contend that *laissez-faire*, as we know it, is in conformity with cosmic process should heed the words of Huxley, one of the foremost pioneers of evolutionary biology, in his Romanes lecture for 1893. He said:

"Social Progress means a checking of the cosmic process at every step and the substitution for it of another, which may be called the ethical process; the end of which is not the survival of those who may happen to be fittest, in respect of the whole conditions which exist, but of those who are ethically the best. . . . The practice of that which is ethically best—what we call goodness or virtue—involves a course of conduct which, in all respects, is opposed to that which leads to success in the cosmic struggle for existence. In place of ruthless self-assertion it demands self-restraint; in place of thrusting aside, or treading down all competitors, it requires that the individual shall not merely respect, but shall help his fellows; its influence is directed, not so much to the survival of the fittest, as to the fitting of as many as possible to survive."

Needed also is a personal ethical consciousness, that is, an individual awareness of the nature and importance of the group's best standards of conduct, that is acute enough to cause men to do the right because it is the ideal right, rather than because they are afraid of penalties and punishments. Needless to say there are altogether too many who would fail to do right if given complete exemption from any personal consequences or from all fear of punishment. Can any one contend that progress can go very far until each individual affirms and acts from a strong sense of social responsibility and a considerable degree of unselfishness?

We also need a general level of morality that will make our ethical canons so gripping that the prevailing practices which enable the attainment of riches to be considered as the chief prize of life will be definitely countered. Such a practice tends to materialize and brutalize any people that adopt it, and things human, things cultural, things spiritual are at a disadvantage. Our canons should enforce practices that make worth depend on the progressive contributions of the individuals.

Furthermore our canons regarding truthfulness are not yet widely binding upon men in all departments of life. And yet in modern society truth-telling is a basic necessity, for it is a great lynch-pin which holds the timbers of society together. The measure of our civilization is

to-day the measure by which we can trust each other. Treachery, broken promises, untruthfulness, inaccuracy, dishonesty, in this day of mutual dependence and fine adjustments, pull men apart and cause chaos and waste. Truth must become universal in practice if contemporary society is to prosper.

A universal ethic and morality must come into being that will reduce and eventually prevent the illimitable possibilities of great evil and destruction inherent in the giant, non-moral force, science. If we do not have it, then the magic which might have made the earth almost a paradise will convert it into a hell and perhaps later into a wilderness. Mankind to-day stands in greater danger of self-inflicted destruction than ever before. Unless the moral advance coincides with the material, which is the result of science, the latter can never be realized and fully enjoyed, but will turn out to be dust and ashes. For no material or other well-being long endures unless it is sustained by a moral order.

3. THE NEW ETHICS

There is a tendency for our ethics, like all our other means of control, to quickly become customary and inflexible, to change tardily, and consequently to function imperfectly in the new age. But there is ever at work a new leaven which serves as the basis of the next step. There is appearing on the horizon to-day what we might call the "new ethics." Of course, it is not widely diffused, nor does it as yet have any currency to speak of, but it is probably a forecast of the ethics of a generation hence. In it are distinguishable several fundamental attitudes of inestimable importance which admirably fit it as a means of establishing basic progress norms.

a. It Is Relative. Until recently the ethical codes—the codes that a given people have used in their daily life—have been commonly conceived as being composed of infallible, unchangeable, universal, and absolute verities. Men have habitually written over their ethical systems, as over their religions, the words: "As it was in the beginning, is now, and ever shall be." But the latter nineteenth century with its potent doctrine of evolution changed all this. All systems now seem to be relative. The candid and revised history of ethics of to-day shows little that is fixed and changeless, little that is as static as the principles of logic or mathematics. There is a noticeable tendency to-day that will probably rid us of many absolutes and prove the relativity of most facts.

The inevitableness of change in morals, as elsewhere, must be recognized. Human life with its ceaseless activity and its kaleidoscopic variations brings about a continual need for readjustment. "Every act . . . not purely habitual or instinctive causes a dislocation of our relations to other people and makes necessary the establishment of a new equilibrium." The average human community therefore assures a mobile rather than a static moral order. "Change . . . is inherent in the very structure of the moral life. Every good act ceases to be a good act by virtue of its performance. It passes from the realm of moral effort into the past and becomes a moral fact. Time, in ethics as elsewhere, makes ancient good uncouth. For the sheer sequence of events creates moral maladjustments. On the heels of the good act completed rise new moral issues." ² Absolute moral rules can hardly be expected in a growing and changing world. Our standards of life are unmade and remade by concrete conditions, changed circumstances, and experiences that have arrived at the point of analysis. Unavowed reinterpretation of the terms in which rules are couched constantly goes on.

This means that moral norms are relative; they vary with place and with time. Different objects are aimed at in different periods. Creeds and the conditions that make them change forever. Different societies and the same societies at different times exhibit the widest variety of conceptions of right and wrong. Practices which would not be tolerated in one period of a society's development become the accepted mode of conduct a decade or a century later. That which at one place is held to be right and proper is at another place considered to be not only wrong, but one of the greatest of crimes. It all depends on the degree and kind and epoch of social development.

Our ideal of the moral good can only be formulated out of the immediate experiences of the present. Morality at any given time is definitely related only to the concrete wants and purposes of a given generation of men. And, as Mecklin points out,³ since future experiences imply situations which are beyond our control and hence unpredictable we can never dogmatize as to the nature of the absolute good. Experience, constantly accumulating, forces us to reorganize again and again our conceptions of the good. The moral ideal, like all other ideals, is a growing goal and not a fixed and distant one which we are slowly approximating. We need not expect to find finality in either the old morality, the pseudo-old, or the new, for all of them are now seen to

² J. M. Mecklin, *Introduction to Social Ethics*, Harcourt, Brace & Co., p. 189.

³ *Op. cit.*, p. 197.

be conditioned by the time and the circumstances of their origin. Thus each generation, it must be remembered, makes its own best ethics. This is a great modern fact, and emphasizes a great modern responsibility.

b. It Is Scientific. The ethics for this new age must be based upon something more substantial than protestations of belief and motive, didactic transcendentalism, revealed religion, or even abstract metaphysical principles. It must become steadily less formal and more factual if it is to promote sound human living. And this can only occur if it rests upon the truths taught by human experience; and these are essentially the contributions which science, especially social science, makes. We see to-day that social knowledge and scientific method are indispensable for the construction of sound ideals of human living, whether these concern chance personal contacts, family life, economic life, political life, international, or interracial relations. Ethics must to-day rest upon the facts produced by scientific inquiry, that is, by the standard scientific method of observation and deduction including experiment and verification. We have succeeded in applying science to our mechanical tasks, and in this have accomplished prodigies; we are now beginning to apply it to the formation of our social ends and purposes, and if the adolescent activities of the social sciences are at all portentous of what adulthood will bring, it augurs well.

In the past we have learned our ethics, as we have learned everything else, by costly experience. To-day scientific method enables us to accelerate the processes of experience vastly and to provide even more reliable results. As such it is one of the greatest ethical forces of our time. The end of scientific investigation is to discover the truth about all things, so far as man is able to grasp it. This includes the truth concerning all the relations of human society. Especially does it demonstrate that if we are to make an ethical decision we must see all the relations of the subject to ourselves and our fellow-men, and see them disinterestedly, without prejudice or regard to authority and tradition. Such a mental attitude is consistently developed by scientific studies alone. The highest ethical truths and the most complete understanding of social relationships can only be part of an ethic that is based upon scientific methods and attitudes.

Especially must the ethics that would play a part in modern social life, or even more—that is to play a part in progress—rest firmly upon social science. The new ethics recognizes this fact and acts accordingly. Of course, science can only lay down general principles of conduct. It cannot possibly determine what specifically is to be done in any specific

moral situation. The particular situations call for individual intelligence and judgment in addition to the scientifically determined norm.

c. It Is Objective. Virtues contemplated subjectively, or perhaps rather egocentrically, have ceased to command respect because they can be neither measured nor verified. If we have a subjective ethics, the test is the individual conscience. The actor must look continually inward for guidance in the social world, but "Such a person," as Carver contends, "is like one who would try to guide himself through the world by closing his eyes to the objects around him and following an assumed inner sense of direction." Conscience is not a reliable guide; it is the product of circumstances of time and place; it may become ingrown and perverted, and lead to any conceivable kind of conduct. To-day we are beginning to realize that our norms must refer to objective tests. "Character and conduct either of the individual or the state are . . . to be evaluated, not in accordance with their power to please, or to create the sensation of approval within us, but in accordance with their power to propel us in the right direction."⁴ In brief, to-day ethics is not a matter of conscience or creeds or forms, but a type of conduct. It is not the views that a man holds or the dogmas he believes in that are of importance to his fellow creatures; it is his acts. The loftiest dreams are of little avail if they do not lead to right action. "To know whether morality obtains or whether men are saints or sinners, we consult results. . . The tangible conditions surrounding us have become an index of the general prevalence of a moral spirit."⁵

If ethics does not inevitably result in the development of sound traits, habits, achievements, and objective surroundings, it is useless; it is hypocritical and therefore worse than useless. Its justification consists in its ability to induce genuine and beneficial change in social conduct. "By their fruits ye shall know them" is robust and wholesome doctrine. This is a fact that the new ethics insists upon.

It must not be forgotten, however, that the objective ethics, to be fully effective, must be the very essence of the individual's action. In other words, the objective ethics must be individually absorbed, and made the working basis of the individual's conduct.

d. It Is Socialized. The ethics of individualism has broken down. Instead of helping to solve ethical problems it has tended to intensify them. In place of it we find the greatest ethical principle of the twentieth

⁴T. N. Carver, *Essays in Social Justice*, p. vi.

⁵O. F. Boucke, "Relation of Ethics to Social Science," *International Journal of Ethics*, Vol. 33, pp. 69, 70.

century, as it has been called, the ideal of service to one's fellows. Righteousness must be definitely social. This involves as the supreme moral end the realization of the socialized self, or socialized personality. As Huxley pointed out, the ape and tiger methods of the struggle for existence are not reconcilable with sound ethical principles. The individual does not merely need to survive and avoid hurting his fellows; he needs also an increasingly keen and sympathetic sense of social obligations. Moral norms to-day must aim as much at the successful and even improved continuation of social life as individual life. The only workable ethics in this increasingly complex society is one which, as Spencer puts it,⁶ "conciliates" the egoistic and altruistic motives of men, one which adds the ideal of service and responsibility to that of individual well-being. It must rest more and more on a sensitive and absorbing interest of man in man for man's sake. The individual must not only consider himself as an individual, but also as a steward of the well-being of mankind. He must realize that no strength and no activity is justified in this world which does not also dedicate itself to the common good. Ethics is only important as it assists in the realization of the social welfare ideal. This the new ethics most emphatically seeks to do. Its chief reason for this is that its final goal is general self-realization. The achievement of this means that all must coöperate along ethical lines, and in all social activities. Failure to perform these social obligations deprives someone else of self-realization. Therefore the completely socialized person must be trained to take his part in the teamwork of social life.

It might be added that the new ethics is not only socialized, but also universalized. It extends not only to all men, but to all life, and insists as much on humane and enlightened treatment of animals, even though they be means, as it does upon the highest good among men.

4. THE RELATION OF GOOD CONDUCT TO ENVIRONMENT

As we have seen, in this world conditions make their own moral codes. They also make the morality of the individuals to a very considerable extent. What this means is that the conduct of individuals partly at least reflects their environment, and that the right morality requires ordinarily a certain kind of environment or it will not grow. It is, of course, conceivable that a slum bred, for example, may exceptionally turn out to be a decent man; but we have no right to expect it, and the

⁶H. Spencer, *Principles of Ethics*, Vol. I, Pt. 1, Ch. XIV.

chances are the other way. Good conduct arises out of improved conditions, and these in turn are the result of plan and effort. It is a responsibility of the progressive to work resolutely to bring about that amelioration in the material and social conditions which produces higher morality.

Of course, as Professor A. K. Rogers points out,[†] the conditions of life must leave a man free to make a fool of himself if he chooses, but special facilities need not be provided. We are interested, therefore, in having the citizen surrounded with agencies that have a tendency to develop the good that is in him, and we must be careful that he is not subjected to temptations that are too strong and persistent. The circumstances of the environment shall not be allowed to take a form which makes it inherently improbable that men generally will have the strength and motive to resist incitements to evil.

5. PROGRESS AND MORAL INCULCATION

Most good citizens are made such by the processes of social control operating consciously or unconsciously within every social group. It is possible for us to greatly facilitate the acquisition of a fine morality if we utilize the proper and efficient means. In fact, we are beginning to see that the group actually has a responsibility in giving to every citizen good, sound, ethical ideas and even habits fit to make him a useful and skillful member of the community; and they should be given him in such a way that they will last him for life.

This is particularly necessary in view of the fact that our social life is growing so rapidly to be so extensive and so complicated, and our moral life involves continually larger groups of people and more complicated situations. The only hope of a sound moral condition in society, not to mention moral progress, lies in the widest possible diffusion of accurate information concerning social situations and the inculcation of the best moral canons.

Just how this is to occur, however, is a problem. Certain it is that it must begin with the young. But parents cannot be depended upon to impart this moral information or to direct the process of moral inculcation because they themselves are in large part ill-trained and ignorant of how to live. The churches and Sunday-schools have done something even with their one-day-a-week influence on a minority of the popula-

[†] "Principles of Moral Legislation," *International Journal of Ethics*, Vol. 29, p. 472.

tion. But the actual perplexing problems of living are seldom taken up in the churches and discussed in a free and unbiased manner; the actual instruction is often distracted or obstructed by theological interests, and offered in terms often unassimilable; the numberless sects offer divergent doctrines, and the work of teaching is done mostly by volunteers with no special training or fitness for the work. It would seem that it was a responsibility of the public schools.⁸

If the schools assume this task, teachers of special aptitude, training, and character will be required, for the only workable method of instruction will demand knowledge, insight, skill, common sense, moral fervor, and above all, outstanding moral soundness. The instruction will consist not in pouring in moral ideas from without by means of verbal instruction, ethical textbooks, or the memorizing of lists of abstract virtues. For knowledge of righteousness, we have discovered, is not a guarantee of greater righteousness in human affairs. The process must consist in drawing out moral powers within the individual by subjecting them to suitable stimuli. As Otto says, "Actual character develops as a certain kind of environment calls into play certain human capacities rather than others."⁹ Children acquire ethical behavior only through participation in life; it is only concrete moral situations that give rise to deep-seated moral ideas. If the formal method of ethical instruction is used there is a tendency for most people to "grow into the conception that the business of life is one thing, the business of being good another." Morality must be taught in such a manner that the issues of everyday life are directly involved and that the individuals learn by their actions to make life more livable for all.

If we would succeed in moral instruction, we must do our best to establish conditions which will make growth in moral character the natural, normal result of the daily contacts of life, in school and out. If the entire school economy is designed to further the moral education of youth and every undertaking is used, without advertising or reference, as a moral training project, much good can be done. Skillful educators doubtless can devise innumerable means. But all the contacts which the child or youth makes must give a right moral impression, for children are exceedingly canny and can see through the hypocrisy of much of our verbal morality. As Professor Otto indicates, the real character building forces are the playground, the street, overheard conversations between

⁸ See Chapter XIV, sec. 6, part h.

⁹ M. C. Otto, "The Moral Education of Youth," *International Journal of Ethics*, Vol. 32, p. 58. See also J. M. Mecklin, *An Introduction to Social Ethics*, pp. 185-186.

adults, books, newspapers, movies, the routine of school and home life—all the various contacts with life. These must be elevated and moralized. But this practically implies a moral regeneration of adults—who are the models of children.¹⁰ With efficient and intensive work in the schools given by conscientious and enlightened teachers some of the unmoral and immoral reactions of the present-day run of adults may be neutralized, and the oncoming generation as adults will offer a better environment and examples than the present. If each successive generation will make as much advance as the preceding, one can see the possibility of a moral progression. Such, at any rate, seems to be our method and our hope.¹¹

6. CAUTIONS FOR THE PROGRESSIVE MORALIST

For anyone who is at all familiar with the elementary principles of ethical science and the basic elements in progressive theory certain cautions stand out if moral progress is to be effected.

a. The Morals Inculcated Must not Be Ascetic. The morality encouraged dare not be ascetic; it must be for man as he is in his present world. We dare not invalidate the urges and interests of the healthy-minded man, nor degrade and enslave the human spirit. This morality cannot be lacking in vitality and strength, nor can it destroy or omit the virile qualities of human nature; it must elicit the masterfulness and courage which are inseparable from strength of purpose and self-respect.

It must be practical and not too contemplative. Its formulas must hold good for such actual questions as men are asking every day in this inchoate society in which we live about riches and poverty, about land and monopolies, about sex and marriage and divorce and the family, about war, race and class conflict, and a hundred others.

b. The Morals Must Be Unselfish. The ethical instructors must face the fact that service is the law of life. Loving our neighbor as ourselves and the sacrificing of self for others is the unavoidable, though perhaps undesired, fact that we must face. The egoistic or individualistic point of view must be modified by and conciliated with the altruistic with its concern for others. To live for others is to find the abundant

¹⁰ *Op. cit.*, p. 61.

¹¹ The reader's attention is called to the following excellent articles dealing with the subject discussed above: M. C. Otto, "The Moral Education of Youth," *International Journal of Ethics*, Vol. 32, pp. 52-67; Durant Drake, "The Acceleration of Moral Progress," *Scientific Monthly*, Vol. 2, 601-606; P. G. Nutting, "Principles of Education," *Scientific Monthly*, Vol. 7, pp. 449-451.

life. Only as the result of such activity can the possibilities of all men be adequately realized, for such activity raises all and degrades none. Men lose themselves in greater wholes.

c. Moral Advance Must not Be Superficial or too Rapid. It must be remembered that the moral progress of society always is a slow and gradual process. Society at large changes only a little at a time. As Cadoux says,¹² "The world's moral color is the general average produced by the color of each component unit, and can change only when a sufficient number of units have changed." The lasting and satisfactory adoption of a new moral standard must be dependent on some inner moral improvement. Men do not live on a higher moral plane unless they have been morally and spiritually prepared for it. "It is quite true that they (men) often appear to be led to change their ways for the better by such external appeals as the criticism of others and the compulsion of laws. . . . But if an advance beyond what society demands be attempted in some department of conduct, without the party concerned feeling sincerely that duty requires that advance, and without his being raised to that spiritual level on which it becomes imperative, the advance achieved will in all probability prove a hollow and short-lived thing."¹³

Furthermore, true morality is not advanced by the passing of laws or the taking of other governmental steps which demand of people generally a far higher standard of conduct than they are yet able to appreciate and aspire to. Gladstone said in this connection,¹⁴ "A moral evil cannot be cured by a mechanical remedy. Changes of law, even for the better, require and presuppose, in order to be beneficial, a degree at least of moral assimilation, a desire for the thing to be enacted as a basis for the enactment, rested on which it may itself react upon and confirm the desire." There must be a progressive moralization, not a suddenly imposed one.

This, of course, does not mean that there must be no ethical advance on the part of the minority until the whole mass of the community is ready to advance on an even front. That is not the way in which great ethical advances ever have been made. The moral advance will always begin with a minority of advanced and uncompromising moral idealists who will lead the way towards better things, keep alive the demand for them, and effect moral revolutions in individual lives. But 'no hasty

¹² C. J. Cadoux, "The Individual Factor in Social Progress," *International Journal of Ethics*, Vol. 32, p. 131.

¹³ *Ibid.*, p. 132.

¹⁴ *The State in its Relations with the Church*, Vol. II, p. 402.

and superficial conversion of the mass of men will ever bring a lasting moral advance.

At the same time it is well to note that the ethical principles stressed for the next step should not be pitched too high. The new moral goal must fit into the preformed mechanism of the social disposition and be able to organize the practical interests of life. The new principles must be within the easy comprehension of men and adjusted to their present capacities for achievement. The goal must be ahead and above, but not out of sight of the mass of men, nor so far above them that they lose hope or are overstrained in reaching for it.

But in all cases moral advance must be just as rapid as the part of wisdom and instruction technique permits, and the ideals should be pitched just as high as the general comprehension of the mass allows. The cautions here mentioned are not for the purpose of slowing up moral progress, but making it certain and sound.

d. The Morals Should Be Positive in Emphasis rather than Negative. The trend of the times is in the direction of less repression and more evocation. Ethical inculcation must recognize this or lose out in the end. The "thou shalt nots" repress and antagonize and arouse morbid curiosity. By prohibiting wrongdoing, for example, you clothe it in a robe of mystery; you awaken curiosity about it; and it receives a sort of dignity. The better way is to emphasize or approve the great social, heroic virtues, and give a tone of victory to right actions. The young should be shown what the good life is, why it is so winsome and noble, and then all the refined arts of encouragement and persuasion should be used to enlist their enthusiasms and energies in its consummation.

Human beings are happy with the joy of creation; they respond more readily in a world of initiative and hope and commendation than in a world of condemnation and negation. And their moral nature actually improves as their conduct becomes better.

e. Benevolence Should not Be Omitted. With our rapid scientific advance and the naturalistic point of view that goes with it we must be careful that these do not too much control our actions and attitudes. For these for many tend to individualism and materialism. A union between benevolence and the scientific attitude, and not one or the other alone, is what is needed in an effective ethics, and it must be incorporated in any ethical program. For along with the concrete facts and the unavoidable deductions and plan of action must go a moral enthusiasm, a fine sympathy, a powerful good will, and ennobled human

warmth. If not, you have merely a machine, and machines are efficient only in the world of things.

7. THE ETHICAL FUTURE

That this is an auspicious age from the ethical point of view is borne out by the fact that there never were so many social forces working as there are to-day urging men and women everywhere to rise out of their narrowness, their rank individualism and selfishness, and secure common benefits for all. It is probably true that never before were there so many men in this world ready to offer their means or their lives for humanity, never so many who rally to the cry of justice and liberty, never so many concerned with the utmost equality of opportunity. The bulk of men are probably wiser and better than they have ever been; but they can be infinitely better and wiser than they are. Our moral life can be and will be what we make it. Now it is still far from even present conceptions of that which is good. But if we use every agency of social education we can in time raise the mores to a level more in conformity with the fundamental ethical principles prerequisite to social stability and progress, and through the same agent we have the power to make sins, which are now generally tolerated and respectable, so odious, so infamous, that they will practically cease. It is for the felicity minded to recall also that that conduct which conduces to the best interests of society will ultimately be caused to be sanctioned and justified, and that which hinders the progress of the social group and threatens its existence can be made wrong and unmoral or immoral. This means that society can make anything right. We believe that it will only accept permanently those institutions and modes of conduct that lead to social progress.

We must also face the fact, however, that if the better world is to be soon, its coming depends on the propulsive nature and the degree of coöperation among the socially-minded. We have reached the place in our social development where moral progress can be achieved only as those individuals who have already themselves reached a high moral level shall coöperate in the planning and execution of a moral progress.

QUESTIONS AND PROBLEMS

1. What can law do to improve morals? Is it altogether adequate?
2. Why does progress necessitate a constant moral readjustment? What are some of the readjustments we are now making?

3. What has been the effect upon our moral code of (a) emancipation of women, (b) the World War, (c) science, (d) growth of cities?
4. What are some of the most significant molders of contemporary ethical conceptions? Is the resultant ethics in conformity with progress ideals?
5. What factors encourage moral laxness to-day?
6. What are some of the evidences of great moral possibilities in the world to-day?
7. What should be the bases for judging the moral value of new types of conduct?
8. What can be said of conscience as a reliable moral guide?
9. In what sense are we obligated to render social service?
10. Can a man act from loyalty to the fundamental interests and welfare of humanity as a whole and still be expressing himself progressively?
11. "So act as to release the best in others, and thereby you will release the best that is in yourself." (F. Adler, *The World Crisis and its Meaning*, p. 212.) Discuss.
12. What is the ethical reply to-day to the old axiom implied in the question, "Shall I not do what I will with mine own?"
13. "Each individual has to work out his own course alone and establish the law of his own life . . . each man confronts his own moral problems which no other man's are exactly alike." (Dole, *The Ethics of Progress*, p. 384.) Does this contradict what has been said in the body of the chapter concerning the group's responsibility for the ethical conduct of individuals?
14. Are there any universal ethical fundamentals?
15. How shall the responsibility for moral conduct be divided between the individuals and the group?

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CHAPTER XXIV

THE ESTHETIC REQUISITES OF PROGRESS

I. PROGRESS AND BEAUTY

BEAUTY is another indispensable value for any society which aspires to be progressive. Now beauty is a very strange thing that has never been satisfactorily defined or analyzed. Moreover, its canons are not eternally and universally the same, but are relative, varying in different individuals, different nations, different climes, and different epochs. Nevertheless, it is for us, a given people, at a certain time and place, an attribute of persons and things, and it does things to us, and through us, and for us that causes its actuality to be universally admitted. It is a great spiritual possession that takes its place along side of truth and justice and goodness and love and religion.

All through the ages, as archeology and social anthropology record, some human beings have been consciously reaching out for beauty, and trying to make it and to embody it in their various spiritual, intellectual and material creations. Among all contemporary peoples, however rude or simple their lives, and however unsophisticated they may be, beauty is more or less consciously felt and appreciated, and more or less completely expressed. In fact, the history of the origin and development, the growth and decline of the forms and expressions of beauty among men constitutes a very important portion of the history of civilization. As regards a particular people, the history of their efforts to conceive and express beauty is, with the single exception of the history of their speculative opinions, the most reliable test of the stage of progress which they have attained. A civilization without beauty or one that is careless and unmindful of beauty is not wholesome or of high grade, and certainly not progressive.

When do we have beauty? When we have those attributes and relationships of things, or situations, or thoughts, or sounds, that give to men a mystical inner joy, a poignant sense of perfect harmony, a buoyancy of soul, and exaltation and even sublimation of self. In beauty there is an absence of irrelevant elements, a complete inner harmony, a fitness and rightness, a perfection of form, a grandeur of ideal char-

acter, a superhuman majesty. Thus when man conceives of beauty he is uplifted, he is placed above material things and interests; the soul of him is touched, and he is impersonalized, spiritualized, and eternalized; all the highest values of life are opened up to him. While under its influence he has a type of perfect experience, he is a free and serene spirit, and consciously and fully lives.¹ Beauty tends toward the freeing, ordering, and perfecting of life; it refreshes, enhances, exalts, stimulates; it means higher aspiration, better work, and more abundant life; it seems to embody our ideal of what life should be. Finally its appreciation makes the individual part of the great creative communion of men—in some degree a co-worker in the great spiritual republic of beauty makers.

It is obvious that there can be no progress without beauty. There can be no notable realization of great selves, no even approximate spiritual fulness, no utter harmony, no living on a high plane, no high self-expression if there is not beauty. No civilization can be lovely in attainments, the quality of whose daily living is ugly. In fact there seems to be a direct connection between ugliness and meanness. When life is ugly and sordid the human soul is cramped and twisted, the human spirit perverted and dulled. Now there may be rare souls who can be most beautiful in their life expressions even among the most unpleasant and sordid surroundings and conditions, but they are few—very few. Most men unconsciously and of necessity reflect the nature of the life about them. Therefore if the individual life is to be one of spiritual quality and finest satisfactions and expressions, it must have beauty about it.

Beauty is one of the few great things which sustain the spirit of communities, and place the group psyche on a spiritual level. It sets a tone, even establishes flowing standards of a sort, for it gives us instances of what we would like our society to be like, entirely and continually. A society simply cannot get along without it, or be blind to it. One of our greatest American students of both civilization and beauty has said: "Ugliness, whether in the informing spirit and the declared principle, or in the material manifestation, is the unfailing

¹"The sheer, unquestionable and unquestioned joy of beholding a beautiful thing, and the liberating activity of producing it, have been regarded throughout recorded history as among the clear and impeccable goods of life." I. Edman, "Art for Philistia," *Bookman*, Vol. 61, p. 394. "Man, in the presence of beauty, is transported for the time being into a little world where his own pettiness and imperfection are lost sight of in the enjoyment of harmonious and complete living." W. M. Cabot, "The Place of Beauty in American Life," *Forum*, Vol. 46, p. 514.

evidence of something wrong, the danger signal set against imminent disaster." ²

2. ART AND ITS SOCIAL FUNCTION

As far back as there is any record of human culture there is evidence also of artistic employment. Every normal contemporary man, at some time in his life at least, is also an artist, in aspiration, if not in capacity. There seems to be a universal art hunger. Esthetic gropings are evident everywhere and at all times. Art is universal and eternal, not parochial or epochal.

By art we mean the conscious and more or less articulate human expression of beauty in visible or audible form; it is the welling-up of the esthetic impulse; the means whereby man makes beauty and expresses that in him. It is also the product of the expressional impulse in man, of his desire to convey impressions and enjoyments to others, and to represent in the most attractive and permanent forms the ideas, thoughts, circumstances, scenes, or emotions which have powerfully stirred his own nature. The artist is driven to utterance by the intensity of the pleasure or interest he feels or imagines.³ There is something which attracts him, seduces him, compels him to catch it as it passes, hold it fast, and then, through himself as a medium, present it as melody, gesture, words, rhythm, shape, or ordered color.

Thus art is an indication of the attempt of the human soul to give itself liberation, of the human spirit to give itself manifestation; it is the speech and literature of the beauty in man; it is that embodiment of the finer moments when life is wonderfully worth while, the perceptible record of that which is fine. It symbolizes the great, mutual values of human experience.

As such, art has a distinctive social function to perform from the progressive point of view. Duncan Phillips expresses this well when he speaks of its purpose as being "to stimulate the appreciation of life and to intensify the joy of living." ⁴ Art's obligation is to make all men co-sharers of the ecstasies, the delights, the magnificent sensations of those great ones who have the skill to delineate the beautiful, the dignified, the poised, in form, color, sound, thought, or act. Its duty is to

² Ralph Adams Cram in the Commencement Address on "Challengers of Democracy" at the University of Nebraska, June 4, 1927.

³ "The artist elicits beauty from the world by bringing to it his own vision of the beauty that is there." C. A. Bennett, "Art as an Antidote for Morality," *International Journal of Ethics*, Vol. 30, p. 169.

⁴ *The Enchantment of Art*, preface.

enrich the life of the people as a whole by bringing them under the influence of these esthetic emotional states, by giving them the enhanced vision of the beautiful, by widening their spiritual horizon, by emancipating the human soul from the commonplace. Art should arouse in the plain men activities more stimulating than mere imitation; it should arouse the imagination, develop appreciation of form and beauty, elevate the spirit, produce distinctive experience rhythms, reveal the grandeur of their own powers, introduce new meaning into life, exalt its interests, and make for its own increase in the world among them. Finally it should redeem the world from ugliness, pettiness, and sordidness.

3. THE SCANDAL OF PRESENT-DAY UGLINESS AND LACK OF ESTHETIC APPRECIATION

When one moves from the field of the theory of esthetics and art to an examination of the actual situation concerning the prevalence of beauty and the degree to which its appreciation is generally developed, the present state of affairs is far from satisfying. It would actually seem that beauty is neglected in most districts and among most people, and that ugliness is rampant. The sense of beauty and the demand for it are so notably absent and so little cultivated in our lives.

Of course, there are no fixed canons of beauty, but judged even by the ideals that still exist and occasionally express themselves, there is so much that is fundamentally ugly. What is worse, there is no effort to be beautiful. We have become so habituated to ugliness that it does not disturb us; its challenge for the majority of people does not seem very worth while or provocative either of serious regard or consideration.

Even among the intelligent people there is too apt to be a feeling that beauty at best is ornamental and hence superficial—not bound up intimately and inextricably with life, especially the good life. Art, among these, is put in the same category with beauty. Irwin Edman expresses it well when he says: "There is no question that in America, for many intelligent minds, art is a foolish epithet adorned by effeminate sillies. It is associated with museums that one never enters and books that one never—voluntarily—reads. It is profound, unctuous, and essentially unimportant. It is as serious as a religious service, and as dull. Or it is an embroidered dissipation indulged in by elegant wastrels. . . . The wholesome, normal, full blooded, he-man with the tangible goods of swift motors, week-end golf, and the rattat intoxication of jazz, sniffs at museums, concert halls, and libraries with all

their dull and deadly arts. If he tolerates art at all, it is with the breeziest of the intellectuals in their canonization of the lively arts of jazz, vaudeville, and the comic strip.”⁵ Among many there is actually a self-conscious, shamefaced embarrassment at a word suggestive of beauty. Even those of the educated classes who have cultivated their own taste, and have imparted something of grace and charm to their own surroundings have come to take the prevailing ugliness as a matter of course. Beauty is not to be found in our daily life to any great extent, and its absence is tacitly accepted.

Even the most partial and superficial inventory of ugliness shows an appalling amount in all phases of life. There are, for example, the rows of dreary, monotonous, jerry-built houses in every city, all exactly alike and equally bald and ugly, certainly creating an atmosphere that is either garish and depressing, or dingy and depressing. In these houses and most others will be found monotonously standardized products of all kinds—clothes, furniture, breakfast-foods, and even interests. There are the rows upon rows of business blocks made up of all kinds of buildings of all shapes and sizes and materials, and showing a complete absence of harmony or beauty—just chaotic rows of horrible, tawdry structures, almost devoid of what should be called architecture. There is the practical ugliness of our factory districts with their motley array of unbeautiful buildings, the belching, soot-capped iron or brick smokestacks, the switch-tracks, and the endless grime and grayness. There are the depressing stretches of ugly sheds, ash-heaps, and tenements along the right of way of the railways in every city. There is the grim, black ugliness of the coal or iron regions such as the Ruhr and Saar valleys, the Black Country of England, the collieries of Wales, the anthracite region of Pennsylvania, or the bituminous district of West Virginia. There are the slatternly and bleak New England and Carolinian textile villages with their dusty mills, impoverished huts, and scarred landscape. There are our water-fronts, with great natural beauty marred by horrible buildings, straggling railway yards, noisome dump-heaps and pestilential dives. There is the garishness and vulgarity of much of our advertising, the bill-boards outraging our countrysides. There is the blatant boorishness of much of our journalism that assails us with its cheapness and unloveliness. There is quite a bit of the jazz music, further perverted by puerile and moronic sentiments sung to it, and the interminable squawkings of radios. There are the horrors of much of our religion, with its stilted theology, its vapid and jingly

⁵ *Op. cit.*, p. 392.

hymns, its soul-destroying austerities and utilitarianism, and the go-getter tactics of its clergymen. Even much of what passes for art is freakish, repulsive, and abnormal, as for example, cubist sculpture, ultra-modernist painting, futurist music. The recital of hideousness might go on, but what is the use?

The causes of this ugliness are various. Some of our religious notions, particularly those resting on Calvinism and Puritanism, have tended to outlaw beauty as one of the seductive wiles of the devil, and its appreciation as a weakness, if not a vice. Consequently the two great twin elements of the human spirit—religion and beauty—have been kept asunder, to the infinite harm of each. More significant, however, has been the industrialism of the last century. With its insistence upon profits first and last, its machine-made products, its mechanized men, its standardization, its competitiveness and commercialism, and its rampant utilitarianism, it has materialized everything, destroyed and forgotten beauty, except as a profit-increasing aid, destroyed much artistic ability, and failed to tap much of that in existence. Beauty and artistry can hardly exist in an atmosphere of modern industrialized commercialism and its accompanying materialism. When all things, even leisure-time activities and religion, are regarded in the light of profit-making ends, the ability to appreciate the intrinsic spiritual worth of things diminishes, the sense of proportion disappears, volume becomes more important than form, and monetary values are the only impressive values. "Regard for the outer connection of things rather than for their inner, spiritual meanings not only tends to harden and materialize life, but through the encouragement of superficiality, to breed an insidious restlessness of mind and body. Movement and busyness rather than poise and leisure are sought and admired. The chronic nervous fatigue which this helps to create makes all synthetic thought and feeling, on which esthetic pleasure depends, irksome and difficult." ⁶ Popular art has been destroyed and general appreciation or even recognition of beauty has been largely lost. This is a challenge that has already been accepted by a few, but it still must give us pause as a civilization before we meet it.

4. ESTHETIC NEEDS

In view of the situation as depicted certain needs are obvious. We need beauty with its poise and order amidst the disturbing complexity and strain of modern existence. We need as never before its sooth-

⁶ W. M. Cabot, *op. cit.*, p. 516.

ing, steadying, and uplifting influence, especially in its simpler and more vital form. We need to make our environments eloquent of spirit rather than matter, of beauty rather than ugliness. And we can only enjoy beauty if we make our daily conditions and surroundings more beautiful and our life more sensible and spontaneous. This will only come as our order of society becomes more generous.

We need beauty in our landscapes, streets, homes, business and factory districts; it should be so much a part of our daily environment that it will develop a taste for the greatest beauty among us all. We need to have displayed to us the ingredients of a beautiful world. Our cities especially should be made lessons in healthful, orderly, and beautiful rather than discordant living. Wholesome and beautiful ideas and interests cannot spring up spontaneously in an atmosphere that suggests discord. Just one instance of what might be done: To-day our building departments carefully examine every plan made for private as well as for public buildings, and prescribe how the walls shall be for strength, how high the building may go, and what the sanitary details must be, all in the effort to make our buildings safe and healthful. Why not go farther and demand that the buildings be beautiful also? This does not necessarily mean insistence upon a certain style of architecture, but merely that outrages of ugliness shall not offend us and abuse us, and that the buildings in the block or street should harmonize as to form and color and material. Why should we have to look upon buildings or any other things that appall us with their utter ugliness?¹

We need also a type of education that will wage an offensive battle against bad taste and low standards, and will produce an appreciative public, for it will not be a fully progressive public until it can recognize and appreciate beauty. We need an education and morale that will make beauty less of an effete stranger. This education must surround people, especially children, with beauty, and set esthetic standards for them, and encourage the development of all the beauty and all the appreciation of beauty latent in them. It must avoid standardization and counteract mechanization. It needs, from nursery-school to university, to make provision for the imaginative life. It needs to develop in us a sense of the esthetic possibilities of acts and objects not ordinarily included in the realm of art. For education is the education of all that is best in man, the making possible the realization of all his potentialities, the building up of personality.

¹ The Philadelphia art jury is a notable beginning along this line.

We need to take a different attitude toward art. In the first place, we need to think of art as an essential element in every department of life. Our tendency is to think only of the "Seven Arts"—sculpture, painting, architecture, poetry, music, the drama, and ceremonial—and these we have relegated in the main to the museum, the art gallery, or the library. Conscious beauty need not be alien anywhere—in our manufacturing processes, our households, or elsewhere. We must stop thinking exclusively of the fine arts, and put art in all the details of our life, for true art is making everything beautiful. We need to see, for example, that art is possible even in the most utilitarian things, that beautiful things can be made by machines, that the cheap or the well-made need not be ugly. Beauty of design is possible with anything; in fact, the materials or usages may suggest designs and forms that are both appropriate and unique, thereby adding new enriching elements to life. In industry there are now coming to be recognized unrivalled opportunities for the application of design, color, and form. It must also be remembered that industrialism cannot be abandoned, but that a new sense of beauty and a new art will have to be developed that will be conformable to the essential phases of industrialism.

Secondly, we need to recognize that art is not a mere dandified pastime, the industry of the idle, the entertainment of the rich or priggish; it is for all—in fact, it only becomes valuable as it is shared by all. Art is an essential of life, not an accessory. All of us need to become conscious of the processes of the great thinkers' thoughts, the intensities of the artist's feelings, the imaginings of all who have experienced great beauty, and to have our mental processes operated on a large scale and to a more significant result than we do by ourselves. Art has no choice but to give to people a larger activity than they can have without it. For this art must be popularized and made more accessible.

Third, art should make for its own increase. This will come when we recognize the absolute esthetic hunger in all men and the general but largely latent creative power of almost all men. When we have a nation of men who have themselves the opportunity to create, and have tried to create, then the occasional master will appear much oftener. In that day we will be able to create beauty out of the simplest materials of our life, and this will be a greater esthetic achievement than partially to relive, through some alien work of art, the creative insights of another.

Finally, we need to know that we can have no great civilization

without art, for art is one of the necessary creative outlets. Furthermore, no civilization can dispense with the activity, the cleanliness, the tidiness, the order, the gaiety, the serenity, and the mastery that goes with art. It is something which a civilization should nurture if it is to be great. Todd puts it well when he says, "That age which skimps its art atrophies a very large part of its creative energies. That society which consciously cultivates its art impulses lives broadly and stamps its name upon an epoch in human history."⁸ Above all, art is the indispensable element of future advances.

5. HOPES FOR ESTHETIC PROGRESS

In spite of the general discount of beauty mentioned previously, there are abundant grounds for hope for a better esthetic future. There is, first of all, the new attitude toward the release of self. Many of the austerities and stupidities and hypocrisies of the last century are definitely recognized as outworn and are totally ignored by many, especially the oncoming generation. Self-expression, free and spontaneous, in the field of the esthetic, as elsewhere, is again possible. Secondly, as Edman points out,⁹ there is so much of vitality, energy, and freshness in our civilization that is amenable to forms of beauty. In fact, there is such an exuberance of spirit and life that the dominantly important utilitarian activities do not absorb it all, and it overflows into the field of sports, and not the esthetic.

Thirdly, there is a new spontaneous appreciation of beauty. The pendulum has swung about as far toward ugliness as it can, and the recoil has begun. This is evidenced in many of our motor cars, which are singularly beautiful apart from their luxury; the revival of real architecture, especially in skyscrapers; the way in which music, even classical music, is making its way in America; the brilliant literature of the last few decades; the widespread sweep of community pageantry; the great circulation of journals that deal with beauty of home and grounds, and fine arts; the Little Theater and Community Theater movements; and the sheer beauty of some of our advertising and movies, as well as in many other ways.

In the fourth place, notable are the various organized or partly organized movements of one kind or another actually to introduce beauty into American life or increase its appreciation. Among the

⁸ *Theories of Social Progress*, p. 500.

⁹ *Op. cit.*, p. 396.

various movements of this kind can be mentioned the city planning movements; the development of park systems and municipal art museums and art schools; the introduction of spontaneous artistic expression in high schools; the teaching of courses in the appreciation of music and art in many of our public schools, as well as actual instruction in the arts themselves; the organizations promoting the circulation and display of art collections; the establishment of departments of fine arts in our colleges and universities; the conscious efforts to beautify factory grounds and plants; and the art departments maintained by commercial organizations of various kinds. Not only is there a seething ferment of beauty that is welling up and insistently demanding expression, but we are consciously attempting to bring beauty back into our lives, and we in America at least are sustained by our successes. It is quite possible that, if present trends are accelerated, in several generations a transformation will have occurred, that will have banished much of our contemporary ugliness, and have brought us much of the fullness that beauty brings.

QUESTIONS AND PROBLEMS

1. Goethe said,
 "The vulgar, the cheap, is the mass's allure,
 What is sought by the minds of the mob must be poor."
 Must this necessarily be true?
2. "Art in its primary forms is the esthetic devoted to a use." (Kallen)
 Explain.
3. To what extent does the art of a people represent or reflect the characteristics of their civilization?
4. Why is there so much ugliness and bad taste in our literature, drama, painting, architecture, and music?
5. Why should a high degree of standardization and conventionality dull the esthetic sense?
6. What are some of the problems that realism raises?
7. Outline all the feasible ways you can think of whereby a greater general appreciation of beauty might be developed.
8. Does beauty make for goodness?
9. Does the artist have a responsibility to society for the type and quality of work he does?

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CHAPTER XXV

THE RELIGIOUS ASPECTS OF PROGRESS

I. THE NATURE OF RELIGION

RELIGION is not something which can be superinduced or superimposed upon men. Nor is this necessary, for religion is a universal attribute of man at every stage of his culture and in every period of his history. In all races and in all times there is a human experience which is specifically religious. It is a great human fact—a fact both of the individual consciousness and of the social order. From the earliest dawn of human life to which we can get back, man has been, as a French writer has said, “incurably religious.”

Everywhere religion has developed from crude and humble origins, and everywhere religion and civilization have developed together. These facts are borne out by anthropology and any of the comparative and historical studies of religion. And yet it is something very difficult to catch and define, for the facts of religious experience are exceedingly multiform in their significance, their intensity, their degree of differentiation from other social facts, their cultural associations, and their geographical and chronological bearings. One can ask Buddhists what Buddhism is, and Mohammedans what Mohammedanism is, and Christians what Christianity is, and find that none can explain in a way so definite that every other Buddhist or Mohammedan or Christian would accept the definition, and agree what must be included as essential or what must be rejected as unimportant. Nor can one make a definition which shall cover all forms of it from the lowest to the highest and yet describe to the satisfaction of devotees the characteristics of the most evolved forms.¹ And yet when one penetrates beneath the medley of social customs and practices, the bewilderment of cult forms and ceremonials, the maze of divinities and revelations, the confusion of creeds and dogmas, one finds a common attitude of mind, a common impulse animating each and all. All religions are merely satisfying man's basic religious needs and all founders of religion have

¹ Sumner and Keller, *The Science of Society*, Vol. II, p. 1428.

simply established certain more or less unique but appropriate means of satisfying and canalizing these basic needs.

Among men of all stages of cultural development the aleatory element is outstanding in religion,² though other cultural and philosophical elements are added to the higher religions. Religion is a means of satisfying that yearning for inner peace that man feels as he perceives his greater natural and social environment. He is in awful fear of the unknowns and inexplicables about him, especially a supernatural and altogether irresistible power. His efforts in the struggle for existence are thwarted by forces which he does not understand. His experiences are with more than he can see, more than he can touch, more than he can know through the channels of sense, more than he can describe within the confines of the syllogism, more than he can prove, and yet the reality of these experiences is beyond question. He contemplates the vast, inexplicable, and incomprehensible cosmos, the stupendous forces and processes, the inexorable laws of nature, which he but dimly comprehends, and the meaning and purpose of which he cannot understand. He is awed and dismayed by the enormity and the timelessness and the order and the plan of it all. He feels himself in the presence of something which passes comprehension. His comfort, his peace of mind, even life itself, depends upon some explanation of and some adjustment to this unreckonable and inexplicable. In brief, he wants security and certainty against mischance and the unknown in their innumerable forms, whether they are social or cosmic. He needs some escape from the ills of life, some mode of reconciliation as a policy of welfare, some sort of explanation. Hence in every group religion is a deliberate attempt to get into helpful social relationships with powers believed to be able to provide the satisfaction for felt needs, to provide for individual and group self-maintenance in confronting the unknown and all-powerful, to establish, in a measure, some control over the unknown, to get into harmony with the secret of the universe. The customs, rites, symbols, phrases, scriptures, altars, temples, dogmas, creeds, churches, ceremonies, sacred books, cults, denominations, organizations, and systems are merely machinery for facilitating these ends. They are the institutional devices holding together the ideas of a particular religious group and perpetuating them. They may vary from the crude and barbarous forms of primitive people to those elevated and spiritual forms occasionally found among the highly civilized peoples. In themselves they have no religious value.

² Sumner and Keller, *The Science of Society*, Ch. XL.

2. RELIGION AT ITS BEST AND ITS RELATION TO PROGRESS

In its simpler forms religion is merely an attempt to secure physical comforts, gain security, and obtain a reasonable degree of peace of mind. At all times it may take forms that cause it to serve as an agent for perpetuating and spreading gross superstitions, perverted beliefs, and vicious practices that deprave and degrade a people and make their religion an outright retrogressive factor. In certain of its higher forms, however, it offers man possibilities of fulfilment that inhere in no other activity in life. As such these have great significance from the point of view of the theory of progress.

In the first place, religion at its best offers man cosmic peace, and this in turn frees him from harassing and distracting fears and anxieties. It is his means of adjusting himself to his physical and social environment and to the universe; for obtaining peace and serenity of mind and the fullest expression of self amidst the phenomenal world of nature, struggling and sinful humanity, and uncertainty and seeming chaos. While it does not always give him an acceptable explanation of the universe, it does give him a more or less satisfying relationship to it. It symbolizes the human attempt to come to terms with life. It gives hope, security, and more or less satisfying understanding. It enables, even teaches, us to live with joy and calm in the presence of inevitable perplexities; it gives us the feeling of being at home in the universe.

In the second place, religion at its best satisfies man's need of being linked up with the ultimate, the universal, and eternal, though, to be sure, the conception of these must of necessity change continually as man advances in thought and experience. The world of mechanical laws, of physical evolution, of social activities, of social service, of here and now—the existence that is divided and fragmentary—is not the whole of life for the man of full intellectual and spiritual stature. Nor does the most ideally conceived social organization meet this need. As Professor Cooley says, "There is no prospect that the world will ever satisfy us; and the structure of life is forever incomplete without something to satisfy the need of the spirit for ideas and sentiments that transcend and reconcile all particular aims whatsoever. . . . Thomas à Kempis and the rest were right in holding that no sort of tangible achievement can long assuage the human soul."⁸ Man wants

⁸ *Social Organization*, Charles Scribner's Sons, p. 380.

to, he must, when he reaches his full intellectual stature, rise above the material, temporal, and human, and link himself up with the ultimate, the infinite, the universal, and the eternal. Religion is man's means of achieving this completion which he is unable to obtain by ordinary means, for it is his conception of the underlying and ultimate reality, of what is permanent and must endure. It assists man in coördinating life and the universe and eternity; in extending human life beyond the narrow confines of time and sense, and in giving it its ultimate significance; in making himself a citizen vibrant with the universe. It brings him into full harmony with the ultimate cause of all things, intellectually, emotionally, volitionally. Man, in a measure, becomes one with the spirit of the universe.

Thirdly, religion at its best offers man the possibility of realizing his spiritual self by opening up to him the realm of the spirit. With it comes the inevitable flowering of individual life, for religion encourages and fulfils the finest promptings in man, and gives meanings to spiritual upheavings within him. It links him up with the great spiritual forces of life, gives him a soul, and sustains that soul in him by bringing it into vital touch with the great Oversoul. It is that which dispels discord and worry and gives buoyancy and hope to his spirit, which lifts him out of the depressions of life and takes him beyond the material and temporal, and enables him to "lift up his eyes to the hills." It is the enfranchisement of the human spirit. As religion plays upon the individual it includes his entire personality, his intellect, feelings, emotions, will, his thoughts, aspiration, activities; it purifies them, and binds them all up into an ineffable experience.

As such religion adds all the richness of the universal and spiritual and ultimate to the best of the earthly and human and social in the completion of man. There is in it that also which lures on to greater cosmic insight and greater spiritual achievement. When men catch it they become part of the spirit of the ages, and self expands into the spiritual, the infinite, and the eternal.⁴

Finally, religion at its best is the way of a Good Life somewhere, not merely the secure life. It holds before us the magnificent ideal, the vitalizing vision of the new life, the higher life, the abundant life, the permanent life. It provides a *summum bonum* to be realized, avenues of universal action, ultimate purposes, and then interprets and appraises

⁴Cf. B. Russell, "The Essence of Religion," *Hibbert Journal*, Vol. 11, pp. 46-62; C. M. Case, "Religion and the Concept of Progress," *Journal of Theology*, Vol. 1, pp. 160-173.

life, and makes it such an adventure that the ideal may be realized. It offers the selfless, untrammelled life in the whole. It seeks unity, the realization of intellectual and moral and esthetic ideals, all precious values—of knowledge, goodness, justice, beauty, truth, love; it seeks to restrain little thoughts, petty wishes, passing fancies, follies, greed, hates, partialities, and selfish ambitions in men. It wants that which has universal and eternal value, that which is pregnant with the larger good.

3. SOCIALIZED LIVING AS CONCRETE RELIGION

Religion, however, has no province of its own separate from the rest of life. In fact *when it becomes a matter of concrete expression it finds its fruits in humanity*. As we face the problems of adjustment and security the most obvious and pressing and possible adjustment is to our fellow-men. For us immediately the well-being of humanity becomes the end-term of the universe. In view of the identity of human interests and the solidarity of human societies, the security of the individual depends upon the well-being of humanity, and the demands of the Unseen upon us are first realizable as they apply to humanity. Religion must and does give us a sustained belief in the value of social well-being. For there can be no peace and harmony of spirit, no security of life if our aims or ends run counter to human interests. Any forms or programs of religion which do this or which even fail to provide for the claims of human well-being are a sacrilege upon the essential character of religion. The religiously right consists essentially of the socially right. Religion impresses social values upon man's consciousness in the most intense way. It is a vital impelling force which moves men on toward a life of love, service and sacrifice, a force that tends to make them socially conscious residents of the world, and which inspires them to establish a new and better social order.

As religion brings the revitalized soul of man into contact with the challenging responsibilities of life, it gives new significance to duty and a new intensity to human and social aims. It raises the common duties and requirements of the common life into a higher value. It gives us a high sense of a quite definite mission in life. It inculcates altruistic and unselfish ideals in our minds that demand the enlistment of our energies in the creation of human and social values; it demands that each of us, according to his abilities and capacities, contribute his share to the great fund of good by putting his life at the service of man.

As such it largely accounts for the readiness to sacrifice personal ease and joys for the sake of others.

It is this social phase of religion which brings fresh joy and power into the lives of individuals, a distinct enlargement of mind, increasing play of the social and spiritual capacities. In fact it brings a degree of self-realization for this only comes by self-sacrifice. We find life by giving it, because in attaining the moral level which self-sacrifice demands we so develop our personalities that the result is a development and bringing of all the energies of our nature into more perfect unity and coöperation.

It is probably due to a recognition of the basic nature of social emphasis in religion that one finds the ten commandments and their equivalents, the golden rules, stated either positively or negatively, the conceptions of service, of justice and righteousness running through most of the dominant religions.

But this social emphasis in religion must not be thought of as being the same thing as social service, neighborliness, humanitarian or social ethics. It is all these, but it is much more also. If religion were not more it could not be the powerful reinforcement that it is. *The religious spirit will always have to call the individual farther than any ethical principle or demand for service can compel him to go.* Religion adds a spiritual emphasis to social conduct and social relationship; it binds up the moral or social act with all time and all men, it makes it a consciously cosmic act; it adds the divine touch. Religion wants not only excellent conduct, "but also relatively divine qualities—particularly a transcendent and divine state of consciousness." Religion is an aspiring or stretching for the best conceivable in the universe as well as present brotherhood and friendliness and service. "The distinction . . . between neighborliness and religion is that neighborliness aims at the best use of our present mode of consciousness whereas religion aims at transcending and surpassing it."⁵ There is a magnificent speculative element in religion which rests upon man's unrealized possibilities. The conception increasingly prevalent that if we have humanitarianism and service and social prosperity, religion will follow, is an inverted idea. Religion comes first; it enables man to see his relationship to things in general to the degree that human beings are capable of, and then these other states follow. A man must be at peace with the universe, he must have come to some sort of terms with life's great

⁵A. R. Orage, "Unedited Opinions: Religion in America," *New Republic*, Dec. 31, 1924, p. 141.

intangibles, before he can be a good neighbor or a good friend or a good server or a good humanist; otherwise he is merely an ethical, and, perhaps also an emotional, machine. The life of the spirit is a larger and finer thing than even such large and fine things as have been mentioned. Religion is more than a power house for or an expression of moral and social activity.*

While morality, humanitarianism, social service, brother love, and the like, are commendable and indispensable, they are not religion, nor a substitute for religion; they are its finest fruits in social life, but they are never its roots. Completion cannot be found solely in these activities. No amount of morality or social service can answer questions about the universe, nor can questions as to why, whence, whither, the meaning of existence, and so on, be answered thereby.

4. THE PROBLEMS PRESENTED BY ORGANIZED RELIGION FROM THE PROGRESSIVE POINT OF VIEW

When we pass from religion at its best as an individual spiritual experience and force, and as a functioning factor in self-completion, and frankly face its functioning in its organized and institutionalized forms in the Western world, we find much that is not good from the progressive point of view. When the power is recalled which organized religion has possessed and still possesses of bringing home to the souls of men with dramatic force the ultimate issues of life, and how much this has meant to the cause of social progress, it is profoundly disquieting to see signs of its failure in our own day. Furthermore, it must be remembered that the forces of organized religion are for most men really the determiners of the kind and quality of their religious experience; hence the vital significance of the make-up and functioning of organized religion at any given moment. The following difficulties inhere more or less in most of the religious systems the world over, but especially in those of the Occident, and present critical problems in this twentieth century.

a. Anachronism and Resistance to Necessary Adjustments. Organized religion tends in its forms, institutions, philosophy, and terminology to be of an earlier stage of cultural evolution. A most superficial examination of contemporary religion shows that it has not yet made itself fully at home in this new world of modern knowledge, modern

*For an analysis of Christianity in this connection see A. Wyatt Tilby, "Reconstruction of Religion," *Nineteenth Century*, Vol. 91, pp. 466-467.

democracy, modern science. It has tried to move much of the intellectual furniture of the medieval home into the new, only to find it increasingly incongruous. Christianity, for example, in its various sects, is still full of pre-Copernican theology and medieval superstition, hence it confuses the average citizen.

Any religion which is to play its part must give a philosophy of adjustment that is suitable to its age, and all the characteristics of the life of the time must be taken into consideration. It must be free to grow. It cannot as a social agency render important services to society if it is not adjustable to the spirit of its age. And yet religions everywhere as structures offer resistance to new conceptual interpretations of cosmic realities. As science and new knowledge, for example, solve problems that have been considered to be within the jurisdiction of organized religion, it should not insist upon keeping them within its sphere, but pass on to the new problems of a religious nature that are continually appearing. To maintain something as religious when it has passed out of the sphere of religion is to hold down the human spirit, and tie man to ignorance and obscurantism. Some of the great religions, because of their insistence upon eternal truths and supernaturally revealed ways of life and afterlife, which must not change, seriously interfere with their own function in the world, for instead of transforming and spiritualizing life as they should along the new lines continually appearing, they are restricting it. Religion must be ever advancing; it must keep its touch with the full-blooded realities of human experience. It must be sensitive to the new forces, the new ideas; it must discover what cosmic realities may be depended upon in the new age in facing life's problems; it must survey human resources repeatedly, formulate ideals, seek ways of organization for the realization of them. In a living, growing world there can be no eternal, static, and perfect entities, whether ideas, forms, or values. The quest for absolute truths, absolute spheres, must be frankly given up. The inherited religious doctrines must be restated and reinterpreted in order to function in the present, else they will in time become merely an ancient voice. The spirituality of the old religion must be retained and at the same time the forms and philosophy must fit in with a democratic society, the revelations of science, and the new world-view. Religion must enable man definitely to meet the challenges of life, and many of its ancient tools, still retained, are quite unsuited for this delicate task.

There is also an unjustified note of finality in religious systems and even religious sects which impairs religion as a function of life. All

religious groups claim to have the truth; all others are wrong, hence it is permissible to feel sorry for others, hate them, and even on occasion persecute them. But the relativity of all religious truth must be recognized for it is conceived through human agency, which is finite and imperfect, bound to a given time and place in interpretive ability.

With the gradual infiltration of the idea that the world is the result, not of fiat, but of process, has come the new and vitalizing concept of religion itself as a process, an unfolding, a forward looking, an upward striving.

b. Excessive Rigidity of Dogmas, Creeds, and Theologies. Another series of problems, somewhat related to the above, grow out of the widespread adherence to more or less crystallized dogmas, creeds, and theologies. A certain amount of dogma is necessary to give that concrete meaning to a religion that enables the rank and file to grasp it, but the danger lies in the fact that the dogma may become an everlasting pronouncement of doctrine, an unchanging, infallible statement of historico-metaphysical fact. As such, dogmas become incapable of improvement; they come to have some special virtue in themselves which makes their dutiful acceptance insistent, and the religion tends to be a matter of exterior adherences rather than inner authority. The individual members lose much of what is infinite in life, and become limited in their thoughts, lose consciousness of the life of the whole, have their outlook impoverished, and their existence rendered smaller even in its finite parts. We are beginning to see that one of our first-rank problems is to preserve religion without any considerable dependence upon dogmas, particularly those to which an intellectually honest assent grows daily more difficult. A considerable relaxing of dogma is necessary for the spiritual advance of many people of this new age. Certainly the fact needs to be heralded that religion is not the marshalling of psychic agents to get individuals to embrace the special dogmas of some sect.

Creeds, though they have a proper and indispensable function to perform, in their common forms, also take away much of the flexibility and spirituality of religion by tying the individuals down to a crystallized set of postulates which they are taught to regard as an essential part of religion, which, however, are largely associated with questionable historical beliefs. Sooner or later the individual's creeds are found to come into conflict with the development of knowledge in general and his own thought life in particular. Even more serious is the fact that creeds are divisive in their tendencies, aligning religious men in

more or less antagonistic and intolerant groups. It is necessary that many insistently maintained details of creeds, many of them the result of literal misstatement of historical or cosmic fact, be either discarded or definitely treated as unessential, and that the greatest latitude of interpretation be permitted of all creeds. If a creed does not meet contemporary needs it is useless. There is much truth in the statement that "Each generation makes its own best creeds." Theologies that give a definite interpretation of a particular religion, or even sect, add further difficulties. What seems to be insistently needed is more harmony concerning the real meaning of religion in general.

It must be remembered that religious experience is private. Any formulas or crystallized statements or interpretations employ words and symbols which are common counters with settled connotations. To adhere too closely to these is to be disloyal to the spirit of religion. The religious experience is profounder than any theory or tradition and it dare not be stifled. Dogmas, creeds, and theologies to be of assistance must be put to an incessant process of testing and reshaping in the light of advancing knowledge, the time spirit, and the new world needs. If not they become artificial or dead, intolerant of truth, destructive of spiritual sense, opposed to all true religion. Conformity becomes more important than consecration.

c. The Attitude toward Sacred Books. The older theological conceptions of authoritative, infallible, legalistic sacred books, interpreted and manipulated by an official ecclesiasticism, have been a bane to religion as well as to the progress of thought in other spheres. Of most of the sacred books there are no inerrant originals; things are stated as fact in them which no one could know; all of them have been subject to mutations and misadventures; most of them hold a world-philosophy which has carried over into a subsequent period in which it is survivalistic, with an authority that negatives adjustment. With priests and sages to interpret them, they have become the authority for religious acts and rules of right, deductions being made and passed independently of their social effects. This or that thing must be done because the sacred books say so, or are understood to say so, or say so by inference. That this has caused great wrong and woe and vast complications need not be emphasized. Sacred books need to be approached in a severely scientific way. They are not to be read as unchangeable and literal statements, as ends in themselves, but as records of spiritual experiences, inspired utterances of religious men, aids and encitements to religious understanding. No sacred book is completed; further chapters

are always being written. Above all, no sacred book is, in its nature, suited as a scientific textbook.

d. Fatalistic and Deterministic Tendencies. Religions tend to be fatalistic or deterministic. But when this occurs religion dampens initiative. It promotes the idea that all man's life is arranged and that it is useless for him to attempt to go against the divine decrees. All that man can do is to submit. The life of inaction, resignation, and submission is the noblest he can live. Consequently the passion against wrongdoing and injustice is stopped up, human activity is diverted into socially ineffective channels, and religion instead of being a stimulus and a fine achievement becomes an absolutist anæsthetic.

e. Anti-Rationalism. Of course religion can never be completely rationalistic. In its very nature there are and must be effects for which no causes can be assumed and that are not subject to experiment or other proper verification, but are real within the sphere of human experience. In the main, however, religion unavoidably contains an address to the intelligence; it comes as a messenger of truth, it deals with the values and inexplicables and eternal of life; at its best it is a matter of personal thought and decision. But so much of religion is still anti-rational and refuses to submit its authoritarian dogmas to free and fearless examination. It still supinely refuses to accept the authority of evidence, the supremacy of intelligence, or the validity of freedom, each of which is indispensable to-day. As such it arrays itself against the entire drive of the ascending human spirit. It declares war on all that is most honest, brave, and free. It deprives its own teachings of the possibility of vindication in the open court of reason. It has not yet discovered that a living doubt is better than a dead faith.

Many religious bodies have still to discover the fact that the real religious man is a rational and independent being who does not learn faith like the multiplication table, but who must think out his own creed for himself. He may not be able to explain this creed to others, or if he is, he probably feels the impropriety of wearing his religion on his sleeve, but he believes in something outside and beyond himself, and this is something fine and beautiful that should not be cramped or stultified or forced to take the form of a mental reservation.

f. Institutionalization. Organized religions, due to the very fact of their organization, and the resulting emphasis upon their structural aspects, the fact that they are used for control purposes, that they are established and autonomous, tend to become institutionalized and over-organized. Then there is a tendency for the organization to become an

end in itself rather than a means, and the real end is lost sight of. There is an over-emphasis on machinery, and fixed and standardized forms and creeds and theologies, and even souls that fit into a mechanized régime. The personnel drifts into a more or less perfunctory and mechanical way of doing its work. Religion and religious experience and expression are then so easily confused with theology and ritual, ecclesiastical esthetics, fast days, ceremonies, supernaturalism—even sabbatarianism and the holier-than-thou attitudes. And it is so easy to discharge religious obligations by means of these. The organization is likely to pose, exaggerate, overdraw. Incidentally this also makes for intolerance, artificialities, ineffectiveness, morbidity, and conservatism. The most sinister fact of all though is that it is easier to administer the affairs of an organization than it is to keep creeds flexible, codes of conduct clear and uncompromised, and the life of the spirit immanent. Such perversions of necessary institutions are utterly incompatible with progress; the fundamentals of religion at its best are set aside, the religious spirit is smothered, or killed, or never even brought to life.

g. Thwarting Antagonisms. In no sense, dare variety of religious opinion or worship be banned. Spontaneity of individual religious thinking and experience is something to be encouraged. In fact, any variety must be looked upon as a sign of religious growth and vitality. What is objected to are those types of religious cleavages and divisions which result in alienation of sympathy, intolerance, bigotry, bickering, dis-fellowship in work, disapproval of men's consciences and convictions, and which become a source of confusion, bewilderment, curtailed and perverted religious expression, and vicious antagonisms.

What religious people need to recall is that religion is greater than any of the religions. It is a great quest in which we participate as individuals and groups. The great common need is behind it all. To make this search as profitable as possible there must be the greatest toleration of opinions, the most magnanimous forbearance, the greatest possibility of exchange of ideas, every opportunity for mutual enrichment and common adjustment, and above all, a great human worldwide, coöperative movement making for human good which is greater than classes, creeds, sects, nations, or systems, and considers the race in its entirety as a moving stream of life.

h. The Hiatus between Religion and Life. There tends also to be an uncomfortable break between religion and life. The energy of religion does not seem to be fully available in the cause of human advance,

nor does it serve as an agent of spirituality to the degree that it is capable. Instead of being the great principle and force for unity, men find larger and more inclusive unities in other things. There is also current a mistaken feeling that the exigencies of the present are supreme and self-illuminating. There is the chasm between religion and those practical social and moral activities which so largely make up modern life, and even between religion and many of those social and moral activities which are supposed to and do issue from the religious spirit.

Our religious fundamentals are still largely left out of consideration in our Western life. Not only the aims, duties, and standards of judgment in our individual life, but our social policies and institutions, political or economic, or any other kind, should be ordered with definite reference to the religious ideals which we profess.

Powerful force that religion is, it is still so much a thing apart from everyday activities. If it is to serve its part in a progressive program of bringing the consummation of a kingdom of God, it must enter into and be a directing factor in every human and social activity, and become a thing to live by.

5. SCIENCE AND RELIGION

The contacts between science and religion, while they have resulted in many supposed antipathies and irreconcilable differences and incompatibilities, have actually been mutually advantageous. The oft-mentioned statement that science destroys religion is unadulterated nonsense. There can be no contradiction between the two. The God that reveals himself in religion does not contradict himself in the findings of science. Science does not deal with one kind of truth and religion with another. The worst that science can do to religion is to point out the folly of certain of its guesses with respect to the origin, development, and functioning of man and the universe that religion has provided. Science as a technique of understanding and using cosmic and social forces and discovering cosmic and social unknowns, and of placing all on a firm factual foundation, supplements religion in a powerful way. In fact science, properly considered, has come to be the handmaid of religion, and speeds the kingdom of God on its way.

Science, to be sure, has dealt harshly with the supernatural element in religion. It has found that so many things which were once regarded as supernatural are due to natural causes. It feels also that in time, as other scientific laws and principles now undiscovered and perhaps even unus-

pected appear, an increasing number of phenomena will be found to be natural. Phenomena are not due now to the will or caprice of the gods; they are seen as natural results of natural causes, even though they are as awe-inspiring as ever. It is also true that for most religious people acquainted with science it has broken down the rigid bars of antique orthodoxy. Of course, it has clouded the vision for some, but it has widened that of others until they see in the far distance a fundamental unity. If science is undermining a certain kind of faith, it is probably a faith that we are better off without, for true religion to-day must be a faith thoroughly consistent with established knowledge.

Science has rendered religion certain other valuable services, for as it has advanced it has narrowed the range of religious investigation, so that to-day it does much of the work done by religion, or claimed to have been done by religion in previous times. More and more science and natural methods have replaced religious efforts to overcome and control environment or to cure the ailments of the individual or society. In this it has tended to reduce religion to its fundamentals, or rather it has brought emancipation from theological and superstitious bondage, and has set free the spirit of man for higher religious flights. Anthropology, folklore, higher criticism, biology, and geology, have eliminated many barren explanations and superstitions, much speculation and mysticism, many hypotheses, antiquated beliefs, legends, fables, imagined solutions of mysteries, and ancient cosmogonies. Disease is no more a penalty for man's sins imposed by an angry deity, nor is death of the devil; weeds are not prayed out of farms or gardens; nor is insanity or epilepsy a matter of demons. Science has taken over such questions as these and put them upon a firm, factual foundation. And to-day the informed and open-minded and honest religious man recognizes these facts. In curing or allaying his ills or those of his group, he does not ask miraculous intervention or some other supernatural assistance, but calls upon the man of science for aid, or upon the state, which, through laws and science, makes possible the remedying of these situations. Crop bulletins issued by the states or federal government; boards of health requiring vaccination and sanitary observances; calculations of the weather bureau; publication of vital statistics and scientific inquiries into social conditions; the enactment of eugenic measures—these are the aids which the religious individual of the present fosters and searches for in his attempt to adjust himself more efficiently to his social and physical environment. All this has left religion purer and nobler, has deepened it, and tended to reduce

it more and more to the cosmic philosophy and the spiritual essence that it is. It is at the same time true that a religion which to-day defies science must be willing to lose its sway over the hosts who think and live in terms of scientific learning.

Another significant and beneficent influence of science upon religion is the recently discovered fact that the scientific spirit of inquiry and experimentation is causing religious people affected by it to emphasize results. They are taking literally the statement that prophets should be tested by their fruits and that wisdom is justified of her children. Through it also they come to rely more upon themselves and gain in power and responsibility, and grow in character; a responsible will is developed.

There can be no permanent hiatus between science and religion; in fact, there can be nothing but the happiest union. As Harry F. Ward says, "Each is impotent to change mankind without the other; one for lack of technique and one for lack of power." Both are, in the last analysis, working at the problem of human welfare. They can and should be made to work together as a living synthesis in which science provides the established knowledge, the plans, and the technique, while religion furnishes the spiritual dynamic, the aspiration, and the motives. Science deals primarily with facts and their laws, not with their spiritual interpretation; it supplies men with power, but it demands a quality of spirit for which it cannot supply the motive. This is the function of religion. And religion just because it seeks a synthesis between life and truth cannot function vigorously without the support of science. As Ellwood says, "Religion needs science to give it knowledge of the best means to reach its ends, but science needs religion not less to move men effectively to use aright the truth which it discovers."⁷ Any attempt to alienate science and religion will produce disastrous results if it is in any measure achieved. The two must be combined into an effective working union.

It is true, however, that at present there is a realm in which science has no part, which is in the field of faith alone—a realm which is utterly inaccessible to science. That is the realm of the infinite and the ultimate. Science never does and perhaps never can penetrate to the ultimate origin or cause of anything; it deals only with secondary causes, never reaching the first cause. The explanations of the laws and order and mechanisms of nature are in the realm of infinity—beyond the reach of science and exact knowledge, but they are not beyond the reach of

⁷ C. A. Ellwood, *Christianity and Social Science*, p. 10.

reason and faith. In other words, "Where science ends faith begins." * In the beginning there was no law or principle or mechanism nor is there now, but—shall we call it God?—a Cosmic X. This is still the undisputed realm of religion. Beyond the scope of achieved understanding and control forever reaches the realm of the unknown.

6. THE RELIGIOUS REVOLUTION IN THE UPPER REACHES OF WESTERN THOUGHT

Human society and human thought have undergone seismic upheavals during the last few decades; the old order is giving place to the new. Especially among the more intellectual groups, attitudes on matters of theology and religion have gone through a transformation along with all the rest, and this tendency is percolating downwards rapidly. The world has outgrown the orthodoxies of only a generation ago. Consequently many elements that once were thought to be cardinal and integral phases of religion are being discarded. This is not due to the fact that the newer generations of religious thinkers are less religious, but that they are not taking things for granted with the same easy confidence; they want their religion, as all else, reduced to realities, and made timely, appropriate, and effective.

Men everywhere want freedom from all hampering, destructive, and despoiling things. Their temper is expansive; it is for giving liberties to everything that can show a claim of right; and the new enlightenment and emancipation made possible by knowledge and science has enabled them to do this more and more. Many superstitious sanctions are gone or going; theological crutches are being cast aside; the old boundaries and ancient beliefs are everywhere going by the board; the way of mystics wherein "overcoming the world" meant mortifying the flesh is no longer followed; the old eschatological motives of religion no longer motivate; dogma stuffing is vigorously resented; formal creeds are less and less adhered to, and, in the main, honored with mere lip assent; the old world view is fading.

Men feel that these so-called religious elements that are being cast aside deaden the spiritual faculties and distort reality. Religion, if it is truly religious, should provide facilities and tools for the building of personality, spirituality, and creative experience. It must be characterized by aspiration and creativity. There must be a spiritual joy in living; life must be something worth while. Religion must give man

* Cf. Conklin, *op. cit.*, pp. 197, 203, 211.

intelligent and satisfactory answers about the universe and a feeling of at-homeness in it. In brief, religion to-day is more and more standing for the complete and permanent satisfactions of human life.

Another revolutionary religious tendency is becoming discernible. It is the growing democratization of religion. People are beginning to see that religion can have no aims which run counter to human interests; any forms or programs that conflict with democratic principles are sacrilege upon the essential character of religion. Being less dogmatic, the new religion is more open-minded in its attitude toward science; in fact, as noted above, it makes science its helpmate. It is also more spiritual. Being emancipated from antiquated theology, it gives man a larger conception of the spiritual nature of God and religion. The new order is getting beyond anthropomorphic conceptions; God is a spirit, He is life—one with the universe. Being more pragmatic, it offers a religion that touches life more intimately; religious experiences are life experiences; religion and life coincide. Furthermore, the time seems to be passing, when intelligent and thoughtful men and women will submit their religious conceptions or beliefs to an ecclesiastical visé. Religious opinions of all kinds, even the most unconventional, are in many circles completely tolerated; nor do these variant views prejudice the individual's standing.

There is insistence also that religion to-day be more and more functional in its nature. If it is not transforming the day's work, conducting a campaign, or striving for fuller life, it is considered as a slightly harmful emotional luxury. No more do honest and thinking men permit themselves to use it as a refuge from reality. More than ever before men are convinced that "By their fruits ye shall know them."

There is also noticeable a gradual trend toward religious unity, though it is still confined in the main to more or less feeble efforts at developing a common understanding and means of coöperation within the major religions. There is, however, a growing interest among men everywhere regarding other religions, and a mutual borrowing of principles and forms that promises much for the future.

The revolution in religion is on; it cannot be stayed. Eventually it will percolate down among the rank and file. Who can say that a finer religion and a finer spirituality and a fuller life will not come out of it? The different phases of this revolution have not been generally felt, however, nor have the effects been widespread. Consequently the religious situation the world over is a great challenge to the progressive and an incitement to effort.

QUESTIONS AND PROBLEMS

1. What light does the possibility of modifying human nature and human institutions throw on the success of ethics and religion in changing the individual? (Ellwood, *Christianity and Social Science*, pp. 13-19.)
2. Is religion once and for all the same? Ought it change? (Ellwood, *Reconstruction of Religion*, pp. 47-55.)
3. Has religion played its part in the social evolution of the race or has modern man still need of it? (Ellwood, *The Social Problem*, pp. 207-210.)
4. What, according to Ellwood (*Reconstruction of Religion*, pp. 85-89), are some of the obstacles to the achievement of a Christian state of human society? Can you name any other elements adhering to present-day religion which impair its efficiency as a social and spiritual force? (Todd, pp. 414-438)
5. Analyze the nature of the Kingdom of God. How is it to be achieved? (Hertzler, *History of Utopian Thought*, pp. 70-83.)
6. What is the significance of religion in a program of social progress? (Ellwood, *Reconstruction of Religion*, pp. 66-69; J. Q. Dealey, *Sociology, its Developments and Application*, pp. 499-504.)
7. What, in your opinion, should be the part of the church in contemporary social progress?
8. Show, by historic instances, how religion has been (a) a favoring, and (b) a hindering factor in social progress.
9. Does the church have an educational function?
10. What evidence is there that the church is realizing that science is its best ally?

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CHAPTER XXVI

PROSPECT

I. THE NATURE OF A FINAL REVIEW

BEFORE closing any discussion of progress, especially one of a theoretical nature, one must needs pause and weigh the chief difficulties that lie ahead, face the primary costs that will unavoidably accompany its achievement, even in part, examine some of the major requirements, and consider what seem to be some of the possibilities of its attainment. We shall not be so rash, however, as to attempt a prediction of events or even of discoveries, or to delineate the outlines of the social state of any future time. No man who has carefully looked into the fundamentals of social change would dare to do anything of this kind for beyond a half generation in the future.

2. THE EXISTING OBSTACLES TO PROGRESS ¹

a. The Course of Progress Is Uncharted. The very fact that the world has never tried to consciously progress before on any large scale makes it very difficult. There are no precedents to go by, no extensive experience with successful methods. Unlike the civil or mechanical engineer, the social engineer has to make his blue-prints largely without social formulæ, logarithm tables, experience tables, short cuts, or other tried and proven aids. Each progressive venture is still much like the first transatlantic voyage of Columbus; a constant lookout must be maintained, frequent soundings must be taken, the way must be felt out, all must be ready for any kind of an emergency.

To a certain extent this deficiency can be satisfied by properly reading and interpreting history. The social scientist has come to regard the wide and various experience of all generations as so many experiments performed and recorded for his instruction. But history so far is merely information concerning trial and error, its data are not as accurate as could be desired, the combination of causal conditions is not always the one wanted, and the facts reflect spontaneous rather than directed change.

¹ See E. A. Ross, *Civic Sociology*, pp. 184-191.

Of course, as the fact-finding methods in the social sciences improve, ability to chart the course of progressive movement will grow. The work done along this line so far gives promise of most auspicious results in the way of technique in time.

b. Beliefs, Passions, Prejudices, and Unprogressive Attitudes Largely Prevail. In the most common fields of life, such as the religious, economic, and political, the average person is almost invariably governed by his interests, his lower ambitions, his prejudices, or his passions, and pays little or no attention to the light which science throws on his life or its problems. In fact, he imputes to the men of science the same sort of bias and prejudice in favor of their idea that he feels in connection with his. Furthermore, the scientific man's activity in connection with matters that do not affect the average man's pocket-book, or his love of power, or his social standing, as, for example, the relativity theory, the question as to whether there is life on Mars, the matter of the inheritance of acquired characteristics, the exploration for prehistoric remains, and so on, is immaterial to the average man, or he expects him to solve problems of this sort, and will accept the scientific man's conclusions. But let the scientifically inclined man speak on free trade, public ownership, federal marriage laws, compulsory arbitration, war, international trends, eugenics, the revision of political parties, or the development of the god idea, and a host of class, group, or party passions are aroused, the scientific opinion is rejected with contempt or indifference, and the scientific man is sneered at as a "theorist," "crank," "bolshhevik," or "heretic."

Then, too, there is still so much subjection of altruism to egoism, of justice to self-interest, or ideas to fears and suspicions, of breadth of view to provincial ignorance, of human good will to racial and national antipathies.

Another great obstacle to progress to-day is the unwillingness or inability of people to see the world as it actually is, and to turn from curious triviality, violent prejudice and apathy, phrases and attitudes. The only way this reliable picture of the world can be obtained, however, is by a broad knowledge of the social as well as the physical sciences. Only in such a way can limitations of individual experience be overcome; only in such a way is the unreal forsaken for the real; only in such a way is a liberal and tolerant frame of mind developed. Our hope lies in the application of sound intelligence to social, political, and economic problems with the same open-mindedness, courage, and thoroughness with which it has been employed in the study of natural

phenomena. We need *mind* more than ever before, and it is now clear that we can have indefinitely more of mind than we now have if we but honestly desire it and avail ourselves of the resources already at hand.

In view of the fact that it is the attitudes of the individual that determine his activities, it is well to note that to-day there are also prevalent many attitudes that obstruct progressive effort. There is, for example, the unsocial or anti-social attitude toward fellow-men which is made up of selfishness, hate, intolerance, personal, group, or racial conceit, political or religious bigotry.

The sophisticated, and bored attitude of many toward questions of great human and social significance is another serious obstacle, worse perhaps than that of those who are too lazy to be disturbed or those whose selfish interests force them to take the opposite stand.

There is the attitude also of that part of the older régime who will never be capable of appreciating the significance of progress or even of change. It is said that our beliefs and attitudes along almost all lines are fixed by the time we are thirty-five. It is very hard for a man beyond this age to change. If he does find that he must change to be honest with himself, he does so grudgingly and with much compromising and interpreting. Except in quite exceptional cases, little can be hoped for from these. We must wait until they die off. Auguste Comte's contention to the effect that the comparative shortness of human life is one of the most important of all accelerating influences is amply borne out. An infinite extension of human life, unless human psychological processes changed markedly in the meantime, would presently put a stop to all progression whatever. It is the steady renewal of agents with the successive generations that assures progress at present. The main hope must always be put in the oncoming generation, not yet wedded to the beliefs and attitudes of an older and a harder régime.

There is also the attitude of those whose minds are held in bondage by delusion and ignorance, and cannot or will not face reality—and their number is legion. They are so busy rationalizing their prejudices that they cannot see things as they are. They cling tenaciously to superstitions and to conventional modes of thought, and consequently fail to comprehend the nature of man or the nature of progress. They have not yet learned to make intelligence their guide.

c. The Rigid Adherence to Tradition and Conformity. Tradition has been one of the most formidable obstacles to progress in all ages, and it still serves that unkind rôle. "Disguised in the latest and most

popular fashions it has always worked to arrest progress or to misguide. In the semblance of the guardian of souls, as the custodian of public morals and safety, in the guises of patriotism, of authority, of loyalty and in many other more or less reasonable attires, it has played havoc with human intelligence. It has been driven out of the domain of science, but in the fields of government, economics, and religion it still holds its own." ² And yet in these fields tradition is incompatible with the scientific spirit, which is the very essence of the progressive spirit. Tradition, along with custom, forms a social fabric which weighs down upon any disposition to change. There is a group conservatism as there is an individual conservatism.

The stifling effect of tradition is amply demonstrated by the ways in which it interfered in early science. For centuries the world had been taught by tradition that heavier bodies fall faster than light ones. Galileo took a number of balls of different weight to the top of the leaning tower of Pisa and by dropping them showed that they all fell at the same rate. The learned professors of the University of Pisa, whose states of mind were the creations of tradition, would not believe their eyes, however. "Does he think," they said, "that by such experiments he can shake our belief in the true philosophy which teaches us that a hundred-pound ball falls one hundred times faster than a one-pound ball? Such disregard of authority is dangerous." ³

An earlier and more ridiculous incident is stated in the following account which may be spurious, but which nevertheless gives an accurate representation of Scholastic principles:

"In the year of our Lord 1432, there arose a grievous quarrel among the brethren over the number of teeth in the mouth of a horse. For thirteen days the disputation raged without ceasing. All the ancient books and chronicles were fetched out, and wonderful and ponderous erudition, such as was never before heard of in this region, was made manifest. At the beginning of the fourteenth day, a youthful friar of goodly bearing asked his learned superiors for permission to add a word, and straightway, to the wonderment of the disputants whose deep wisdom he sore vexed, he beseeched them to unbend in a manner coarse and unheard of, and to look in the open mouth of a horse and find answer to their questionings. At this, their dignity being grievously hurt, they waxed exceedingly wroth; and joining in a mighty uproar, they flew upon him and smote him hip and thigh, and cast him out forthwith. For, said they, surely Satan hath tempted this bold neophyte to declare unholy and unheard of ways of finding truth

² H. M. Dadourian, "Some Problems of Progress," *Scientific Monthly*, Vol.

by Dadourian, *op. cit.*

contrary to all the teachings of the fathers. After many days more of grievous strife the dove of peace sat on the assembly and they as one man, declaring the problem to be an everlasting mystery because of a grievous dearth of historical and theological evidence thereof, so ordered the same writ down."⁴

In the light of three hundred years or more of advance along scientific lines such occurrences seem ridiculous to us, but is it so difficult to find equally absurd traditional viewpoints and methods current to-day? Until the scientific spirit is permitted to clarify all the departments of life tradition will continue to serve as a check upon progress.

Another obstacle akin to tradition and perhaps even more of an incubus on progress is the widely felt need of perfect conformity. This complete absence of discrepancy or variation which the group insists upon in its forms of action, thought, or speech, and imperiously compels with threat of ostracism or worse, is a dead-weight on progress. For conformity plants its feet firmly on the rock of reaction. It always tends to remove from the field of rational consideration and analysis certain portions of life and experience; it is dumb and unreflective. It is a willful disposition to refuse to try and understand and to judge.

"Conformity makes the cut of a coat more important than the cut of a character; . . . it makes a desire to believe the incomprehensible more important than a desire to be of use to humanity here and now. . . . Conformity confronts and menaces the honest individual desirous of self-expression at every turn. . . . So long as he is content to be like someone else, to ape some popular idol, to do as the 'right-thinking' do, comfort and respectability are his. But let him once start to be himself just as honestly and sincerely as he can and immediately his pathway is strewn with stones by those who have been commanded to love one another, but do not love him."⁵

According to conformity it is a crime to be different, and upon him who dares to be different or think differently there descends the consummate wrath of the group. Because of it men have suffered, and, of course, progress has been thwarted.

d. The Lag of Thought Habits and the Lethargy of the Masses.

It is much easier to change institutions, or even to abolish them, than it is to change the bulk of popular thought that has been shaped to their pattern. This is especially true of economic, political, and legal institutions and the thought that goes with them. This is why glowing

⁴Quoted by H. E. Barnes, "The Historical Background and Setting of the Philosophy of Francis Bacon," *Scientific Monthly*, Vol. 18, pp. 476-477.

⁵T. Swann Harding, "The Greatest Faith of them All," *Open Court*, Vol. 36, pp. 230-240, 231.

predictions of a Utopia near at hand so frequently terminate in disappointment. Habits of thought outlive modifications in habits of action. "Consequently as a rule, the moral effects of even great revolutions, after a few years of outwardly conspicuous alterations, do not show themselves till after the lapse of time. A new generation must come upon the scene, whose habits of mind have been formed under the new conditions."⁶ Habits produce a bias, and when that bias is not only that of a group but of a whole age, the difficulty of escaping from it is very great indeed. It produces what Peters⁷ calls an "apperceptive set," which acts as a dead-weight upon any disposition to change. For necessary change, as we have seen, requires mental flexibility.

Similar to this in effect as an obstacle is what might be called the lethargy of the multitude. One notices among so many of the people a stodgy contentment concerning most phases of life. They are characterized by inertia and laziness, a complacent satisfaction with things as they are if they are not positively unendurable. This in turn means indifference to the great majority of the questions that vitally affect the future, lack of public-mindedness, a deficient sense of social responsibility, an absence of idealism, and a tendency to crowd-mindedness, lack of thinking, and an acceptance of crowd standards. It is possible that much of this is due to ignorance, at least social ignorance, and when education includes a scientific treatment of more and more of the questions vitally related to human and social life this situation may gradually improve.

e. The Fear of Change and Chance. The dominant group in society are always reluctant to permit any tampering with fundamental institutions. They fear that criticism and change may go too far when once started and cause the social pendulum to swing in the other direction, thus possibly causing violent reactions, which, if they occurred would easily destroy the fruits of centuries of toil. They prefer status and stability even with ignominy. Their attitude is expressed in the adage, "Let sleeping dogs lie." "They feel that it is better . . . to let a few worm-eaten and unsightly pillars stand a while longer than to risk bringing down into the ruins the whole structure while trying to replace them."⁸ What they fear is, of course, always a possibility, but scientific progress in no way implies this, as any thinking man knows.

There are others who offer lip-worship to ideas of necessary change

⁶ J. Dewey, *Human Nature and Conduct*, pp. 108-109.

⁷ C. C. Peters, *Foundations of Educational Sociology*, pp. 276-277.

⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 278.

and prophetism, whose general philosophy of life, in fact, would seem to be liberal or progressive, who, however, when confronted with the actual transition, shrink back and lean upon the past or construct a subterfuge to excuse their withdrawal or non-participation. They are only fair-weather progressives.

Bound up with the above situations is the tendency to glorify the past. It is strange what a fascination the past has for most of us, and what an irresistible tendency there is for us to turn to it in our moments of perplexity. Disappointed with the present, fearful of the future, every generation seems to turn to the past seeking in the mists and uncertainties of yesterday to find that ideal to which the aspirations of man ever tend. This is due to various facts, significant being that we are afraid and mentally lazy and do not have the will to try; that we lack confidence in our own powers, and a mistaken notion that all that the past contributes is proven and good. Consequently many are in the class of those who are "hanging on to the tail-end of progress yelling whoa."

f. The Resistance of the Vested Interests. The leaders, the social élite, the governing and propertied classes usually find it to their personal or class interest to keep social life as nearly static as possible. The members of these classes already occupy a favored position, because of present arrangements, and change is more likely to reduce their relative advantage than to augment it. Even though a reorganization of education, industry, politics, ethical codes, or the church may lead to a much greater ultimate good, these favored ones throw their weight against and thwart, as far as possible, any movements for such fundamental change. Their interference is made through subtle and not always socially justified control of social institutions, or by propagandist methods they bring into disrepute anything which by contrast criticizes or accuses them.

g. Institutionalization. While institutionalization is necessary to the efficiency of any belief or program or activity, the very institutionalization may in time make any of these an incubus upon progress. The standardized curriculum becomes a convention and then a tradition, the religious belief is crystallized into a creed, the method of trial becomes a fixed procedure, custom or legislation is codified, a tenet of philosophy becomes a fundamental characteristic of economic and political life, etc. Not only does age ennoble and set these, but they are put into the hands of bishops, secretaries, self-perpetuating boards or old men to conserve them. Thereby an inertia sets in which maintains them far beyond their

legitimate time. Thus institutions tend to become crystallized, and preserve in rigid form the extremely conservative ideals of the past.⁹ They tend to become structures without life or potency.

The very reaction against these crystallized institutions produces another obstacle to progress, namely, the radical, who represents the extreme rebound of protest and discontent. In his violent reaction the radical often seriously impairs the progressive development and actually causes standstill or regress.

h. The Lack of the "Facility of Association." The spirit of suspicion, selfishness, intolerance, and controversy complicates progressive programs of every sort. It seems that it is very hard for people to get along together without friction and antagonism and still harder to co-operate in some great and rather strenuous effort. Emerson said that "facility of association" was the measure of civilization, meaning that as people become enlightened and broad-minded they develop the ability to coöperate in higher and higher degree. It is obvious that we have not yet achieved this high level of civilization, and it is equally obvious that progress will be difficult until we do. We still lack that breadth of view and of sympathy, that toleration, that generosity, that spirit of human fellowship, that good will and sincerity among all classes that are among the fundamental conditions of social progress. We still are swayed by a class spirit, a class consciousness, a class devotion. This, however, it would seem, only needs to be broadened and enlightened to be a potent regenerating force.

All these obstacles and the hosts of others that have not been mentioned constitute a present day challenge that progressives must meet. Some of them are being dealt with, as has been indicated; all of them, however, require to be carefully and intelligently attacked and as far as possible vanquished. But no one need expect this to occur at once.

3. THE COSTS OF PROGRESS

Progress cannot be won without certain pains, sorrows, sacrifices, without some upheaving and unsettling, without temporary chaos here and there.

a. Increasing Dissatisfaction and Unrest. As soon as the better condition has been conceived, even though it be by a pitifully small minority, unrest and discontent begin. There is then the protest against things as they are, subdued at first, but gradually becoming stronger

⁹ See E. A. Ross, *Principles of Sociology*, pp. 501-510.

and eventually being accompanied by forceful action. This serves to keep a progressive society in a continual turmoil; progressive opposes conservative and reactionary; programs are met by entrenched opposition; everywhere there is controversy and struggle; ease, contentment, perfect peace cannot be expected for generations, for those who profit in one social order do not so easily and quickly relinquish their advantageous positions and acquiesce to the next. The processes of education and public influence work on them slowly. The progressive does not lie on a downy couch, nor does he walk on a path strewn with rose petals. Life is for him a struggle, a continual exertion, and an exercising of pressure.

b. An Increase in Recognized Social Evils. When man is in the deep lethargy of protracted social sleep he has no social evils. All is a part of the drowsy world and is accepted without protest or question. But when society begins to progress a myriad of evils bob up everywhere; man then is alert and critical; everything is put to the test. He has the wit to comprehend his own wretchedness as he progresses and the intelligence to construct conceptions of the better. Just as we became concerned about physical diseases and infirmities as biological science, especially medicine and surgery, developed, so with the advance of social science and progressive technique the number of social evils enormously increases. We must expect in the near future to see phases of life which we now accept, or at least suffer to exist, be definitely branded as evils.

c. Frequent Reactions against the Progressive Movement because of Cranks and Panaceas. The progressive agitation will result in a superficial confidence in the idea of progress among many, a feeling that the world wants to be better, and that some waving of a social wand will release the progressive forces of mankind and produce the new era. While the progress cause will doubtless produce a vast amount of good substantial scientific thinking, it, like all other new hopes and causes in history, must expect to be cluttered up by impostors, well-meaning but ignorant and clumsy enthusiasts, notoriety seekers, sentimentalists, evangelists, cranks, quacks, and others—the "lunatic fringe," as Roosevelt called them—who will inundate it with nostrums, palliatives, and panaceas of one sort or another.

Social agitation and social reform, carried on by zealous and enthusiastic individuals, unwise in their progressivism, easily become a handicap to progress. Men, in general, become "fed up" on the agitation of such, call them radicals and cranks, and for a time become alienated

from all progressive activity, because of their fear of fools, as they see them, and they soothe their consciences with the thought that the old world has wagged along for quite a while and will probably last another generation or two at least. And yet these men deep in their hearts are eager for social improvement, and will welcome the man and the program that offers them a sane and practical way of lessening human misery and advancing human fulfilment.

They are simply suspicious of numerous panaceas and half-baked agitators and reformers whom they feel are not much more useful than the cure-all patent medicines cried by blatant ballyhoo artists. Some means must be found of keeping the personnel clear of such as these latter, because they do progress incalculable harm. For some time to come the level-headed man will have the task of not only safeguarding himself against these, but also helping others to do so, for he realizes that no patent devices can be offered for making new worlds out of old; no panaceas can be found; society is too complex to be put right by any formula.

d. Progress Is Accompanied by a Certain Amount of Suffering and even Extermination. Every new mechanical device, every advance in business organization, or in science, even every humanitarian reform, however necessary, which makes the world more tolerable for most of us, makes it impossible for some of us. Progress always causes a shifting of classes, a rearrangement that destroys occupations or livelihood and breaks up interests. The ones displaced are not the ones who secure the joys of a richer and fuller life. "That which enormously benefits mankind is too often the irretrievable ruin of the few."¹⁰ To individuals the forces of progress are sometimes remorselessly cruel. As Giddings points out,¹¹ in the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries when serfdom broke up, there was an advance in most respects, but the enforced economic equality of an earlier day had disappeared. Success now rested upon intelligence and enterprise, qualities that were not equally diffused among the former serfs. Consequently many of them lost out and sank into the lowest wage-earning class. Similarly the abolition of slavery in this country caused untold hardship to many of the former slave-owning farmers. The unsettling of lives and occupations as the result of prohibition is still fresh in our minds. Progress, like all other forms of growth, is accompanied by growing pains. Our social adjusting mechanisms operate imperfectly.

¹⁰ F. H. Giddings, *Studies in the Theory of Human Society*, pp. 231-232.
p. 232.

There is another way in which sorrow and suffering are caused, as Park and Burgess point out.¹²

"Not all the world is able to keep pace with the general progress of the world. Most of the primitive races have been exterminated by the advance of civilization, and it is still uncertain where, and upon what terms, the civilized man will let the remnant of the primitive races live.

"It has been estimated that in the complicated life of modern cities, at least one-tenth of the population is not competent to maintain an independent, economic existence, but requires an increasing amount of care and assistance from the other nine-tenths. To the inferior, incompetent, unfortunate, unable to keep pace with progress, the more rapid advance of the world means disease, despair, and death. In medicine and surgery alone does progress seem wholly beneficent, but the eugenists are even now warning us that our indiscriminate efforts to protect the weak and preserve the incompetent are increasing the burdens of the superior and competent, who are alone fit to live."

The saying of the sage of old, "He that increaseth knowledge increaseth sorrow," still holds true.

e. Successful Living Will Be More and More of a Strain. It is quite conceivable that progress increasingly necessitates progress. In some respects it creates a civilization that is so much a matter of contrivance, so artificial, so pyramided, that if any part of it breaks down, chaos can easily appear. Man cannot now relax; he cannot return to a simpler or more natural life; he must see the battle through, and master his environment and control his destiny. For example, as we keep more and more people alive by sanitation, hygiene, medicine, and surgery, we are forced to be constantly on the alert to prevent the reappearance of adulterated foods and drugs, strains, or unsanitary conditions; we must continually keep at a high level the enforcement of all our hygienic standards and regulations, and all our sanitary technique and equipment. If we should weaken our controls or permit them to sag it is conceivable that the more artificially sustained population would die off like flies in a frost. In fact, populations have grown so large in response to the development of the arts that it is impossible to recede from the artificial without getting rid of a large part of the population. It is also possible that unless a general mental-hygiene program is carried out the increasingly complex and regimented life would cause a marked increase in mental and nervous disorders. As we increase our

¹² Park and Burgess, *An Introduction to the Study of Sociology*, University of Chicago Press, pp. 954-955.

social gear ratios we must be quite certain that we are prepared to meet the new human strains and safeguard ourselves against them. Else "illth" unavoidably results.

We must also somehow save ourselves from the tightening of life that comes with mechanical advances. Each new invention lays hold of man and makes him its servitor. Each new convenience makes the world more comfortable, but it adds fresh conditions to the fulfilling of life, particularly making it more complicated. Each has come to us disguised as a means of saving time and effort, yet each has made time more precious and effort more imperative. Our machinery transcends that of the ancients as the electric arc outblazes the firefly; yet never has the world had less repose than it has to-day. Every labor-saving device increases the cost of labor; every time-saving contrivance makes the day shorter. "'Tis common knowledge that we to-day, are far more pressed for time, more overborne with work, more distantly removed from opportunity for rest and converse with our souls than were our countrymen who walked with Franklin. Yet in those days they had not steam nor gas nor dynamo, nor any one of all the multitude of modern agencies designed to conquer time and lengthen life."¹⁸ Somehow we must keep the machine from conquering us.

Our social, political, economic, religious, and ethical institutions and principles must be kept in continual adjustment also, for our complicated and contrived life to-day depends on the successful functioning of these agents. We must more and more be on the alert. The levees within which our advanced civilization flows cannot be neglected if disaster is to be avoided.

f. Progress Is Accompanied by a Certain Amount of Limitation of Personal Freedom. Social progress implies social control, and as time goes on and population increases and life becomes more complex and the possibilities of running afoul of each other become more numerous, as the mass becomes larger and the problems more acute, the control that will have to be exercised by the group in its own interest will have to increase. This will mean an increasing restraint of the individual and a diminution of his personal liberty in some respects. His own conduct and activities of all kinds will be more and more regulated; his marriage, his consumption and economies, the management and education of his children, his personal hygiene, the place and conditions of his residence and employment, and probably many other phases of his life activity now pretty much a matter of complete indi-

¹⁸ Clifford Howard, "Progress," *Atlantic Monthly*, Vol. 105, p. 123.

vidual freedom will come under the strict regimentation of the state, or its successor.

Now, of course, it is entirely conceivable that man can be educated to the idea of seeing the necessity of this and being willing to submit to it, or we may in time produce a much more coöperative and brotherly human nature which will make it unnecessary; but in any case it is a difficulty that we must face.

g. Derangements of all Kinds, Temporarily at Least, Must Be Expected. Until the technique of progressive change is developed to such a point that it can be brought about universally and without shock of any kind, in perfect coördination with all its related elements, we will have to expect derangements of all kinds. Progress along one line, unless it is accompanied by the same degree of progress along allied lines, will cause maladjustments in these allied departments of life. For example, political changes affect the group industrially, ethically, religiously, and socially, and change along any of the other lines will have similar concomitant effects. Progress at present unavoidably brings with it a temporary upheaving and breaking up, which lasts until the new adjustments have been made. Its way is not an altogether smooth one.

h. A Certain Amount of Desertion from the Cause of Progress Must Be Expected. Progress is such an uphill fight, and requires such sustained confidence and faith, and such endurance in effort that it is entirely conceivable that many a progressive will become over-fatigued as the result of the strain of the long struggle against obstacles, disappointments, repudiation, and villification, and will give up the fight, sink into a state of cynicism and desuetude, and consequently give much comfort to the opposition. But progressives, like other people, are human, and an occasional one will illustrate common human frailties of spirit, and not an inherent weakness of the progress ideal.

4. THE NECESSITY OF CAREFUL STRATEGY

Since progress is such a precious and necessary thing its cause must not be made unduly difficult by bungling, by thick-headedness, hot-headedness, or display of hatred or violent opposition, for each of these breed more of their kind and in the end result in loss of energy and time, and frequently in social deadlock. Therefore the most careful and intelligent strategy must be used.

Often long-time, roundabout, and even camouflaged attacks are best. The long, slow process of education with an occasional discreet and

veiled onslaught upon the forces of evil are most certain to yield good results. Vicious ideas and movements must be made to lose their significance, either by taking away their *raison d'être*, "stealing their thunder," or demonstrating conclusively to fair-minded people, and there really are many, how dishonest and harmful they are.

The continuous light attack by indirect suggestion, veiled criticism, unconvinced attitude, the marshalling of evidence without calling attention by direct reference to the evil against which it is directed, is what arouses suspicion, induces thought, confirms convictions, and finally removes for the individual the supports that have sustained the harmful institution, idea, or organization. The opposition's stand must be undermined or riddled by subtle and well manipulated means.

Such tactics do not antagonize the opposition because they are not sufficiently obvious. Bulldozing or open and pointed opposition are not usually the best methods. They tend to make martyrs of the opposed and enlist in their support many whose feelings are stronger than their wills, but who give weight to a movement, nevertheless.

This whole question of strategy, however, rests upon a variety of factors. It depends upon the type or class of people opposing you; that is, their degree of intelligence or enlightenment, their amenability to the rules of the game, the nature of the issue, the degree to which it is pressing at the moment, and the terrain of the controversy. The appropriate method must always be sought.

For some issues and among some contestants open discussion and public controversy are best. It is certainly true that much of the intolerance, arrogance, bigotry, prejudice, and misunderstanding that stand in the way of sound thinking and effective programs is the result of intellectual and moral isolation. When this isolation is broken up by discussion, mutual understanding and even sympathy may appear. Group discussion tends to remove inhibitions, clears minds of suspicion and bias, releases good will and opens the way, not for grudging, reluctant compromises, but for generally approved rectifications and adjustments. As such it is indispensable.

Then, of course, there are some issues where the open fight to the finish with no quarter is probably the only way out. The conflict between church and state, the slavery question, the matter of prohibition, and perhaps the peace movement are illustrations of such controversy. Here the serenity of a high moral stand is the most effective strategy. It is significant that every great fight of this nature in history that the writer knows of has finally been decided right.

5. THE NECESSITY OF ALL PROGRESSIVE EFFORT BECOMING A MULTIPLE MOVEMENT INTERNATIONAL IN SCOPE

Progress to be effective must be a multiple movement touching all classes, all nations, and every department of life. Every part of social life is correlated with every other and exists for and through every other. Society to-day is both more complex and more unified than ever before, and both its complexity and unity are due to close and manifold correlations, which embrace industry, politics, and morals, and are international in their scope. At the same time there are to-day so many narrow, one-sided movements and developments, one-sided efforts at reform, partial attempts at betterment along one line or another, that obstruct and menace full social life, because they aim only at the good of particular classes, groups, nations, or combinations of nations. We shall not be able to secure any social progress which is worth while until social policy is broadened so as to give duly proportionate attention to all factors in the social life. All social movements must be synthesized and given humanitarian direction. This rests, in the last analysis, upon the development of an international consciousness.

As has been pointed out above,¹⁴ industry, commerce, and finance, even religion, science, and art, are rapidly becoming international, and in some respects even world-wide. But the world is not united intellectually or spiritually. In spite of the vast advance physically and economically, we have singularly failed to make a corresponding and sufficient intellectual and spiritual advance, even though there is so much that can be and should be the common intellectual and spiritual possession of mankind.

And yet a common view of truth and mankind such as will contribute best to the progress of an enduring civilization based on the nobler qualities of man is absolutely necessary. If progress is to occur there must be an international mind, an international consciousness, and an international coöperation. No problem of any significance can be permanently settled in one country unless it is settled everywhere. The United States, for example, cannot solve the problems of prohibition, narcotics, prostitution, physical and mental defect, crime, venereal disease, war, marriage and divorce, denominational coördination, sanitation, and others without the coöperation of most of the other countries, and the same holds true of any other country. At best merely national efforts are

¹⁴ Chapter XVIII, sec. 7.

piecemeal and palliative. The world must think on its problems as a unified body, and its efforts must be systematized, synthesized, and synchronized. There must be a world viewpoint, because nothing less than a well-balanced world order will best conserve human values.

The wisdom of mankind must not be parceled out by national boundaries nor by barriers which separate one portion of thought from another, nor must its efforts be local and narrowly confined. Progressive thought and effort must become internationalized. Every corner of the earth must be searched by disinterested and depersonalized investigation for its hidden truth, and every progressive everywhere must be marshaled for the universal achievement. There must be a complete pooling of all the world's intellectual and spiritual resources. In some way or other the partial views of things must be united into a whole. All the partial international minds must be united into a more comprehensive one which shall embrace all the more comprehensive and profound concerns of mankind. This is a work to inspire the best efforts of the world's greatest intellects.

Finally, success cannot be expected except through organized and careful effort; and such labor will need an organ and a clearing house for ideas. There must be an international educational system, an international science service, a broad and open forum for the analysis of debated questions by those best qualified to treat them, and an organization, or organizations, capable of drawing up and carrying into effect a program, or programs, on which men can agree. Some sort of a League of Nations will have to be organized that will go way beyond the present league in scope, and that will carry out Francis Bacon's idea of a House of Salomon on a universal scale.

6. THE POSSIBILITY OF PROGRESS

To sustain the progressive there must be a faith that progress will occur, that his hopes and efforts are not in vain. It is easy for the myopic student of society to dwell at length on the sins and sufferings of men until he becomes morbid, discouraged, and exhausted, and there will always be some people for whom this will be the characteristic attitude; there will always be small men who will fear to do big deeds. At the same time there is every reason for the normal man to feel that in place of despair and apathy there may be hopefulness and energy, better things unfolding into a progressive civilization. In fact, in the vision and charity of the believing individual it is already here. What

firmer grounds has the progressive for his faith than has the religious man for his, the core of which is made up largely of intangible, undemonstrable, and unknowable elements! Is progress possible? Can men be converted to the idea? Are the agencies available? Is there the requisite mental and spiritual dynamic? In every case, yes.

To-day the progressive is sustained by the thought that there exist substantial foundations for a belief that there can be progress. There is, for example, the remarkable development from the brute to the man, and the equally remarkable development from the simple, fearful, cave-dwelling primitive, who was largely a pawn of fate, to the contemporary civilized man who looks out upon his world with the smile and assurance of a conqueror. There is also the history of great reform movements, whereby man's inhumanity to man has been greatly reduced, carried to eminently successful terminations. This modern man also is beginning to see that all the mistakes of the past are available to correct him, and all the knowledge of the past is here to sustain him.

The lover of progress is also encouraged by the fact that there is among so many people to-day, particularly the younger generation, a spirit of questioning, of dissatisfaction with established systems and institutions, a determination to arrive at something better. The very existence of all kinds of new sects, teachings, movements, almost all purporting to have a cure-all for every ill, is but evidence of this dissatisfaction with things as they are. People somehow have a conception of something better and they are dissatisfied with that which is. It is this striving, this unrest, this zealous effort toward progress that is the hopeful and wholesome thing at this moment. So many of us are dissatisfied with the present conditions—filled with what we feel to be a sort of divine discontent. The very improvement that we have made in recent years is responsible for a growing awareness of misfit; it has enhanced our sensitivity and dissatisfaction. We seek improvements and feel that they are within our reach, provided a sufficient number of a given society want them bad enough. Eventually this discontent can be directed, made scientific and rational and used for general reform and corrective action.

There is also in this new world, especially in America, an unbounded energy, an intellectual vigor, and a will that is tremendous, the like of which has never before been known. There is also an idealism and enthusiasm and vision, of which we had glimmerings in our conquest of the continent, that is magnificent and portentous of great things, though now temporarily largely in abeyance. When we once learn to harness

our power to our ideals, instead of our material desires, when we find means of redirecting our tide of energy into channels which lead directly to human welfare, we will have such a civilization as the world has never known.

In this connection also there is available a tremendous, though heretofore largely untapped force among human beings, the force of creative effort, a force which causes the individual to attempt to produce something new, something vital and living. Of course, it is not equally diffused among all people, but all who possess it feel the need of expressing it if they are to have a sense of satisfaction in life. It is the creative efforts of men that have shaped the world of to-day and built our civilization and weakened the dominance of nature, and it is by means of these efforts that man is changing the things around him to-day. "There is to-day creative effort enough in the world to make this world a paradise and to make of man right speedily an ideal being."¹⁸ Danforth discusses the matter in a lucid and pointed fashion.

"A tenth part of the constructive thought now being employed building up great industries with their elaborate buildings, complex machinery, and vast business organization, would, if directed primarily toward creating an ideal environment, make the world we live in so much more beautiful, healthful, and altogether joyous that we would hardly recognize the old ball.

"None of the main stream of creative effort has been turned to this purpose; only the ripples and eddies play upon it here and there sporadically. No truly vast, far-reaching and comprehensive effort has been directed on this goal. The goal has been sighted by many a prophet, poet and writer. Too often it has been put in some far away utopia, and oftener still relegated to a future existence. Yet already more workable results than this have been accomplished by man, tasks more truly stupendous. Some of these achievements are of but partial or even doubtful value to the race, yet wonderful.

"The beautification and sanitation of the whole world, both town and country, is relatively simple in nature, if vast in extent. Compared with the complexities, intrigues and agonizing intensity of the great war, it is simplicity itself. Its organization and successful prosecution would require no more men, money, brains and effort than any one of the seven greatest businesses in the world, or of the seven greatest governments in the world. Yet which could we spare best—the ideal world or the individual business or governmental organization referred to?

"Many, many times the amount of engineering and business achievements have been consummated which would be required to eliminate slum conditions the world over, remove the dust nuisance from town and country, control mosquito and other nuisances of temperate and tropical zones, and

¹⁸ R. E. Danforth, "Creative Effort as a Factor in Human Evolution," *Scientific Monthly*, Vol. 17, p. 131.

restore forests to their rightful places and beauty to each eyesore when the hand of man has shown more zeal than inspiration.

"A youthful leader, with the ability and genius of a John D. Rockefeller could, by devoting his life, organize the men, the brains, the means and the concentrated effort, put the movement on a sure foundation, and start it forward and upward with an impetus which eternity itself would never stop.

"At the present moment, man has reached a stage in his evolution where he is ready to receive and coöperate with a concerted, consistent effort to quickly, scientifically and sanely improve the human hereditary stock and the physical environment we live in. The double improvement will react, one part upon the other, the improved environment accelerating the upward evolution of man, and the new-born superman will appreciate more fully and evaluate more accurately and truly the world-wide movement toward a perfect environment. Then it will require but a few centuries more when every denizen will be a perfect man, perfect in physique, intelligence, ability, absolute joyousness, interest, spirit, and every way, and the world about as fine as heaven itself."³⁸

We must get into the habit of thinking about the vast resources about us, now used for other purposes, that are available for progress purposes if we learn how to utilize them and care to do so. Consider, for example, the enormous power of the agencies now used for forming public opinion, usually in the interests of classes, particularly the power of the newspaper and periodical press, as it now reflects the commercial point of view, in thoroughly inoculating our entire people with the ideas which it is promoting. Consider also the vast resources of the highly and scientifically organized commercial advertising business as we find it to-day, capable of bringing about almost inconceivable sales successes in the space of a single year. Or consider the resources which were demonstrated in the processes of marshaling the United States for participation in the World War—the women's organizations doing half a hundred things, the Liberty Loan drives, and the food-husbanding work, not to mention the mobilization, equipping, and training of between four and five million troops in a bare year and a half. In fact, the war showed quite generally that intelligence and training and means are available for the conducting of great public affairs in the public interest when the occasion generates the will to employ them for that end. It seems to show that after such a demonstration of power in behalf of public concerns, only absence of effective desire, or the power of contrary desire to serve private interests, are the factors to stop us

³⁸ Danforth, "Creative Effort as a Factor in Human Evolution," pp. 133-134. See also Hertzler, *The History of Utopian Thought*, pp. 312-313, and A. D. Weeks, *op. cit.*, pp. 36-37.

from engaging in large-scale progressive effort. We already, certainly, have evidenced the capacity to carry out unheard of measures if we but want to enough.

Nor is it hazardous to state that there are also undiscovered latent forces, social and otherwise, that will be available for progressive purposes in time; processes that we do not yet have the wit to devise, but which can be confidently expected. For we are just launched on this career of discovery. The story is told of the old sunken barge that no one could raise. Finally an old sailor floated two other barges up to it at low tide, one on either side, and ran chains from each of the adjoining barges under the old hulk. He then let the tide raise it. Perhaps we shall find homely but powerful agencies of this kind that will use available but undiscovered forces. All we need is alertness and ingenuity.

Undoubtedly there is still in human nature the potentiality of great power to be released through the excitation of new discoveries. The new psychology with its more exact information concerning the elasticity of human nature is showing that a thing seemingly impossible may be made possible by creating new habits of thought, by changing ideas, by readjusting superficial relations. Therefore who cannot fail to have the best of confidence that there is a long and important line of advancement now to be followed out?

Social inspiration is also increasing. The newly awakened interest in the social subjects, the increasingly keen and sympathetic sense of social obligation, the will to do justice in all ranks and classes, and the thousands of people who are willing, even eager, to render social service, are the witness of this reality. Of course, this inspiration must be guided by intelligence and tempered by foresight, otherwise it will run into mere sentiment, but there is also evidence that we are learning how to safeguard ourselves against such results.

Equally encouraging is the fact that man is ready, or making ready to-day, to face the problems of social, political, religious, and economic organization, to ponder the question whether the world can really be made safe for free, rational, civilized human beings. More and more of us are turning with earnestness and unselfishness to the task of our own salvation. More and more of us also have the necessary scientific insight into these problems, and are part of a trained and enthusiastic personnel to carry programs into effect. For more people than ever before are grasping at methodical experimentalism and honest analysis as a substitute for routine, tradition, rules, and dogmas in the conduct of life. The disposition to challenge and to cross-examine practices, insti-

tutions, and principles is gradually undermining popular faith in many traditions, symbols, and formulas which have hitherto produced inertia if not obstacles. The world is more and more becoming a fertile breeding ground for an infinite number of novel and constructive enterprises of all kinds—technical, industrial, social, and intellectual. Above all, there is behind much of this the humanistic motive power of the perennial hope of progress. It is well also again to recall that the fundamental discoveries of the past came mostly by chance, while now men for the first time are systematically seeking to know the secrets of nature, human nature, and society.

We are also developing that new outlook, that ability to face the world from another attitude, which is a precondition of a permanent invasion of new fields. Many of us are rapidly coming to be in a mental state where we are not shocked by new ideas or new proposals. In recent years, as Professor John Dewey states,¹⁷ "Fixed beliefs have been shocked into disintegration. Complacent convictions which were thought to be based on reason have been pried loose and the rock of prejudice exposed. Imagination has got used to seeing 'impossible' things done in a large way, and the achievement has rendered us docile, more receptive alike to the lessons of experience and to entertainment of strange ideas, of new possibilities."

Can poverty be eliminated? Can war be abolished? Can the excessive concentration of wealth be forestalled? Can prejudice and bias and blind passion be destroyed? Can the great mass of humanity be lifted to a rational, dignified, human plane of existence? Can vulgarity, vice, ignorance, and coarseness be successfully combated, and good taste, clean living, broad thinking, culture, love of beauty, and spirituality be widely diffused? Can the conditions of modern society which divide it, which cause waste and trouble and anguish, which breed animosity and hatred, and which lead to internecine and international conflict in various forms be rectified? It is with questions such as these that many of us are grappling. Never before have they been so well understood as now. It may be confidently said that the general level of awareness and of interest in life is higher than it has ever been in the past. To-day among mankind in general, the educated and the uneducated, there is a greater degree of awakening, a more ardent inquiry into the cause of existence, and a more intense desire to take part intelligently in the general scheme than the world has ever seen. A new leaven is working among men. Mankind may be divided into two great classes, the awakened and the

¹⁷ "A New Social Science," *New Republic*, April 6, 1918.

unawakened, and at present there are many indications that the former class is increasing.

We have as yet little agreement respecting the remedies to be applied, the preventives to be adopted, or the constructive policies and means to be employed. We cannot, as some one has put it, at this time "come forth with an outline of every subordinate office to be filled, and a blueprint of every building to be occupied." But the problems we face are not all positively desperate ones. While they call for difficult efforts of all kinds, and much sustained labor, they nowhere seem to face utter frustration. Deep study, careful thinking, free discussion, and extensive experimentation will sooner or later evolve a substantial consensus of opinion, effective programs, and successful agents. In every community there are those who are inherently progressive, resourceful, creative, capable of self-mastery and self-direction, and those who are capable of directing great movements to their consummation.

The new state and the new society is coming but it is coming because the men and women of the present state and society are seeking solutions of apprehended and realized problems, remedies for serious evils, wrongs, and conflicts that are causing us pain and anxiety. And this being true, the new state is like Rome—all roads lead to it. It is the conscious goal of many, but the unconscious goal of many more. How fast it will come when it is the conscious goal of a majority or more is a question which intrigues the imagination, but which one cannot answer reliably.

Where there is hope of healthier and happier human relations, of greater and finer and fuller human beings, of a better society, of unity, peace, and concord in the future, where there is a craving for justice and righteousness, where there are sublime and divine glimpses, impulses, aspirations, and ideals, where there is in large numbers of individuals the still small voice of the categorical imperative of the social "ought," there is every reason to feel that progress is as certain as a human hope can be. The wish has always been father to the thought, and thinking has always made things this or that.

Of course, the progress goal, even the limited one we now conceive, will not be achieved in a century, perhaps not in a millennium, but it will be achieved gradually. Man is awakening, and though the first hundred years may have the appearance of a hopeless jumble, this period of chaos is but the necessary breaking down which must precede any new structure. Once mankind in general begins to be puzzled about the causes of existence, and begins to inquire into the purpose of life,

and the best means of fulfilling that purpose, the era of progress will have begun. "The chaos of the world to-day is not a cause for pessimism, but for rejoicing, for it is an infallible sign that the great awakening has begun. The throes of birth are upon the world, for the old order is changing. The darkness which is around us is the darkness of the very early morning, and from it will be born a day more beautiful than any that has yet been."¹⁸ The problems that humanity faces can be solved, not immediately, but in calculable time. The truth is in the world, and now, as in the past, those who truly seek it will find it.

There are those who say that the good described by humanity's prophets from the Pisgah heights of their prescient intellect is but a mirage, a phantasy, an unrealizable nonentity. The most appropriate reply is that of an anonymous thinker who said, "A mirage it may be—but a mirage is only possible if there is a reality somewhere beyond; a mirage if you like; and like a mirage, deceptive, in that the vision seems so very near, whilst the reality is so far beyond; but yet it *is* beyond, somewhere, however far, if only we have courage enough to perseveringly press on, strength enough to hew down the obstacles, intelligence enough to see the right path, and purity and single-heartedness to keep it."

QUESTIONS AND PROBLEMS

1. Why is it necessary to at least keep the rate of constructive reorganization equal to the rate of social change?
2. Consider some progressive change that you would like to see effected. List the obstacles that would probably be encountered in realizing it.
3. What costs or unfortunate by-products of progress can you give in addition to those mentioned?
4. Someone has said, "The hardest thing in the world to do is to make people care, and the next hardest thing is to make them do something about the thing they care about." How does this apply to progress?
5. Along what lines is progress likely to occur during the next century? Why?
6. What does the progress of the future depend upon in the last analysis, reform of institutions or reform of thought and attitudes? Why?
7. Why discuss strategy?
8. What concrete evidence have you that progress is possible in the near future?

¹⁸ G. H. Bonner, "Progress," *Nineteenth Century*, Vol. 97, p. 18.

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INDEX

- Abundant life as goal, 90**
Academy of sciences, of Bacon, 34
Acceleration, principle of, 72
Acheulean culture period, 136
Achievement and environment, 306
Achievement, part in progress, 73
Acreage, possibilities of increasing, 355-356
Adaptation test of progress, 86-87
Adjustment and progress, 87
Advance in knowledge of universe, 144-145
Æschylus, 19
Agents of progress, Chs. IX-XIV; conclusion, 289-290; education, Ch. XIV; exceptional individuals, Ch. XI; ideals and programs, Ch. XII; intellect and knowledge, Ch. IX; public opinion, Ch. XIII; science, Ch. X
Aggravation stage in progressive movement, 122
Allport, F. H., 79-80
Amalgamation, racial, 472
Americans, resistance of, to progress, 111-112
Anachronism in organized religion, 537-539
Anatagonisms, racial, 462-463
Anaximander, 17-18
Anaximenes, 18
Ante-Nicene Fathers, 24
Anti-rationalism of religion, 541
Apocalyptists, 15
Aquinas, Thomas, 25
Aristotle, 20
Art, nature of, 522-523; need of different attitude toward, 527; social function of, 522-523
Art and literature as agents of public opinion, 256
Ascent of life, 136
Atlantis of Plato, 16
Attack, unified, by reformers, 129-130
Attitude, of radicalism, 107-108
Attitude, progressive, 108-109; reactionism, 107; progressive and science, 204-205; toward sacred books, 540-541
Attitudes, change of, 106; conservatism, 107; ethical, 121; inflexibility of, 105-106; progress and, 105-106; racial, 466, 473-476; suggestion and, 248; toward progress, 6; unprogressive, 551-552
Augustine's *City of God*, 24
Aurignacian culture period, 137
Average man, 381; and education, 276
Avoidance of war, 498-501
Azilian-Tardenoisian-Maglomesian culture period, 138
Bacon, Francis, progress ideas of, 33-34
Bacon, Roger, contribution of, to progress idea, 25-26
Bagehot, W., 96
Balz, A. G. A., 158
Barbarism, 234
Basic principles, 109
Beauty, Ch. XXII; function of, 521; nature of, 520-522; need of, 525-528; progress and, 520-522
Beauty making, 521
Belief, mistaken, that beauty is merely ornamental, 524
Benevolence and morals, 516
Bentham, J., 47
Bernard, L. L., 194; concept of environment as analyzed by, 294-296
"Bigger" as test, 83
Biological control, importance of, 323-324
Biological costs of war, 492-493
Biological degeneration, 140
Biological foundation of individual, 313
Biological improvement, 140
Biological nature and quality of human beings and progress, Ch. XVI
Biological progress of man, 139-141
Biological study, significance for progress, 312-313
Biological tests of progress, 99-100
Birth-control, 327, 457-458; and quantity of population, 369-372; and falling birth-rate, 348; contemporary significance of, 369-372
Birth-rate, 343-348; and death-rate, ration of, 343-352; of abler stocks,

- 319; of less capable stocks, 319.
See also Falling birth-rate
- Boas, F., 184
- Bodin, Jean, 31-32
- Books, as agents of public opinion, 256
- Bourbonism, 479
- Brain, out of balance with vital functions, 140
- Bruno, Giordano, 32-33
- Buckle, H. T., 179
- Bury, J. B., 12
- Business, socialization of, 428-430
- Campanella, 34-35
- Carlyle, T., quoted, 220
- Carver, T. N., 124
- Case analysis in social sciences, 211
- Cattell, J. M., quoted, 223, 225
- Causes of modern war, 489-490
- Cautions for the progressive moralist, 514-517
- Cautions to be observed in progress, 124-130
- Celibacy, abolition of certain forms of, 332
- Censorship, 378
- Centuries, the thought of the fifteenth, sixteenth, and seventeenth, 26-38
- Change, 12; and chance, fear of, 555-556; as unavoidable, 64; in attitudes, 106; is not progress, 68-70; must be continuous with past, 242; not confuse quantitative with qualitative, 128-129; slow and tempered, 485-486
- Changeableness of ideals, 240-241
- Changing family, 443-446
- Changing marriage, 440-443
- Changing parenthood, 446-448
- Changing processes, not cognizant of, 69
- Character training, 280-282
- Chastellux, 42
- Chellian culture period, 136
- Chemistry, 202
- Child, C. M., 171
- Child labor, 427
- Child, parents, respect personality of, 448
- Child welfare, 446
- Childless families, 444
- Children of superior ability, responsibility toward, 277-278
- Children, treatment of, 151
- China, early progress theory of, 13-14
- Church, Early, coercive power of, 25
- Church Fathers, progress ideas of, 24-25
- Civilization, 43; and culture, 134-135; and exceptional men, 220; and ideals, 238; as educational process, 270; difficulty of evaluating, 132-133; distinguished from progress, 134-135; effect on natural selection, 318; expansion and decay of, 74
- Clamor and noise, beware of, 125-126
- Class alignment and maldistribution of wealth, 411
- Class sentiment, necessity of changing in connection with quality of population, 329-330
- Class rule, limited, 148
- Clergymen and divorce, 452-453
- Climate, effects of, 297-298
- Cobb, Frank I., quoted, 257
- Communication and progress, 146
- Communication, changes in, 202
- Companionate, 444
- Complexity of life, 140; as obstacle to proper functioning of democracy, 384
- Composite nature of progress tests in practice, 95-96
- Comte, A., 7, 56-58
- Concentration of wealth, effects of, 409-410
- Concept of environment as analyzed by Bernard, 294-296
- Conditions favorable to progress, 119-120
- Conditions in early eighteenth century, 146
- Conditions necessary for the formation of sound public opinion, 251-255
- Condorcet, 43-45
- Conduct and good environment, 511-512
- Configuration of land and progress, 298-299
- Conformity, 552-554
- Congenital weaknesses and the quality of the population, 322-323
- Connection between social and individual good, 94
- Consciousness, socially conditioned, 167
- Consensus, as standard, 97; progress ideals as, 78
- Conservatism, analysis of, 107
- Constitution, flexible, needed, 386-387
- Contemporaries, repudiation of exceptional men by, 228-229
- Contemporary life, materialization of, 405-407
- Content of progress goal, 88-95
- Content of public opinion, 246-247
- Control forces, ideals as, 237
- Control, ideals as higher forms of, 237
- Control of environment, 307-309

- Control, social, progress as, 116-118
 Controlled world, 72-74
 Cooley, C. H., 159
 Copernican conception of the universe, 27
 Copernicus, 30
 Cosmopolitan sentiment, 398
 Costs, human, of industry, 427-428; of progress, 557-562; of revolution, 481-483
 Course of progress, 124; uncharted, 550-551
 Courts of domestic relations, 453
 Cranks, 559
 Craving of workers for responsibility, 425-426
 Creative effort, 567
 Creeds, religious, 539-541
 Critical spirit, 205
 Croly, H., 160
 Crusades, effect of, on thinking, 26
 Cultural costs of war, 494-495
 Cultural movements and progress, 5
 Culture and civilization, 134-135
 Current progress ideas, not clear and consist. nt, 6
 Curriculum, balanced, need of, 278
 Cycles, 13, 16; historic, 14

 Danger of idea of "law" of social progress, 75-76
 Danger of idea that progress is automatic, 74-76
 Dark ages, 25
 Darwin, C., on evolution, 59-60; significance of, in progress theory, 59-60
 Darwin, L., 323
 Davies, G. R., 358
 Death-rate, and birth-rate, ratio of, 343-352; diminished, 147; falling, 348-350. *See* Falling death-rate
 Defectives, treatment of, 152
 Definitions of progress, no agreement concerning, 68
 Degeneracy and progress, 313-314; types of, 315-317
 Delinquents, 152
 Delvaile, J., 12
 Democracy, Ch. XVIII; and complexity of life and divergence of interests, 384; and equality of opportunity, 379-380; and legal equality, 380; and plutocracy, 385-386; and politics and politicians, 384-385; and rational humanitarianism, 381; and tendency to mediocrity, 381-383; as a spiritual element, 375; as a form of social control, 375-376; as a form of society, 375; efficient, essentials of, 377-381; essentials of, for progress, 386-389; growing indispensability of responsible expert official, 288-289; importance of population of high quality, 377; industrial, 423-427; in practice, 377; in the future, 390-391; nature of, 375-377; needs a flexible constitution, 386-387; obstacles to proper functioning, 381-386; pure form, 375; unimpaired discussion and, 377-378
 Democratic state, 276-277
 Democratic trend, international, 397-399
 Democratization of religion, 547
 Dependence, mutual, of nations, 397-398
 Dependents, treatment of, 152
 Derangements as result of progress, 562
 Descartes, 35-36
 Desertion from cause of progress, 562
 Determination of tests, 96-97
 Deterministic tendencies of religion, 541
 Development, 16; not progress, 71
 Dewey, J., 69, 76
 Differential fecundity of different occupational groups, 319-320
 Difficulty of evaluating civilization, 132-133
 Discouragement in progress, 114-115
 Discussion, and democracy, 377-378; of ideals, 237-238
 Discussion of race problems, 475-476
 Discussion stage in a progressive movement, 123
 Diseases, degenerative, 140
 Dissatisfaction and unrest, 557-558
 Distribution, wastes of, 414
 Divergence of interests as obstacles to proper functioning of democracy, 384
 Divorce, and clergymen, 452-453; a symptom of maladjustment, 448-453; causes, 450-451; frequency of, 448-449; majority acquired by women, 450; publicity given to, 452
 Divorce problem, a marriage problem, 451-452
 Dogmas, religious, 539
 Domestic and sexual aspects of progress, Ch. XX
 Domestic economy, 416
 Domestic relations, courts of, 453
 Domestic tests of progress, 101
 Draft showing regarding quality of population, 315
 Dynamics of population, 340-341
 Dysgenic force, war as, 318

- Earth, all exploited, 355
 Economic activity, basic nature of, for progress, 403-405; function of, 403
 Economic agents and the quantity of the population, 331-332
 Economic aspects of progress, Ch. XIX
 Economic conditions, improved, and the falling death-rate, 350; do not guarantee progress, 404-405
 Economic costs, of revolution, 481-482; of war, 491-492
 Economic factors in the falling birth-rate, 344-345
 Economic future, 430-431
 Economic tests of progress, 98-99
 Economics, educational, 284-285
 Editorialism standardized, 263
 Education, 112; as agent of progress, Ch. XIV; as basis for the operation of the other progress agents, 260-270; as process of self-realization, 273; better selection and utilization of special ability, 277-278; character training and, 280-282; chief instrument of social betterment, 270; develop mental alertness and flexibility, 279-280; development of attitudes and, 271; diffusion of social heritage and, 275-277; effect of, on falling birth-rate, 346; esthetic, 526; eugenic, 330-331; for leisure in an industrial age, 286-287; for women, 438; human nature and, 271; instruction in the social subjects and, 278-279; need of balanced curriculum, 278; progressive function of, 272-282; provide a progressive philosophy of life, 273-275; sex, 455-456; should actually "lead out," 272-273; significance of, in progress, 63; the master agent of progress, 270-272
 Educational economics, 284-285
 Educational freedom, 287-288
 Educational standards and population excess, 362-363
 Educational system, demand for a uniform and nation wide, 288-289
 Educational tests of progress, 100-101
 Egypt, ancient, progress ideas of, 12-13
 Eighteenth century, age of rationalism and science, 39
 Eighteenth century ideas, weaknesses of, 58
 Elite, 79
 Ellwood, C. A., 86, 78, 180, 185, 194, 279, 376; definition of human nature of, 158
 Emancipated family, 445
 Emancipation of woman, 437-440
 Emigration and immigration and population increase, 364-366
 Emotion in progress, 126-127
 Empedocles, 18
 Encyclopædists, 41-42
 Enforcement stage in a progressive movement, 123
 English thinkers on progress, 45-48
 Environment, Chs. VIII, XV; and achievement, 306; and conduct, 511-512; artificial, man must construct, 309; as stimulus or obstacle to progress, 293; biological or organic, 295; control of, 307-309; as modeling force, 169-171; institutionalized, 295-296; physical, 294-295; as a conditioner of progress 296-301, 302-304; relation to progress, 293-294; social, 295; as an eliciting or repressing force, 304-305
 Epicureans, 21
 Equality of opportunity and democracy, 379-380
 Essentials of efficient democracy, 377-381
 Esthetics, Ch. XXIV; appreciation, lack of, 523-525; education, 526; needs, 525-528; progress, hopes for, 528-529; tests of progress, 101
 Estimates of population increase, 341-342
 Ethical attitudes, high level of, as condition of progress, 121-122
 Ethical future, 517
 Ethical instruction, 512-514
 Ethical needs, contemporary, 504-507
 Ethical requisites of progress, Ch. XXIII
 Ethical theory, basis of progress, 51
 Ethics, 504; objective, 510; relative, 507-509; scientific, 509; socialized, 510-511; the new, 507-511; universal, 507
 Eugenic education, 330-331
 Eugenics, as progress agent, 323-333; cautions to be observed in, 325-326; nature of, 324-325; negative, 326-328; positive, 328-333
 Euthenic possibilities, 334-335
 Euthenics, nature of, 333-335
 Evolution, according to Darwin, 59-60; artificially directed and accelerated, 72; as movement toward perfection, 62; indifferent to qualitative considerations, 70; is not progress, 70-71; may be progressive or regressive, 71; not progress, 58-59; points

- to the future, 59; Spencer's definition of, 61; tinkering with, 317-318
- Evolutionary doctrine, significance for progress of, 58-63
- Exceptional man, not a mutation, 221
- Exceptional men, Ch. XI; causes of, 224-225; function in progress, 221-222; in history, 219-220; not welcomed, 229; production and conservation of, 229-232; products of their age, 225-226; proportionate number of, 223-224; relation to their age, 225-226; repudiation by contemporaries, 228-229; singular products, 226; stimulating environment and, 231-232; what are they?, 220-221
- Excessive social control, 127
- Expectation of life, 203
- Experimental method, 25
- Expert, needed in democracy, 388-389
- Expression and sex, 454
- Expression, family as a means of, 436-437
- Extermination and suffering as result of progress, 59-60
- Facility of association, lack of, 557
- Facts, importance of, 185
- Faith and science, 545-546
- Faith in progress, 565-566
- Falling birth-rate, birth-control and, 348; changing attitude toward women and, 346; economic factors in, 344-345; education and enlightenment and, 346; effect of lower death-rate upon, 348; female sterility and, 347; social democracy and, 345; social legislation and, 345-346; urbanization and, 347; venereal disease and, 346-347
- Falling death-rate, 348-350; improved economic conditions and, 350; infant mortality and, 349-350; modern medical science and, 349; public safety measures and, 350
- Families, childless, 444
- Family, Ch. XX; as means of expression, 436-437; changing, 443-446; emancipated, 445; origin of, 443; significance of, in progress, 435-436
- Family life, inadequate preparation for, 446
- Fatalism, 75
- Fatalistic and deterministic tendencies of organized religion, 541
- Fatigue as waste, 415
- Fear of change and chance, 555-556
- Federalism, unavoidable, 387-388
- Feeling, 176
- Fellowship of races, 476
- Female sterility and falling birth-rate, 347
- Ferrers, G., 69
- Fichte, 51
- Fifth century, B.C., brilliant intellects in, 142
- Final end of progress, 89
- Fisher, I., 318
- Flexibility in make-up of human beings, 157
- Flexible constitution, needed by democracies, 386-387
- Flint, R., 12
- Fontenelle, 36-37
- Formation of public opinion, 246-247, 251-255
- Fouillee, A., 178
- Foundations for belief in progress, 566
- Fourier, 55-56
- France, Anatole, 15
- Free speech, press, and assemblage, 253-255
- Freedom, educational, 287-288
- Freedom of intercommunication, 254
- French thinkers in progress, 39-45
- Function of economic activity, 403
- Function of the modern state, 374
- Function, progressive, of education, 272-282
- Future, economic, 430-431; ethical, 517; of democracy, 390-391; science and the, 212-214; the newspaper and, 265
- Galileo, 111
- Galton, Sir F., 223-225
- Gautama, and "deed structures," 13
- Genesis*, 14
- Genius, not limited to aristocracy, 229
- Geographical basis of human life, 296-297
- German thinkers on progress, 48-53
- Gibbon, 46
- Giddings, F. H., 224
- Goal, as source of inspiration, 78; contemporary content of, 88-95; in progress, 77-78; not happiness, 86; of progress as a moving goal, 80-81; significance of, 51
- Goals and ideals, 235-237
- Godwin, W., 46-47
- Golden age, 17, 54, 88; Chinese conception of, 14; idea of, in early India, 13
- Government, function of, 374
- Gradual achievement of progress, 571-572

- Great men, *See* Exceptional men
 Greeks, intellectual quality of, 141;
 progress ideas of, 16ff.
 Group environment as modelling force,
 169-171
 Guizot, 88, 93
 Habit, 176; and instinct, 164-165
 Hall, G. S., 181
 Happiness as goal, 37; not goal, 86
 Harmonism of Fourier, 56
 Hebrews, progress ideas of, 14-16
 Hegel, evolutionary doctrine of, 52-53
 Heraclitus, 18, 69
 Herder, 48-50
 Heredity, 312-313
 Hesiod, 17
 Hiatus between religion and life, 542-
 543
 Historical development of the idea of
 progress, Chs. II, III
 Historical epochs, of Condorcet, 44
 Historical method in the social sciences,
 211
 Historical perspective, importance of,
 133
 Historical review of progress theory,
 necessity of, 11-12
 History, as an organic whole, 40; as
 knowledge for progressive pur-
 poses, 186-187; as process of de-
 terioration, 16; as progressive ac-
 cording to Fichte, 51; exceptional
 men in, 219-220; philosophy of, 49-
 50
 History of progress idea, conclusion,
 63-66
 Hobhouse, L. T., 7, 376, 399
 Homer, 17
 Hoover committee, report of, 414
 Horace, 21
 Human actions, meaning in, 50
 Human beings as end of progress, 89
 Human life, geographical basis of, 296-
 297
 Human nature, Ch. VIII; as distinct
 from animal nature, 158-159;
 Cooley on, 158-159; importance in
 knowing what we want in, 174;
 malleability of, 42; modification,
 why the objectors object to it, 160-
 161; Park on, 159; plasticity of,
 171-172; progress and, 157-158;
 socially acquired, 169; what is it?
 158-160
 Human well-being, 93
 Humanism, 27
 Humanitarianism, rational, and prog-
 ress, 381
 Hume, 45
 Humility of present generation of
 thinkers, 144
 Huxley, 221, 368; quoted, 506
 Ibn Khaldun, theories of, 28-29
 Idea-forces, theory of, 178-179
 "Idea" of Hegel, 52
 Idea of progress, *see* Progress idea
 Idea-systems and physical environment,
 300
 Ideal of perfection, not the highest aim
 of life, 79-80
 Idealism, growing, 149
 Idealists, 78; social, 226-228
 Ideals, Ch. XII; as basis of the future,
 239-240; as blue-prints of the fu-
 ture, 234-235; as control forces,
 237; as goals, 235-237; as stand-
 ards, 236; at first rough-hewn, 241;
 change in, 79; changeableness of,
 240-241; difficulty of rank and file
 appreciating them, 241; education
 and, 269; must be rooted in reality,
 242; nature of, 234-235; not all are
 sound, 236; not pitch too high, 241-
 243; opposition of ruling classes
 to, 241; process of realization of,
 237-239; progressive attitude and,
 240; selective process of, 237; some
 are products of fools, 241; source
 of, 78-79; subjected to selective
 process, 78; values and, 235; vicis-
 situdes of, 241; vitality of, 237-
 238
 Ideological tests, 85-86
 Ignorance, 185
 Inadequate preparation for family life,
 446
 Increase in recognized social evils, as
 cost of progress, 558
 Increase of wealth, 413-417; by reduc-
 tion of waste, 414-417
 Increased accessibility of nations to
 each other, 397ff.
 Immigrants, made over, 170
 Immigration and emigration and popu-
 lation increase, 364-366
 Immigration and quality of population,
 322
 Immutability, the, as perfect, 17
 Importance of study of past, 11
 Improvement, esthetic, 528-529
 India, early progress ideas of, 13
 Individualism, 89
 Individuals, exceptional, Ch. XI; qual-
 ity of, 91; socially-minded, 78
 Industrial age, education for leisure in,
 286-287

- Industrial democracy, necessity of, 423-427
- Industrial unrest, causes of, 423-425
- Industry, human costs of, 427-428
- Infant mortality, and falling death-rate, 349-350; and population excess, 361-362
- Inferiority of races, 468-470
- Initiation stage in a progressive movement, 122
- Inquisition, 25
- Instinct, 176; disagreement as to number, 162; environmental influences and, 166; habit and, 164-165; intelligence and, 163; nature of, 161-165; necessity of being adapted to future conditions, 162-163
- Instinctive behavior, shaping of, 165-167
- Instincts, man shedding his, 166-167
- Institutionalization, as general obstacle to progress, 556-557; of religion, 541-542
- Institutions, 46; inflexible and revolution, 480-481; only relatively stable, 69; social, 42, 43, 92
- Intellect, 176-177, Ch. IX; as distinguished from other psychological reactions, 176-177; as a social factor, 178; elements of, 176-177
- Intellectual achievement and social progress, 179-180
- Intellectual atmosphere, importance of, in development of progress idea, 64-65
- Intellectual climate, importance of, 23
- Intellectual costs of revolution, 481
- Intellectual faculties, 141
- Intellectual progress in the past, 141-144
- Intellectual tests of progress, 101-102
- Intelligence, need of exercising, 181; waste and neglect of, 180-181
- International aspects of population increase, 363-367
- International democratic trend, 397-399
- International knowledge, 186
- International scope of progressive effort, 564-565
- International struggle for resources, 368
- Intersocial stimulation, 246-247
- Intolerance, racial, 473-474
- Invention, and science, 196; as condition of progress, 119-120; war as stimulus, 488
- Investment and progress, 417
- Investment for the public good, expenditures for education as, 285
- Ipuwer, the prophet, 12
- Isolation, physical, and progress, 298
- Israel, 14-16
- Jenks, J. W., 247
- Jesus, 111; progress idea of, 15-16
- Jowett, 340
- Kant, progress theory of, 50-51
- Kingdom of God, 15-16
- Knowledge, Ch. IX; diffusion of, 188-189; education and, 269; improvement of thought life and, 183; growing body of, 143-144; man's fear of, 188; must be a common possession, 276; nature of, 182-183; not good in itself, 189; progress and, 184-186; significance of, 183-184; social sciences and, 187-188; telesis and, 184
- Kracht, 391
- Kropotkin, P., 4-7
- Latent forces and resources, 568-569
- Law, Ch. XVIII; as "legislative will," 392; as reflection of growth and experience of the people, 392-393; efficacy of, 393-395; in social phenomena, 74; of historic continuity of Leibnitz, 48; of progress according to Spencer, 60-61; of social progress, 74; of three stages of Comte, 56-57; of two stages of Saint-Simon, 55
- "Laws" in social science, 212
- Laws of nature, 56
- Lawyers, inadequacy and diversity of training of, 396
- Leader, difficulty of getting plain man to follow, 222-223
- Leaders, need of, 277
- Leadership, part of, in progress, 222-223
- League of Nations and war, 501
- "Learn to earn," mistaken cry of, 285-286
- Legal aspects of progress, 391-396
- Legal equality and democracy, 380
- Legal profession and progress, 395-396
- Legislatures, 394
- Leibnitz, 48
- Leisure, as condition of progress, 121; in an industrial age, education for, 286-287; progress and, 418
- Lethargy of the masses, 555
- Liberalism of the scientific point of view, 204-205
- Liberty, religious, 546

- Life, end of, 89-90; stricter regimen-
tation of, 153
Limitation of personal freedom as re-
sult of progress, 561-562
Lippmann, W., 246
Living, more and more a strain as we
progress, 560-561
Long day, 427
Lucretius, 21
- Machiavelli, 29
Magdalenian culture period, 37
Malthus, T. R., 47, 339
Man and woman complementary, 440
Marco Polo, travels of, 26
Marcus Aurelius, 20
Marriage, a luxury, 442; changing,
440-443; must be based on love,
441; laws, 326-327; must be con-
ducted on democratic principles,
442
Married women employed, 438
Masses, lethargy of, 555; progress
keep pace with, 114
Material abundance, improper use of,
147-148
Material advance, growing strain ac-
companying, 148
Material basis of progress, 146
Material progress in past, 144-148
Material welfare and population excess,
360-361
Materialism, 505-407
Materialistic tests of progress, 83-84
Materialization of contemporary life,
405-407
Medical science and falling death-rate,
349
Mediocrity, tendency to, in democra-
cies, 381-383
Men as active agents in social change,
219
Mental alertness and flexibility, devel-
oped by education, 279-280
Mentally defective classes, 316
Messianic hope, 14
Messianism, before the Hebrews, 13
Metal ages, 138
Methods of fact finding in the social
sciences, 211-212
Mind, a social product, 167-168
Mistaken idea of perpetual progress, 4
Moderatism, 108-109
Modifiability of human nature, 157
Montesquieu, 39-40
Moral advance not superficial, 515-
516
Moral costs, of war, 495-496; of rev-
olution, 482
- Moral development, not kept pace with
scientific, 505
Moral inculcation and progress, 512-514
Moral progress in past, 149-154
Moral responsibility for the uses of
science, 214-217
Moral tests of progress, 978
Moralist, progressive, cautions for, 514-
517
Morality, nature and significance of,
504; sex, 454-455
Morals, benevolence and, 516; negative,
516; not ascetic, 514; positive,
516; unselfish, 514-515
More, Sir Thomas, 30-31
Motion film, as agent of public opinion,
256-257
Mousterian culture period, 137
Multiple tests of progress, 97-102
- National vitality and population excess,
362
Natural law, 39
Natural laws, 57
Natural resources, waste of, 415
Natural sciences, 117
Nature of ideals, 234-235
Necessity of an historical review of the
progress theory, 11-12
Necessity of the telic point of view, 76
Needs, esthetic, 525-528
Negative eugenics, 326-328
Neglect of intelligence, 180-181
Neolithic, progress in, 138-139
New, not always good, 125
New Christianity of Comte, 57-58
New ethics, 507-511
"Newness" as test, 83
News, distortion, coloring, exaggeration,
suppression of, 260-261; propa-
ganda in, 261; standardized in
papers, 263
Newspaper, and the future, 265; as
agent of public opinion, 257-265;
as profit-making business, 263-264;
concentration of ownership of,
263; importance of, 257-258;
owned or controlled by large-prop-
ertied classes, 264-265; sensation-
alism, muck, and sports in, 261-263;
suggestive power of, 258-259; syn-
dicated and standardized news and
editorials in, 263
Newspaper press, general condition of,
259-263
Newton, 197
Niceforo, 85
Nineteenth century, progress ideas of,
53-63

INDEX

- Nordau, M., 183
 Numbers, accelerated increase of, 350-352; trend of, 341-343
- Objections to idea of modification of human nature, 160-161
 Objective ethics, 510
 Objective tests, necessity of, 96
 Obstacles to progress, 550-557
 Obstacles to proper functioning of democracy, 381-386
 Occupational groups, differential fecundity of, 320-321
 Odin, A., study of, 223-224
 Old not always bad, 125
 Opportunities for developing exceptional men, 231
 Opportunity, equality of, and wealth distribution, 411-412
 Optimist, and progress in past, 154
 Organized religion, problems of, 537-543
 Orientals, progress ideas of, 3-4
 Otto, M. C., 172, 215
 Outlawry stage in a progressive movement, 123
 Outlook, progressive, 570
 Owen, Robert, 47-48
- Paleolithic, Lower, progress in, 136-137; Upper, progress in, 137-138
 Pampering the race, beware of, 128
 Panaceas, 558-559
 Paper and printing, effect of introduction of, 27
 Parenthood, changing, 446-448; prerequisites for modern, 447; voluntary, 457-458
 Park, R. E., on human nature, 159
 Past, biological progress in, 139-141; intellectual progress in, 141-144; material progress in, 144-148; moral progress in, 149-154; political progress in, 148-149; progress in, Ch. VII
 Patrick, G. T. W., 94, 148, 275
 Pauline doctrine of subservience of women, 437
 "Pecuniary" culture, 405
 Perfectibility of man, 44
 Perfection, 46; evolution as a movement toward, 62
 Persia, early progress ideas of, 13
 Personal equation in science, 205
 Personal freedom, limitation of by progress, 561-562
 Pessimism of early Christendom, 24
 Petrie, Flinders, 135
 Philosophy of history, 40
- Physical environment, as a conditioner of progress, 296-301; and idea systems, 300; control of, 307-308; psychological characteristics of individuals and groups and, 301; religion and, 300-301; size of human aggregations and, 299-300; selective influence of, 300
 Plasticity of human nature, 171-172
 Plato, 19-20, 237
 Plutocracy as obstacle to the proper functioning of democracy, 385-386
 Policies, progressive racial, 473-476
 Political and legal requisites of progress, Ch. XVIII
 Political costs of war, 493-494
 Political progress in the past, 148-149
 Political tests of progress, 99
 Politics and politicians as obstacles to proper functioning of democracy, 384-385
 Population, and progress, 367-369; and resources, 358-360; draft showing regarding quality of, 315; dynamics of, 340-341; problems of numbers, 339-341; qualitative trend of, 314-323; quantity, 47
 Population excess, and educational standards, 362-363; and infant mortality, 361-362; and material welfare, 360-361; and national vitality, 362; and social morals and ideals, 362; and standard of living, 361; and status of women, 363
 Population increase, and war, 366-367; and emigration and immigration, 364-366; international aspects of, 363-367
 Positive eugenics and quality of the population, 328-333
 Possibility of progress, 565-572
 Post-Nicene Fathers, 24
 Pre-Chellian culture period, 136
 Prejudice, racial, 466-468
 Prejudices, 551-552
 Principle of acceleration, 72
 Prisoners, treatment of, 150
 Problem of numbers, 339-341
 Process, historical, 52
 Process of realization of ideals, 237-239
 Processes, repetition of, 16
 Production of exceptional men, 229-232
 Production of harmful things, as waste, 416
 Program, assistance of social sciences in building, 243; importance of, 243

- Progress, aim of, 92-95; a modern idea, 63; an American stereotype, 4; as achievement, 73; as intellectual achievement, 179-180; as law of history, 53-54; as manipulation of shaping agencies, 172-174; as multiple movement, 564-565; as process, 80; as self-fulfillment, 88-92; as social teleosis, 71-72; as step-by-step process, 113; as social control, 116-118; a Western concept, 3-4; basic nature of economic activity for, 403-405; beauty and, 520-522; biological nature and quality of human beings and, Ch. XVI; cautions to be observed in, 124-130; change and, 68-70; child labor and, 427; concrete meaning of, 94; conditions favorable to, 119-122; configuration of the land and, 298-299; contemporary needs and, 504-507; continuous, 51; contributions of science to, 201-204; control of environment and, 309; costs of, 557-562; course of, 124; course of, is uncharted, 550-551; decay and, 154; degeneracy and, 313-314; demand for a controlling technique, 116; distinguished from civilization, 134-135; domestic and sexual aspects of, Ch. XX; economic aspects of, Ch. XIX; environmental aspects of, Ch. XV; esthetic requisites of, Ch. XXIV; ethical requisites of, Ch. XXIII; eugenics and, 323-333; evidence of, 88; evolution and, 70-71; evolutionary doctrine, 58-63; final end, 89; good climate for, 298; history and, 186-187; human nature and, 157-158; importance of standard in, 77; importance of sociology for, 6-10; international in scope, 564-565; knowledge and, 184-186; leisure and, 418; legal aspects of, 391-396; legal profession and, 395-396; long day and, 427; matter of science, 54; mental attitudes and, 105-106; moral inculcation and, 512-514; necessity of careful strategy, 562-563; not unrestrained individualism, 92; obstacles to, 550-557; origin of the word, 3; personal or class attitudes and, 5; physical environment as conditioner of, 296-301; political and legal requisites of, Ch. XVIII; possibility of, 565-572; public opinion and, 265-266; quantity of population and, Ch. XVII; racial aspects of, Ch. XXI; rate of, 112-116; reduction of waste and, 414-417; relation of environment to, 293-294; relation of revolution and war to, Ch. XXII; relative nature of goal, 79-81; religious aspects of, Ch. XXV; resistance to, 110-112; revolutions and, 481; significance of biological study for, 312-313; significance of goal in, 77-78; slow, 112; social idealists and, 226-227; social science and, 187-188; social science as factor in, 208-212; source of ideals of, 78-79; spirit of, 109-110; teacher and, 282-284; thrift, savings, and investment and, 417; unemployment and, 428; war and, 486-501; working woman and, 428; work and, 419-423
- Progress agents, Ch. IX-XIV
- Progress idea, comparatively new, 11; continually changing, 11; diverse nature of, 56; factors responsible for prevalence of, 4; held by various types, 5; historical development of, Chs. II, III; matter of continual growth, 64
- Progress in past, Ch. VII; among prehistoric men, 136-139; biological, in past, 139-141; importance of standard in, 132-133; intellectual, in past, 141-144; material in past, 144-148; moral, 149-154; not certain, 154-155; political, 148-149
- Progress tests, Ch. V; multiple nature of, 97-102
- Progressive, the, 109
- Progressive attitude, 108-109; and ideals, 240; other attitudes toward change and, 107-109; science and, 204-205; toward sex, 453-457
- Progressive function of education, 272-282
- Progressive measure, proportion of group necessary to inaugurate, 118-119
- Progressive moralist, cautions for, 514-517
- Progressive movement, reaction against, 558-559; stages of, 122-123
- Progressive racial policies and attitudes, 473-476
- Prophet, Robert Owen as, 48
- Prophets, Hebrew, 14-15
- Propaganda and public opinion, 249-250; and suggestion, 249; as capitalized prejudice, 249; as social menace, 249-250; in news, 26; in war, 249; not educational, 250

- Proportion of a group necessary to inaugurate a progressive measure, 118-119
- Proportionate number of exceptional men, 223-224
- Prospect of progress, Ch. XXVI
- Providence, 5, 24, 116
- Psychological characteristics and physical environment, 301
- Psychosis, martyr, 129
- Public opinion, art and literature as agents of, 256; as agents of progress, Ch. XIII; and ascendancy of the wise, 252; and free speech, press, and assemblage, 253-255; and political processes, 245; and progress, 265-266; and propaganda, 249-250; books as agents of, 256; characteristics of, to-day, 250-251; competence of population and, 251-252; conditions necessary for formation of, 251-255; content and formation of, 246-247; importance of scepticism in formation of, 252; importance of socially homogeneous people, 251; motion film as agent of, 256-257; nature of, 245-246; nature of influential agents of, 255-257; newspaper as agent of, 257-265; not consistent, 250; not necessarily majority opinion, 247; not stable, 250; not well-informed, 250; part of suggestion in, 247-249; potency of, 245; radio as agent of, 257
- Public safety measures and the falling death-rate, 350
- Punishment, milder forms substituted for more brutal, 150
- Purposeful social action, 62-64
- Pyramiding of control of nature, 336
- Pythagoreans, 19
- Qualitative trend of population, 314-323
- Quality of human beings and progress, Ch. XVI
- Quality of individuals, 91
- Quality of the population, abolition of certain forms of celibacy, 332; birth-control and, 327; congenital weaknesses and, 322-323; democracy and, 377; economic agents promoting, 331-332; eugenic education and, 330-331; eugenics and, 333-335; immigration and, 322; necessity of changing class sentiment, 329-330; positive eugenics and, 328-333; segregation, 328; standard of living and, 329; sterilization and, 327-328; stricter marriage laws, 326-327; unavoidable task concerning, 335-336
- Quantitative and qualitative change, 128-129
- Quantity of the population, birth-control and, 369-372; effect of birth-rate, 343-348; progress and, Ch. XVII; ratio of birth-rate to death-rate as affecting, 343-352; trend of numbers, 341-343
- Rabelais, 31
- Race, beware of pampering, 128; importance of discussing problems of, 475-476; lack of understanding of, 473; nature of, 463-466; traits, 464
- Race prejudice, 466-468; as attitudes, 466; causes of, 467-468; non-inherited, 467
- Races, all one species, 465-466; as human varieties, 464; as one human family, 462-463; cultural enrichment, 472; fellowship of, 476; intermingled, 465; superior and inferior, 468-470
- Racial aspects of progress, Ch. XXI
- Racial contacts and racial unrest, 461-463
- Racial groups, dominated, and self-expression, 471
- Racial inferiority and cultural background, 469-470
- Racial intolerance, 473-474
- Racial justice, 474
- Racial policies, 473-476
- Racial self-expression, 470-473
- Racial tests of progress, 102
- Racial unrest and racial contacts, 461-463
- Radicalism, attitude of, 107-108
- Radio, as agent of public opinion, 257
- Rate of progress, 112-116
- Ratio of birth-rate to death-rate, 343-352
- Reactionary attitude, 107
- Reactions against progressive movement, 558-559
- Reality and ideals, 242
- Realization of ideals as time consuming process, 238-239
- Reason in history, 41
- Recreational tests of progress, 102
- Redistribution of wealth, 409-413
- Reform should be slow, 113-114
- Reform, youthful advocates of, 115
- Reformation, effect of Protestant, 27-28
- Reformers, need of unified attack among, 129-130

- Relative nature of progress goal, 79-81
- Relativity of scientific truth, 197
- Religion, 55; aleatory element, 532; anachronism, 537-539; and the spiritual, 534; at its best, 533-535; attitude toward sacred books, 540-541; civilization and, 531; concrete, socialized living as, 535-537; democratization of, 547; functional, 547; hiatus between life and, 542-543; institutionalization, 541-542; nature of, 531-532; not social service or social ethics, 536; offers cosmic peace, 533; physical environment and, 300-301; problems of organized, 537-543; relation to progress, 533-535; satisfies man's need of union with the universal and eternal, 533-534; science and, 543-546; the way of the Good Life, 534-535; thwarting antagonisms, 542
- Religious aspects of progress, Ch. XXV
- Religious criteria, 85
- Religious dogmas, creeds, theologies, rigidity of, 539-540
- Religious liberty, 546
- Religious revolution, 546-547
- Religious tests of progress, 101
- Religious unity, 547
- Religiously right and socially right, 535
- Remedies for evils, 571
- Remnant, doctrine of, 14
- Renaissance, 26-27
- Reorganization, social, 73
- Repressing force, social environment as, 305
- Repressive social control, 127
- Repudiation of exceptional men by contemporaries, 228-229
- Research, 199; and science, 195-196
- Researcher, 197-198
- Resident social forces, 57
- Resistance of vested interests, 556
- Resistance to progress, 110-112
- Resources, as determiner of population, 352; future and, 354-355; inventions and science, and, 353; striking the balance between population and, 358-360; trend of, 352-357
- Responsibility, craving for, by workers, 425-426
- Reuter, E. B., 358
- Revolution, avoidance of, by telic policy, 483-486; costs, 481-483; flexible social organization, 484; futile, 483; importance of democratic organization, 484-485; nature and causes of, 478-481; part of social strata in, 478-479; progress and, 478-486; religious, 546-547; thwarted self-expression and group expression, 479
- Right, problems of, 504
- Rigidity of religious dogmas, creeds, and theologies, 539-540
- Romans, progress ideas of, 16ff.
- Rousseau, 42-43
- Sacred books, attitude toward, 540-541
- Saint-Pierre, 37-38
- Saint-Simon, 54-55
- Sanitary engineering, 147
- Saturation point of population increase, 360
- Savagery, 134
- Saving and progress, 417
- Scepticism, social importance of, 252
- Schelling, philosophical idea of origin of evolution, 53
- Scholasticism, 25
- Science, 46; an unmoral agent, 214; and the future, 212-214; as means of carrying on world's work, 194; as method of progress, 206-207; as progress agent, 42, 206-208, Ch. X; as technique of truth finding, 191-192; as tool of civilization, 191; as verified knowledge, 192-193; contributions of, to progress, 201-204; education and, 269; faith and, 545-546; invention and, 196; laws of, 193-194; nature of, 191-194; need of humanitarian direction, 215; part of, in progress, 54; religion and, 543-546; research and, 195-196; spirit of, 197-200; stumbling blocks of, 205-206; supernatural element in religion, 543-544
- Scientific achievements, 207
- Scientific ethics, 5-9
- Scientific impulse in Western thought, 25
- Scientific man, qualities of, 198; tolerance of, 199-200
- Scientific method, nature of, 192
- Scientific movement, effect of, 28
- Scientific point of view, liberalism of, 204-205
- Scientific progress, 146
- Scientific truth, relativity of, 197
- Scientist, need of social perspective, 217
- Segregation and quality of population, 328
- Self, as shaped product, 167-169; the developing, 95

- Self-expression, racial, 470-473; revolution and, 479
- Self-fulfillment, content of progress goal, 88-92
- Self-realization, 91
- Seneca, 20
- Sex, Ch. XX; education, 455-456; expression of, 454; importance of, 453-454; morality, 454-455; progressive attitude toward, 453-457; stimulation, 454
- Sexes, relations of, 151-152
- Shaping agencies, and progress, 172-174
- Shaping of instinctive behavior, 165-167
- Sickness, as waste, 415
- Significance of knowledge, 183-184
- Small, A. W., 77
- Smith, A., 45
- Social change as reflection of leadership, 222
- Social change in early groups and societies, 136-139
- Social control, 116-118; must not be excessive or repressive, 127; not too abrupt, 127; unscientific, 117-118
- Social democracy and the falling birth-rate, 345
- Social dynamics, agents of, 57
- Social environment, Chs. VIII, XV; as an eliciting or repressing force, 304-305; character and, 304; as conditioner, 302-304; control of, 308; composition of, 302-303; moral conduct of individual and, 304
- Social evils, increase in recognized, 558; sensitiveness to, 153
- Social faith and hopefulness as condition of progress, 119
- Social forces, resident, of Comte, 57
- Social function of art, 522-523
- Social heritage, 49; and education, 275-276; continually becoming richer, 143; versus intellectual progress, 141-144
- Social idealism, time of, as condition of progress, 119-120
- Social Idealists, 226-228
- Social ideals, as choicest products of exceptional men, 234
- Social inspiration, 569
- Social institutions, *See* Institutions
- Social laws, 43
- Social legislation, 148; and falling birth-rate, 345-346
- Social life as affected by intellect, 178
- Social morals and ideals and population excess, 362
- Social process, 6-7
- Social processes, 9, 302; knowledge of, 117
- Social psychological method in social sciences, 211-212
- Social psychology, 106
- Social reorganization, 73; of Saint-Simon, 55
- Social science as factor in progress, 208-212
- Social science as knowledge for progressive purposes, 187-188
- Social sciences, 79; achievements of, behind natural science, 209; advance of, 211; methods of fact finding, 211-212; recent development of, 203
- Social shortcomings, consciousness of, as evidence of progress, 88
- Social structure, plastic, as condition of progress, 120
- Social subjects, instruction in, 278-279
- Social welfare in past, 150
- Social well-being, indispensable supplement of true aim of progress, 92-95
- Socialists and progress, 5
- Socialized ethics, 510-511
- Socialized living and concrete religion, 535-537
- Socializing business, necessity of, 428-430
- Society as manipulating agent, 169
- Sociocracy, of Ward, 63
- Sociologists, their responsibility in promoting progress, 9
- Sociology, necessity of knowledge of, for progress, 9, 10; social life and, 7; social progress and, Ch. I; the analytical and coordinating social science, 6-7; the humanitarian science, 7-8; the science of social progress, 8-9
- Socrates, 111
- Soil and resources, 299
- Solutrean culture period, 137
- Special ability and education, 277-278
- Speed, rate of, 201
- Spencer, H., 70; on evolution, 60-62; significance of, in progress theory, 60-62
- Spirit of progress, 109-110
- Spirit of questioning, 566
- Spiritual costs, of revolution, 482; of war, 495-496
- Stages of a progressive movement, 122-123
- Stages of historical progress of Vico, 38
- Standard, importance of, in study of progress in the past, 132-133
- Standard, in progress, 77

- Standard of living, quality of the population and, 329; population excess and, 361
- Standardization can be carried too far, 128
- Standards, 170; and ideals, 235-237
- Starbuck, E. D., 282
- Start with things as they are in progress, 124-125
- State, democratic, 375-377; modern, function of, 374
- Statistical method in social science, 211
- Statistical tests, measure quantitative change, 84-85; of progress, 84-85; value of, 85
- Status of women and population excess, 363
- Stereotyped individuals, 91
- Stereotypes, 246
- Sterilization, 327-328
- Stimulating environment and exceptional men, 231-232
- Stoics, 20
- Strategy, necessity of careful, 562-563
- Stricter regimentation of life, 153
- Striking the balance between population and resources, 358-360
- Struggle, in history, 52
- Struggle, in progress, 73
- Stumbling blocks of science, 205-206
- Subnormal individuals, 315-316
- Substitution of foods, 357
- Suffering and extermination as result of progress, 559-560
- Suggestion and propaganda, 249
- Suggestion in public opinion, 247-249
- Suggestive multiple tests of progress, 97-102
- Suggestive power of newspaper, 258-259
- Superiority and inferiority of races, 468-470
- Supplement to true aim of progress, 92-95
- Surplus, world of, 408-409
- Surplus energy as condition of progress, 121
- Survival differential, 318-322
- Tao, 13
- Teachers, and progress, 282-284; do not consider themselves as permanent members of teaching body, 283; preparation of, 283; standardization of their instruction, 283; wretched salaries of, 283-284
- Teaching, status of, in the community, 284
- Telesis, and knowledge, 184; social, and progress, 71-72
- Telic idea according to Ward, 62-63
- Telic point of view, necessity of, 76
- Telic policy, as means of avoiding revolution, 483-486
- Telic will and education, 274
- Tertullian, 24
- Tests, adaptation, of progress, 86-87; biological, 99-100; composite nature of, in practice, 95-96; determination of, 96-97; domestic, 101; economic, 98-99; educational, 100-101; esthetic, 101; ideological, 85-86; intellectual, 101-102; materialistic, 83-84; mistaken or partial, 83-87; moral, 97-98; multiple, 97-102; necessity of being objective, 96; political, 99; product of socially intelligent and interested minority, 102; racial, 102; recreational, 102; religious, 101; statistical, 84-85; ultimate, 91
- Thales, 17
- Theologies, 540
- Theory of idea-forces, 178-179
- Thought, best conditions for its free working, 181-182
- Thought habits, lag of, 554-555
- Thrift, effects of, 417; nature of, 417; saving and investment and, 417
- Thwarting antagonisms of religion, 542
- Time-conceit, 133
- Time element, significance of, in study of progress in past, 133-134
- Tinkering with evolution, 317-318
- Todd, A. J., on plasticity of human nature, 71
- Tradition and conformity, 552-554
- Transportation and progress, 146
- Trend, of numbers of population, 341-343; of resources, 352-357; qualitative, of population, 314-323
- Truthfulness, 506-507
- Turgot, 40-41
- Types of degeneracy, 315-317
- Ugliness, causes of, 525; our acceptance of, 525; present-day, 523-525
- Ultimate test, 91
- Unavoidable task concerning the quality of the population, 335-336
- Unemployment, 428
- Unexpected results of invention, 204
- Uniform, nation-wide education, 288-289
- Unity, religious, 547
- Universal education, effect on emancipation of women, 438
- Universal ethic, 507
- Universal society, 93

- Universe, advance in knowledge of, 144-145
- Universities, 28
- Unrest, 557-558; racial, 461-463
- Urban life and family, 444
- Urbanization and falling birth-rate, 347
- Uses of science, moral responsibility for the, 214-217
- Utilitarian tendencies in education, 285
- Values and ideals, 235
- Venereal disease and the falling birth-rate, 346-347
- Verifiable progress, 96
- Vested interests, resistance of, 556
- Vicissitudes of ideals, 241
- Vico, 38
- Violence and revolution, 482
- Virgil, 23
- Vitality of ideals, 237-238
- Voltaire on progress, 41
- Voluntary parenthood, 457-458
- War, abolition of, 37; adjustment of economic causes, 499; and a league of nations, 501; and biological costs, 492-493; and biological selection, 488; and cross-fertilization of cultures, 487-488; and directed evolution, 498; and economic imperialism, 490; and growth of population, 489; and leadership, 487; and national acquisitiveness, 489; and national debts, 491-492; and personal qualities, 487; and progress, 486-501; and population increase, 366-367; cultural costs, 494-495; as dysgenic force, 318; as progress factor in the past, 486-489; as progress factor now, 903-915; as stimulus to invention and discovery, 488; as waste, 415-416; avoidance of, 498-501; demilitarization, 499; economic and material costs of war, 491-492; in present, 490-496; modern, causes of, 489-490; moral costs, 495-496; outlawry, 499-501; political costs, 493-494; problem of, 486; spiritual costs, 495-496; the next, 496-497
- Ward, Lester F., 86, 196, 223-224, 229, 306; and the telic idea, 62-63; emphasis on education of, 271; quoted, 183, 219
- Waste, fatigue as, 415; of intelligence, 180-181; reduction of, 414-417
- Wastes of distribution, 414
- Wealth, as condition of progress, 120-121; increase of, 413-417; maldistribution of, and class alignment, 411; maldistribution of, and equality of opportunity, 411-412; opportunity, 403-404; redistribution of, 409-413; redistribution of, reasons for, 412-413; without well-being, 407-409
- Welfare, social, in past, 150
- Well-being, and wealth, 407-409; conditioned by social environment, 93
- Western concept of progress, 3-4
- Western man not advanced intellectually since Greeks, 142-143
- Weyl, W., 115, 404
- White, A. D., 206
- White, W. A., on modern newspaper, 260
- Will and reshaping of human nature, 173
- Wives and mothers, working, 443
- Wolfe, A. B., 107, 197
- Women, changing attitude toward, and the falling birth-rate, 346; changing status of, and marriage, 441; consideration of, 151; emancipation of, 437-440; granted political rights, 148; libertarian movement of, bad effects of, 439-440; working, 428
- Work, and progress, 419-423; as self-expression, 420; attitude against, 419; interest in, 421; nature of, 419
- Working wives and mothers, 405
- World not too highly standardized, 128
- Zoroaster, philosophy of, 13



